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

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Preface to the Issue "The Negro American"

THIS IS the first of two issues that *Dædalus* will be publishing on the Negro American. In May 1965, at a closed conference at the House of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, where drafts of these papers were discussed, I described the meeting as the most important one we had convened during the past five years. Not since 1960, when we launched our studies in the field of arms control, had a comparable effort been made by the American Academy. Rarely had we undertaken a critical examination of a matter of such pressing concern to the nation.

The story of the development of these volumes may interest our readers. Early in 1963, as the result of private conversations, a decision was made to proceed with an earlier Academy initiative in this field. It was in April 1964 that a small Planning Committee met to consider the extent and character of our study. Invitations were issued to twenty-four authors late in the summer, with fairly explicit instructions on the kinds of questions we hoped they would examine. In many instances, those invited to write were not at the time investigating the themes selected by the Planning Committee. Because of the urgency of the topic, we asked authors to interrupt their other work to reserve time for this. When we met in May 1965 in a more formal conference, the majority of the draft essays had been prepared. For two days, the group engaged in lively and frank criticism of these papers. The discussion was of such interest that we plan to publish much of it in the second *Dædalus* issue on the Negro American, scheduled for this winter. Because certain themes emerged as particularly crucial, suggesting the need for further inquiry, additional articles were commissioned after our May meeting. It is out of these several stages that the present volume has emerged; it is because of these procedures that future studies are to be expected.

These issues could not have been produced but for the willing-

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ness of many to assist us. For their counsel and cooperation, we are immensely grateful to Charles Abrams, Daniel Bell, Edwin C. Berry, Wiley Branton, James P. Breeden, Kenneth B. Clark, Oscar Cohen, Robert Coles, Robert Dentler, St. Clair Drake, G. Franklin Edwards, Ralph Ellison, Rupert Emerson, Erik H. Erikson, Rashi Fein, Joseph H. Fichter, John H. Fischer, Harold Fleming, Eugene P. Foley, John Hope Franklin, Paul A. Freund, Clifford Geertz, Eunice and George Grier, Oscar Handlin, Philip M. Hauser, Hudson Hoagland, Everett C. Hughes, Carl Kaysen, Martin Kilson, Max Lerner, Edward H. Levi, Jean Mayer, Robert Merton, Daniel P. Moynihan, Guichard Parris, Talcott Parsons, Thomas F. Pettigrew, Lee Rainwater, Saunders Redding, Peter H. Rossi, William M. Schmidt, Paul B. Sheatsley, James Tobin, John B. Turner, James Q. Wilson, C. Vann Woodward, and Whitney M. Young, Jr.

The Carnegie Corporation is to be thanked for its support of this venture. They provided funds at a time when they were most needed—at the beginning, before we knew the form that the project would take.

We are honored that the President of the United States has written the Foreword to this volume.

S.R.G.

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LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Foreword to the Issue

NOTHING IS of greater significance to the welfare and vitality of this nation than the movement to secure equal rights for Negro Americans.

This Administration is dedicated to that movement. It is also dedicated to helping Negro Americans grasp the opportunities that equal rights make possible.

Much has been done—within government and without—to secure equal rights. Much remains to be done if a people enslaved by centuries of bigotry and want are to realize the opportunities of American life.

In June of this year I spoke to the graduating class of Howard University about the condition of most Negroes in America. Before me were those for whom the future was illuminated with hope. My thoughts were of the others—those for whom equality is now but an abstraction.

I said, "You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race, and say, 'you are free to compete with all the others,' and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.

"Thus it is not enough to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates.

"This is the next and more profound stage of the battle for civil rights . . . the task is to give 20 million Negroes the same choice as every other American to learn and work and share in society, to develop their abilities—physical, mental, and spiritual—and to pursue their individual happiness."

No one who understands the complexity of this task is likely to promote simple means by which it may be accomplished. The papers that follow testify to the inter-locking effects of deprivation —in education, in housing, in employment, in citizenship, in the

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entire range of human endeavor by which personality is formed.

It will not be enough to provide better schools for Negro children, to inspire them to excel in their studies, if there are no decent jobs waiting for them after graduation. It will not be enough to open up job opportunities, if the Negro must remain trapped in a jungle of tenements and shanties. If we are to have peace at home, if we are to speak with one honest voice in the world—indeed, if our country is to live with its conscience—we must affect every dimension of the Negro's life for the better.

We have begun to do that—sometimes haltingly and in great trepidation, sometimes boldly and with a high heart. The will of government and of the people has been committed to resolving the long, bitter trial of the Negro American in the only way that was ever really possible: by including him in our society.

Some of these papers instruct us in the means by which that may be done. They are invaluable source materials for the White House Conference to be convened in November, which I have called "To Fulfill These Rights." For this contribution by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the participants in that conference—and all those who work for a just society—are profoundly grateful.

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DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN

Employment, Income, and the Ordeal of the Negro Family

THE CIVIL rights revolution of our time is entering a new phase, and a new crisis. In the first phase, the demands of the Negro American were directed primarily to those rights associated with the idea of Liberty: the right to vote, the right to free speech, the right to free assembly. In the second phase, the movement must turn to the issue of Equality. This dualism, which has always been present in the civil rights movement, simply reflects the dualism of American democracy. From the outset American society has been committed to the twin ideals of Liberty and Equality. These are not the same things. Nor do they appeal to different persons with the same force. The Declaration of Independence began with a proposition about Equality, but the word does not appear in the Constitution until almost a century later. One reason, surely, is that at the time the Constitution was adopted almost one American in five was a slave.

The ideal of Equality, in Robert Harris' words, "is at least coeval with, if not prior to, liberty in the history of Western political thought."[1] But over the years Liberty has enjoyed incomparably the more prestige, especially in the white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant circles which are still greatly influenced by British attitudes. Equality has been suffered rather than espoused; a scullery dream more than a parlor principle; Sam rather than John Adams; a style of the frontier and the slum; for the longest while Irish rather than English; now increasingly Black rather than White.

As long as Negro demands concentrated on issues of liberty they enjoyed the unquestioned support of the centers of power in American society. Even those who resisted did so in practice, rather than on principle: no one can successfully challenge the principle of liberty in the United States at this time. However, as demands turn toward those associated with equality, this support can only dissi-

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pate. Several problems are involved. The first is that of incomprehension. Great portions of the American middle class simply do not understand the nature of the demand for equality. Typically, they assume such demands are met when equal opportunity is provided. Thus Negro Americans have found their staunchest white allies among newer middle-class groups who for varying periods were excluded from the competitions of American life by quotas and other techniques, but who once admitted were quickly successful. But equality, as a fundamental democratic disposition, goes beyond equal opportunity to the issue of equal results. Here middle-class support begins to dissipate, principles are not clear, concensus does not exist.

Given the ethnic group structure of American life, equality for Negro Americans means that they will have open to them the full range of American economic, social, and political life, and that within the pattern of endeavor that they choose, having assessed the comparative advantages of time, place, and cultural endowment, they will have a fully comparable share of the successes, no less than of the small winners and of the outright failures. The test of American society will be whether it can work out arrangements so that this happens more or less naturally for Negro Americans, as it has more or less naturally happened for other groups. The rules are unwritten, but well enough understood. A certain amount of Freemasonry is not only permitted, but necessary. Some concessions are in order from other groups. It is fatal to make an across-the-board assault: highly developed activities are highly resistant to intrusion; the less developed an activity is, the more opportunity it provides for newcomers. More than a generation must pass before the outcome will be clear. It will be uneven, but nonetheless acceptable.

From the very outset, the principal measure of progress toward equality will be that of employment. It is the primary source of individual or group identity. In America what you do is what you are: to do nothing is to be nothing; to do little is to be little. The equations are implacable and blunt, and ruthlessly public.

For the Negro American it is already, and will continue to be, the master problem. It is the measure of white *bona fides*. It is the measure of Negro competence, and also of the competence of American society. Most importantly, the linkage between problems of employment and the range of social pathology that afflicts the Negro community is unmistakable. Employment not only controls

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the present for the Negro American; but, in a most profound way, it is creating the future as well.

The current situation and recent trends pose a problem of interpretation which may not have been much noticed. It is that in terms of employment and income and occupational status it is quite possible the Negro community is moving in two directions, or rather that two Negro communities are moving in opposite ones. Obviously such a development would be concealed—cancelled out—in aggregate statistics that list all "nonwhites" together. Anyone with eyes to see can observe the emergence of a Negro middle class that is on the whole doing very well. This group has, if anything, rather a preferred position in the job market. A nation catching up with centuries of discrimination has rather sharply raised the demand for a group in short supply. One would be hard put to describe a person with better job opportunities than a newly minted Negro Ph.D. In a wide and expanding range of employment, there would seem to be no question that opportunities for some are rather more equal than for others, and that for the first time in our history the Negro American is the beneficiary of such arrangements. These facts are reflected in the steadily rising level of Negro aspirations and in efforts by the Negro to acquire the education and training that are the *cartes d'identité* of the Great American Middle Class.[2]

At the same time there would also seem to be no question that opportunities for a large mass of Negro workers in the lower ranges of training and education have not been improving, that in many ways the circumstances of these workers relative to the white work force have grown worse. It would appear that this in turn has led to, or been accompanied by, a serious weakening of the Negro social structure, specifically of the Negro family. It could be that this situation has gone on so long that the Negro potential is already impaired; in any event it would hardly seem possible to doubt that if it persists much longer the capacity of the Negro community to make the most of its opportunities will be grievously diminished. Measures that would have worked twenty years ago may not work today, and surely will not work twenty years hence. A crisis of commitment is at hand.

The moral grandeur of the Negro revolution makes it more than normally difficult to speak of these matters; yet it demands that we do so. The plain physical courage which the Negro leaders and their followers have shown in recent years ought at least to sum-

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mon in the rest of us the moral courage to inquire just how bad things may have become while we were occupied elsewhere. It is probable that such inquiry will be resented by some and misused by others. So be it. The important fact is that it is not likely to cause any great harm if things turn out not to be so bad as they appeared. On the other hand, if present indications are correct, the only hope we have is to state them and face up to them.

I. *Unemployment*

The primary measure of the problem of Negro employment is the rate of unemployment.[3] It is here that the deterioration of the Negro position is most conspicuous. What has happened is that over the past thirty-five years the rate of Negro unemployment, from being rather less than that of whites, has steadily moved to the point where it is now regularly more than twice as great, while, of course, the over-all unemployment rate in the United States has remained higher than that of any other industrial democracy in the world. (As I write, unemployment in Japan is less than one per cent.)

The decennial census shows the steady rise in the ratio.[4]

Unemployment Rates	*1930*	*1940*	*1950*
White	6.6%	14.1%	4.5%
Nonwhite	6.1%	16.9%	7.9%
Ratio, nonwhite to white	.92	1.20	1.76

There is a sense in which this two-to-one ratio has not so much been a situation which has developed among Negroes, as it has been a relation that has long existed for Negroes in certain circumstances and that more and more Negroes have found themselves in those circumstances in recent years.

In 1930, 41 per cent of Negro males were engaged in agriculture where, if incomes were low, so was unemployment. If the South is taken out of the 1930 census data, thereby measuring employment among predominantly urban Negroes, a 1.6 to 1 unemployment ratio appears: white 7.4 per cent, nonwhite 11.5 per cent. By 1940 the two-to-one ratio outside the South had emerged: 14.8 per cent for whites, 29.7 per cent for nonwhites. Since 1930 the proportion of Negroes living in cities has almost doubled. It is now nearly 75 per cent, greater than that of whites. Correspondingly, the two-to-one unemployment ratio has since become general—one of the seemingly fixed ratios of our economy.

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The full development of the pattern can be seen in the 1960 census.

White and Nonwhite Unemployment Rates for Males, Urban and Rural, 1960

	Urban	Rural Nonfarm	Rural Farm
White	4.5	5.9	2.4
Nonwhite	9.3	8.7	3.4

Source: *1960 Census of Population*, Volume 1, Part 1, Table 194, pp. 1–487 to 1–498.

In order to emphasize that nothing is very clear about the nature of this development, it should be pointed out that while the two-to-one ratio has apparently existed for some time in urban situations, it is not the direct result of *industrial* employment. White and nonwhite unemployment rates in nonfarm industries were about equal in 1930, but the ratio thereafter gradually widened to the familiar two-to-one relationship.

Unemployment Rates in Nonfarm Industries

	1930	*1940*	*1950*	*1960*
White	7.9%	9.3%	NA	4.6%
Nonwhite	8.6%	13.4%	NA	8.3%
Ratio, nonwhite to white	1.09	1.44	NA	1.80

Over the period 1957 to 1964 the economy went from a point of high employment, down into a recession, up, down, and up again into the long, spectacular expansion that began in February 1961 and which by 1964 had brought the over-all unemployment rate almost to 1957 levels. Through all the ups and downs the ratio remained largely unchanged, even, perhaps, growing slightly worse. (See table on p. 750).

It must be emphasized that employment of nonwhites has grown faster than that of whites since 1957, but so has the nonwhite labor force, which rose from 7.3 million in that year to 8.3 million in 1964. Nonwhite unemployment gains have simply not been sufficient to narrow the gap in the unemployment rate. In 1964 nonwhites made up 11 per cent of the civilian labor force, but accounted for 21 per cent of the unemployed and 25 per cent of those jobless for six months or longer. Their unemployment rate of 10 per cent was more than twice that of white workers.

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Unemployment Rate of the Civilian Labor Force, by Color: Annual Averages, 1957–64
(In thousands)

Unemployment Rate	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
White	3.9	6.1	4.9	5.0	6.0	4.9	5.1	4.6
Nonwhite	8.0	12.6	10.7	10.2	12.5	11.0	10.9	9.8
Ratio of nonwhite to white	2.05	2.07	2.18	2.04	2.08	2.24	2.14	2.13

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor

In terms of emerging patterns, the situation of Negro teenage workers is particularly striking. As recently as 1948 (the first year for which data exist) Negro teenage males had a slightly lower rate of unemployment than did whites—7.6 per cent as against 8.3 per cent. In the years that followed the white rate doubled, but the nonwhite rate quadrupled. In January 1965 the combined unemployment rate for nonwhite teenagers was 29 per cent. Job opportunities for nonwhite teenagers have been notably scarce. The number of nonwhite teenagers employed in 1964 (540,000) remained almost unchanged from seven years earlier, while the number of white teenagers with jobs was rising by 800,000.

The unemployment rate is, of course, a vertical measure—recording the situation at any given moment. The true impact of unemployment in the Negro community can be measured accurately only in horizontal terms—the experience of unemployment over time. Here the facts emerge as something near disastrous. In 1958 only half the nonwhite males who worked at any time during the year worked a full 50 to 52 weeks; in 1963, only 55 per cent. Fewer than a third of the nonwhite women who worked during 1963 had a full year's employment. In some measure these statistics reflect the flexibility of the American work force. White rates, 67 per cent for males and 38 per cent for females during 1963, are also low. At the same time, the degree to which Negroes are forced into this pattern of intermittent employment is unmistakable. In 1964 nonwhites held 10 per cent of the full-time and the voluntary part-time jobs in nonfarm industries, but they accounted for 27 per cent of those working part-time involuntarily for economic reasons. This situation has shown no improvement since 1957. In sum, after an extended period of unprecedented economic growth, the Negro experience in the labor market remains hazardous and intermittent in the extreme.

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II. *Occupational Patterns*

In contrast to the experience of unemployment, the occupational patterns of Negro workers have clearly improved over the past three and one-half decades. Slowly they are coming into line with the white work force; but they have a long way to go. The most dramatic and important movement has been out of agriculture. Over one-third of the Negroes were in agriculture in 1930; less than one-tenth in 1960. This movement has been accompanied by migration northward: approximately 70 per cent of the Negro workers were in the South in 1930 and about 50 per cent in 1960.

	1930	1940	1950	1960
Per cent of Nonwhite Civilian Labor Force which is in the South	71.9	72.8	63.0	53.3
Per cent of Experienced Labor Force which is in Agriculture				
White	19.2	16.1	11.4*	6.2
Nonwhite	36.5	30.7	19.5*	9.1

* Based on those employed rather than total labor force.

Employment of nonwhite *farmers and farm managers* has declined substantially over the past decade, falling much more rapidly than employment in that category generally. There were 389,000 nonwhites in this group in 1954, only 145,000 a decade later—a drop of 63 per cent. As a result, the proportion that nonwhite workers represent of total employment in this group fell substantially, declining from 10 per cent in 1954 to 6.3 per cent in 1964. This movement was of course most pronounced in the South. In 1930 nearly half the Southern Negro workers were in agriculture; by 1960, only one-fifth. In short, movement of Negroes out of agriculture to other work in the South was even more marked than their migration to other parts of the country.

It should be noted, however, that the decline of Negro farmers was not matched by a similar decline in Negro *hired farm laborers.* During the decade in which nonwhite farmers and farm managers fell by 63 per cent, nonwhite farm laborers and foremen fell only 14 per cent, from 589,000 to 506,000. As a result, the proportion of nonwhites in this employment category actually rose slightly, from 23.6 per cent in 1954 to 23.8 per cent in 1964. This has been accompanied by increasing rates of unemployment—tenants and sharecroppers, no matter how low their income and living stand-

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ards, are not so subject as hired farm workers are to unemployment or, possibly, to a decline in social stability.

Unemployment Rates in Agriculture	1930	1940	1950	1960
White	1.3%	4.4%	NA	3.0%
Nonwhite	1.6%	3.9%	NA	7.3%
Ratio, nonwhite to white	1.23	.89	NA	2.43

At the other end of the spectrum, employment of nonwhite *professional and technical workers* has increased sharply over the past decade, growing more rapidly than employment in any other major occupational group. Between 1954 and 1964, employment of nonwhite professional workers increased from 217,000 to 499,000, a growth of 130 per cent. This increase in employment was far more rapid than that for all professional and technical workers in the economy, and, as a result, the proportion that nonwhites represent of all professional workers increased substantially during the decade, rising from 3.9 per cent in 1954 to 5.8 per cent in 1964. The largest part of this increase has occurred since 1961, when the percent nonwhites made up of total employment was still only 4.1.[5]

The rate of increase in employment of nonwhite *clerical workers* was exceeded only by that for professionals during the past decade. The number all but doubled, to a total of 572,000 in 1964, with a corresponding increase in the nonwhite proportion of all clerical workers to 5.4 per cent. A similar movement occurred among nonwhite craftsmen and foremen, whose numbers increased by two-thirds during the decade from 316,000 to 525,000. Their proportion accordingly rose from 3.8 per cent to 5.8 per cent. A perhaps significant ratio is to be seen here. Among professional, clerical, and skilled workers, nonwhites steadily improved their position in the decade following the Korean War, rising to 5.8, 5.4, and 5.8 per cent of the respective groups. From about one-third of their proportionate share, they moved up to about one-half. Each group has now rather more than a half million members. By and large they make up the Negro middle class, for whom things have unmistakably been getting better.

The American work force is classified in eleven broad categories. Among those not so far mentioned, trends in nonwhite employment show few marked changes and some declines. Some are categories Negroes have been trying to escape, and decline can be considered as improvement. Others are those in which the well-

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paid jobs are for Negro males with limited skills—where stability in the proportion has been to the Negro's disadvantage.

By far the largest group of nonwhite workers are those classified as operatives—the blue-collar workers of the nation's industry. Their number, 1,520,000 in 1964, was almost exactly that of professional, clerical, and skilled workers combined. Their numbers increased very little over the decade, less than 16 per cent.

During that decade there was a long-run decline in manufacturing employment, which has only recently been reversed. Most importantly for the Negro worker, there has been a steady decline or stagnation in manufacturing employment in the Northern and Western cities to which so many of them have been moving. During the period 1960–64, manufacturing employment in the nation increased by 3.0 per cent. However, it decreased by 2.0 per cent in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Washington, D. C., Los Angeles, Cleveland, St. Louis, Newark, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh, combined. In New York the drop was 8.2 per cent; in Philadelphia, 3.9 per cent; in Newark, 3.1 per cent; and in Pittsburgh, 4.7 per cent.

There were slightly more than one million nonwhite *private household workers* in 1954, an increase of 13 per cent over the decade. During this period, however, the nonwhite proportion of such workers dropped from 51.4 per cent to 43.6 per cent.

Service workers (except private household workers) provide another large field of employment for nonwhites. Their number grew by one-third during the decade of 1954–64, to a total of 1.4 million, but their proportion of the over-all total declined slightly to 20 per cent. However, an increasing proportion of nonwhite men are employed in service occupations. The proportion rose from 14 per cent in 1959 to 17 per cent in 1963. Those with very much education were leaving service employment, but nonwhite men with little education were moving into it rapidly. From 1959 to 1963 the per cent of nonwhite high-school graduates employed in service occupations declined from 23 to 14. In the same period, the percentage rose for nonwhite men with an elementary education from 11 to 19.

Among *laborers* (except farm and mine) there was an actual decline in nonwhite employment over the same period, the total dropping 4 per cent to 974,000. The nonwhite proportion of the over-all total also declined slightly.

In the South, where half the nonwhite work force is still located,

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the distribution of employed nonwhite men is even more skewed toward the lower rungs of the occupational ladder. Unskilled labor accounts for 39 per cent of nonwhite male employment in the South, as compared with 19 per cent in the rest of the country. On the other hand, the occupational distribution of white males in the South is not much different from that of all other regions combined.

Negroes fare badly in the category of *sales workers*, for all that their situation may be improving. In 1964 there were 136,000 nonwhite sales workers, representing 3.1 per cent of the total. This represented an increase of better than 50 per cent in a decade, but subtracting Asians from the total would leave a Negro component of only about 100,000, assuming that Negroes were about the same proportion of nonwhite sales workers in 1964 that they were in 1960. In this area of employment it may be assumed there is a great deal of direct discrimination against Negro workers.

Without question, however, the most conspicuous failure of Negroes to win their way in the world has been in the related field of *managers, officials, and proprietors*. Once again the number of nonwhites in this category increased by nearly half over the decade, but the end result was only 192,000 positions, representing only 2.6 per cent of the total, as contrasted with 2.3 per cent in 1955. Taking away Asians would diminish the number still further, to only about 140,000 Negro positions.

It could well be that Negro Americans are arriving in the nation's cities at a time when opportunities for establishing small businesses are declining, a parallel to the decline in manufacturing jobs, and another example of the problem of the *timing* of the Negro migration. No other immigrant group came upon the scene at a moment of declining employment opportunities. But given the absence of any tradition of Negro entrepreneurship, the scarcity of entrepreneurial opportunity has worked virtually to exclude Negroes from this singularly important echelon of employment. Only 6.5 per cent of nonwhite males with one or more years of college are working in this field, as against 22.7 of whites. In over-all terms, present-day Negroes, as newly arrived migrants in the great urban areas of the nation, present an employment pattern strikingly similar to that of past migrant groups. For example, first- and second-generation Italian immigrants recorded in the 1900 census had almost precisely the occupational pattern of Northern Negroes sixty years later.

The basic question concerning the future employment of Ne-

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Occupations of Italians in 1900 Compared with Northern Negroes in 1960

	Total	Planters, Farmers, Overseers	Professional Services, Trade, and Transportation	Manufacturing and Mechanical	All Others
Italians, 1900	100%	2%	21%	32%	45%
Negroes, North, 1960	100%	*	23%	32%	45%

* Less than 1 per cent

groes is whether the pattern of opportunity is shifting to make it easier or more difficult for them to move into line with the work force in general. We must also question whether or not the existing patterns of employment are affecting the Negro potential for taking advantage of the opportunities which arise in the future.

III. *Income*

The patterns of Negro employment are directly related to those of income. Negro income has risen substantially in recent years, as has employment. But the gap between Negro and white income is not closing; it is widening. And the problems that follow are made more savage by a soaring population.

The principal problem, and the proper focus of public concern, is that of the Negro male worker. His plight does not seem to improve. Income rises. Year-round, full-time workers gained almost $1,000 in the short period from 1957 to 1963. But positions relative to white workers did not improve significantly, nor did the chances of being a year-round, full-time worker.

The family income of nonwhites, relative to that of whites, rose steadily during the 1940's, peaked in the 1950's at about 57 per cent, and has since fallen back. Of late the ratio has remained frozen in a two-to-one proportion reminiscent of the unemployment rates. During the period 1949 to 1959 the ratio of the median income of Negro men to that of white men *declined* in every region of the nation. The ratio went from .75 to .72 in the Northeast, from .50 to .47 in the South, and from .53 to .52 in the country as a whole.[6] From 1959 to 1963 the position of the Negro male appears to have

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improved somewhat in these terms, but the roughly two-to-one proportion was maintained.

In 1963 the median income of nonwhite males had risen to $2,507, as against $4,816 for whites. However, the Negro position remained precarious in the extreme. Six out of ten nonwhite farmers earned less than $1,000, fewer than one in ten earned over $3,000. Over half the nonwhite males earned less than $3,000. Only 1.2 per cent of nonwhite males earned over $10,000—approximately 70,000 persons in all the United States, of whom as many as 25,000 were probably Chinese or Japanese. The impact of unemployment on nonwhite income is unmistakable. In 1963 those nonwhite men who worked year-round, full-time earned a median income of $4,019 —almost two-thirds the white median of $6,245. However, only 49.7 per cent of nonwhite men with income in 1963 actually worked a full year, as against 60.1 per cent of whites.

In the familiar pattern, income of white and nonwhite workers tends to increase as the amount of education completed rises, but the gain for nonwhite men is much less than for white men. White men who had at least one year of college had a median income in 1963 of $6,829, about 80 per cent more than those who had completed only elementary school. But among nonwhite men with at least one year of college the gain was only about 50 per cent, from $2,740 to $4,070. In fact, the median income of nonwhite men who were high-school graduates ($3,821) was about the same as that for white men who had completed only elementary school ($3,749). The income gap between white and nonwhite men at each additional level in 1963 was not significantly smaller than it had been in 1958.

To the extent that the income gap between the Negro and white world has been closed, it is through the employment of Negro women. While the income gap for men was little changed between 1958 and 1963, it narrowed substantially for women. In 1958, the income of nonwhite women was 59 per cent of white women; by 1963 it had risen to 67 per cent. The gain was concentrated among women with more than a grade-school education, while the income of those having less education decreased slightly. In the longer period from 1949 to 1959, Batchelder reports that Negro women improved their income position relative to white women in each region of the nation, to the point that it was practically equal for all regions other than the South. For example, the ratio rose from .83 to .99 in the Northeast. The low Southern ratio, which rose

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from .46 to .56, kept the over-all ratio at .60 but the trend of events was clear by 1963 when the income of nonwhite women was two-thirds that of whites.

At the same time that Negro women were closing the income gap, more were working. Between 1950 and 1960 the female proportion of the Negro labor force rose from 35.1 per cent to 40.2 per cent. By 1964, women accounted for 41.3 per cent of the nonwhite labor force. This was a period when women generally were dropping behind men in their earnings. Batchelder calculates that the women-to-men ratio for whites declined from .44 to .35 between 1949 and 1959. The comparable Negro ratio also declined—but by only one-third as much. In the period 1958 to 1963, white women fell further behind white men in income, but nonwhite women improved their position slightly in relation to nonwhite men.[7] Batchelder writes "Something in the labor market permitted Negro, but not white, women to increase their share of the labor force without depressing their incomes relative to men's."[8] Part of this increase was the result of matriarchal strain in Negro family life which would seem to have been reinforced by economic developments of the postwar period. There are still, for example, more Negro women college graduates in the United States than Negro male graduates. The position of these women in relation to their white counterparts has been roughly comparable for some time. But in the short period from 1958 to 1963 the nonwhite women with a year or more of college moved sharply *ahead*, with a median income of $2,904, as against $2,530 for whites. This may be because more of the nonwhite women worked full time, but, in any case, the fact remains that they earned more money. Similarly, between 1958 and 1963 the income of nonwhite women who had a high-school education increased faster than that for white women, and as a result the income gap was narrowed.

This is not the place to describe the health of the Negro. However, it is intertwined with his general economic status. Nonwhites, in all age groups except seventeen to twenty-four, are more often physically disabled, whether measured in terms of days of restricted activity, bed disability days, or days in which work was lost. For fiscal years 1962 and 1963, nonwhite males in the labor force age seventeen and over averaged 13.7 days of restricted activity. Whites averaged 11.2. Generally, a smaller proportion of whites than nonwhites report chronic conditions. However, a higher proportion of nonwhites reported activity limitations resulting from

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chronic conditions. (Among other things, these results may reflect less use among nonwhites of diagnostic medical services; fewer know they have chronic conditions until the situation is so serious that they cannot work).

While the situation is improving, it is well to keep in mind that the Negro man still has a considerably lower life expectancy than the white man. At the prime working age of thirty, the difference is 5.2 years, with the nonwhite male having a life expectancy of 38.5 years and the white male having 43.7 years remaining.

IV. *The Ordeal of the Negro Family*

The cumulative result of unemployment and low income, and probably also of excessive dependence upon the income of women, has produced an unmistakable crisis in the Negro family, and raises the serious question of whether or not this crisis is beginning to create conditions which tend to reinforce the cycle that produced it in the first instance. The crisis would probably exist in any event, but it becomes acute in the context of the extraordinary rise in Negro population in recent years.

At the time of the founding of the nation, one American in five was a Negro. The proportion declined steadily until it was only one in ten by 1920, where it held until the 1950's when it began to rise. Since 1950 the nonwhite population has grown at a rate of 2.4 per cent per year, compared with 1.7 per cent for the total population. One American in nine is nonwhite today. If the rates of growth between 1950 and 1964 continue, one in eight will be nonwhite by 1972. In 1964 among children under the age of fourteen, 15 per cent were nonwhite. Under one year of age, 16.4 per cent were nonwhite: one in six. Although white and nonwhite fertility rates have declined somewhat since 1959, the nonwhite/white ratio of 1.42 has not narrowed. Between 1950 and 1960 the size of the white family changed very little, while that of nonwhites increased from 4.07 persons to 4.30 persons.

Perhaps most significantly, the gap between what might be called the generation rate between white and nonwhites is particularly wide. Negro women not only have more children, but have them earlier. Thus in 1960, there were 1,247 children ever born per thousand ever-married nonwhite women fifteen to nineteen years of age, as against only 725 for white women, a ratio of 1.7. The effect of this burgeoning population on family life is accentuated by its con-

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centration among the poor. In 1960 nonwhite mothers age thirty-five to thirty-nine with family incomes over $10,000 had 2.9 children; those with less than $2,000 had 5.3. A peculiar, and possibly important phenomenon, which might be termed the Frazier effect, after the distinguished author of *Black Bourgeoisie,* is that Negro upper-class families have fewer children than their white counterparts, while lower-class families have more. In 1960 nonwhite women (married once, husband present) age thirty-five to forty-four married early to undereducated laborers had 4.7 children, as against 3.8 for white women in the same situation. But nonwhite women in that age bracket, married at twenty-two or over to professional or technical workers with a year or more of college, had only 1.9 children, as against 2.4 for whites.

The impact of family size on the life chances of children and the strength of the family can be measured by a number of statistics. The Task Force on Manpower Conservation (1963) studied the nation's young men who failed to pass the Selective Service written test. A passing score on this test indicates the achievement of a seventh- or eighth-grade education. Three out of four of the nonwhite young men failing the test came from families with four or more children. One out of two came from families with six or more children.

A Negro child born to a large family is more likely to be reared in a broken family. Such are the strains of rearing large families with marginal incomes and unemployed fathers. In the urban U. S. in 1960 there were 154,000 one-child nonwhite families headed by married men age twenty to twenty-four with wives present. There were 19,000 such families headed by women separated from their husbands, one-eighth as many as whole families. There were a similar number of such husband-wife families with four or more children, 152,000, but there were 39,000 headed by married women separated from their husbands—one-fourth the number with both husband and wife. Poor families break under the responsibilities imposed by a large number of children. Children from these families become the nation's draft rejectees, because—among other reasons—they have spent a basic learning period in an institution too large for its resources and often with one of the instructors missing.

Poverty is both the cause and the result. In 1963 the median income of nonwhite families was $3,465, about half the $6,548 median of whites. The magnitude of the income gap is illustrated by the

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fact that incomes were lower in nonwhite families with employed heads than in white families with unemployed heads. What the long trend of the gap will be is not, of course, clear, but from 1960 to 1963 the nonwhite median family income as a per cent of white declined from 55 to 53.

In March 1964 nearly 20 million persons fourteen years and over were living in families with annual incomes under $3,000. Nonwhite persons accounted for a quarter of those living in such families. But nearly half of all nonwhite youths under fourteen are living in families with incomes under $3,000. Nonwhites make up 40 per cent of the children living in such families. Using a flexible scale that relates required family income to family size, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare has estimated that 60 per cent of the Negro children in America today are growing up in poverty-stricken families. In these circumstances the stability of the Negro family, still grievously impaired by the heritage of slavery and segregation, would seem to have been weakened still further.

The fundamental problem is the position of the male. To begin with, the Negro father tends to hold jobs with a minimum either of prestige or income. In 1963, fully one-third of the nonwhite family heads who worked at all had their longest (or only) job in farming, domestic service, or laboring occupations. For these persons, income was well under half that of all families with working heads. In addition to low income and low prestige, the Negro father is burdened with savage rates of unemployment at precisely that moment in his life when family responsibilities are most heavy. The ratio of nonwhite to white unemployment is highest among men between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four—2.57. This compares with a ratio of 2.17 for all men fourteen and over. The next highest ratio for men was 2.48, at thirty-five to forty-four years of age. In 1963, 29 per cent of nonwhite males in the work force were unemployed at one time or another. Three out of ten nonwhite men who were unemployed in 1963 had three or more periods of unemployment; one-fifth of all unemployed nonwhites were out of work half the year or more.

A measure of the distress of Negro men in their middle years is that they disappear—literally. In 1964 for every 100 white and nonwhite women age thirty to thirty-four years, there were 99.4 white, but only 86.7 nonwhite, men. The Negroes had not died—they begin to reappear after forty—they had simply become invisible. (An interesting question is whether an accurate enumeration of these

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missing males would not significantly increase current unemployment rates for Negro males.)

It is in the perspective of the underemployment of the Negro father that we must regard the Negro mother as being overemployed. From 1957 to 1964 the civilian labor-force participation rate of nonwhite men dropped from 80.8 per cent to 75.6 per cent. The ratio of nonwhite to white labor-force participation rates *dropped* from .99 to .97. During this period, the civilian labor force participation of nonwhite women *rose* somewhat over-all. It rose particularly in ages twenty to twenty-four, from 46.6 per cent in 1957 to 53.6 per cent in 1964; in ages twenty-five to thirty-four years, from 50.4 per cent in 1957 to 52.8 per cent in 1964; and in ages forty-five to fifty-four where it reached 62.3 per cent in that year. Typically, the nonwhite/white ratio of labor-force participation for women is highest in the middle years, reaching 1.50 for age twenty-five to thirty-four, a stark contrast with the male situation. Strikingly, also, is the fact that the unemployment ratio of nonwhite to white women is *lower* than average in just those middle years when it is highest for nonwhite males. In 1964 it was only 1.73 for women thirty-five to forty-four years of age, compared with 2.48 for men of the same age and 1.96 for all women.

Inevitably, the underemployment of the Negro father has led to the break-up of the Negro family. In 1964, among unemployed white men twenty years and over there were 859,000 married with wife present and only 147,000 of "other marital status" (excluding men never married), the former group being six times the size of the latter. But among nonwhites, for 168,000 unemployed males with wives present, there were 76,000 of "other marital status." Nonwhites made up 34.1 per cent of all unemployed males of "other marital status." These are the men who first lose their jobs and then lose their families.

The first effect is simply that of broken homes. Nearly a quarter of Negro women living in cities who have ever married are divorced, separated, or living apart from their husbands. These rates have been steadily rising and are approaching one-third in, for example, New York City. Almost one-quarter of nonwhite families are headed by a woman, a rate that also continues to rise. At any given moment some 36 per cent of Negro children are living in homes where one or both parents are missing. It is probable that not much more than one-third of Negro youth reach eighteen having lived all their lives with both their parents. The second effect

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of the deterioration of the position of the Negro male worker has been a sharp increase in welfare dependency among Negro families. It would appear that a majority of Negro youth sooner or later are supported by the Aid to Families of Dependent Children program. In 1961 not quite half of all children receiving AFDC aid were Negro (1,112,106) and half of these were in cities of 250,000 population, where they made up three-quarters of the AFDC recipients. Nonwhites account for almost two-thirds of the increase in AFDC families between 1948 and 1961. The third effect that must be associated with the deteriorating position of the Negro male is the phenomenon Kenneth Clark has described as the tangle of pathology—the complex of interrelated disabilities and disadvantages that feed on each other and seem to make matters steadily worse for the individuals and communities caught up in it.

The cycle begins and ends with the children. A disastrous number begin their lives with no fathers present. Many, in some communities nearly half or more, are illegitimate. In 1963, 24 per cent of all nonwhite births in the nation were illegitimate. Too few live their early years in the presence of a respected and responsible male figure. The mothers, as often as not magnificent women, go to work too soon, if indeed they ever stop. This situation is getting worse, not better. In March 1959, 29.3 per cent of nonwhite women with children under six years of age were in the work force. By March 1964 this proportion had increased to 36.1 per cent! At that moment 56.7 per cent of nonwhite women with children six to seventeen years of age were in the work force—a higher percentage than that of nonwhite women with *no* children under eighteen years of age, which was 50.5 per cent. Although these movements were matched among white women, they clearly have gotten out of proportion among Negroes.

Negro children are going to school in nearly the same proportions as whites in the years from seven to nineteen, when free education is available more or less everywhere in the United States. But after having once closed the gap also in the crucial years on either side of that age span, they have begun to fall back again when education often is not free. In 1953, 18.1 per cent more of the white population than of the nonwhite were in school between the ages of five and six. By 1958 this gap had narrowed to 7.5. By 1963 it had widened again to 13.1. The conclusion must be that Negroes are falling behind once more in terms of the number of students who enter the main grades with advance preparation. Sim-

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ilarly the gap in population enrolled in school age twenty to twenty-four narrowed from 6.5 points in 1953 to 5.4 in 1958, but spread to 8.1 in 1963.

As they go through school, the economic pressures begin to mount. In a survey made in February 1963, half of the white male dropouts, but only one-third of the nonwhite, attributed their leaving school before graduation from high school to school-connected reasons, such as lack of interest in school, poor grades, or difficulties with school authorities. In contrast, more nonwhite males than white gave economic reasons for leaving school.[9]

To be sure, the gap between Negro and white education, however it may fluctuate within a decade, is now very narrow indeed —in formal terms. What has happened in real terms of the quality of education is not clear. Batchelder has suggested that "for the decade of the 1950's that although nonwhites (and surely Negroes too) gained on whites in median years of school completed, in the country as a whole, the average quality of a year of school completed by Negroes living in the North and West was reduced. . . . In educational attainment, quality dilution exceeded quantitative gains for Negroes in the North and West."[10]

Surely there are few developments in the area of employment, where improved education presumedly ought to produce better results, to indicate that the position of the Negro youth entering the labor force at present is improved over the past. Since 1961 the federal government has been engaged in a serious and sustained effort to improve the employment position of the American Negro by breaking down the barriers of discrimination. The President's Committee on Equal Employment has had unprecedented support both within the government and from the business and labor community. Results are slow to come, and the Committee has been loath to proclaim them when they have not existed—one break with the past that does honor to all concerned.

The Committee studies have provided considerable evidence that the position of the Negro worker is certainly not improving much in the normal course of events. Evidence has appeared that in large segments of American industry the number of Negro craftsmen is, if anything, proportionately greater than the number of Negro apprentices. Efforts to increase the number of apprentices have produced steady results, but at a pace and at a level which suggest fashioning a social revolution for twenty million souls one lad at a time.

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Nor is it so obvious that middle-class Negroes are finding in ever-more-abundant supply the resources—family, financial, and other—required to pass through the lengthy apprenticeships demanded by the American professions. In 1965 after a decade of splendidly militant legal and political action by the civil rights movement, Clyde Ferguson, Jr., Dean of the Howard Law School, reported that of the 54,265 law students in the entire United States, there were only 543 Negroes.

Obviously, the most pressing question for American social policy is whether the essential first step for resolving the problem of the Negro American is to provide such a measure of full employment of Negro workers that the impact of unemployment on family structure is removed. The assumption would be that only then will the wide and increasing range and level of social services available to the Negro American have their full effect, and only then will there be a Negro population that not only has equal opportunities in the American economy, but is equal to those opportunities.

Cases Opened under AFDC (Excluding Unemployed Parent Segment) Compared with Unemployment Rate of Nonwhite Males

Year	AFDC Cases Opened[1]	Nonwhite Male Unemployment Rate
1964	429,048	9.1
1963	380,985	10.6
1962	370,008	11.0
1961	391,238	12.9
1960	338,730	10.7
1959	329,815	11.5
1958	345,950	13.7
1957	294,032	8.4
1956	261,663	7.3
1955	256,881	8.2
1954	275,054	9.2
1953	222,498	4.4
1952	234,074	4.5
1951	225,957	4.4
1950	291,273	8.9
1949	278,252	8.8
1948	210,193	5.1

[1] Does not include cases opened under program which commenced in some States in 1961 of assistance to children whose fathers are present but unemployed. There were 70,846 such cases opened in 1961, 81,192 in 1962, 80,728 in 1963, and 105,094 in 1964.

Source: AFDC cases opened from HEW; nonwhite male unemployment rates from Department of Labor.

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This, of course, is not an inconsiderable assumption. No one knows whether it is justified or not. The relation between economic phenomena, such as employment, and social phenomena, such as family structure, has hardly begun to be traced in the United States. An association between rising economic and social distress in the world of the Negro American can be seen readily enough in data, but proof of a causal relationship is a more complex matter.



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Such is the extent to which science has taught us to be skeptical of what our common senses tell us.[11]

A more sophisticated but not less pressing question is whether the impact of economic disadvantage on the Negro community has gone on so long that genuine structural damage has occurred, so that a reversal in the course of economic events will no longer produce the expected response in social areas. There are several combinations of social and economic data which make it reasonable to ask both of these questions. They prove little, but they suggest a great deal. More importantly, they raise questions researchers should attempt to answer, for many of the answers we are looking for will, in my opinion, be found in the interplay between the economic environment and the social structure.

The relationship between the nonwhite male unemployment rate and the number of *new* AFDC cases opened each year since 1948 (excluding cases under the program begun in some states since 1961 under which fathers may be present but unemployed) is one example. The curves rise and fall together. Between 1948 (when, it will be recalled, the nonwhite unemployment rate first became available) and 1962 they have the remarkable correlation of .91.[12] Between 1955 and 1956, however, the unemployment rate dropped, but the number of new cases went *up* slightly, from 256,881 to 261,663. Unemployment in 1960 was lower than in 1959, but new cases were higher, 338,730 as compared to 329,815. (Note the rising level of new cases.) In 1963 unemployment was down, but new cases were up. In 1964 it went down, but new cases went up again—sharply now, reaching the highest point ever: 429,000.

While the two lines on the chart go hand in hand, the situation is more complex than it first appears. Some of the increase in AFDC cases is the result of white dependency, not Negro. However, almost two-thirds of the increase in the AFDC rolls between 1948 and 1961 is attributable to nonwhite families. While the unemployment rate for nonwhite males is used for comparison, the unemployment rate for all males would show similar changes. Some of the changes in AFDC families among nonwhites are also due to unemployment problems among families headed by females, families broken long ago. At present, these components cannot be isolated completely, and we look to corroboration from additional approaches.

The statistics are available by which we can observe the year-to-year changes in the per cent of nonwhite married women who

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Per Cent of Nonwhite Married Women Separated from Husbands and Unemployment Rates of Nonwhite Males Aged 20 and Over

Year	Nonwhite Married Women Separated from Their Husbands, March of Each Year		Unemployment Rate of Nonwhite Males 20 and Over, 9 Months Prior to April 1 of Each Year	
	Per cent	Deviation from Linear Trend	Per cent	Deviation from Linear Trend
1953	10.6	−2.4	4.1	−2.1
1954	12.7	−0.6	5.6	−1.1
1955	15.1	+1.6	9.3	+2.2
1956	14.2	+0.5	6.8	+0.8
1957	13.1	−0.9	6.8	−1.3
1958	16.0	+1.8	9.8	+1.3
1959	17.6	+3.2	12.3	+3.3
1960	13.8	−0.9	10.2	+0.7
1961	14.3	−0.6	10.7	+0.8
1962	14.9	−0.2	11.2	+0.8
1963	14.6	−0.7	9.8	−1.1
1964	14.8	−0.8	8.6	−2.7

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

are separated from their husbands. The period from 1953 to 1964 was one of generally rising unemployment for Negro men with marked fluctuations corresponding to the rise and fall of the nation's economic activity in this period. This was also a period when the number of broken Negro families was rising, with fluctuations up and down.

The upper half of the chart shows the per cent of nonwhite married women separated from their husbands (as of March of each year) and the unemployment rate (for the nine months preceding separation rate) of nonwhite men twenty years of age and over. The two lines rise and fall together, with both having an upward trend. The bottom half of the chart shows the yearly fluctuations from the trend, and again, the lines rise and fall together. The correlation between the deviations of the two series from their respective trends is .81.

As in the comparison of AFDC cases and unemployment, the strength of the relationship between unemployment and separation is considerably less after 1959 than it was before, at least in the limited period of time we are able to examine it. After 1962, unemployment dropped sharply, but the increase in employment opportunities for Negro men was not accompanied by a decline in broken marriages.

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
PER CENT OF NONWHITE MARRIED WOMEN SEPARATED FROM THEIR HUSBANDS AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF NONWHITE MEN AGED 20 AND OVER
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (PER CENT)
SEPARATION RATE (PER CENT)
Separation Rate
Unemployment Rate, Average of three immediately preceding quarters
DEVIATIONS FROM LINEAR TREND
DEVIATION FROM LINEAR TREND
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
(Separation rate is as of March of each year. Unemployment rate is for 9 months preceding separation rate)

It would be troubling indeed to learn that until several years ago employment opportunity made a great deal of difference in the rate of Negro dependency and family disorganization, but that the situation has so deteriorated that the problem is now feeding on itself—that measures which once would have worked will henceforth not work so well, or work at all.

The important point is not that we do not know whether this is

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or is not the case. It is rather that until now we have never seriously asked such a question. Obviously an answer, or set of answers, can be had, and public policy can be guided accordingly. Time, not method, is our enemy. In the next six years the nonwhite work force will increase by 20 per cent, about twice the rate of the past decade and the rate for the whites in the coming same six years. The crisis of commitment is at hand.

REFERENCES

1. Robert Harris, *The Quest for Equality* (Baton Rouge, La., 1960), p. 4.

2. In 1964 the number of corporation personnel representatives visiting the campus of Lincoln University in Pennsylvania was twice that of the graduating class. Inasmuch as half the class was going on to graduate school, the representatives of American business outnumbered their potential recruits by four to one. For an excellent survey, see Dorothy K. Newman, "The Negro's Journey to the City," *Monthly Labor Review*, May-June 1965. See also *The New York Times*, May 30, 1965.

3. A statistical note is necessary here. A great deal of data taken to refer to Negroes in fact refers to a larger group, all of whose members are classified as "nonwhite," as opposed to "white." These are the two main categories into which the population is divided in most ongoing statistical series collected by the federal government, as, for example, the employment series. Only in the decennial census is the nonwhite group broken down into subgroups. In 1960 Negroes were 92.1 per cent of all nonwhites. The remaining 7.9 per cent were made up largely of Indians, Japanese, and Chinese. An important fact is that with respect to almost all economic and social data, Chinese and Japanese (who together make up 3.4 per cent of nonwhites) are at the opposite end of the spectrum from Negroes. Japanese and Chinese have twice as large a proportion of their population going to college as do whites; Negroes have a little less than half. Negroes have twice as high a rate of unemployment as do whites; Chinese and Japanese have half. In 1960, 21 per cent of Negro women who had ever married were separated, divorced or had their husband absent for other reasons, as against 7 per cent of Japanese and 6 per cent of Chinese. A consequence of these figures is that statistics for nonwhites generally understate the degree of unemployment among Negroes as well as the extent of family disorganization, and the gap that separates them from the white world. In this study the terms "Negro" and "nonwhite" are not used interchangeably, but rather refer to the smaller or larger group, as the case may be.

4. The 1930 census was taken in the spring of the year before the full effects of the depression were felt. Data are not strictly comparable with those of later years, but ratios are valid.

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5. As many as 90,000 of the half-million nonwhite professional workers are *not* Negro. However, about two-thirds of the 90,000 would be Japanese or Chinese.

6. Alan B. Batchelder, "Decline in the Relative Income of Negro Men," *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* Vol. 78 (November 1964), pp. 525–548.

7. Comparisons of income position in 1959 with that of 1949 are based on calculations made by Alan B. Batchelder and reported in "Decline in the Relative Income of Negro Men," *op. cit.,* pp. 531 and 533.

8. *Ibid.,* p. 534.

9. The pinch of poverty is felt early. Negro families can save very little. In 1960–61 Negro families and single consumers living in cities average $23 in savings. White groups saved almost nine times that much.

10. Batchelder, *op. cit.,* p. 538.

11. There have been few attempts to examine the impact of unemployment on the survival of the family. It has been more than a quarter of a century since researchers addressed themselves to such questions in America, and, where investigation occurred, it was of white families, not Negro. An example is *Citizens Without Work* (1940), by Edward Wight Bakke. The most comprehensive analysis of the interrelationships between the ability of the Negro male to perform his expected economic role and the stability of the Negro family is still the work of E. Franklin Frazier. Anthropologists have investigated matrifocal families in search of some universal explanation of why they predominate in some societies. For a recent report, see "A Survey of the Consanguine or Matrifocal Family," by Peter Kunstadter in *American Anthropologist* (February 1963). Kunstadter concludes that the common feature of such societies is a division of labor which results in a physical separation of the male from the family over long periods of time. He reports that several investigators have pointed to the inability of males to fulfill their family economic roles successfully as the predominant feature of matrifocal societies. Kunstatder does not examine Negro American society in any detail which, of course, is quite mixed in this regard. However, the Negro American does not face a problem of a division of labor which results in physical separation. A recent investigation of the differences between white and Negro families with regard to the relative "power" of men and women is that of Robert Blood and Donald Wolfe, *Husbands and Wives: The Dynamics of Married Living* (New York, 1963).

12. A correlation was also computed for the deviations from the linear trends of the two series. With the trend removed, the correlation was .82, thereby ruling out the possibility that a similar but unrelated trend was responsible for the high correlation.

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ST. CLAIR DRAKE

The Social and Economic Status of the Negro in the United States

Caste, Class, and "Victimization"

DURING THE 1930's, W. Lloyd Warner and Allison Davis developed and popularized a conceptual scheme for analyzing race relations in the Southern region of the United States which viewed Negro-white relations as organized by a color-caste system that shaped economic and political relations as well as family and kinship structures, and which was reinforced by the legal system. Within each of the two castes (superordinate white and subordinate Negro), social classes existed, status being based upon possession of money, education, and family background as reflected in distinctive styles of behavior. "Exploitation" in the Marxist sense was present within this caste-class system, but also much more; for an entire socio-cultural system, not just the economic order, functioned to distribute power and prestige unevenly between whites and Negroes and to punish any individuals who questioned the system by word or behavior.[1]

Students of the situation in the North rarely conceptualized race relations in terms of caste, but tended rather to view specific communities as areas in which *ethnic* groups were involved in continuous competition and conflict, resulting in a hierarchy persisting through time, with now one, and again another, ethnic group at the bottom as previous newcomers moved "up." Each ethnic group developed a social class structure within it, but as individuals acquired better jobs, more education, and some sophistication, they and their families often detached themselves from immigrant colonies (usually located in slum areas) and sometimes from all ethnic institutions as well. They tended to become a part of the middle class. The Negroes who migrated North in large numbers during World War I were the latest arrivals in this fluid and highly competitive situation, but their high visibility became a crucial factor limiting their upward mobility. Upwardly mobile Negroes could not "dis-

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appear" into the middle class of the larger society as did European ethnics.[2]

Thus, on the eve of World War II, students of race relations in the United States generally described the status of Negroes as one in which they played subordinate roles in a caste system in the South and an ethnic-class system in the North. The actions of persons toward those of another race were explained not in terms of some vaguely defined emotions connected with "prejudice," but rather in terms of the behavior they felt was expected of them by others in various positions within the social structure, and as attempts to protect and maximize whatever power and prestige accrued to them at their locus in the system. John Dollard, a psychologist, in his *Caste and Class in a Southern Town,* added an additional dimension. He analyzes the situation in terms of the "gains" and "losses"—sexual, psychological, economic, and political —which both Negroes and whites sustained at different levels in the Southern caste-class system.[3]

The caste-class analysis still provides a useful frame of reference for studying the behavior of individuals and groups located at various positions in the social structure. It can also serve as a starting point for viewing the *processes* of race relations in terms of their consequences. Of the racial and ethnic groups in America only Negroes have been subjected to caste-deprivations; and the ethnic-class system has operated to their disadvantage as compared with European immigrants. In other words, Negroes in America have been subject to "victimization" in the sense that a system of social relations operates in such a way as to deprive them of a chance to share in the more desirable material and non-material products of a society which is dependent, in part, upon their labor and loyalty. They are "victimized," also, because they do not have the same degree of access which others have to the attributes needed for rising in the general class system—money, education, "contacts," and "know-how."

The concept of "victimization" implies, too, that some people are used as means to other people's ends—without their consent—and that the social system is so structured that it can be deliberately manipulated to the disadvantage of some groups by the clever, the vicious, and the cynical, as well as by the powerful. The callous and indifferent unconsciously and unintentionally reinforce the system by their inaction or inertia. The "victims," their autonomy curtailed and their self-esteem weakened by the operation of the

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caste-class system, are confronted with "identity problems." Their social condition is essentially one of "powerlessness."

Individual "victims" may or may not accept the rationalizations given for the denial to them of power and prestige. They may or may not be aware of and concerned about their position in the system, but, when they do become concerned, victimization takes on important social psychological dimensions. Individuals then suffer feelings of "relative deprivation" which give rise to reactions ranging from despair, apathy, and withdrawal to convert and overt aggression. An effective analysis of the position of the Negro in these terms (although the word "victimization" is never used) may be found in Thomas F. Pettigrew's *A Profile of the Negro American* (1964).

Concepts developed by Max Weber are useful for assessing the degree of victimization existing within the American caste-class system.[4] Individuals and groups can be compared by examining what he refers to as "life chances," that is, the extent to which people have access to economic and political power. *Direct victimization* might be defined as the operation of sanctions which deny access to power, which limit the franchise, sustain job discrimination, permit unequal pay for similar work, or provide inferior training or no training at all. *Indirect victimization* is revealed in the consequences which flow from a social structure which decreases *"life chances,"* such as high morbidity and mortality rates, low longevity rates, a high incidence of psychopathology, or the persistence of personality traits and attitudes which impose disadvantages in competition or excite derogatory and invidious comparisons with other groups. Max Weber also compared individuals and groups in terms of differences in *"life styles,"* those ways of behaving which vary in the amount of esteem, honor, and prestige attached to them. Differences in "life chances" may make it impossible to acquire the money or education (or may limit the contacts) necessary for adopting and maintaining prestigious life styles. The key to understanding many aspects of race relations may be found in the fact that, in American society, the protection of their familiar and cherished life styles is a dominating concern of the white middle classes, who, because many Negroes have life styles differing from their own, have tried to segregate them into all-Negro neighborhoods, voluntary associations, and churches.[5] (Marxist sociologists tend to overemphasize protection of economic interests as a dynamic factor in American race relations, important though it is.)

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The "Ghettoization" of Negro Life

Pressure upon Negroes to live within all-Negro neighborhoods has resulted in those massive concentrations of Negro population in Northern metropolitan areas which bitter critics call "concentration camps" or "plantations" and which some social scientists refer to as "Black Ghettos."[6] Small town replicas exist everywhere throughout the nation, for the roots of residential segregation lie deep in American history. In older Southern towns slave quarters were transformed into Negro residential areas after Emanicipation—a few blocks here, a whole neighborhood there, often adjacent to white homes. In newer Southern towns and cities a less secure upwardly mobile white population usually demanded a greater degree of segregation from ex-slaves and their descendants. Prior to World War I, the residential patterns did not vary greatly between North and South, but the great northward migration of Negroes between 1914 and 1920 expanded the small Negro neighborhoods into massive Black Belts. Middle-class white neighbors used "restrictive-covenants" as their main device for slowing down and "containing" the expansion of Negro neighborhoods. Thus, with continued in-migration and restricted access to housing in "white neighborhoods," the overcrowded Black Ghetto emerged with its substandard structures, poor public services, and high crime and juvenile delinquency rates.

Scholars know from careful research, and increasingly wider circles are becoming aware of the fact, that Negroes do not depress property values, but that middle-class white attitudes toward Negroes do.[7] As long as Negroes, as a group, are a symbol of lower social status, proximity to them will be considered undesirable and such social attitudes will be reflected in the market place. The problem is complicated by the fact that a very high proportion of Negro Americans actually does have lower-class attributes and behavior patterns. The upward mobility of white Americans, as well as their comfort and personal safety, is facilitated by spatial segregation. (Older cities in the South have been an exception.) The white middle class could protect its values by acting solely in terms of class, letting middle-class Negro families scatter into white neighborhoods irrespective of race. Instead, the white middle class in American cities protects its own neighborhoods from behavior patterns it disapproves of and from chronic social disorganization by "ghettoizing" the Negro. Real-estate operators, black and white,

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have exploited the fears of the white middle class from the beginning of the northern migration by "block busting," that is, by buying property for less than its normal market value and reselling it at a higher price to Negroes barred from the open market or by charging them higher rentals. Eventually the profit-potential in residential segregation was maximized by the institutions which controlled mortgage money and refused to finance property for Negro residence outside of the Black Belts except under conditions approved by them.

In 1948, the Supreme Court declared racial restrictive covenants unenforceable in the courts, but this action tended to accelerate rather than reverse the process of ghettoization, for many whites proceeded to sell to Negroes at inflated prices and then moved to the suburbs, or they retained their properties, moved away, and raised the rents. The Court's decision was based partly upon a re-evaluation of the concept of civil rights and partly upon a recognition of the fact that serious economic injustice was a by-product of residential segregation, a situation summed up by Thomas Pettigrew:

> While some housing gains occurred in the 1950's, the quality of Negro housing remains vastly inferior relative to that of whites. For example, in Chicago in 1960, Negroes paid as much for housing as whites, despite their lower incomes. . . . This situation exists because of essentially two separate housing markets; and the residential segregation that creates these dual markets has increased steadily over past decades until it has reached universally high levels in cities throughout the United States, despite significant advances in the socio-economic status of Negroes. . . .[8]

The trend has not yet been reversed despite F.H.A. administrative regulations and Supreme Court decisions.

The spatial isolation of Negroes from whites created Negro "communities." Within these Negro neighborhoods, church and school became the basic integrative institutions, and Negro entrepreneurs developed a variety of service enterprises—barbershops and beauty parlors, funeral homes and restaurants, pool parlors, taverns, and hotels—all selling to what came to be called "The Negro Market." Successful banking and insurance businesses also grew up within some Negro communities. A Negro "subculture" gradually emerged, national in scope, with distinctive variations upon the general American culture in the fields of literature, art, music, and dance, as well as in religious ritual and church polity.

The spatial isolation of Negroes from whites in "Black Belts" also

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increased consciousness of their separate subordinate position, for no whites were available to them as neighbors, schoolmates, or friends, but were present only in such roles as school teachers, policemen, and social workers, flat janitors and real-estate agents, merchants and bill collectors, skilled laborers involved in maintenance, and even a few white dentists and doctors with offices in the Black Belt. Such a situation inevitably generated anti-white sentiments (often with anti-Semitic overtones), and the pent-up feelings have occasionally erupted in anti-white riots. Normally, however, this intense racial consciousness finds expression in non-violent forms of social protest and is utilized by Negro leaders to sanction and reinforce Negro institutions and their own personal welfare. It has also lent powerful support to the segments of municipal political machines existing within Negro neighborhoods. As long as ghettos remain, race consciousness will be strong.

Residential segregation created the demographic and ecological basis for "balance of power" politics, since the possibility of a Negro bloc vote had to be recognized by both political parties. Northern Black Belt voters are not only occasionally the decisive factor in municipal elections, but have also sent a half-dozen Negroes to Congress. Indeed, it is ironic that one of the most effective weapons against segregation and discrimination in the South has been the political power generated in Negro precincts and wards of Northern Black Ghettos, thus reinforcing the direct action tactics of the civil rights movement. In the South, too, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and subsequent legislation, the political strength of newly enfranchised voters lies in their spatial concentration. There is some evidence that fear of this strength may operate as a factor in Northern cities to support "open occupancy," desegregation being considered preferable to Negro dominance.[9]

While the development of machine politics has brought some gains to Negro communities, it has also resulted in various forms of indirect victimization. Local Negro leaders often co-operate with the city-wide machine in the protection of "the rackets"—policy, dope, and prostitution—and sacrifice group welfare to personal gain for self and party. They have not hesitated, in some places, even to drag their heels in the fight for residential desegregation rather than risk wiping out the base of their power. Being saddled with a "bought leadership" is one of the greatest burdens Black Ghettos have had to bear. Economic victimization is widespread, too. In the "affluent society" of the sixties, consumption-oriented

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and given to the "hard sell," Negroes like other Americans are under social pressure to spend beyond their means. Given the lack of sophistication of many recent migrants and the very low median income of those with less than a high-school education, it is not surprising that loan sharks and dubious credit merchants (of all races) make the Black Ghetto a prime target. Negroes pay a high price for "protection" of the white middle-class way of life, since those who aspire to leave the ghetto are trapped, and those who are content to stay develop a limited and restricted view of the world in which they live.

Folkways and Classways Within the Black Ghetto

Black Ghettos in America are, on the whole, "run down" in appearance and overcrowded, and their inhabitants bear the physical and psychological scars of those whose "life chances" are not equal to those of other Americans. Like the European immigrants before them, they inherited the worst housing in the city. Within the past decade, the white "flight to the suburbs" has released relatively new and well-kept property on the margins of some of the old Black Belts. Here, "gilded ghettos" have grown up, indistinguishable from any other middle-class neighborhoods except by the color of the residents' skin.[10] The power mower in the yard, the steak grill on the rear lawn, a well stocked library and equally well stocked bar in the rumpus room—these mark the homes of well-to-do Negroes living in the more desirable portions of the Black Belt. Many of them would flee to suburbia, too, if housing were available to Negroes there.

But the character of the Black Ghetto is not set by the newer "gilded," not-yet run down portions of it, but by the older sections where unemployment rates are high and the masses of people work with their hands—where the median level of education is just above graduation from grade school and many of the people are likely to be recent migrants from rural areas.[11]

The "ghettoization" of the Negro has resulted in the emergence of a ghetto subculture with a distinctive ethos, most pronounced, perhaps, in Harlem, but recognizable in all Negro neighborhoods. For the average Negro who walks the streets of any American Black Ghetto, the smell of barbecued ribs, fried shrimps, and chicken emanating from numerous restaurants gives olfactory reinforcement to a feeling of "at-homeness." The beat of "gut music"

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spilling into the street from ubiquitous tavern juke boxes and the sound of tambourines and rich harmony behind the crude folk art on the windows of store-front churches give auditory confirmation to the universal belief that "We Negroes have 'soul.'" The bedlam of an occasional brawl, the shouted obscenities of street corner "foul mouths," and the whine of police sirens break the monotony of waiting for the number that never "falls," the horses that neither win, place, nor show, and the "good job" that never materializes. The insouciant swagger of teen-age drop-outs (the "cats") masks the hurt of their aimless existence and contrasts sharply with the ragged clothing and dejected demeanor of "skid-row" types who have long since stopped trying to keep up appearances and who escape it all by becoming "winoes." The spontaneous vigor of the children who crowd streets and playgrounds (with Cassius Clay, Ernie Banks, the Harlem Globe Trotters, and black stars of stage, screen, and television as their role models) and the cheerful rushing about of adults, free from the occupational pressures of the "white world" in which they work, create an atmosphere of warmth and superficial intimacy which obscures the unpleasant facts of life in the overcrowded rooms behind the doors, the lack of adequate maintenance standards, and the too prevalent vermin and rats.

This is a world whose urban "folkways" the upwardly mobile Negro middle class deplores as a "drag" on "The Race," which the upper classes wince at as an embarassment, and which race leaders point to as proof that Negroes have been victimized. But for the masses of the ghetto dwellers this is a warm and familiar milieu, preferable to the sanitary coldness of middle-class neighborhoods and a counterpart of the communities of the foreign-born, each of which has its own distinctive subcultural flavor. The arguments in the barbershop, the gossip in the beauty parlors, the "jiving" of bar girls and waitresses, the click of poolroom balls, the stomping of feet in the dance halls, the shouting in the churches are all *theirs*—and the white men who run the pawnshops, supermarts, drug stores, and grocery stores, the policemen on horseback, the teachers in blackboard jungles—all these are aliens, conceptualized collectively as "The Man," intruders on the Black Man's "turf." When an occasional riot breaks out, "The Man" and his property become targets of aggression upon which pent-up frustrations are vented. When someone during the Harlem riots of 1964 begged the street crowds to go home, the cry came back, "Baby, we *are* home!"

But the inhabitants of the Black Ghetto are not a homogeneous

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mass. Although, in Marxian terms, nearly all of them are "proletarians," with nothing to sell but their labor, variations in "life style" differentiate them into social classes based more upon differences in education and basic values (crystallized, in part, around occupational differences) than in meaningful differences in income. The American caste-class system has served, over the years, to concentrate the Negro population in the low-income sector of the economy. In 1961, six out of every ten Negro families had an income of less than $4000.00 per year. This situation among whites was just the reverse: six out of every ten white families had *over* $4000.00 a year at their disposal. (In the South, eight out of ten Negro families were below the $4000.00 level.) This is the income gap. Discrimination in employment creates a job ceiling, most Negroes being in blue-collar jobs.

With 60 per cent of America's Negro families earning less than $4000.00 a year, social strata emerge between the upper and lower boundaries of "no earned income" and $4000.00. Some families live a "middle-class style of life," placing heavy emphasis upon decorous public behavior and general respectability, insisting that their children "get an education" and "make something out of themselves." They prize family stability, and an unwed mother is something much more serious than "just a girl who had an accident"; pre-marital and extra-marital sexual relations, if indulged in at all, must be discreet. Social life is organized around churches and a welter of voluntary associations of all types, and, for women, "the cult of clothes" is so important that fashion shows are a popular fund raising activity even in churches. For both men and women, owning a home and going into business are highly desired goals, the former often being a realistic one, the latter a mere fantasy.

Within the same income range, and not always at the lower margin of it, other families live a "lower-class life-style" being part of the "organized" lower class, while at the lowest income levels an "unorganized" lower class exists whose members tend always to become *dis*organized—functioning in an anomic situation where gambling, excessive drinking, the use of narcotics, and sexual promiscuity are prevalent forms of behavior, and violent interpersonal relations reflect an ethos of suspicion and resentment which suffuses this deviant subculture. It is within this milieu that criminal and semi-criminal activities burgeon.

The "organized" lower class is oriented primarily around churches whose preachers, often semi-literate, exhort them to "be

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in the 'world' but not of it." Conventional middle-class morality and Pauline Puritanism are preached, although a general attitude of "the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak" prevails except among a minority fully committed to the Pentecostal sects. They boast, "We *live* the life"—a way of life that has been portrayed with great insight by James Baldwin in *Go Tell it on the Mountain* and *The Fire Next Time.*

Young people with talent find wide scope for expressing it in choirs, quartets, and sextets which travel from church to church (often bearing colorful names like The Four Heavenly Trumpets or the Six Singing Stars of Zion) and sometimes traveling from city to city. Such groups channel their aggressions in widely advertised "Battles of Song" and develop their talent in church pageants such as "Heaven Bound" or "Queen Esther" and fund-raising events where winners are crowned King and Queen. These activities provide fun as well as a testing ground for talent. Some lucky young church people eventually find their fortune in the secular world as did singers Sam Cooke and Nat King Cole, while others remain in the church world as nationally known gospel singers or famous evangelists.

Adults as well as young people find satisfaction and prestige in serving as ushers and deacons, "mothers," and deaconesses, Sunday-school teachers and choir leaders. National conventions of Negro denominations and national societies of ushers and gospel singers not only develop a continent-wide nexus of associations within the organized lower class, but also throw the more ambitious and capable individuals into meaningful contact with middle-class church members who operate as role models for the less talented persons who seek to move upward. That prestige and sometimes money come so easily in these circles may be a factor militating against a pattern of delaying gratifications and seeking mobility into professional and semi-professional pursuits through higher education.

Lower-class families and institutions are constantly on the move, for in recent years the Negro lower class has suffered from projects to redevelop the inner city. By historic accident, the decision to check the expansion of physical deterioration in metropolitan areas came at a time when Negroes were the main inhabitants of substandard housing. (If urban redevelopment had been necessary sixty years ago immigrants, not Negroes, would have suffered.) In protest against large-scale demolition of areas where they live, Negroes have coined a slogan, "Slum clearance is Negro clearance."

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They resent the price in terms of the inconvenience thrust upon them in order to redevelop American cities,[12] and the evidence shows that, in some cities, there is no net gain in improved housing after relocation.

At the opposite pole from the Negro lower class in both life styles and life chances is the small Negro upper class whose solid core is a group in the professions, along with well-to-do businessmen who have had some higher education, but including, also, a scattering of individuals who have had college training but do not have a job commensurate with their education. These men and their spouses and children form a cohesive upper-class stratum in most Negro communities. Within this group are individuals who maintain some type of contact—though seldom any social relations—with members of the local white power élite; but whether or not they participate in occupational associations with their white peers depends upon the region of the country in which they live. (It is from this group that Negro "Exhibit A's" are recruited when white liberals are carrying on campaigns to "increase interracial understanding.") They must always think of themselves as symbols of racial advancement as well as individuals, and they often provide the basic leadership at local levels for organizations such as the N.A.A.C.P. and the Urban League. They must lend sympathetic support to the more militant civil rights organizations, too, by financial contributions, if not action.[13]

The life styles of the Negro upper class are similar to those of the white upper *middle* class, but it is only in rare instances that Negroes have been incorporated into the clique and associational life of this group or have intermarried into it. (Their participation in activities of the white upper class occurs more often than with those whites who have similar life styles because of Negro upper-class participation as members of various civic boards and interracial associations to which wealthy white people contribute.) Living "well" with highly developed skills, having enough money to travel, Negroes at this social level do not experience victimization in the same fashion as do the members of the lower class. Their victimization flows primarily from the fact that the social system keeps them "half in and half out," preventing the free and easy contact with their occupational peers which they need; and it often keeps them from making the kind of significant intellectual and social contributions to the national welfare that they might make if they were white. (They are also forced to experience various types of nervous

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strain and dissipation of energy over petty annoyances and deprivations which only the sensitive and the cultivated feel. Most barbershops, for instance, are not yet desegrated, and taxi drivers, even in the North, sometimes refuse Negro passengers.)

The Negro upper class has created a social world of its own in which a universe of discourse and uniformity of behavior and outlook are maintained by the interaction on national and local levels of members of Negro Greek-letter fraternities and sororities, college and alumni associations, professional associations, and civic and social clubs. It is probable that if all caste barriers were dropped, a large proportion of the Negro upper class would welcome complete social integration, and that these all-Negro institutions would be left in the hands of the Negro middle class, as the most capable and sophisticated Negroes moved into the orbit of the general society. Their sense of pride and dignity does not even allow them to imagine such a fate, and they pursue their social activities and play their roles as "race leaders" with little feeling of inferiority or deprivation, but always with a tragic sense of the irony of it all.

The Negro middle class covers a very wide income range, and whatever cohesion it has comes from the network of churches and social clubs to which many of its members devote a great deal of time and money. What sociologists call the Negro middle class is merely a collection of people who have similar life styles and aspirations, whose basic goals are "living well," being "respectable," and not being crude. Middle-class Negroes, by and large, are not concerned about mobility into the Negro upper class or integration with whites. They want their "rights" and "good jobs," as well as enough money to get those goods and services which make life comfortable. They want to expand continuously their level of consumption. But they also desire "decent" schools for their children, and here the degree of victimization experienced by Negroes is most clear and the ambivalence toward policies of change most sharp. Ghetto schools are, on the whole, inferior. In fact, some of the most convincing evidence that residential segregation perpetuates inequality can be found by comparing data on school districts in Northern urban areas where *de facto* school segregation exists. (Table 1 presents such data for Chicago in 1962.)

Awareness of the poor quality of education grew as the protest movement against *de facto* school segregation in the North gathered momentum. But while the fight was going on, doubt about the desirability of forcing the issue was always present within some sec-

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tions of the broad Negro middle class. Those in opposition asked, "Are we not saying that our teachers can't teach our own children as well as whites can, or that our children can't learn unless they're around whites? Aren't we insulting ourselves?" Those who want to stress Negro history and achievement and to use the schools to build race pride also express doubts about the value of mixed schools. In fact, the desirability of race consciousness and racial solidarity seems to be taken for granted in this stratum; and sometimes there

TABLE 1. Comparison of White, Integrated and Negro Schools in Chicago: 1962

	Type of School		
Indices of Comparison	*White*	*Integrated*	*Negro*
Total appropriation per pupil	$342.00	$320.00	$269.00
Annual teachers' salary per pupil	256.00	231.00	220.00
Per cent uncertified teachers	12.00	23.00	49.00
No. of pupils per classroom	30.95	34.95	46.80
Library resource books per pupil	5.00	3.50	2.50
Expenditures per pupil other than teachers' salaries.	86.00	90.00	49.00

Adapted from a table in the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights report, *Public Schools, Negro and White* (Washington, D. C., 1962), pp. 241–248.

is an expression of contempt for the behavior of whites of their own and lower income levels. In the present period one even occasionally hears a remark such as "Who'd want to be integrated with *those* awful white people?"

Marxist critics would dismiss the whole configuration of Negro folkways and classways as a subculture which reinforces "false consciousness," which prevents Negroes from facing the full extent of their victimization, which keeps them from ever focusing upon what they could be because they are so busy enjoying what they are—or rationalizing their subordination and exclusion. Gunnar Myrdal, in *An American Dilemma,* goes so far as to refer to the Negro community as a "pathological" growth within American society.[14] Some novelists and poets, on the other hand, romanticize it, and some Black Nationalists glorify it. A sober analysis of the civil rights movement would suggest, however, that the striking fact about all levels of the Negro community is the absence of "false consciousness," and the presence of a keen awareness of the extent of their victimization, as well as knowledge of the forces

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which maintain it. Not lack of knowledge but a sense of powerlessness is the key to the Negro reaction to the caste-class system.

Few Negroes believe that Black Ghettos will disappear within the next two decades despite much talk about "open occupancy" and "freedom of residence." There is an increasing tendency among Negroes to discuss what the quality of life could be within Negro communities as they grow larger and larger. At one extreme this interest slides over into Black Nationalist reactions such as the statement by a Chicago Negro leader who said, "Let all of the white people flee to the suburbs. We'll show them that the Black Man can run the second largest city in America better than the white man. Let them go. If any of them want to come back and integrate with *us* we'll accept them."

It is probable that the Black Belts of America will increase in size rather than decrease during the next decade, for no city seems likely to commit itself to "open occupancy" (although a committee in New York has been discussing a ten-year plan for dismantling Harlem).[15] And even if a race-free market were to appear Negroes would remain segregated unless drastic changes took place in the job ceiling and income gap. Controlled integration will probably continue, with a few upper- and upper-middle-class Negroes trickling into the suburbs and into carefully regulated mixed neighborhoods and mixed buildings within the city limits.[16] The basic problem of the next decade will be how to change Black Ghettos into relatively stable and attractive "colored communities." Here the social implications of low incomes become decisive.

Social Implications of the Job Ceiling and the Income Gap

Nowhere is direct victimization of Negroes more apparent than with respect to the job ceiling and the income gap; but indirect victimization which is a consequence of direct victimization is often less obvious. For instance, it has been mentioned that family incomes for Negroes are lower than for whites; but family income figures are inadequate tools for careful sociological analysis unless we know which, and how many, members of a family labor to earn a given income. In 1960, half of the white families were being supported by a husband only, while just a few more than a third of the Negro families could depend solely upon the earnings of one male breadwinner. In six out of ten nonwhite families where both a husband and wife were present, two or more persons worked; yet less

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than half of the white families had both husband and wife working. But even in those families which commanded an income of over $7,000.00 a year, twice as many nonwhite wives had to help earn it as white.[17] One not unimportant consequence is that a smaller proportion of Negro than white wives at this income level can play roles of unpaid volunteers in civic and social work, a fact which should be remembered by those who criticize Negroes in these income brackets for not doing more to "elevate their own people."

One of the most important effects of the income gap and the job ceiling has been the shaping of social class systems within Negro communities which differ markedly in their profiles from those of the surrounding white society. Negro class structure is "pyramidal," with a large lower class, a somewhat smaller middle class, and a tiny upper class (made up of people whose income and occupations would make them only middle class in the white society). White class profiles tend to be "diamond shaped," with small lower and upper classes and a large middle class. Unpromising "life chances" are reflected in inferior "life styles," and Black Ghettos are on the whole "rougher" and exhibit a higher degree of social disorganization than do white communities.

The job ceiling and the income gap do not create classways—for these reflect educational levels and cultural values, as well as the economic situation—but job ceiling and income gap do set the limits for realization of class values. It is a fact of American life (whether one approves of it or not) that as long as Negroes are predominantly lower-class they will, as a group, have low esteem. Yet, Negroes are victimized in the sense that the job ceiling and the income gap make it more difficult for them than for whites to maintain middle-class standards equivalent to those obtaining among whites. A given life style demands a minimum level of income, but it is evident that Negroes are victimized in the sense that their effort as reflected in the acquisition of an education does not bring equal rewards in terms of purchasing power, for they have less to spend than their white counterparts at any given educational level. Nonwhite family heads in 1960 had a smaller median income than whites for every educational level. (See Table 2.)[18]

In a sense, getting an education "pays off" for Negroes as for all other Americans; but while some individuals "get ahead" of other Negroes, education has not yet raised their earning power to the level of whites with equivalent training. In fact, the average income for a nonwhite family with a male head who had finished high

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TABLE 2. White and Nonwhite Median Family Income by Educational Level, 1960: U.S.A.

Amount of Education in Yrs. of School Completed	*White*	*Nonwhite*
Elementary School		
Less than 8 years	$3,656	$2,294
8 years	4,911	3,338
High School		
1–3 years	5,882	3,449
4 years	6,370	4,559
College		
1–3 years	7,344	5,525
4 or more years	9,315	7,875

school was less than that of a white male head who had finished only the eighth grade. Since any aspects of the caste-class system which make it more difficult for Negroes than for whites to achieve middle-class norms of family behavior retard the process of eventual "integration," the income differential and the necessity for more members of the family to work operate in this negative fashion. Even more serious in determining deviations from general middle-class family norms is the manner in which both income distribution and the occupational structure function to reinforce the number of families without fathers and to lower the prestige of Negro males *vis-à-vis* their mates, prospective mates, and children. Thus a pattern of male insecurity which originated under slavery persists into the present. In fact, the struggle of Negro men, viewed as a group, to attain economic parity with Negro women has, up to the present, been a losing fight. Norval Glenn, in an exhaustive study of this problem,[19] has concluded that "Among full-time workers, non-white females were, in 1959, less disadvantaged relative to whites than were non-white males." Women were obtaining employment at a relatively faster rate than men and sustained a more rapid proportionate increase in income between 1939 and 1959. According to Glenn, there was an actual reversal in the income growth pattern of Negro males and females during a twenty-year period, and he notes that if their respective rates remain the same it will take twice as long for Negro males to catch up with white males as for Negro women to catch up with white women (93 years to achieve occupational equality and 219 to achieve equality of income). This is a case of *relative* deprivation, of course, but is significant nevertheless. An impressive body of evidence indicates that rather seri-

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ous personality distortions result from the female dominance so prevalent in the Negro subculture, since the general norms of the larger society stress the opposite pattern as more desirable.

The interplay between caste evaluations and economic and ecological factors has tended not only to concentrate a low-income Negro population within ghettos, but has also concentrated a significant proportion of them in vast public housing projects—sometimes "high rise." In the 1930's public housing projects were often exciting experiments in interracial living, but there has been a tendency in many cities for them to become ghettos within ghettos. Within housing projects as well as out, a small hard core of mothers without husbands and a larger group of youth without jobs are developing a pattern which social psychologist Frederick Strodtbeck has called "the poverty-dependency syndrome." Here and there an integrated program of professional family services has proved its usefulness, but, in general, family case-work becomes a mere "holding operation."

Only the future will tell whether a large-scale "Poverty Program" coordinated through federally sponsored agencies will break the interlocking vicious circles which now victimize urban Negro populations. The dominant pattern in the American economic system has never been one of racial segregation. In fact, the racial division of labor has always involved considerable close personal contact, while demanding that Negroes play subordinate occupational roles carrying the lesser rewards in terms of economic power and social prestige. Doctrines of racial inferiority originated as dogmas to defend the use of African slave labor and were later used by white workers to defend their own privileged position against Negro competition. Trade union restrictionism reinforces employer preference in maintaining a job ceiling. Often, even when an employer decided it was profitable to use Negro labor, white workers used intimidation or violence against both white employer and black employee.

Access to new roles in the economic structure has occurred during periods of a great shortage of labor, as in the North during both world wars. Negroes entered at the bottom of the hierarchy, but were "last hired and first fired." Yet the job ceiling *was* raised, and, beginning with the organization of industrial unions in the 1930's and reaching a climax in the civil rights movement of the 1960's, ideological factors have reinforced economic interest in breaking the job ceiling. Now, for the first time in American his-

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tory the full weight of top leadership in labor, industry, and government has been thrown in the direction of "fair employment practices," and public opinion is tolerating an all-out drive against job discrimination (partly because the economy is still expanding). Yet so drastic are the effects of the past victimization of the Negro that any decisive alteration in the caste-class structure without more drastic measures seems remote. Thomas Pettigrew, after an analysis of recent changes, concludes:

> At the creeping 1950-1960 rate of change, non-whites in the United States would not attain equal proportional representation among clerical workers until 1992, among skilled workers until 2005, among professionals until 2017, among sales workers until 2114, and among business managers and proprietors until 2730![20]

"In Sickness and in Death"

The consequences of being at the bottom in a caste-class system are revealed clearly in comparative studies of morbidity, mortality, and longevity, the latter being a particularly sensitive index to the physical well-being of groups. Comparing Negroes and whites with respect to longevity, Thomas Pettigrew notes that:

> At the turn of this century, the average non-white American at birth had a life expectancy between 32 and 35 years, 16 years less than that of the average white American. By 1960, this life expectancy had risen from 61 to 66 years. . . . But while the percentage gain in life expectancy for Negroes over these sixty odd years has been twice that of whites, there is still a discrepancy of six to eight years. . . .[21]

In other words, Negroes were "catching up," but, as a Department of Labor study pointed out in 1962, they ". . . had arrived by 1959 at about the longevity average attained by whites in 1940."[22] They were twenty years behind in the race toward equality of longevity.

Differences in longevity reflect differences in morbidity rates. Among the communicable diseases, for instance, the Negro tuberculosis rate is three times greater than that of whites, and the rates for pneumonia and influenza are also higher. The incidence of venereal disease is substantially higher among Negroes, although the Public Health Service figure of a syphilis rate ten times larger than that for whites has been questioned in Dr. Ann Pettigrew's study.[23] Twice as many Negro children per thousand as white children suffer from measles, meningitis, diphtheria, and scarlet fever. Given such differences between Negroes and whites in the incidence of

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specific diseases, it is not surprising to find that the *death* rate from childhood diseases is six times higher among Negroes than whites and that the tuberculosis death rate is four times higher in all age-groups.[24]

The analysis of mortality rates provides one tool for studying the effects of the caste-class system which victimizes the Negro population. A United States government report for the year 1963 noted that "The age pattern of mortality . . . as in previous years, is similar for each of the color-sex groups—high rates in infancy, lower rates until the minimum is reached during grade-school age, then rising rates for the older age-groups."[25] Although the *pattern* was the same, there were racial differentials in the actual rates; for instance, "The relative increases in the 1963 death rates over the prior years were slightly greater for non-white persons than for white. . . ." There were other differentials too.

The death rate among mothers at childbirth in 1963 was four times greater for nonwhites than for whites (96.9 deaths per 100,000 live births to 24.0). The death rate of nonwhite babies during the first year after birth was almost double the rate for white babies (46.6 per thousand to 25.3 per thousand for males and 36.7 to 19.0 for females.) Prenatal hazards were, as in previous years, greater for nonwhites than for whites. Up to the age of five the nonwhite death rate was twice that for whites, and for older age-groups varied from two to four times the white rate.

Using broad categories of classification, the U. S. National Center for Health Statistics reported in 1963 that "the three chief causes of death—diseases of heart, malignant neoplasms [Cancer], and vascular lesions affecting central nervous system account for three fifths of all deaths. They are also the chief causes of death for each color-sex group."[26] Here, too, racial differentials exist, the nonwhite to white death ratios being: (a) diseases of heart (333.9/100,000 to 277.9); (b) malignant neoplasms (145.2/100,000 to 123.7); (c) vascular lesions of central nervous system (133.4/100,000 to 71.3). A comparison of deaths from specific diseases and from other causes also reveals racial differentials and the pattern of indifferences suggests a relationship between high rates and low socio-economic status.

If the ten leading causes of death in 1963 for nonwhites and whites are compared by sex, the results of indirect victimization of Negroes are apparent: Those diseases which rate highest as causes of death are found disproportionately among lower-class families,

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those who suffer from poor nutrition, overcrowded housing, hazardous occupations, and inadequate medical care. Table 3 presents rates for ten leading causes of death for males:

TABLE 3. The Ten Leading Causes of Death: Males, U.S.A., 1963

	Nonwhite		*White*	
Causes of Death	*Rate*	*Rank*	*Rate*	*Rank*
Diseases of the heart	330.6	1	444.8	1
Vascular lesions of Central Nervous System	116.8	2	100.5	2
Certain diseases of early infancy	81.8	3	34.3	7
Influenza and pneumonia	70.6	4	39.3	5
Hypertensive heart disease	61.1	5	24.1	9
Accidents other than motor vehicle	57.9	6	37.8	6
Cancer of digestive organs	51.1	7	54.1	3
Symptoms-senility and ill-defined conditions	42.1	8	10.9†	—
Motor vehicle accidents	36.7	9	34.4	8
Homicide	35.7	10	3.9†	—
Cancer of respiratory system	34.5*	—	43.7	4
Diabetes mellitus	13.9*	—	14.2	10

* Not among first ten for nonwhites
†Not among first ten for whites

Among males, certain causes of death directly related to standard of living affect nonwhites two to four times more frequently than whites: (a) certain diseases of early infancy (2.38×); (b) influenza and pneumonia (1.79×); and (c) "symptoms-senility and ill-defined conditions" (3.86×). The last named "cause" does not even appear among the first ten for whites. (See Table 4.)

Two causes of death on the list for nonwhite males are probably directly related to the caste situation. The death rate for hypertensive heart disease is over twice that for whites and ranks fifth as a cause of death, compared to ninth for whites. Thomas Pettigrew, commenting on all types of hypertension, notes that some students feel that it is related to "psychosocial influences" and that, with regard to the high rates for Negroes, " . . . the problem of repressing hostility against whites . . . may be an important factor."[27] A homicide death rate nine times higher than that for whites, and appearing among the ten leading causes of death for nonwhite males, reflects the overt terror in the Black Belt, the explosions of in-caste aggression, and the anomic lower-class situation, as well as the distinctive ethos of the Negro subculture where crimes of passion among the lower-class are not condemned to the extent that they are in some other segments of American society.

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Of the ten leading causes of death among nonwhite males, eight are also leading causes of death for white males, but in the case of six of these the nonwhite rate is higher (diseases of the heart and cancer of digestive organs being the exceptions). The extent of the difference is indicated in Table 4.

TABLE 4. Comparison of Death Rates for Nonwhites and Whites, by Sex, for the Ten Leading Causes of Death for Each Color-Sex Group

Degree of Difference Between Rates	*Males*		*Females*	
	Cause of Death	*Ratio of Nonwhite to White Rates*	*Cause of Death*	*Ratio of Nonwhite to White Rates*
Very much higher for Nonwhites	Homicide†	9.14	None	
Considerably higher for Nonwhites	Symptoms—Senility, and ill-defined conditions†	3.86	Symptoms—Senility, and ill-defined conditions†	4.35
	Certain diseases of early infancy	2.38	Certain diseases of early infancy	2.56
	Hypertensive heart disease	2.12	Hypertensive heart disease	2.09
Somewhat higher for Nonwhites	Influenza and pneumonia (except pneumonia of newborn)	1.79	Influenza and pneumonia (except pneumonia of newborn)	1.68
	Accidents other than motor vehicle accidents	1.37	Diabetes mellitus	1.38
	Vascular lesions affecting central nervous system	1.16	Cancer of genital organs	1.17
	Motor vehicle accident	1.07	Accidents*	1.15
			Vascular lesions affecting central nervous system	1.08
Lower for Nonwhites	Diabetes mellitus*	.97	Diseases of the heart	.84
	Cancer of digestive organs	.94	Cancer of digestive organs†	.71
	Cancer of respiratory system*	.78	Cancer of the breast	.67
	Diseases of the heart	.73		

* Among ten top-ranking causes for whites but not for nonwhites
† Among ten top-ranking causes for nonwhites but not for whites

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The prenatal period is much more serious for nonwhite male babies than white, death rates for "certain diseases of infancy" (birth injuries, infections, and so forth) ranking seventh as a cause of death for white males, but only third for nonwhites.

The section of Table 4 dealing with females indicates that nonwhite women are also more vulnerable to death from pneumonia and influenza, hypertension, diseases of early infancy, and "senility and ill-defined conditions" than are white women and to the same degree as nonwhite males. Deaths from "deliveries and complications of pregnancy, childbirth, and the puerperium" are not a major cause of death for any American women but for the 1,466 cases reported for 1963 the nonwhite rate was over five times that for whites (5.6 to 1.0). Anemias, too, are not prime killers, but nonwhite women have more than their share of death from this cause (3.0/1,000 to 1.7), with the same situation obtaining from asthma (3.2 to 1.8), and gastric ailments (7.2 to 3.9). Table 5 summarizes the data for the ten leading causes of death among women. The diseases of infancy rank fourth as a cause of death among nonwhite women and ninth among white women, a similar situation to that involving males. On the other hand, while the nonwhite female hypertension rate is twice that of whites, the rank order as a cause of death is not very different.

TABLE 5. The Ten Leading Causes of Death: Females, U.S.A., 1963

	Nonwhite		*White*	
Causes of Death	*Rate*	*Rank*	*Rate*	*Rank*
Diseases of the heart	262.2	1	312.1	1
Vascular lesions of central nervous system	120.4	2	110.9	2
Hypertensive heart disease	67.0	3	32.0	5
Certain diseases of early infancy	58.1	4	22.7	9
Influenza and pneumonia	51.0	5	30.3	6
Accidents	38.1	6	33.0	4
Cancer of digestive organs	32.1	7	45.5	3
Symptoms-Senility, and ill-defined conditions	30.9	8	7.1†	—
Cancer of genital organs	28.2	9	24.0	8
Diabetes mellitus	25.4	10	19.2	10
Cancer of the breast	18.2	—*	27.0	7

* Not among first ten for nonwhites
† Not among first ten for whites

In addition to an analysis of the ten leading causes of death, other 1963 death rates reflect the low socio-economic status and the influences of the Negro subculture. Of the 6,835 who died from tu-

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berculosis, three and one-half times as many nonwhites as whites succumbed. Only about 2,000 deaths from syphilis occurred, but nonwhites were over-represented four to one.

As for a group of deaths from children's diseases, the pattern of over-representation for nonwhites also prevails. (See Table 6.)

TABLE 6. Number of Deaths and Rates for Whites and Nonwhites, for Certain Children's Diseases: U.S.A., 1963

Diseases	*Cases*	*Nonwhite*	*White*
Whooping Cough	115	.3	.0
Scarlet Fever	102	.1	.0
Diphtheria	45	.1	.0
Measles	364	.4	.2

It was once both fashionable and scientifically respectable to explain these differences in terms of differential racial susceptibility to various diseases, but as Thomas Pettigrew points out:

> The many improvements in his situation since 1900 rendered a dramatic increment in the Negro's health, providing solid evidence that corrosive poverty and inadequate medical care were the reasons for his short life span in the past. . . . this difference [between Negro and white rates] can be traced to the diseases which are treatable, preventable and unnecessary.[28]

This is now the generally accepted view among serious students of the problem, and "corrosive poverty" and "inadequate medical care" are aspects of the victimization to which Negroes have been subjected. Further improvement in the health status of Negroes depends upon the eradication of poverty and all its accompanying side effects as well as upon access to adequate medical care.

Much of the "corrosive poverty" has been associated with life in the cotton fields, the logging camps, the mines, and the small-town slums of a poverty-stricken South. Conditions were bad for most people, and the caste-system made them worse for the Negro. Dr. Ann Pettigrew has presented convincing evidence that the massive shift of Negro population into Northern and Western cities during the past two decades has resulted in some health gains for the Negro, and these gains have been due largely to greater access to medical advice and medical care.[29] But, the differentials are still large, even in the North, especially for tuberculosis, pneumonia, and venereal diseases. "Ghettoization," with its associated overcrowding, has been one important factor in keeping these rates high; but for these, as well as for other ailments, hospital discrimi-

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nation is a primary factor limiting access to adequate medical care.

Patterns of discrimination and segregation by hospitals are prevalent throughout the country. A report prepared in 1962 for circulation to members of the National Medical Association (an organization of Negro physicians)[80] summarized the hospital situation in a sentence, "Things are bad all over," and the report included the bitter comment that "Hospitals under religious auspices have been the most vicious in discrimination." Conditions were worst in the South where the caste-system has not yet been shattered. In Birmingham, Alabama, for instance, a city of 750,000 people half of whom are Negro, only 1,100 beds were available for whites, and only 500 for Negroes. In Atlanta, Georgia, the South's most progressive city, 4,000 beds were available for whites, but only 600 for Negroes. (Nonwhites were 22.8 per cent of the population of the metropolitan area.) In Augusta, Georgia, a smaller city, twelve beds were set aside for Negroes in the basement of the white hospital but there were no beds for Negro pediatrics or obstetrics patients. The Hill-Burton Act under which federal funds may be secured for aid in building hospitals has a non-discrimination clause, but, generally, it has been evaded or ignored in the South. In one large Texas city a new $6,000,000 hospital constructed with federal aid refused to admit any Negroes until threatened with a suit. (The National Medical Association report emphasized that it was a Catholic hospital.) In Richmond, Virginia, a new "treatment center" accepted Negroes only as out-patients. By 1962, about 2,000 hospitals had been built in the South with federal assistance, and of these 98 would accept no Negroes, while the others stayed within the letter of the law by providing as little space for them as possible. In the few places where Negro physicians are practicing, they usually find it impossible to have their patients hospitalized under their own care since they cannot become members of hospital staffs. (In Elizabeth City, North Carolina, a Negro physician was recently taken on a staff after thirty-two annual applications.) Most Southern local medical societies bar Negroes from membership. (In South Carolina, however, twenty-five of the sixty-five Negro doctors belong to the state medical association, but must hold separate sessions. They can join local societies only if they will agree in advance to stay away from social functions.)

In the more fluid ethnic-class system in the North, patterns of discrimination and segregation vary from city to city. At one extreme is Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, of which the National Medical

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Association report simply says, "No hospital problems." A similar assessment is made of Philadelphia. In Gary, Indiana, after a prolonged fight, 85 per cent of the Negro physicians were placed on the staff of some formerly all-white hospitals. When the National Medical Association says that "There is no hospital problem" in these cities, what it really means is that Negro physicians no longer find it difficult to have their patients hospitalized. But the Negro masses still face other problems; for, insofar as they are disproportionately represented in low-income groups, more of them are "charity" patients and must face the more subtle forms of victimization which the poor face everywhere in American hospitals—less careful attention to their needs, psychological and physical, than private patients receive. There is substantial evidence from studies made in one Northern city that such patients are more frequently handled by medical students and interns than by fully trained doctors, and there is reliable statistical evidence indicating that more infants die on the wards than in the rooms of private patients. As important as it is to insist upon the right of Negro doctors to take their patients into hospitals which formerly barred them, other aspects of the Negro health problem must be dealt with, too.

The city of Chicago, with its 900,000 Negroes rigidly segregated into ghettos, reveals the full dimensions of the problem. As recently as 1960 there were no more than 500 beds available to Negroes in private hospitals—one-half bed per 1000 Negroes as compared with 4.5 beds per 1000 whites. A distinguished Negro physician serving as Chairman of a Committee to End Discrimination in Medical Institutions released a statement to the press in October, 1963, in which he said that only thirty-three out of eighty private hospitals admitted Negroes and that:

> Many of these do so on a segregated and discriminating basis. . . . Some hospitals which do admit Negroes place them in the oldest rooms, in basements, in all-Negro wings and often have a quota system limiting the number of Negro patients they will accept. . . . when a Negro becomes ill, he knows he will be accepted at County hospital and is in no mood to have to fight to gain admittance to a private hospital where he will be discriminated against.[31]

The Negro physicians, however, did take up the issue by insisting upon staff appointments so they could take their own patients into these hospitals and insure adequate care for them.

The fight began seriously in 1955 with the passage of an anti-discrimination bill in the City Council and a plea for compliance by

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Cardinal Stritch. In 1960, after five years of publicity and pleading, only twenty-one of the two hundred fifteen Negro physicians in Chicago held appointments on any private hospital staff outside of the Black Belt, these being at twenty-one of the sixty-eight hospitals of this type. At this point the Mayor appointed a special committee to work on the problem, and a group of ten Negro doctors filed suit under the Sherman and Clayton anti-trust acts against fifty-six hospitals, the Illinois Hospital Association, the Chicago Medical Society, the Chicago Hospital Council, and the Illinois Corporations operating Blue Cross and Blue Shield medical prepayment plans. They took this action, they said, "to thwart the more subtle and sophisticated techniques" being used to evade the issue.[32]

In response to these pressures (and to the general atmosphere regarding civil rights), forty-two of the sixty-eight hospitals in the city had given one hundred two staff appointments to sixty-four of the city's two hundred twenty-five Negro doctors by 1965. (Only eighty-eight of these, however, "permit the physician to admit his private patients.") The downward trend in the number of Negro physicians choosing to practice in Chicago was arrested. For a city which ranked only fourth from the bottom among fourteen cities on degree of hospital integration, the breakthrough has been a major victory.[33] One measure of the extent of the Negro's victimization is the fact that scores of physicians had to spend their money and invest time which could have been devoted to research or professional development in fighting for access to hospital facilities.

The victory of the Chicago Negro doctors has alleviated the plight of paying patients who now have a wider choice of hospitals, though not necessarily closer to their homes. (Because of the fear of being "swamped" by Negro patients, some hospitals near the Black Belt have interposed stronger barriers against Negro doctors than have those farther away.) As early as 1949, a health survey of Chicago pointed out that "A serious problem faced by the Blue Cross Plan for hospital care in this area is its inability to fulfil its obligations to the 50,000 Negro subscribers, since they are not accepted by all the member hospitals. . . . Many of the subscribers must be admitted to Cook County Hospital under the guise of emergencies. . . ." Six years later, the Packinghouse Workers Civic and Community Committee complained that "Our union has struggled and won hospital benefits for all our members, but a great number of UPWA-CIO members who are Negroes are being cheated out of

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those benefits. . . ." With over 100,000 insured Negroes and less than 1,000 beds available to them in private hospitals they are still being cheated, and not they alone.[34]

Chicago Negroes have been forced by hospital discrimination to use the facilities of four or five hospitals within the Black Belt and the large but overcrowded Cook County Hospital which should be serving only those who cannot pay and emergency cases. By 1960, almost two-thirds of all the Negro babies delivered in a hospital were being born at Cook County. Some white hospitals near the Black Ghetto closed down their maternity wards rather than serve Negroes. A prominent white physician delivering an address in 1960 in favor of widening access to hospital care stressed that this was unfair both to the paying patients who were denied the right to choose and to the indigent who were being deprived of space at the Cook County Hospital by Negroes who could pay. He said:

> Cook County Hospital is even being used to absorb a large number of Negro patients unwanted by the voluntary hospitals even though they may be able and willing to pay . . . the Chicago public would not tolerate this misuse of a tax-supported hospital. . . . for an equivalent number of non-Negro patients. . . .[35]

Placing Negroes on the hospital staffs has not solved the fundamental problem of the shortage of beds available to a rapidly expanding Negro population. To build new hospital facilities in the Black Belt *before* eliminating segregation in *all* hospitals would be considered bad strategy by most Negro leaders and a "sell-out" by the militants. The Chicago paradigm has general relevance and is not applicable only to the local scene.

Hospital discrimination is only one facet of a complex process involving both direct and indirect victimization which leads to a lower level of physical and mental well-being among Negroes and which is reflected in morbidity and mortality rates. Health hazards for most of the Negro population begin even before birth, and they affect both mother and child. These hazards are greatest in the rural South, but they exist in urban situations as well, both Northern and Southern. Premature births occurred 50 per cent more frequently among Negroes than among whites during 1958-1959 and maternal mortality rates among Negroes were four times higher.[36] A higher proportion of Negro mothers failed to receive prenatal care, and a higher proportion died in childbirth. The most authoritative testimony on the disadvantaged position of the Negro expectant

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mother has been supplied by an eminent obstetrician, Dr. Philip F. Williams, who has called attention to the fact that "one survey of maternal mortality is cited which found errors in judgment and technique as well as neglect on the part of the physician, as much as fifty per cent more frequently in the case of Negro than white mothers." He pointed out, too, that Negro women who were pregnant and those who had babies were victims of a set of interlocking conditions which included a lack of concern by husbands and putative fathers, a relatively high exposure to gonorrhea and syphilis, and, in the South ". . . a scarcity of physicians that has resulted in an inferior grade of attendance at birth (the untrained midwife). . . ."[37] In both North and South, hospital facilities are still inadequate and all of these factors combine to create a situation " . . . more or less adversely affecting the chances of survival of the Negro mother at childbirth." They affect the chances of the baby's surviving, too. Studies made soon after World War II revealed that, for Negroes as compared with whites, fewer Negro babies were delivered in hospitals and therefore more of them died at birth or during the first year after (and more died before they could be born, too). Immunization of children was less common among Negroes and childhood diseases more prevalent and more often fatal.[38] Negro children, on the average, received fewer of the benefits of deliberately planned feeding, and fewer parents, in proportion, ate according to the more advanced nutritional standards.

Insofar as the job ceiling, the income gap, and Ghettoization preserve and reinforce lower-class behavior patterns among Negroes to a greater extent than in the general society, the general health status of the Negro will be affected. For instance, a less adequate nutritional level than is found among whites is one factor often cited in accounting for the poorer average health status of Negroes. It is conceivable that Negroes could improve their nutritional status immediately by altering their present patterns of food consumption, but this is likely to occur less as a result of education and propaganda than as a by-product of changes in the caste-class situation. Except in wartime or during depressions, food habits are among the most difficult to change, unless change is related to mobility strivings. Maximizing the opportunity for Negroes to achieve the values and norms of the general American middle class is likely to do more to change the eating habits of the Negro population than all of the written or spoken exhortations of home economists or the most seductive of television commercials. A shift in social

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class supplies the motivation to change, and such a shift is dependent upon an increase in the number and proportion of Negroes entering white-collar occupations.

Maintaining a style of living consonant with any occupational roles demands a minimum level of income. Success in improving the health status of the Negro population may ultimately depend upon an indirect rather than a frontal assault. One student of the problem gives us a clue to the strategy when he observes that ". . . the much lower income level of the American Negro, to the extent that it is a measure of standard of living, explains, in part at least, the differences in health status and longevity between whites and non-whites in the United States."[39] Carefully controlled studies "point up the intimate relationship between physical illness and economic . . ."[40] to use Dr. Ann Pettigrew's expression. Economic factors not only partially explain, or serve as indices of, the causes of divergent morbidity and mortality rates, but they also give us the clues to a strategy for change, namely, working toward a continuously rising standard of living. Whether hope or pessimism is warranted depends upon the possibility of drastically changing the economic status of the Negro over the next decade, of eliminating economic "victimization."

Closing the income gap is crucial, or alternatively, the provision of a subsidy for medical services. Large masses of Negroes will never become members of the white-collar class, but better job opportunities in commerce and industry will place many of them in a position to benefit from privately sponsored health and insurance plans. These will be of maximum benefit, however, only if hospital discrimination is eliminated. Also, the wider extension of adequate medical care to all citizens through the use of public funds, and the more effective use of social workers and educators, will automatically benefit those Negroes who are not upwardly mobile.

Chronic illness, as well as frequent periods of sickness, not only results in loss of man-hours of production, but also increases stress and strain in interpersonal relations and deprives individuals of the maximum amount of pleasure to be derived from a sense of physical well-being and from recreation and pleasurable interaction with other human beings. Insofar as the general health level of Negroes is lower than that of whites they suffer more from these deprivations. Tendencies to escape from pain and its consequences by habitual use of alcohol and drugs, or the anodyne of excessive preoccupation with the supernatural world, may be related to the general health

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situation within the Negro lower class. These less tangible and immeasurable disabilities are as real as the financial burdens imposed by sickness.

The Identification Problem

Some of the most damaging forms of indirect victimization manifest themselves at the psychological level. The Black Ghetto and the job ceiling are the key variables in accounting for differences in morbidity and mortality rates, and for the persistence of subcultural behavior patterns which deviate from middle-class norms. At the subjective level they also determine the crucial points of social reference for the individual Negro when answering the questions "Who am I today?" and "What will I be tomorrow?" The Black Ghetto forces him to identify as a Negro first, an American second, and it gives him geographical "roots." The job ceiling is an ever present reminder that there are forces at work which make him a second-class American. But the Black Ghetto and the job ceiling are only two components of a caste-class system now undergoing revolutionary transformation—an institutional complex which includes the courts, schools, churches, voluntary associations, media of mass communication, and a network of family units. Like all other persons, the individual Negro receives his orientation to this social nexus first from his family and later from his peer group. Exposure to schools and the mass media continues the process of socialization and personality formation while membership in voluntary associations provides a tie to the class system and constitutes an aid to upward mobility.

The white middle class is the reference group for those who are mobile; yet the entire system operates to emphasize identity with "The Race," since defensive solidarity must be maintained against the white world. Inner conflicts are inevitable; and conventional, as well as idiosyncratic, adjustments to this situation have been thoroughly studied. Ann Pettigrew suggests that ". . . the perception of relative deprivation, the discrepancy between high aspirations and actual attainments . . . is a critical psychological determinant of mental disorder. And certainly racial discrimination acts to bar the very achievements which the society encourages individuals to attempt."[41] A disparity in psychosis rates reflects this discrepancy, but for most Negroes the reaction to oppression is less severe. Neither insanity nor suicide is a *typical* Negro reaction.

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Both Negroes and whites are "victims" of one persisting legacy of the slave trade—the derogation of "negroidness." The idea that a dark skin indicates intellectual inferiority is rapidly passing, but at the esthetic level derogatory appraisal of thick lips, kinky hair, and very dark skin is still prevalent. That many Negroes reject their own body image is evident from advertisements for skin lighteners in the major Negro publications,[42] and Negro children in experimental situations begin to reject brown dolls for white ones before the age of five.[43] The ever present knowledge that one's negroid physiognomy is evaluated as "ugly" lowers self-esteem and, therefore, weakens self-confidence. The rise of the new African states has given a psychological "lift" to those American Negroes who still look more African than *metis,* but extreme Negro physical traits are still a source of inner disquiet—especially for women. (There is no equivalent in America of the African cult of *negritude* whose poets idealize the black woman.) These negative esthetic appraisals are part of a larger stereotype-complex which equates Africa with primitiveness and savagery and considers Negro ancestry a "taint." A frontal assault on a world-wide scale is necessary to undo this propaganda of the slave era which still exists as a form of cultural lag which has lost even the excuse of the functional utility it once had in rationalizing an integral part of the Western economic system—Negro slavery.[44]

Negroes in America, as a numerical minority, always have a feeling of being "on the outside looking in," of not being "in the main stream." Yet, the mere fact of being only one in ten does not automatically generate this feeling; the "victimization" flows, rather, from the values of the majority who refuse to accept every individual upon his own merit, but insist upon ascription of status on the basis of membership in a racial group. (Bahia, Brazil, presents an interesting case where the opposite is true, where individual achievement can almost completely over-ride racial origin.)[45] This sense of alienation is reinforced by traditional or deliberate omission of Negroes from the decision-making process. That they are absent from the boards of major corporations is not surprising; but it is surprising that they are virtually absent from the boards of foundations and professional associations. Only in the realm of public administration and the world of sports and entertainment are Negroes present in sufficient numbers to be "visible," and to serve as role models for Negro youth.

These omissions are particularly crucial in a society where

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numerous illustrated publications function as the image-makers. A Negro child seldom sees a person like himself in an advertisement or in illustrations accompanying fiction. The children in the textbooks are all white. The image of the powerful, the desirable, the admirable is set very early as "white." There is an increasing awareness of the seriousness of this problem, and by 1964 the television industry was making a half-hearted attempt to use a few Negroes in commercials, and one or two Northern cities were experimenting with "integrated textbooks." But still, Negro newspapers and magazines alone cater to this hunger to see the Negro image in print. These publications also give prominence to whatever interracial participation is taking place, but they cannot eliminate the feeling of resentment over exclusion from the collective representations of the larger society.

Leaders in the civil rights movement frequently refer to the process of desegregation and integration as having the goal of "bringing Negroes into the main stream." This sense of isolation from "the main stream" was given poetic expression by the late Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois in the 1890's when he spoke of living behind, or within, "The Veil." This isolation not only generates distorted perceptions of the total society and occasionally bizarre definitions of situations, but it also results in cognitive crippling. The communication flow needed to provide data for rational decision making is often impeded. Incomplete information is available for "playing the game" the way it is played in various segments of the larger society, and in a highly mobile society it is all-important to know "who is who" and "what is what." There is some evidence, for instance, to indicate that lower-middle-class and lower-class Negro parents often have high aspirations for their children but have no clear idea how to realize them. Negro students in segregated colleges and high schools are also often woefully ignorant of opportunities and techniques for succeeding.[46]

One cannot be mobile without learning the professional codes and the folkways of other social strata. It was this which the Supreme Court had in mind when it ruled some years ago that a separate law school for Negroes cut the student off from those contacts which were necessary to make a person a first-class lawyer and therefore could not meet the criterion of equality. It is this contact which most Negro physicians are denied. Also, in a society where the social ritual is so much a part of the business world, Negroes are generally not in a position to secure the cues and tips

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needed for competition on a basis of complete equality. If they cannot meet their peers at professional meetings and in the informal gatherings of persons who pursue similar occupations and professions, they, of necessity, will see only "through a glass darkly." Very clever and ambitious individuals (and persistent ones) sometimes rip aside "The Veil," but such persons are rare within any ethnic group. Most individuals remain victims of the communication blockage, and special efforts will be necessary to open the channels of communication. Participation across race lines with persons in similar occupations is the first step toward structural integration.

In a social system which forces Negroes to think of themselves *first* as Negroes and only second as Americans, a problem of "double identification" is posed for those who are partially integrated. Guilt feelings sometimes arise over the charge hurled by others that they are "running away from the Race." Negroes who represent the country abroad are exposed to the criticism of Africans and Asians as being "the tool of the white man." Personnel officers, political leaders, and work-supervisors are always open to the charge that they are "Uncle Toms," have "sold out," or have "forgotten the Race." This problem will be intensified if the process of integration at upper levels of power and prestige is not accompanied by the complete disappearance of racial barriers to upward mobility, or if the masses of Negroes are doomed to be America's permanent lower class. In the meanwhile, the rise of Malcolm X and the appeal of the Black Muslims and various local Black Nationalist groups suggest that the lower classes and lower middle classes can work their way out of the problem of double identification by rejecting "white" values and by proudly proclaiming their psychological independence. Such a solution is not available to the more sophisticated Negroes, but the possibility is not to be excluded that, since America insists upon limited integration rather than complete acceptance, increased identification of educated Negroes with some aspects of the Negro subculture and with the cultural renaissance taking place in Africa may become the norm.[47]

The Condition of Powerlessness

The problem of "identification" is crucial, but Charles Silberman in, *Crisis in Black and White,* puts his finger upon the most critical aspect of Negro-white relations in the United States when he stresses the psychological effect of being "powerless." Negroes

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realize that, as a minority in "the white man's country," they do not set the rules of the game. Unlike Negroes in Africa and the West Indies they do not fight for national independence, but rather for "desegregation" and "integration," and they can attain these goals only if the white majority sanctions them as legitimate and desirable. "Integration," in the final analysis, also means that the Negro community must increasingly become more middle-class in values and behavior if it is to win respect and approval. Negroes do not determine the ends for which they struggle, nor the means. The most they can expect is an increasingly greater share in the *joint* determination of their future. The problem of maintaining dignity and some autonomy in such a situation is, for sensitive personalities, a continuous one, even within the civil rights movement, for white friends, even in liberal-left circles, often strive to bend Negroes to their will and not to ask their advice as co-workers.

In the past, this sense of "powerlessness" to determine their own destiny or to change their position in the caste-class system has been one important factor in accentuating in-group aggression among lower-class Negroes, in the diversion of energy and financial resources into the over-elaboration of the church-voluntary association complex, and in the development of those styles of life which E. Franklin Frazier portrayed so unsympathetically in *Black Bourgeoisie*. Black Belt crime, juvenile delinquency, and cynical exploitation have also been interpreted by some sociologists as one reaction to a state of "powerlessness." Within the lower class and lower middle class, hostility and resentment become "socialized" for a few in the form of Black Nationalism and take organized form in movements such as the Black Muslims.[48] Among the rootless masses, the anger flowing from frustration bursts forth periodically in verbal abuse and violent assault, in arson and looting, in attacks upon policemen and property—thus the tragedy of Harlem, Rochester, and Philadelphia in 1964 and of Los Angeles and Chicago in 1965. The feeling of having made the conquest of power, of being in control of their own fate, if only for a moment, is symbolized in a widely circulated photograph of jubilant Negroes giving the V-for-Victory sign on top of a shattered police car in Los Angeles. But these Black Belt explosions underscore a basic fact—that no revolution can follow the storming of the Bastille by Negroes in America. Camus and Sartre, not Marx, provide the key for understanding these events.

Conventional politics has been the most realistic approach to

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gaining at least the semblance of power. Recent demographic trends, including the flight of whites to the suburbs, have placed some Negro communities in a strategic position to play "balance of power" politics more effectively, and the civil rights movement may result in increased political power for Negroes in the South. Yet, all Negro leaders know the limits of their ability to wield decisive political influence. (And in the world of "big business" their influence is even less.) Silberman has suggested the importance—cathartic and practical—of grass-roots movements, with "middle-level" leadership, fighting for limited goals where results can be achieved, and Thomas Pettigrew has stressed the psychologically liberating effect of participation in the civil rights movement.[49] The feed-back in terms of an increased incentive to secure more education or to get better jobs can be sustained only if society actually provides the rewards in terms of expanded occupational mobility. The sense of being powerless can disappear, however, only if the social system eventually changes to the extent that Negroes will not need to organize *as Negroes* to defend their interests and if color ceases to be a factor in membership in the "power structure." Riots will cease only when Americans allow Black Ghettos to dissolve.

The Myth of "Separate but Equal"

Negroes have been "victimized" throughout the three hundred fifty years of their presence on the North American continent. The types of social systems which have organized their relations with whites have been varied—over two hundred years of slavery and indenture, ten years of post-Civil War Reconstruction in the South, and eighty years of experimentation with a theory of "separate but equal" ostensibly designed to replace caste relations with those of class. The "separate but equal" doctrine has now been repudiated by the federal government and a broad section of public opinion as unjust and inimical to the national welfare. The period of desegregation has begun. Yet, the legacy of the past remains. As a transition to some new, and still undefined system of race relations takes place, it is relevant to examine the extent to which victimization persists, probing for its more subtle and covert manifestations. An estimate, too, should be made of whether or not what Merton has called "the unintended consequences of purposive social action" carry a potential for new forms of victimization.

By 1900 the doctrine had become firmly established that it was

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desirable for Negroes and whites to be members of two functionally related segments of a bi-racial society in which families, intimate friendship groups, and voluntary associations (including churches) would be separate, although members of both races were participating in a common economic system and political order. Both Negro and white leaders emphasized the point that "social equality" was not a Negro aspiration, and Booker T. Washington's famous Atlanta Compromise address delivered in 1895 made this point very explicit with his symbolism of the five fingers, separate and distinct, but joined together at the palm.

The theory of "separate but equal" visualized a future in which Negroes would gradually acquire wealth and education on such a scale as to develop a social-class system within the Negro community paralleling that of the white community. Then, as the sociologist Robert Park once phrased it, Negroes and whites would "look over and across" at each other, not "up and down." Defenders of "bi-racialism" believed that although institutional life—including schools and neighborhoods—should remain separate, Negroes should be allowed to compete freely for jobs and should gradually acquire the full voting rights which they had lost in the South after 1875. It was considered unwise, however, to make a frontal assault upon segregation in public places since the key to the ultimate dissolution or transformation of the caste system lay in the acquisition of education and economic well-being—not in protest. The "correct" behavior of an enlarged Negro middle class would eventually win acceptance by the white middle class. The doctrine of "separate but equal" was given legal sanction in a number of Supreme Court decisions, the most famous being that of *Plessy vs. Ferguson*, and it became the operating ideology among Southern white liberals between the two world wars.

During the first decade after World War II the doctrine of "separate but equal" was abandoned as a guide to the formulation of public policy insofar as the armed forces, public transportation, public accommodations, and public schools were concerned. Experience between the two world wars had demonstrated that, while it might be theoretically possible to achieve equality within the framework of a segregated school system in the South, it seemed impossible in actual practice. In the field of public transportation, no matter how many shiny new coaches replaced the old rickety "Jim Crow" coaches, Negroes did not consider them "equal," and they never ceased to be resentful that there were two American armies instead

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of one. The cost of duplicating facilities to make public accommodations and schools truly equal would have been exorbitant even if Negroes welcomed the idea. Thus, a demand for change was in the air when the historic 1954 decision requiring school desegregation was taken, and the Court cut through to a fundamental question which had often been evaded: whether or not it was possible to maintain any kind of *forced* segregation in an open society without perjorative implications. Did not the very insistence upon separation imply inferiority? The caste-class system organizing race relations was recognized for what it really was—a system which, irrespective of the intent of individuals, resulted in the victimization of Negroes. Makers of national policy have now embarked upon a thoroughgoing program of desegregation coupled with an assault upon all institutionalized forms of racial discrimination. But the white public has not accepted the concept of "total integration."

Some Paradoxes of Progress

The abandonment of the doctrine of "separate but equal" has forced consideration of many provocative questions, such as: "Can the victimization resulting from unequal treatment of Negroes in the past be eliminated without preferential treatment for present-day victims?" There are those who contend that justice demands more than equality, that it requires a "revolutionary break-through" in the form of preferential hiring, distinctive programs of education, and special scholarship schemes. The existence of entrenched patterns of residential segregation also raises the question of the desirability and probability of the persistence of Negro neighborhoods and institutions. If *forced* separation eventually disappeared would separateness cease to be an index of victimization? Would it then lose its pejorative implications? Would the right to choose, if it ever came, mean that some Negroes will choose *not* to be "integrated" except in the economic and political order?

New types of victimization are emerging which are not only indirect but are also unintended consequences of actions designed to eliminate victimization. For instance, in several Northern cities an earnest effort is being made to facilitate and speed up the process of residential desegregation at the middle-class level. Negroes whose incomes and life styles approximate those of the white middle class are accepted into neighborhoods and apartment buildings in limited numbers in order not to excite fear and panic among white residents,

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The goal, as one Chicago neighborhood association states it, is "an integrated neighborhood with high community standards," to reverse the process of ghettoization. However, without a commitment to "open occupancy" at the city level, attainment of this goal demands a neighborhood-by-neighborhood approach, which calls for studying "tipping points" and setting up "benign quotas" in order to maintain a "racial balance." It may also involve a program which forces all lower-class residents to leave irrespective of their color, while integrating a small number of middle-class Negroes into neighborhoods or specific apartment buildings. One effective technique has been clearance of slums followed by rebuilding at a high enough rent level to keep the proportion of Negroes automatically very low. This process is frequently called "controlled integration."[50] Actions such as these often result in the concentration of many lower-class Negroes into almost completely segregated public housing projects. What is gained for some in terms of better physical surroundings is lost in increased "ghettoization." Other displaced persons increase the degree of overcrowding in already overcrowded neighborhoods or filter into middle-class Negro neighborhoods and disorganize them.

Serious problems also arise within the middle class at the psychological level. Insofar as Negro families have to cooperate actively in setting and maintaining quotas on the number of Negroes who enter, and in eliminating lower-class Negroes from the neighborhood, they become vulnerable to attack by other Negroes. Some sensitive individuals suffer from a feeling of guilt over manipulating the situation to maintain exclusiveness; others feel a loss of dignity in carrying on continuous discussion about race with white people. They dislike dealing with themselves as "a problem." A few people simply withdraw from such "integrated" situations into the comfort of the middle-class "gilded ghetto." This situation is only a special case of a more general problem confronting some Negroes in this Era of Integration—how to reconcile being a "loyal Negro" or a "Race Man" with new middle-class interracial relations or new occupational roles.

Rapid and fairly complete "integration" of middle-class Negroes into neighborhoods, churches, educational, and voluntary associations could have a profound effect upon Negro institutional life, "skimming off the cream" of the Negro élites to the disadvantage of the larger Negro community. This would result in a kind of victimization of the Negro masses which would be permanent unless the

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conditions of life for the lower classes were drastically changed.

Unfortunately there are few signs of hope that the Negro masses will profit from current economic changes, for at the very moment when the civil rights movement has been most successful, and when access to training is being made more widely available to Negroes, forces are at work which could render these gains meaningless. Whitney Young, Jr., of the National Urban League, emphasizing economic problems facing Negroes, stated upon one occasion: "Unless we identify these problems and take steps to meet them, we will find the masses of Negroes five years from today with a mouthful of rights, living in hovels with empty stomachs."[51] About 12 per cent of the nonwhite labor force were unemployed in 1960, twice the rate for white workers.[52] In some urban areas it was between 15 and 20 per cent. It was higher for Negro men than for women. Unemployment rates are particularly high for Negro youth. In 1961, nonwhite boys and girls between fourteen and nineteen had the highest unemployment rate of any age-color group in the nation, while the unemployment rate for Negro high-school graduates between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one was twice that for white youth and higher than the rate for whites who had *not* attended high school. One out of five Negro high-school graduates were unable to find jobs.[53] If high-school graduates face such a situation, the plight of the untrained Negro is likely to be even worse. It was estimated in 1964 that automation was wiping out about 40,000 unskilled jobs a week, the sector of industry where Negro workers are concentrated. This trend is likely to continue for some time.[54]

If Negroes are not to become a permanent *lumpen-proletariat* within American society as a result of social forces already at work and increased automation, deliberate planning by governmental and private agencies will be necessary. Continued emphasis upon "merit hiring" will benefit a few individuals, but, in the final analysis, structural transformations will have to take place.[55] There are those who feel that only a radical shift in American values and simultaneous adjustments of economy and society will wipe out, forever, the victimization of the Negro. If such a situation does occur it is not likely to be the result of any cataclysmic proletarian upheaval, but rather through drift and piece-meal pragmatic decisions. One straw in the wind has been raised to test the temper of the time. Gunnar Myrdal and twenty-nine other scholars, writers, and political scientists have released a statement on "The Cybernation Revolution, the Weaponry Revolution, and the Human Rights Revolution." In dis-

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cussing the need for adjustment to the effects of largescale automation, they made a revolutionary suggestion:

> We urge, therefore, that society, through its appropriate legal and governmental institutions, undertake an unqualified commitment to provide every individual and every family with an adequate income as a matter of right. . . .

Should this ever happen, Negroes would, of course, profit even more than whites, but demands for radical reforms of this type have not arisen from within the Civil Rights Movement whose leaders generally accept a middle-class work ethic which is incompatible with such a solution.

The author wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of Miss Odessa D. Thompson.

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4. For a discussion of these concepts see Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York, 1946), chapter on "Caste, Class and Party."

5. The distinguished psychotherapist, Bruno Bettelheim, of the Orthogenic School of the University of Chicago, in a provocative and perceptive article

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in *The Nation*, October 19, 1963 ("Class, Color and Prejudice"), contends that protection of social class values is a more important variable than race prejudice in structuring relations between Negroes and whites in the North of the U.S.A.

6. St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, in *Black Metropolis* (New York, 1962), use the term "Black Ghetto" to refer to the involuntary and exploitative aspect of the all-Negro community and "Bronzeville" to symbolize the more pleasant aspects of the segregated community. Robert C. Weaver, another Negro scholar, called his first book *The Negro Ghetto* (New York, 1948). The term is widely used by contemporary Negro leaders with pejorative implications.

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8. Thomas F. Pettigrew, *A Profile of the Negro American* (Princeton, N. J., 1964), p. 190. His wife, Dr. Ann Pettigrew, M.D., collaborated with him on the chapter dealing with health.

9. Though based upon only one community in Chicago, *The Politics of Urban Renewal*, by Peter Rossi and Robert A. Dentler (Glencoe, Ill., 1961) analyzes basic processes to be found in all Northern cities.

10. Professor Everett C. Hughes makes some original and highly pertinent remarks about new Negro middle-class communities in his introduction to the 1962 edition of Drake and Cayton's *Black Metropolis*.

11. Pettigrew, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-181.

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13. Drake and Cayton, *op. cit.*, Chap. 23, "Advancing the Race."

14. See section on "The Negro Community as a Pathological Form of an American Community," Chap. 43 of Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York, 1944), p. 927.

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27. Pettigrew, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 82-94, "Communicable Diseases," and pp. 97-98, "Economics and Physical Health."

30. It has been demonstrated with data drawn from six Southern states that Negro mothers occupying private rooms in hospitals had a lower death rate among their infants than white mothers on the wards. See H. Bloch, H. Lippett, B. Redner, and D. Hirsch," Reduction of Mortality in the Premature Nursery," *Journal of Pediatrics*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (September 1952), pp. 300-304.

31. Dr. Arthur G. Falls' statement was released through the Chicago Urban League on October 20, 1963, having been sent out on October 16th with a "hold." (Copy in files of Chicago Urban League, C.E.D.)

32. These actions are discussed in the Presidential Address delivered to the Institute of Medicine of Chicago, January 14, 1960, by Dr. Franklin C. McLean, "Negroes and Medicine in Chicago." (Mimeographed copy in files of Chicago Urban League).

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33. The 1965 assessment is from a statement by Dr. Robert G. Morris, circulated in mimeographed form by the Chicago Urban League. The standard work on the problems facing Negro physicians in Dietrich C. Reitzes, *Negroes and Medicine* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958).

34. Summarized from documents on file with Chicago Urban League.

35. Dr. F. C. McLean, cited in 32 *supra.*

36. Note Pettigrew, *op. cit.,* p. 97, which cites "lack of prenatal care, poor family health education, inadequate diet and inexpert delivery" as factors.

37. Philip F. Williams, "Material Welfare and the Negro," *Journal of American Medical Association,* Vol. 132, No. 11 (November 16, 1946), pp. 611-614.

38. M. Gover and J. B. Yaukey, "Physical Impairments of Members of Low-Income Farm Families," *Public Health Reports,* Vol. 61, No. 4 (January 25, 1946), and Marion E. Altenderfer and Beatrice Crowther, "Relationship Between Infant Mortality and Socio-economic Factors in Urban Areas," *Public Health Reports,* Vol. 64, No. 11 (March 18, 1949), pp. 331-339.

39. Marcus S. Goldstein, *op. cit.,* p. 93.

40. Dr. Ann Pettigrew cites a study carried out in Chicago, using 1950 data, in which, when Negroes and whites of the same economic level were compared, mortality rates were about the same although the rates for Negroes as a group when compared with those for whites as a group were higher. Other studies using the same body of data indicate sharp differences in mortality rates as between laborers and skilled workers among Negroes, a situation similar to that found among whites (Pettigrew, *op. cit.,* p. 98).

41. *Ibid.,* p. 80.

42. *Ebony,* a well-edited, widely circulated, popular weekly magazine which concentrates upon the display of what its editor calls "Negro achievement" carries skin-lightener advertisements routinely. *Ebony*'s African imitator, *Drum,* also carries such advertisements.

43. The classical study in this field is Kenneth B. Clark and Mamie P. Clark, "Racial Identification and Preference in Negro Children," which has been made widely accessible through T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley's *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York, 1947), pp. 169-178.

44. Analyses of the genesis of the derogatory stereotypes of Africa and Africans may be found in Kenneth Little, *Negroes in Britain* (London, 1948), and Philip Curtin, *The Image of Africa* (Madison, Wisc., 1964). See also "Toward an Evaluation of African Societies," by St. Clair Drake, in *Africa Seen by American Negro Scholars* (New York, 1958).

45. The extent to which the pattern in Bahia, Brazil, differs from that in the United States is analyzed by Donald Pierson in *Negroes in Brazil* (Chicago, 1942).

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46. Wilson Record, "Counseling and Communication," *Journal of Negro Education*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Fall 1961).

47. Note Harold Isaacs, *The New World of Negro Americans* (New York, 1963), and St. Clair Drake, "To Hide My Face? An Essay on Pan Africanism and Negritude," in Herbert Hill (ed.), *Soon One Morning* (New York, 1963).

48. See Essien-Udom, *Black Nationalism: A Search for an Identity in America* (Chicago, 1962); and Charles Eric Lincoln's *The Black Muslims in America* (Boston, 1961). Reactions to the deaths of Patrice Lumumba and Malcolm X among a segment of the Negro American lower-class reveal the not-to-be-ignored depth of Black Nationalist feeling in the U.S.A.

49. Pettigrew, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-168, "The New Role of the Equal Citizen."

50. Peter Rossi, *op. cit.*

51. Quoted by James Reston in a column, "The Ironies of History and the American Negro," *The New York Times*, May 15, 1964.

52. See Glenn, *op. cit.*, and Haynes, *op. cit.*

53. See Schiffman, *op. cit.*

54. Pettigrew, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

55. *Ibid.*, "Some Needed Societal Reforms," pp. 168-176.

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RASHI FEIN

An Economic and Social Profile of the Negro American

In the author's preface to *An American Dilemma*,[1] Gunnar Myrdal wrote that he was a "stranger" to the American scene and that "Things look different, depending upon 'where you stand.'" It is also true that things look different, depending upon where you look. The profile of the Negro American is a changing profile. What one sees depends on what one looks at, on the period that one examines, and on the comparisons one makes. Our profile will not "look." It will "look different" or "look similar." Without comparisons its significance would be limited.

In this essay I examine a variety of socioeconomic indicators. I do so for various points in time in order to compare the world in which the Negro American lives with the world in which he lived and with the world (both past and present) of the white American. Always we shall compare. For, as indicated, the data have meaning only as they are compared. They may be compared with an American ideal; they may be compared with a potential; they may be compared with the past; but compared they must be. Roosevelt's "one-third of a nation" could be contrasted with the remaining two-thirds and Martin Luther King's dream with a present reality. To understand where the Negro American stands today requires a frame of reference.

The frame of reference, the relevant comparison in drawing an economic and social profile and in understanding the significance of the data that make up the profile, is a comparison between the Negro and other Americans. Such comparisons are given increased dimension when the data examined represent the positions of the two groups at different moments in time. For if we are to understand the attitudes, aspirations, and accomplishments of the Negro American, we need to know not only where he is, but also how he

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got there, how rapidly conditions have been changing, what has been happening to his relative position. Others may consider whether the most significant influence on the psychology and attitudes of the Negro is where he stands in relation to the white, where he stands in relation to his parents and grandparents, how his status relative to whites compares with the relative status of his parents and grandparents in an earlier period, or a mixture of these that takes account of relative progress as well as relative position. Surely, however, all have some measure of influence.

The frame of reference developed in this essay differs from those most frequently used in analyzing the Negro's progress. It is generally customary either: (1) to compare Negro attainment today with the level of Negro attainment at some earlier time (for example, the Negro maternal mortality rate in 1960 was 98 per 100,000 live births, down from 774 in 1940) or (2) to compare Negro-white differentials today with Negro-white differentials in some earlier period (for example, in 1960 the Negro maternal mortality rate was 3.8 times the white rate while in 1955 it had been 4.0 times).[2] In general, the first type of comparison shows significant improvement—Negroes (just as is true for whites) *are* better off than their grandparents were. But how one assesses one's own situation is, and should be, influenced by how others are faring at the same time. It is true that the second comparison does take account of Negro progress relative to white progress and does attempt to measure where the Negro finds himself in relation to other Americans. It is thus more meaningful than the first comparison. Nevertheless, it is often difficult to interpret. Because white-nonwhite differentials are large and because the rates of change of white and nonwhite indices are different, we sometimes find that the absolute differences between white and nonwhite indicators behave differently than do the ratios of the same indicators. In 1940, for example, the absolute difference between the white and nonwhite infant mortality rate was 31 per 1,000 live births, while in 1962 the difference had declined to 19 per 1,000. Yet in 1940 nonwhite infant mortality was 70 per cent greater than that of whites and in 1962 it was 90 per cent greater. Another example: in 1940 the absolute difference between white and nonwhite maternal mortality was 454 per 100,000 live births while in 1960 the difference had declined to 72. Yet in 1940 nonwhite maternal mortality was 2.4 times that of white and in 1960 it was 3.8 times as great. Sometimes, too, differentials are narrowed because nonwhite indi-

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cators are improving (slowly, but improving) while white indicators—perhaps pressing against limits of present knowledge—have reached a plateau. The important consideration, however, is that the narrowing differential fails to take account of a frequent and significant phenomenon: the nonwhite is moving up more slowly than the white did when, many years ago, the white stood where the nonwhite now is. That comparison—between speed of movement over the same range of experience—is relevant in assessing recent developments and the possibilities for the future.

The measure I introduce is simple yet informative. Where data permit, I calculate a time-lag statistic: how many years earlier did the white American—with the full range of opportunity open to him—attain the particular level (say, of health, education, income) that the Negro—so long denied that opportunity—has reached only today. I ask also whether this gap (in years) is greater or less than at earlier times (that is, was the Negro more years behind in some earlier period). I thus compare the relative speed of movement over the same range of experience. The change in the length of the gap depends upon the relative rates of change of white and Negro indicators over time. The results are disturbing: in a number of cases the time gap has been widening rather than narrowing. Today the Negro is further behind the white (in years) than he once was.

An illustration may be helpful. Table 1 presents hypothetical data on level of health attainment: the higher the index, the better the health level.

TABLE 1. Hypothetical Health Levels, White and Negro, Selected Years

	1900	*1920*	*1940*	*1960*
1. White	100	200	250	275
2. Negro	—	100	150	200
3. Absolute differential (1-2)	—	100	100	75
4. White-Negro ratio (1÷2)	—	2	1.67	1.375
5. Time gap (years by which Negro progress lags white)	—	20	30	40

The data show a narrowing of differentials in the period 1920-1960 (from 100 down to 75; from a factor of 2 down to 1.375). Yet, whereas the Negro in 1920 was where the white of 1900 had been, that gap of twenty years had widened to forty years by 1960 (in

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1960 the Negro was where the white had been in 1920). This occurred because the white had moved from 100 to 200 in two decades, but conditions prevented the Negro from doing so well: in this hypothetical example it takes Negroes four (not two) decades to cover the same terrain. This comparison, the reader will note, focuses on movement over the same range of experience (100 to 200) rather than on movement over the same time period (1920 to 1960). This is its strength, for it helps center attention on the process of growth and on prospects for the near future. In this example it suggests that special efforts will be required if previous growth rates are to be sharply boosted and the time gap narrowed.[3] For if the Negro does only as well as the white once did in moving from an index of 200 to 275, it will take the Negro forty years to achieve equality—even if the white were to make no more progress.

Let me make clear that I do not imply that all groups should be expected to follow the same growth path. Each group—ethnic, racial, religious—in American life has its unique characteristics and is the product of its unique experiences. The "baggage" the Negro brings with him—the traditions, the strengths, the handicaps—is different from that brought by others. Furthermore, the gap (in years) may widen or narrow due to erratic behavior of white indices—unrelated to discrimination against Negroes. Such patterns must be examined carefully. But often the difference in speed of upward movement between Negro and white Americans is—in a broad way—an indication of the effects of present and past differences in opportunity. It is cause for concern.

It is important to recognize that if the Negro in 1965 is where the white was in 1945, this does not mean that the Negro considers himself as well off as the white considered himself twenty years ago. Nor should he. The Negro today is aware that a very substantial majority of the nation has higher income, more education, better health, and so forth than he does. The Negro stands below the median indices for the nation. But this was not true of the white twenty years ago. He did not suffer the psychological disadvantage of being behind—for he was not behind. He was the median American. Thus the situation is vastly different for the Negro who has an income of $3,000 when most other Americans have more, than it was for the white when he had $3,000 income and that was the average for the nation. In a psychological sense—and this molds attitudes toward the problem—the Negro is even further behind than the data show.

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The comparison of white-nonwhite differentials is not meant to suggest that every index should be the same for each and every group (or person). America is a land of many tongues and tastes. Different cultures and value systems will reflect themselves in different behavior patterns and thus in socioeconomic indicators. But the indicators selected measure aspects that surely all groups feel are of importance. We all desire lower infant mortality rates, lower unemployment rates, and so forth. Differentials in the particular indicators selected, therefore, tend to reflect differences in equality of opportunity rather than deliberate choices.

In some future year we will surely reach a stage where it will be difficult to judge the significance of differences in white-nonwhite indices (unless we foolishly define white indices as always the desirable standard and incorrectly assume that white middle-class values are the only "proper" values). This difficulty is clear, for example, in regard to occupational structure. Underrepresentation in some occupations can only occur in conjunction with overrepresentation in other occupations. Surely there is nothing undesirable if, as a consequence of group values and traditions, individuals *choose* to enter a particular occupation, thus resulting in group "overrepresentation" in that occupation and "underrepresentation" in some other. Today, however, it is unhappily all too clear that Negro underrepresentation in the professions, for example, is not the result of a desire to move into unskilled labor. The point at issue is that we look forward not to a situation where everyone is identical and the nonwhite is 10 per cent of every occupation, geographic region, and so forth—but to a situation where he could be that (or more) in any given sector if he so desired. Today it is true that all groups are not distributed throughout the occupations as are all other groups (nor are they distributed evenly geographically). It cannot be expected that this will be vastly different tomorrow. Differentials will, therefore, remain. The analytical method we use is not meant to imply that they should not remain (so long as they are a result of free choice and opportunity).

We begin at birth. The child is born. In 1959-61 the Negro male had a life expectancy of 61.5 years at birth. His white counterpart first reached that level in 1931-33, twenty-eight years earlier (and has not dipped below it since 1937-39). In 1959-61 the white male life expectancy at birth was 67.6 years, 6 years more than the nonwhite. But the point is not that Negro life expectancy in years is 91 per cent of white, but that the Negro male child today is where

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the white was some twenty-two to twenty-eight years earlier. This is the gap of which we speak.

We know more than that. Already in 1921-23 the white had reached a life expectancy level the Negro was not to attain until 1949-51 (thus in 1950 the gap also was twenty-eight years). In 1940 the gap had been twenty-seven years. We have not been making progress in cutting the time gap. It is often easy to forget that the speed of progress is in part dependent on where one starts. The statement, "Since 1900, life expectancy for the total population has increased by more than 20 years; the increase in nonwhite life expectancy, for both males and females, has been about 30 years,"[4] is true. Nevertheless, the following should be noted: in 1900 white male life expectancy at birth was 48.2 years—by 1940, it was 62.8 years—a gain of fifteen years in four decades. But for the Negro, too, a full forty years were needed to progress over the same range: from 47.1 years in 1920 to 61.5 years in 1960. This illustrates the importance of comparing rates of progress over a range that both groups (white and Negro) have experienced—even if they have covered the terrain at different times. The fact that one group made greater progress *over the same chronological time period* than did another may result from the fact that it was in a different range of its (nonlinear)growth curve. If, however, rates of progress are compared over a range common to both groups, we may find—and in this example we do find—that Negro progress was no more rapid than was earlier white progress. This, it is submitted, is surely as relevant for projecting the time dimension of future progress (in the absence of special efforts) as comparisons over the same time period that involve very different ranges.

The significance of the measure should be clear. The Negro covered the same territory from 1920 to 1960 that the white had covered from 1900 to 1940—the same territory in the same length of time. But we would have expected that, given equal opportunity, he would have moved more rapidly. It should be easier for 10 per cent of the population to advance more rapidly (if the other 90 per cent care) than for 90 per cent to advance. Furthermore, the state of scientific knowledge was greater in 1920 than in 1900, greater in 1930 than in 1910, and so on, thus permitting a compression of the time required to make an equal amount of progress. The Negro did not have to wait for the next scientific advance. It had already been made—though he had not fully shared in it. It is here contended that were the Negro to have made his advance only as

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rapidly as had the white there would be cause for concern (and action). But he was prevented from doing even that well. The often-cited advantages of being late did not accrue to the Negro. The time gap has not been materially shortened in the last four decades.

Also disturbing is the fact that the gap remained the same during the deacde 1950 to 1960. During that period the Negro male added 2.6 years (4.4 per cent) to his life expectancy at birth while the white added only 1.3 years (2.0 per cent). But the Negro moved from 58.9 years to 61.5 years—a very different area of the curve than the white who went from 66.3 to 67.6 years. Gains, perhaps, come easier in the range that the Negro is now covering and that the white had covered at an earlier time. What is important is that it took ten years for the Negro to move from 58.9 to 61.5 years. When the white was covering that range (that is, moving from 58.9 in 1922 to 61.5 in 1932), it also took him ten years. Thus, we are made aware—and later in this essay we will again be reminded—that conditions were less favorable for the Negro during the 1950's than is, perhaps, commonly supposed—certainly than many would like to believe.

The child is born. In 1962 the chances were 87 in 100 that he was born in a hospital. Whites, for whom the chances today are 99 in 100, reached today's Negro rate in 1946—a gap of sixteen years. In 1952 the gap was only eleven years. In 1962 the Negro was where the white had been in 1946; in 1952 the Negro was where the white had been in 1941. Thus it took the Negro ten years (from 1952 to 1962) to do what the white had done in five (from 1941 to 1946)—that is, to increase the percentage of hospital births from 66 to 87. As a consequence the gap has widened. It is true, of course, that hospital birth rates differ considerably in the various regions in which our Negro family may reside—though this is not the case for white families. For Negroes, the percentage distribution of live births in hospitals ranges from a high of 99 per 100 in New England to lows of 64, 81, and 87 in the East South Central, South Atlantic, and West South Central divisions—but the lowest white rate in any division is 97 per 100. Even as late as 1962 the chances were barely 50-50 that a Negro baby born in Mississippi was born in a hospital, but the chances were 99 in 100 for white Mississippi-born babies. And for Negro residents of Dallas County and Lowndes County, Alabama, the rates in 1962 were 27 and 9 per 100 (while rates for white residents were 99 and 96 respectively).

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The lack of progress in closing the time gap (indeed, its expansion) is all the more remarkable and disturbing since this has occurred in spite of the substantial Negro outmigration from the rural areas and from the South—that is, from areas with lower percentages of hospital births. The fact that the Negro population was becoming more urbanized (now even more urban than the white), and geographically distributed more like the total population, worked in a direction that should cut the gap—but proved insufficient to do so.

In 1960 the chances that the Negro infant would die before reaching its first birthday were 43 per 1,000 live births—double that of a white baby. This rate was achieved by whites two decades earlier, in 1940. The gap is twenty years. In 1950 the Negro had been where the white was only about eleven years earlier (the gap had been seventeen years in 1940 and fifteen years in 1930). Thus, while the infant mortality rate for whites dropped from 100 per 1,000 to 43 per 1,000 in twenty-five years, it took the Negro thirty years to cover the same distance. Progress, as indicated by narrowing and widening of the gap, was uneven. In some decades progress was more rapid, in other decades less rapid. In the decade of the 1930's Negroes covered a range that whites covered in eight years (1915-1923); in the 1940's Negroes covered a range that had taken whites fifteen years, but in the entire decade of the 1950's Negroes made no more progress than whites had made in a tenth of a decade—in one year.

This is the case because infant mortality for the total population (chiefly white) decreased by about 4.3 per cent each year from 1933 to 1949 and by 2.0 per cent from 1950 to 1960. For nonwhites the rate decreased by 4.6 per cent from 1933 to 1949 but only by 1.2 per cent from 1950 to 1956 and in 1960 the rate was what it had been in 1956.[5] Thus in 1960 the rate of nonwhite infant mortality was 1.9 times that of white in 1960, while in 1950 it had been 1.7 times as high.

The gap for the neonatal mortality rate—deaths of infants under twenty-eight days—is about twenty years and also has widened slightly. The Negro mother's chances of dying from complications of pregnancy (maternal mortality rate) are low—only about 10 in 10,000 live births. But whites—with a rate between 2 and 3 per 10,000—had reached a level of 10 in 1948, twelve years earlier. This represents a dramatic reduction in the gap—it was not until 1941-42 that the Negro reached the level that whites had reached

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in 1915, and Negro progress was rapid in the decade of the 1940's. But again, as with a number of other measures, the gap widened in the decade of the 1950's. In 1950 the gap between white and Negro was only eight years—in 1960 it was eleven years.

The Negro child faces a different world than does today's white baby. So does his family. The mortality rate for his older brother, age twenty, is somewhat over twenty years behind the white mortality rate; the gap for his father is perhaps forty years and for his grandfather exceeds sixty years.[6]

His family faces somewhat different health problems than does the white population. In 1962 the Negro tuberculosis death rate of 11.5 per 100,000 was over twice the white rate of 4.2 (the difference is even greater on an age-adjusted basis), but the gap—as was the case with a number of causes of death, for example, diphtheria and whooping cough—was less than a decade. Other causes of death, such as dysentery and syphilis, exhibited longer lags.

In addition, the Negro family is less frequently covered by hospital or surgical insurance than is its white counterpart. Seventy-four per cent of all whites but only 46 per cent of Negroes were covered by hospital insurance in 1962-63. The Negro coverage rate lags the coverage rate for whites by somewhat more than a decade. Differences in median income account for much of the difference in coverage, but not for all of it. At incomes under $2,000, 38 per cent of whites but only 25 per cent of Negroes were covered, while at incomes between $4,000 and $7,000 coverage was 80 per cent for whites and 66 per cent for nonwhites. The U.S. National Health Survey found that in 1957-59 Negroes on the average had fewer visits per year to physicians (two-thirds the white rate). Their contact with physicians in hospital outpatient clinics far exceeded that of whites (26 per cent of all Negro physician visits were in hospital clinics as compared with only 8 per cent of white visits). During the same time period, in all sections of the United States, whites had double the number of dental visits per person that nonwhites had and, while the number of dental visits for extractions among whites was 1.5 times that among Negroes, the rate for fillings (more of a "luxury" product) was 8 times higher among whites than among Negroes. Finally, in 1958-60 Negroes were less likely to enter hospitals—but likely to stay longer before being discharged.

Many of these differences, as has been pointed out, are largely accounted for by Negro-white income differentials. But, the differ-

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ences, however they are explained, are substantial. Most Negroes face different health conditions than do most whites.

Thus the Negro male child is born into a world in which (in 1962) his chances of reaching age twenty are about the same as that of a white's reaching thirty-seven. A Negro girl (at birth) has the same chances of attaining age twenty as a white girl has of reaching forty-two. The lags are almost two decades.

We turn to education. The educational attainment of nonwhite adults with whom the child comes in contact is greater than was the attainment of adults whom the 1940 child met. Our child's parents have more education than their parents had. In 1960 the median school years completed by nonwhites twenty-five years old and over was 8.2 years. In 1940 the median number completed by nonwhites then twenty-five years and older was only 5.8 years. Yet already in 1940 white attainment was 8.7 years, a level higher than Negro attainment twenty years later. The gap, therefore, exceeds twenty years. It can be noted, too, that the white median rose from 8.7 in 1940 to 10.9 in 1960 (a rise of 2.2 years) while nonwhite attainment—in spite of the start from a lower base—rose by only 2.4 years (5.8-8.2). The difference, though not great, does represent a reversal of the 1920-1940 experience.[7] Much of the rise in the nonwhite median is explained by the substantial drop in the percentage of Negroes with very little education (in 1940, 71 per cent of persons twenty-five years old and over had completed less than eight years of schooling, but by 1960 this was reduced to 47 per cent; in 1920, 45 per cent of those aged twenty-five to twenty-nine had less than five years of school; by 1940 this was true of only 27 per cent of those aged twenty-five to twenty-nine, and by 1960 it was true of only 7 per cent). Nevertheless, the absolute increase in the percentage of whites completing high school or college was greater than was the increase for nonwhites. In 1960 the percentage of Negroes twenty-five years old and over who had completed college (3.5 per cent) was substantially less than the percentage had been for whites in 1940 (4.9 per cent). Even in 1960 the percentage of Negro male college graduates aged twenty-five to twenty-nine (5.3 per cent) was only equal to the percentage among whites in 1920 and the percentage of high-school graduates in that age group was about the same as among whites in 1940.[8]

Educational attainment is related to future employment possibilities. The demand for educated personnel has increased. It can, therefore, be seen that in a very real sense nonwhites without a

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college education in 1960 were at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the rest of the labor force as compared with the competitive disadvantage in 1920 for whites with the same educational attainment. Nonwhites with less than a high-school degree in 1960 were similarly at a disadvantage as compared with white non-high-school graduates in 1940. The educational gap—as it would influence employment possibilities—is even greater and more significant than suggested.

Nevertheless, I cannot subscribe to the view that the Negro faces insurmountable problems in entering the world of work. It is said that technological progress is so much more rapid today than in earlier periods—a statement that itself is probably incorrect—that the Negro is falling further and further behind the educational requirements imposed by modern industry. Some conclude, therefore, that earlier minority groups had a considerable advantage over today's Negro. Were there no discrimination in employment, it is doubtful that this would be the case. It is true that educational requirements advance even as the Negro American's educational level advances. Some of the gains that would lead to upgrading are, therefore, "dissipated." But not all the gains are wasted. The rise in educational attainment of younger Negroes, in particular, is very rapid, and the absolute attainment (outside the South) quite high. Earlier minority groups faced a less demanding economy, but also had less educational attainment to offer. It is not clear that on balance, *and abstracting from discrimination*, the situation is significantly *more* disadvantageous to the Negro.

The tasks that lie ahead in the educational sector can, perhaps, be shown by the following data for the fall of 1963: 56 per cent of white five year olds but only 42 per cent of nonwhite children were enrolled in kindergarten; only 7 per cent of the white youngsters aged fourteen to seventeen enrolled in school were still in elementary school, but this was the case with 20 per cent of Negro enrolled youngsters. At ages eighteen and nineteen, 41 per cent of whites and 40 per cent of Negroes were enrolled in school, but only 23 per cent of whites were still in high school (77 per cent were enrolled in college) while this was true of 56 per cent of Negroes (only 44 per cent were enrolled in college). Thus, even when enrollment rates are similar, retardation rates are much higher for Negroes. Detailed data for the 1960 census show the following: in the South, at all ages, the percentage of nonwhites one or more grades behind the modal grade exceeds the retardation rate for

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white children. By the third grade over 50 per cent of nonwhite children are one or more grades behind the modal grade (grade three). At age fifteen two-thirds of nonwhites enrolled are still not up to the second year of high school (the modal grade for the total population) and almost 40 per cent are still in elementary school. National retardation rates for nonwhites do run somewhat lower than they do in the South, but still remain high.

While data to compare educational attainment as far back through time as we would like are unavailable, a tracing through time can be approximated by comparing persons in various age groups today. In 1964, 16 per cent of Negro males aged twenty to twenty-four had one or more years of college—the same percentage as among white males aged fifty-five to sixty-four, most of whom received their college education thirty-five to forty years ago. Thus, in terms of the percentage with some college education, the young Negro of today is barely attaining what whites who today are fifty-five to sixty-four years old attained when they were young. This represents a gap of over thirty-five years. The gap, though still considerable, is much shorter at lower levels of educational attainment.

Nor is the educational gap between generations always narrowing. As the Bureau of the Census reports, "It thus appears that not only is the nonwhite population more poorly educated than the white population but the net gain of nonwhites at higher levels of education, as calculated from educational differences in the fathers' and sons' generations, has not been as great as for whites."[9] The gap is a generation: in 1962, 10.3 per cent of the fathers of white males aged twenty to sixty-four had some college education (and 25.6 per cent of the sons did) while 10.4 per cent of Negro males aged twenty to sixty-four (the "sons") had some college (and 4.4 per cent of the fathers did). Thus the percentage among white fathers was the same as among Negro sons. A critical question is whether 26 per cent of their *sons* (the sons of today's Negro males aged twenty to sixty-four) will attend college (as is the case for whites who today are aged twenty to sixty-four). College attendance rates will surely accelerate, in part because of the strong positive influence that the level of parents' educational attainment exerts on that of the children. But even if the doors of opportunity open more widely and the 26 per cent rate is achieved, Negroes will be attaining levels that whites attained a generation earlier.

Unfortunately it is impossible to develop an adequate time-lag measure for a number of relevant indices—and certainly impossible

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to compare the length of lag back through time. The reason is clear. Even today the Negro-white differential is so great and adequate statistics are of such recent vintage that the white was already ahead of today's nonwhite attainment when data were first gathered (or shortly thereafter). In such cases more traditional methods must be used to make comparisons over time. Sometimes these difficulties are compounded by the fact that the data are subject to significant cyclical variation (as is the case, for example, with unemployment rates). If, in those cases, earlier years are cited in which the index for whites equalled today's Negro index, this is not done in order to suggest a time-lag measure. Rather, referring to specific earlier years may help remind the (white) reader of what things were like then. Thus, if one wants to understand what an unemployment rate of 20 per cent represents, it is helpful to be reminded that this was the national rate in 1935.

Let us examine unemployment. Today the Negro faces an unemployment situation unknown to the white for almost two and one-half decades—and the Negro has been facing it for a number of years. What is recession for the white (say, an unemployment rate of 6 per cent) is prosperity for the nonwhite. He last saw an unemployment rate below 7.5 per cent in 1953—a full decade ago. In 1964, when the total unemployment rate for white males twenty years old and over was 3.4 per cent, the nonwhite rate was over twice as high—7.7 per cent. The rate for Negro females aged twenty and over was almost twice as high as for whites, and this was also the case for males and females combined (aged fourteen to nineteen). In 1964—a prosperity year—the Negro confronted an unemployment rate (9.8 per cent) more than 50 per cent higher than the highest rate faced by whites at any time since the great depression. Surely, the Negro must feel wry as he considers the debate about the level of unemployment that shall be considered full employment. His employment rate has not reached the "interim target" of 4.0 per cent a single time in the postwar period.

Let me make it clear that I do not say that the Negro fails to share in upward movements of the economy. He does share in prosperity—just as he is hurt by recessions. There *are* differences between unemployment rates for Negro males of 4.4 per cent in 1953, 13.7 per cent in 1958, and 9.1 per cent in 1964. It is a fact, however, that Negro unemployment rates are higher than white rates at the same moment in time and that the Negro *frequently* faces unemployment rates which—if faced by all workers—would

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be considered a national scandal. The fact is that the unemployment rate for Negroes in 1964, a year of general prosperity, was over one and one-half times as large as that for whites in *any* of the postwar recessions. Therefore, perhaps, it is appropriate to say that whites fluctuate between prosperity and recession but Negroes fluctuate between depression and great depression.

The difference in over-all white and Negro unemployment rates is not explained entirely by a different age-sex structure. Negro unemployment rates for every age-sex grouping (except for women over fifty-five) are higher—sometimes far higher—than the highest postwar rate for whites in the same age-sex group. We spoke of *fluctuations* between depression and great or deep depression. But for some of the age-sex groups—particularly, but not exclusively, among teen-agers—unemployment rates appear perpetually high: the unemployment rate for male Negroes aged sixteen and seventeen was last below 20 per cent in 1957 (it reached 31 per cent in 1961); it was last below 20 per cent for males aged eighteen and nineteen in 1956; and it was last below 10 per cent for males aged twenty to twenty-four in 1953. In only five of the seventeen years since 1948 has the rate for Negro females aged eighteen and nineteen been below 15 per cent and it has not been below 20 per cent in the last eleven years.

The differential in unemployment rates presents a real and severe problem. It is a problem requiring special attention and strong specific (as well as general) measures. Indeed, it may require relatively stronger action than would have been necessary fifteen years ago. At that time (in 1950) the white unemployment rate was 4.6 per cent and the nonwhite was 8.5 per cent (1.6 times the white). In 1964, with a white rate again at 4.6 per cent, the nonwhite rate was up to 9.8 per cent (2.1 times the white).

And when the Negro is unemployed, it is for a longer period of time. In 1964, nonwhites represented 11 per cent of the labor force and 21 per cent of the unemployed, but they accounted for 23 per cent of those unemployed fifteen weeks or longer and 25 per cent of those unemployed for over half a year. In 1963, 27 per cent of white, but 35 per cent of nonwhite unemployed males were unemployed fifteen weeks or more and 14 per cent of white but 20 per cent of nonwhite unemployed males were unemployed twenty-seven weeks or more. The average duration of unemployment for white males was slightly under fifteen weeks, for nonwhites slightly over nineteen.

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Finally, it should be noted that Negroes, when employed, are more likely to be working only part time. In 1963, for example, while 81 per cent of whites at work in nonagricultural industries worked full time, this was true of only 74 per cent of nonwhites. Only 3.1 per cent of whites worked part time for economic reasons —slack work, inability to find full-time work—but this was the case for 9.6 per cent of employed nonwhites. The average number of hours worked by those employed was 8 per cent higher for white males than for nonwhite males.

The Negro faces higher unemployment rates, more frequent periods of unemployment in a given year, longer duration of unemployment, more part-time rather than full-time work—and all this is true even when occupation is held constant. The often-heard comment that the differentials result from the fact that nonwhites have a disadvantageous occupational structure is only partly true. Thus, for example, 6 per cent of white professional and technical workers with work experience in 1962 were unemployed for some time during the year, but this was true of 11 per cent of nonwhites (and while 6 per cent of white male professionals had worked at part-time jobs, 12 per cent of nonwhites had done so). Twelve per cent of white but 18 per cent of nonwhite clerical workers were unemployed in 1962 (and while 25 per cent of the white unemployed clerical workers were unemployed for fifteen or more weeks, this was the case for 38 per cent of the nonwhite unemployed). Thirty-two per cent of white laborers had some unemployment in 1962 but 45 per cent of nonwhites did (and while 50 per cent of whites had two or more spells of unemployment, 69 per cent of nonwhites did).

We have indicated that the unemployment situation is worse for Negroes than for whites even if we correct for occupational structure of the Negro labor force. But it is also true that the unfavorable occupational structure does contribute to the problem. In addition, it affects more than unemployment rates (and income). The sharply different occupational structure among Negroes surely has an impact on the child and narrows his horizons. In 1963—as in earlier years—the white child, for example, had a far greater opportunity to meet white-collar workers than did the Negro child: 47 per cent of whites were so employed, but only 18 per cent of Negroes. While the data are rough, it would appear that already in 1900, when we were still a heavily agricultural country, the percentage of white-collar workers in the white population was 18 per cent—a lag of some sixty years. Similarly, in 1963 about 13 per cent

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of employed Negroes were laborers (except farm and mine)—the same percentage as in the white population of 1900 (a percentage which for whites had gradually declined to 4 per cent by 1963).

Thus our Negro child grows up in a world in which opportunity seems closed. And surely his aspirations are in part influenced by the achievements of other Negroes. In 1960, when 10 per cent of the male experienced labor force was nonwhite, only 3.5 per cent of male professionals, technical, and kindred workers were nonwhite (and perhaps one-quarter of these were not Negro). Only 1.4 per cent of accountants and auditors were nonwhite, 1.7 per cent of engineers, 1.3 per cent of lawyers and judges, 1.3 per cent of salaried managers, officials, and proprietors, 2.0 per cent of bookkeepers (and 6.8 per cent of clerical and kindred workers), 2.1 per cent of sales workers, and 4.9 per cent of craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers (all data for males only). But the 10 per cent proportion of the labor force was exceeded in some occupations: 48.4 per cent of private household workers are nonwhite, 26.1 per cent of laborers, and we find large percentages for other occupations at the bottom rungs of the occupational ladder. When a nonwhite child met an employed nonwhite, the chances that he was meeting a janitor were six times as great and the chances that he was meeting an engineer were only one-sixth as great as when a white child met a white employee. There are thirty-one times as many nonwhite male janitors as nonwhite engineers but more white engineers than white janitors. Almost twice as many nonwhite males are janitors as are professional and technical workers, but only one-tenth as many whites are janitors as are professionals. Over four times as many nonwhite males are janitors as are sales workers, but almost seven times as many whites are sales workers as are janitors. And the situation among females, where nonwhites represent 13 per cent of the experienced labor force, is similar: 55 per cent of the private household workers are nonwhite. Surely our Negro child aspires to a higher occupational achievement than nonwhites now have, but how difficult the road ahead appears (and is) when he confronts today's nonwhite occupational distribution.

The difference in educational attainment accounts for much, but not all, of the difference found in occupational structure. In 1962, for example, 20 per cent of nonwhite male high-school graduates were laborers. This was true of only 4 per cent of white male high-school graduates. Even among white males with an elementary

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education or less, the equivalent percentage was only 9 per cent. Nineteen per cent of nonwhite females with some college were private household workers but this was virtually unknown (1 per cent) among white females who had attended college. It was not even as high as 19 per cent (only 13 per cent) for white females with zero to eight years of elementary school.

The interrelation of the various parts of our description is depressing—the relative disadvantage in one area causes and is caused by disadvantages in another area. Relatively high unemployment and a disadvantageous occupational structure, for example, both contribute to lower incomes for Negroes than for whites. We now examine income patterns. What are our child's chances in that area?

In 1964 the Negro family with income had a median income of $3839—only 56 per cent of that for white families. White families had reached a $3800 income level back in 1951, but the situation is worse than is implied by this thirteen-year gap. Negroes in 1964 purchased commodities at 1964 prices, while whites in 1951 purchased at substantially lower 1951 prices. If we correct for price changes and compare income in dollars with 1964 purchasing power, we find that white income, even as far back as 1947, exceeded present Negro income by, perhaps, 10 to 15 per cent. Census data permit more detailed analysis. Using constant 1959 dollars (dollars with the same purchasing power), we find that in 1960 13.7 per cent of all Negro families had annual total money income of under $1,000 and 32.1 per cent had incomes of under $2,000. Even as long ago as 1947 this was true of only 6.5 per cent and 19.1 per cent of all white families. The lag is found among urban, rural nonfarm, and rural farm families (Table 2).

TABLE 2. Median Annual Money Income and Percentage of Families Below Specified Income Levels, by Residence and Color, 1947 and 1960

(Income levels expressed in dollars with 1959 purchasing power)

	Median income	*Per Cent of Families*	
		Below $1,000	*Below $2,000*
Urban nonwhite 1960	$3,844	7.0	21.8
Urban white 1947	4,544	3.6	10.8
Rural nonfarm nonwhite 1960	2,000	24.8	50.0
Rural nonfarm white 1947	3,809	6.6	17.0
Rural farm nonwhite 1960	1,155	44.0	77.3
Rural farm white 1947	2,827	16.4	34.9

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In 1960 the urban nonwhite caught up to the 1947 level for rural nonfarm whites. The urban white had, of course, achieved this level many years before 1947. To say that in 1960 the *urban* Negro family had the same real money income that the white *rural nonfarm* family had in 1947, to say that in 1960 the median Negro family had an income equal to the median white *farm* family is to point up the substantial lag and gap in income.

In 1964 the relative situation was only slightly better: 7.7 per cent of Negro families had incomes below $1,000 (measured in 1964 dollars) but this was true for only 2.7 per cent of whites. Our child had a twenty-two in one hundred chance (unadjusted for differential birth rates by income) of being born to a family with an income below $2,000. A white child would have an eight in one hundred chance. Our child has only a two in one hundred chance of being born in a family with income over $15,000 (eight in one hundred for income of over $10,000). For a white child the chances are seven and twenty-four in one hundred respectively.

If we use a poverty standard—families with incomes under $3,000—the chances in 1963 were forty-three in one hundred that our child was born into a family in poverty (by 1964 the chances were down to thirty-seven in one hundred). It is of course true, as many have pointed out, that the large majority of poor families are white (after all, an even greater majority of all families are white). A program to eliminate poverty cannot, therefore, be successful if it addresses itself only to Negroes. However, the Negro has a far greater chance (almost three times as great) of being in poverty than does the white. Even as late as 1963 the percentage of Negro families in poverty was 50 per cent higher than the white level had been sixteen years earlier in 1947 (measured in 1963 constant dollars). To whom can we ask the Negro to compare himself if he is to have some degree of hope? Apparently only to himself at some earlier period—in 1947 two-thirds of Negro families were poor—but not to the rest of America which already in 1947 was better off than the Negro was in 1963 and which, since 1947, had a decline of 30 per cent in the number of poor families while the number of poor Negro families (in part as a result of the increase in the absolute number of families) *increased* by 2 per cent.

In discussions of income data, the point is often, and validly, made that the worker's educational attainment is an important determinant of income. It is surely small comfort for the Negro to be told that his present low income status is due to his lack of educa-

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tion. Explanations do not assist in making purchases; only money does. Analysis is not a substitute for cash. Perhaps the analysis does make the income determination process a less personal one—things were "determined" at some earlier period, and we are all now acting out our roles. But there is a difficulty with this—even aside from the fact that the Negro's low educational attainment itself is the result of discrimination. The difficulty is that low education does not provide the total explanation for low income. As with a number of variables already discussed, simply being Negro also makes a difference. For in 1963 our Negro child's family had a median income of $4,530 if the family head completed high school. But the white family with the same years of education for the head had an income of $6,997—almost 55 per cent more. Indeed, if the white had but eight years of schooling, his income was $5,454, 20 per cent more than for the Negro high-school graduate. Nor are these unfavorable comparisons isolated cases: The Negro family whose head had some high school earned less than the white with fewer than eight years of schooling; *the Negro who has attended (but not completed) college earns less than the white with only eight years of elementary school,* the Negro college graduate earns but slightly more than does the white high-school graduate. Surely there are differences in the quality of education. In parts of the nation a year of Negro education was not (and is not) equal to a year of white education. Nevertheless, to argue that there is no discrimination in employment and income requires that we argue that the Negro with some college knows no more than does the white with only eight years of elementary school. This is hard to accept. And, surely, the value of an education is less clear when, for those who attended college, Negro male income is only 60 per cent of white male income, but is 68 per cent for those who only completed high school and 73 per cent for those who only attended elementary school. In a survey conducted in February 1963, it was found that 73 per cent of males aged sixteen to twenty-one who had completed less than four years of high school earned $40 a week or more on their first full-time job. This was true for only 41 per cent of nonwhite males. Conversely, 27 per cent of all males, but only 11 per cent of nonwhite males earned more than $60 a week.

It is important to realize the story these data tell. It is true that we cannot correct for quality of education—that the data measure only years of education not amount taught or learned. But even taking this into account, and even taking into account the fact that

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Negroes reside disproportionately in the South (a low income region), it is clear that, important as education may be, it does not offer a complete explanation of low Negro incomes. It is a simple fact that the Negro is *qualified* for higher occupational levels and for higher incomes than he attains. The data document a story of discrimination. Some may pessimistically conclude that it is harder to eliminate discrimination than to raise levels of education. I would respond that, painful as is the story the data reveal, there are grounds for optimism. We need not wait until today's and tomorrow's (better educated) youths become adults to increase incomes and raise occupational levels. Discrimination may be harder to combat than poor education—though even this is not certain. But it can be combated *in the short run.* To raise education and reap its rewards must take time—considerable time. But if discrimination accounts for much (though not all) of the income disparity—and I conclude that it does—we can make more rapid, more immediate progress. Perhaps as little as one-third of the total disparity between white and nonwhite incomes is due to less years of education.[10] Corrections for quality of education and geographic distribution of population would lower the proportion that can be accounted for by discrimination. Nevertheless, substantial income increases could result—even with today's educational levels—as a consequence of the elimination of discrimination. Surely we favor better and more education, but we need not wait for the effects of today's better education to take hold a decade hence.

Perhaps the discrimination that exists can be illustrated by comparing 1959 median nonwhite and white earnings for a series of occupations. We also present data for median years of school completed for nonwhites and for the total population in the particular occupation, thus pointing up the fact that differences in income exist even in occupations where high levels of education are not a requisite. Of course, in many of the occupations, experience on the job has had an opportunity to overcome the influence of poor education. Yet, even so, differentials remain.

How low the family's income is will depend, in part, on the region in which the family resides. But the differences between white and nonwhite income are large in all regions. First, income is reduced because, while almost two-thirds of white families are headed by a year-round full-time worker, only one-half of Negro families are so headed. These differences are found in all regions except the West. Furthermore, family income—even if the head is

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fully employed—is lower for the nonwhite (again in all regions): In the Northeast it is 70 per cent of white, in the North Central 83 per cent, in the South 51 per cent, and in the West 86 per cent. If account is taken of lower full-time employment as well as lower earnings, the percentage that nonwhite family income is of white family income drops significantly to 65, 73, 45, and 76 per cent respectively for the four regions. Clearly, there are large differ-

TABLE 3. Median Income and Median Years of School Completed, Total Population and Nonwhite, by Occupation, 1959

Occupation	*Median income*		*Median years of school completed*	
	Nonwhite	*Total*	*Nonwhite*	*Total*
Bakers	$3354	$4633	8.9	9.2
Carpenters	2320	4271	8.1	9.3
Welders and flame-cutters	4454	5116	9.6	9.7
Elevator operators	3122	3487	8.7	8.6
Automobile mechanics	3173	4372	8.9	9.9
Tinsmiths, coppersmiths, and sheet metal workers	4710	5542	11.1	10.8

ences among regions. Equally clearly, the situation is an unhappy one in all regions.

Our Negro child has been born into a family that is substantially poorer than the average white family. In part, this is because the Negro family head has less education than the white, earns less even at the same levels of education, has less chance of year-round full-time employment. All this most of us know. But startling is the fact that there has been very little change in the ratio of nonwhite family income to white family income over the last decade and a half (there had been extremely rapid progress in the first half of the decade of the 1940's). In 1947 the ratio of nonwhite to white family income was .51 and, though it reached .57 in 1952 (with progress from 1950 to 1952), it had fallen back to .51 in 1958 and stood at .56 in 1964. This was true in spite of the considerable outmigration during the 1950's of Negroes from the South to higher income regions. As has been shown,[11] the ratio of Negro to white income for males fell during the period 1949 to 1959 in every region of the country. Thus, even despite outmigration, the ratio of nonwhite to white male income in the nation fell in the decade of the 1950's. Progress in reducing the disparity in income ratios has been concentrated in periods of tight labor markets (parts of the

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1940's and the early 1950's) but it is unfortunate for all of us and most unfortunate for Negroes that many years have passed since the United States has faced tight labor markets.

What does lower Negro income mean for the living conditions in which our child is raised? We turn to the family's housing. The quality of housing occupied by Negroes is—as we know—markedly inferior to that occupied by whites. Since 1920, when the number of persons per occupied dwelling unit was the same for whites and nonwhites, the rate for whites has declined from 4.3 persons to 3.3 persons per unit in 1960, while the figure for nonwhites has declined only from 4.3 to 4.0. More significant, however, are the figures on the number of persons per room—a crowding measure. In 1960, 14 per cent of nonwhite units had over 1.5 persons per room (down from 23 per cent in 1940), and 28 per cent had more than one person per room (down from 40 per cent in 1940). But comparable 1960 figures for white units were only 2 per cent with more than 1.5 persons per room and 10 per cent with more than one person per room. Already in 1940 the white child was doing his homework under less crowded conditions than our Negro child faced twenty years later. Only 7.5 per cent of white households had more than 1.5 persons per room and only 18 per cent had more than one person per room in 1940—standards considerably better than nonwhites had achieved a full two decades later. The over-crowding statistics result from the fact that in 1960 nonwhite occupied units had fewer rooms (4.2 rooms as contrasted with 4.9 rooms for all units) and larger households (3.2 persons as contrasted with 3.0 persons for all units).

Thus overcrowding is not uncommon in Negro housing. But the situation is made worse by the quality of what is overcrowded. In 1960 30 per cent of housing units occupied by nonwhites lacked bathtubs or showers—a situation true for only 12 per cent of all dwelling units (including vacant ones). Forty-one per cent of nonwhite units had no bathrooms (or had shared ones), but this was the case in only 12 per cent of all dwelling units. Sixty-five per cent of nonwhite housing units had hot and cold piped water inside the structure, but 87 per cent of all units did. A full one-fifth of nonwhite units had no piped water inside the structure, a situation true for only 7 per cent of all units. Finally, while 90 per cent of all units had flush toilets, this was true for only 75 per cent of nonwhite occupied units. In 1960 our family lived in housing that had not reached 1950 U. S. standards on hot and cold water inside the

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structure or on bathing facilities and had barely reached 1950 standards for toilet facilities.

The Negro thus is more likely to be living in an overcrowded unit that lacks a number of modern facilities. In addition, in 1960 the chances were six times greater (than for whites) that the structure he lived in was dilapidated and two and one-half times greater that it was deteriorating. Seventeen per cent of Negro occupied housing (but only 3 per cent of white) was classified "dilapidated," and 28 per cent of Negro occupied housing was classified "deteriorating" (but this was true for less than 12 per cent of white). Only 55 per cent of Negro housing was "sound," and only 44 per cent was "sound with all plumbing." The odds were heavily against our child. It is true that there are significant regional variations in the percentage of nonwhite units that are "sound with all plumbing": in the South only 31 per cent of housing is so classified, while in the West the figure is 67 per cent. It can be noted, however, that in terms of soundness of housing the best region for nonwhites (the West) is equal to the poorest region for whites (the South). Income —and discriminatory housing practices—thus result in the fact that many Negro families occupy substandard, overcrowded housing that lacks modern conveniences.

The child with whom we began our story thus has shorter life expectancy, lives in less desirable housing, is a member of a family with less education, with a less favorable occupational structure, with more unemployment, and with lower income than the median white baby born at the same time. And the rate of improvement in these indices still leaves the Negro far behind the average for the rest of America.

But, of course, there is no *the* Negro American—as there is no *the* white American. There are many Negro Americans who live in conditions far better than the median Negro American. There are some who live better than the median American. There are many who live in far worse conditions. Geographic location makes an important difference in the indices cited. Our child has a better than even chance of being born in the South where the situation is generally even poorer than is indicated by the national data previously cited. It is a fact that the Negro in the North lives very differently than does the Negro in the South—though not so well as many whites believe or would like to believe. Table 4 illustrates some of these differences. In this table the status of Negroes in Census divisions with extreme highs and lows is shown. For pur-

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poses of comparison the median white U. S. averages are also shown.

Though there is significant variation in some of the indicators, in no case is performance in the division with greatest Negro attainment equal to the white median for the entire United States.

TABLE 4. Range of Values for Selected Indices for Nonwhites in Census Divisions and U.S. Median for Whites*

	Nonwhite		*White*
	In "Poorest" Division	*In "Best" Division*	*U. S.*
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births (1962)	46.9 (ESC)	30.7 (P)	22.3
Median school years completed (1960)	6.7 (ESC)	10.3 (P)	10.9
Per cent college graduates, of males 25–29 (1960)	3.6 (ESC)	9.8 (P)	15.6
Per cent housing sound with all plumbing (1960)	23.1 (ESC)	70.9 (P)	79.7
Per cent housing with more than one person per room (1960)	46.0 (M)	18.2 (NE)	9.8
Family income (1963)	$2520 (S)	$5417 (W)	$6548
Per cent families with income under $3,000 (1963)	58.4 (S)	19.8 (W)	15.9

* "ESC" stands for the East South Central division; "P" for Pacific; "NE" for New England; "M" for Mountain; "S" for South; and "W" for West.

The significant differences between South and North and between urban and rural areas, combined with the very considerable migration of Negroes from the South to the North and from rural areas to urban areas, help explain much of the improvement over time in many of the indices we have examined. But progress in the future will require upward movement *within* the urban setting since the heaviest rural-urban migration has already taken place. In 1960, 73 per cent of all Negro Americans had urban residences—a higher percentage than was true for whites. South to North migration, it is true, continues. But the situation is far from satisfactory when the national median for Negroes increases relative to whites only as a consequence of population redistribution even as relative declines occur in all regions.

The differentials that exist between the majority of whites and the majority of the Negro minority are great. The lack of opportunity and the previous (and present) discriminatory practices have

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had their consequences: In many respects the Negro is today living in a world the white has long since left behind. The gains the Negro has made and is making are substantial—all indicators are advancing. The real situation today is better than it once was. Nevertheless, we dare not overestimate the extent of these gains or underestimate the distance still to be covered.

Though the gains are large relative to where an earlier generation of Negroes stood, they are often more limited if the comparison is made of nonwhite indicators relative to those for whites. In such comparisons, (for example, income) we often find that the differential between whites and nonwhites has been widening in recent years. Differentials frequently narrowed in the 1940's but increased again in the latter part of the 1950's. To the economist this underlines the importance of full employment and high-level economic growth in helping to secure advances. Everything is interrelated: Education has an impact on health, and employment on income, and income on education, and so forth. Advances are, therefore, required on a broad front. The generation now growing up will have opportunities opened to them—opportunities to make these advances—that their fathers did not have. But the record of the 1940's and 1950's tells us that these opportunities and the ability to seize them will be greater, the more rapid the growth and expansion of the economy.

Surely, however, the data indicate that the differentials are now so wide and the distance to be covered so great that simply waiting for time to bring improvement is to indulge in unjustified optimism. Many of the nonwhite indicators have not been advancing so rapidly as did the white indicators when they were at comparable levels. It is often taking the Negro longer to move up from "a" to "b" than it took the white. In many cases the narrowing of present differentials results from a redistribution of Negro population—and a "plateauing" of white rates of progress. But "plateauing" could also occur for nonwhites. We cannot be sanguine if we find, for example, that in 1950 the Negro reached levels that the white achieved in 1920 (a gap of thirty years), but that by 1960 he was where the white was in 1925 (a gap of thirty-five years). This kind of advance does not give us confidence concerning the achievement of equality in the not too distant future.

But optimism *is* warranted if concern leads us to take measures directed at the problem. For at no previous time in recent history could measures be so easily taken and progress so readily result.

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We have the knowledge, and the means are available. In an economy with a civilian employment upward of 70 million, in an economy generating an additional $40 billion of gross national product annually, there are abundant fruits sufficient for all to feast upon.

And the numbers of persons involved make the problem even easier of solution, for Negroes represent only about 10 per cent of the population (with, perhaps, 5 per cent of the income). The "burden" of special measures, when addressed to 10 per cent but borne by the whole society, is, therefore, not great. This cost—when borne in a growing economy—can be absorbed while everyone advances. Illustrative of this point is that recent rates of economic growth would permit a doubling of nonwhite personal income (perhaps $20 billion) in one year even while—out of growth—white incomes rose.

And, it should be clear that the gains would not accrue solely to the nonwhite. The raising of Negro education, health, productivity, and employment would increase the economy's bounty for all. (The President's Council of Economic Advisers estimates that in time there would be an increase perhaps of as much as $23 billion—measured at today's price levels—in the Gross National Product.)[12] In addition, the indirect benefits to all of advances in education, health, and such in part of the population—while difficult to measure—are significant. Finally, and most importantly, if we remember that the Negro American is not only a Negro but an American, it should be clear that his gains are our gains—gains by all America.

These conclusions do not in themselves suggest how changes in the present situation are to be brought about—how rates of change are to be accelerated. I have already alluded to a number of situations that have policy implications. I summarize them.

I note again that some argue that the external world the Negro faces is vastly different from that faced by other minority groups in the past and that timing has conspired to rob the Negro of his opportunities. He, the argument asserts, is trying to make speedy progress when automation and increased stress on skills make job entrance more difficult and job requirements more demanding. For these reasons, if for no other, the Negro is said to be at a considerable disadvantage compared to other minorities. I agree that the Negro faces a *different* world. However, relative to the Negro American's achievements and accomplishments, it is not clear that, *were there no discrimination,* it would be a harsher world. The

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economy does place an additional premium on persons with more training—but in 1964 the median number of school years completed by Negroes aged twenty to twenty-four was 12.0 years. This is a far higher educational level than previous generations of Negroes—or previous minority groups—possessed. True it is that technological progress will bring a shift in occupational structure—but this will help unlock opportunities that free the Negro. It is to be preferred to an economic structure that demands less skill but provides less room for upward mobility. In this, as in other areas, expansion, growth, and change are the vital ingredients in Negro advancement. For it is easier to effect advancement for the Negro in a world of change than in a world of rigidity. Free education, expansion of university enrollments, greater concern about poverty, illiteracy, public health, housing codes, economic security—all these surely mean greater opportunity for present and future generations of Negro Americans. The importance of this concern—and commitment—cannot be overemphasized. It is a source of change and of ultimate strength. It is found in many sectors of society, organized and unorganized, public and private. It need not be ephemeral. It is the task of all—perhaps, particularly of the Negro—to keep the fire of concern burning brightly.

Such concern has—and will continue to have—its impact on public and private action—on legislation, on its implementation, and on private (business and non-business) behavior. The catalogue of actions is a long one; it encompasses the daily behavior of individuals and enterprises. What is required is that these actions, that the behavior, be nondiscriminatory, that equality be practiced as well as promised.

The data bear out the fact that a substantial part of America's problem results not only from past but also from present discriminatory behavior, not from objective, quantifiable "shortcomings" of the Negro—for example, less education—but from subjective attitudes of the white. "Men at some times are masters of their fates: The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, But in ourselves, that we are underlings." The fault *is* in *ourselves* (not in the Negro), and we are masters of our fates. We can do much even today without waiting for the educational advancements that bear fruit tomorrow. We can eliminate present discrimination even as we institute programs that help remove the disabilities caused by past discrimination. We can reverse the "slippage" the data reveal.

Elimination of discrimination means a different sharing of the

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nation's (more abundant) products. I stress that a more equitable division is more easily achieved when the amount of product is growing. This is particularly true if conditions are such that the institution of non-discriminatory programs—and of compensatory, supplemental, and upgrading programs—is advantageous to those undertaking them, that is, if it becomes disadvantageous and expensive to indulge in the "taste" for discrimination and prejudice or to maintain the status quo.

The Negro did advance more rapidly in a rapidly expanding economy (the 1940's) than in an economy not living up to its potential (the latter part of the 1950's). Full employment, tight labor markets, high rates of growth are imperatives. They mean jobs, employer training programs, upgrading of labor, relaxation of undesirable restrictive hiring practices. I contend that the Negro will fare better in a redistribution of the fruits of progress than in a battle with others over the spoils of war.

This strikes close to and is also true for the issue often posed as "preferential treatment." Preferential treatment is not a wholly new concept on the American scene. In a very real sense we have witnessed it for decades—for whites. Separate and *unequal* schools, favoritism in hiring and employment, restrictive housing practices —often these were preferential treatment based on race. Universities have admitted less qualified students who were the sons of alumni, or who played band instruments at football games between groups of (other) preferentially treated students. Government expenditure (and tax) policy has given preference (some desirable—the War on Poverty; some undesirable—tax exemption of interest on state and local bonds). It is clear that preferential treatment can mean many different things and can take many different forms. The fact that it did exist in the past does not in itself mean that it should exist in the future. But it does suggest that it is not something completely new, to be rejected simply because it has not previously been used.

Attitudes to the phrase "preferential treatment" can vary with the policy that it calls to mind. Some may favor compensatory or supplemental educational programs and relaxed admission standards by universities but oppose preferential hiring policies by private employers. Some may favor programs to assist the Negro to attain required levels (via tutorial programs, on-the-job training, retraining, summer educational programs) but oppose preference except through such "compensatory" programs. Some may feel pref-

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erence means assistance; others may feel it implies lowering of standards. And persons may disagree on the amount of preference to be granted: If assistance, how much? If relaxation of standards, how far? Does preference mean filling a vacancy with a Negro rather than a white when they are equal in all relevant respects, when the Negro is only a little less qualified, when he is substantially less qualified? Does preference mean extra dollars for Negro schools (how many dollars); does it mean extra training and upgrading programs (if so how many)?

Preferential treatment programs can be best discussed and evaluated as specific programs on their individual merits, each with its own costs, each with its own benefits. But all such programs share three things in common: (1) their goal is to speed progress—to leapfrog ahead (and in many areas discontinuities may require large, rapid and dramatic gains rather than an ever so slow but steady movement, for the problems are complex and intertwined and psychology, motivation, and aspiration are part of them); (2) they are more readily accepted when they are designed to upgrade and remove disabilities or deficiencies rather than to "overlook" them; (3) they are more readily accepted when preference for some does not mean retrogression for others. Specific proposals should be evaluated in the light of these considerations. If this is done we may well find disagreement over words translated into agreement over policies.

We paint tomorrow's picture today. Much of the outline was given to us by yesterday's generation, but that rough sketch can be altered and enriched. We—the Negro and the white—are not captives of our yesterdays. Perhaps in years to come such essays will be written not by economists but by economic historians.

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1. Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York, 1944), p. xviii.

2. We reject comparisons between the Negro American and other groups living outside the United States. Such comparisons are surely felt to be irrelevant by Negro Americans themselves. The unhappy fact that Negroes are often treated as outsiders in their own land does not makes them insiders in some other. Such comparisons also miss the point that Negro Americans are Americans (and have been so for a long time), and they delimit the American ideal: society has not told Irish Americans, for

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example, that their progress is sufficient if their standard of living exceeds that of the rest of the world or that of the Irish in Ireland (what would we tell the American Indian?). The issue, thus, is not whether the 20 million Negro Americans are better off than most of the other 3 billion persons in the rest of the world (they are), but how they compare with the 170 million white Americans.

3. Such time-lag comparisons are valid when we examine data that have strong trends and, at most, relatively small cyclical departures from the trends. Further, "representative" years must be selected (however, as is sometimes done in this paper, a few adjoining years can be averaged to obtain the data for comparison). It should be noted that the measure we introduce cannot be the only yardstick. It adds an important dimension but if relied upon to the exclusion of other measures could, under some circumstances, give misleading results. In the hypothetical example the Negro would be forty years behind the white if in the year 2000 he attained a level of 275. Yet he would have attained equality if the white made no further advances. Clearly the achievement of equality, rather than the forty year lag, would be significant.

4. U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Health, Education, and Welfare Trends,* 1964 Edition, p. 13.

5. U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, *Vital Statistics of the Unitel States, 1960,* Volume II, Part A: Mortality, p. 3-3.

6. Data for years prior to 1933 are for the death-registration area only. They are not strictly comparable with data for more recent years. But, in general, the fact that we sometimes compare nonwhite data for years after 1933 with white data prior to 1933 should yield "conservative" results that *understate* the "true" gap. Where both white and nonwhite data are for years after 1933 this problem does not exist.

7. During the 1920-1940 period the differential in average educational level for those aged twenty-five to twenty-nine widened from 3.1 years to 3.7 years; in 1960 it was down to 1.5 years. Data for 1964 are not presented because they are not strictly comparable with 1960 data.

8. Data for 1920 and for persons aged twenty-five to twenty-nine from John K. Folger and Charles B. Nam, "Educational Trends from Census Data," *Demography,* Vol. 1, No. 1 (1964), pp. 247-57.

9. "Educational Change in a Generation, March 1962," *Current Population Reports,* Series P-20, No. 132, p. 4.

10. Derived from data released by the Council of Economic Advisers, "Economic Costs of Racial Discrimination in Employment" (Washington, D. C., September 24, 1962).

11. Alan Batchelder, "Decline in the Relative Income of Negro Men," *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* Vol. 78, No. 4 (November 1964), pp. 525-48.

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Demographic Factors in the Integration of the Negro

THE SIZE, rate of growth, distribution, and composition of the Negro population both influence integration and provide some indications of the extent to which it has been achieved. The precise way in which these demographic factors affect integration, positively or negatively, is not definitely known. Yet, what is known about the process of acculturation, on the one hand, and about population changes, on the other, permits some consideration of their interrelationships and, at least, speculation about the influence of the latter upon the former. This essay is an attempt to summarize the characteristics of the Negro population and to consider how changes in it affect integration.

It is necessary before proceeding with these tasks, however, to define the term "integration." In popular usage the term is employed to encompass a variety of connotations ranging from mere desegregation or admixture of whites and Negroes, as a salt and pepper combination in an audience, to varying degrees of interaction and participation in common life activities. For purposes of this paper integration is viewed as more than mere desegregation; rather, it is seen as social interaction, effective communication, and a sharing in activities that fill one's life. In this sense integration is a social process that may be considered one form of acculturation—social interaction embracing members of diverse racial as well as cultural backgrounds.

Let us review first some highlights in the population history of the Negro in the United States.

Characteristics of the Negro American Population

Total population. When the first Census of Population was

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taken in 1790, there were some 3.9 million persons in this country.[1] Of these, 3.2 million were white and 757 thousand were Negro. By that time, Negroes had resided in the colonies for about 175 years as the indentured servants or property of their white slave-owner masters. At the first census, they constituted almost one-fifth (19.3 per cent) of the total population.

Negroes remained about one-fifth of the national total until 1810. From that date to 1930, they became a declining proportion of the population as slave importation ceased and white immigration continued. By 1930, Negroes had decreased to less than one-tenth of the national total (9.7 per cent). Since 1940, the growth rate of the Negro population has exceeded that of the white; thus, by 1960, Negroes constituted slightly above one-tenth (10.6 per cent) of the total population. In fact, their absolute numbers had risen to 4.4 million by the onset of the Civil War, to 8.8 million by the turn of the century, and to 18.9 million by the 18th Decennial Census of Population in 1960.

Components of growth. The growth of the Negro population since 1820 was the result almost entirely of natural increase, that is, excess of births over deaths. Although the Negro birth rate, as the white birth rate, declined between 1850 and 1940, it has consistently been above the level of the white. As measured by the fertility ratio (children under five per 1,000 women twenty to forty-four years old) Negro fertility declined by more than half between 1850 and 1940, while white fertility declined by about one-third.

Between 1940 and 1960, the birth rates of both whites and nonwhites rose with the postwar baby boom. Nonwhite fertility increased by 90 per cent (from a fertility ratio of 418 to 795) while white fertility rose by 88 per cent (from 395 to 742). The great increase in nonwhite birth rates represents an astonishing reversal and occurred, interestingly enough, even while the Negro was becoming rapidly urbanized and metropolitanized as is indicated below. The phenomenal increase in nonwhite fertility is a result of the striking rise in nonwhite urban fertility, largely because of the decrease in childlessness brought about by improved health, including reduction in venereal and debilitating diseases.

For many purposes the best measure of mortality is given by its converse, expectation of life. Negro death rates, as the white, have decreased sharply since the turn of the century. Moreover, throughout the course of this century, because of the improvement in the position of the Negro in the nation, Negro death rates have, from a

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higher level, come down more sharply than white. In 1900, expectation of life at birth for nonwhites (mainly Negro) was 33.0 years as contrasted with 47.6 years for whites. By 1960, nonwhite life expectancy at birth had increased to 63.6 years, while white increased to 70.6 years. Thus, the difference in life expectation between the nonwhite and white decreased by more than half, from 14.6 years to 7.0 years.

As a result of more rapid decline in mortality and greater increase in fertility in recent decades, Negro natural increase has risen well above the white. Between 1905 and 1910, nonwhite natural increase at a level of 14.7 (excess of births over deaths per 1,000 persons) was not much above the level of white, 13.8. By 1960, nonwhite natural increase, at 22.0, was about two-thirds greater than that of white, at 13.2. The nonwhite rate of population growth in 1960, if sustained, would double the Negro population in a little over thirty years. In contrast, the continuation of the 1960 white rate would require over fifty years before doubling the population.

Some part of the difference in Negro and white natural increase is attributable to the difference in the age structure of the two populations. As will be seen below, the Negro population is appreciably younger than the white, a fact which tends to increase its birth rate and decrease its death rate. Even if this difference is taken into account, however, the nonwhite rate of increase is still over 60 per cent above the white, the nonwhite intrinsic rate being 31.2 in 1960 in contrast with 19.3 for whites.[2]

Age. In 1840, the median age of nonwhites was 17.3 years as compared with 17.9 years for whites. A century later, because of differences in Negro and white fertility, mortality, and immigration, the nonwhite median age was only 25.2 years, compared with 29.5 years for whites. In 1950, nonwhite and white median ages were, respectively, 26.1 and 30.8 years. Because of the baby boom, however, the median age of both the Negro and white populations decreased between 1950 and 1960 to 23.5 and 30.3 years respectively. Another indication that the Negro population is younger than the white is seen in the fact that a greater proportion of their population is under twenty. In 1960, 45.6 per cent of the Negroes, as compared with 39.5 per cent of whites, were under twenty years of age.

A significant aspect of Negro-white differences in age structure, with important implications for integration, is shown by considering differences in the burden of dependency, that is, the difference in

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the proportion of persons below and above working age in relation to that of persons of working age.

In 1910, Negro and white dependency was approximately the same. The Negro dependency ratio was 105—that is, for each 100 persons of working age (twenty to sixty-four) there were 105 persons either under twenty or sixty-five or over. Of the Negroes of dependent age, 99 were under twenty and 6 were sixty-five or over. The native-white dependency ratio in 1910 was 103, 96 of which were youth and 7 aged. By 1960, however, as a result of the remarkable upsurge in natural increase, the Negro had a considerably greater dependency burden. The Negro dependency ratio reached a level of 107, as contrasted with 90 for native whites. Moreover, Negro dependents were disproportionately young, the youth dependency ratio being 94, compared with 75 for whites. Thus Negro youth dependency in 1960 was at a level 25 per cent above that of white. Aged Negro dependency had increased to 13, but this was still below the level of 15 for whites.

Distribution. In 1790, 91 per cent of the Negroes lived in the South. This regional concentration of Negroes had not changed appreciably by 1910, as recorded in the last census taken before World War I (89 per cent). The first large internal migratory flow of Negroes from the South began during World War I. It was prompted by the combination of need for labor to man the expanding industrial plants of the North, as the United States served as the arsenal for the Allied Powers, and the changing economy of the South which, with the diversification of agriculture and the delayed impact of the industrial revolution, was freeing the Negro from the soil. The flow of Negroes from the South to the North and West continued thereafter, abating somewhat during the depression thirties and accelerating greatly during World War II and its aftermath. In consequence, the proportion of all Negroes living in the North and West almost quadrupled from 1910 to 1960, rising from 11 to 40 per cent.

The regional redistribution of the Negro was achieved primarily, of course, through migration. The internal migratory patterns of Negroes may be analyzed by means of lifetime migration patterns (based on census data on state of residence as compared with state of birth) or of estimates of net migration between censuses. According to the lifetime migration data, in 1910 83 per cent of the nonwhites lived in the state in which they were born, as compared with 77 per cent of the whites. As reported in the Census of 1910,

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90 per cent of the native nonwhites lived in the same geographic division in which they were born and 94 per cent in the same region.* Comparable figures for whites were 84 and 90 per cent. Thus, in 1910, on a lifetime basis Negroes were less migratory than whites. However, Negroes had reversed the pattern and had become more migratory than whites by 1960, when only 64 per cent of the native nonwhites resided in the states in which they were born, only 72 per cent in the geographic division, and only 75 per cent in the region. In contrast, comparable figures for native whites were 68, 77, and 83 per cent.

Between 1910 and 1960, the exodus of Negroes from the South accelerated. Between 1910 and 1920, net migration of Negroes out of the South totaled 454,300; between 1920 and 1930, 749,000; between 1930 and 1940, 347,500; between 1940 and 1950, 1,244,700; and between 1950 and 1960, 1,457,000. Six states in the North and West (California, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) absorbed 72 per cent of all Negro net in-migration between 1910 and 1950. Between 1950 and 1960, the same six states absorbed 68 per cent of all net in-migration of nonwhites.

Negro internal migratory flows effected shifts not only in their regional distribution but, even more important, also in their distribution within urban, rural, and metropolitan areas. In 1910, before large migratory streams of Negroes left the South, 73 per cent of the Negroes in the nation, as compared with 52 per cent of the whites, lived in rural areas, that is, on farms and in areas with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants. By 1960, the distribution of Negroes by urban-rural residence had become completely reversed, with 73 per cent of the Negro population residing in urban areas. Thus, within a period of fifty years, less than a lifetime, the Negro has been transformed from a predominantly rural to a predominantly urban resident. In fact, in 1960, Negroes were more highly urbanized than whites, 70 per cent of whom resided in urban areas.

The great increase in the concentration of Negroes is even more

* The Bureau of the Census classifies the United States into three or four "regions" and nine "geographic divisions." The geographic divisions employed are states grouped as follows: New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific. The regions are: the North (New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, and West North Central); the West (Mountain and Pacific); and the South (South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central). For the states in geographic divisions see *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1964* (Washington, D. C., 1964).

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dramatically revealed by analysis of their metropolitanization. In 1910, only 29 per cent of Negroes lived in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's). By 1960, the concentration of Negroes in SMSA's had increased to 65 per cent. Between 1920 and 1940, Negroes in SMSA's increased by 65 per cent as compared with 36 per cent for whites; and, between 1940 and 1960, Negroes in metropolitan areas more than doubled, increasing by 109 per cent, as compared with 50 per cent for whites.

Even more striking than the increase of Negroes in metropolitan areas is their concentration in the central cities of these areas. Between 1910 and 1920, the Negro population in central cities of metropolitan areas increased by 40 per cent; between 1920 and 1940, by 83 per cent; and between 1940 and 1960, by 123 per cent. Hence, by 1960, 51 per cent of all Negroes in the United States lived in the central cities of SMSA's. Of all Negroes resident in metropolitan areas, 80 per cent lived in central cities. There was a much higher concentration of Negroes in metropolitan areas and in their central cities in the North and West than in the South. In 1960, of all Negroes in the North 93 per cent were in SMSA's and 79 per cent in the central cities; and in the West 93 per cent in SMSA's and 67 per cent in central cities. In the South, however, 46 per cent of all Negro residents lived in SMSA's and 34 per cent in central cities. Finally, it must be observed that Negroes are disproportionately concentrated in the large SMSA's and especially in their central cities. The twenty-four SMSA's with 1 million or more persons in 1960 contained 38 per cent of the total Negro population, and their central cities, 31 per cent. Comparable figures for whites are 34 and 15 per cent.

Segregation. Negroes, as had white immigrant groups before them, found their ports of entry to cities in the inner slum areas, where they lived in enclaves or ghettos. The process of settlement has been well described both for white ethnic immigrants and the Negro.[3] The residential patterns and initial stages of urban settlement of both groups were characterized by segregation, but there were at least two important differences. First, the Negroes were more highly segregated than white ethnic groups; and, second, Negro segregation has, in general, increased rather than decreased over time.

Duncan and Lieberson, in their analysis of ethnic and racial segregation in Chicago in 1930, report an average index of segregation of 28 for four "old" countries and 41 for six "new" countries.[4]

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Thus, it would have been necessary for 28 per cent of the foreign-born whites from earlier immigrations to be moved to match the distribution of native whites and 41 per cent of the foreign-born from more recent immigrations to do the same. In contrast, the index of segregation for Negroes in relation to the various foreign-white stocks varied from levels of 79 to 94. The index of segregation of Negroes in relation to native whites was 85 in 1930. Thus, the segregation of Negroes was much more marked than that of the foreign ethnic groups. In the same study, Duncan and Lieberson showed appreciable declines in the segregation of foreign-born whites relative to native whites between 1930 and 1950. These findings were further corroborated by Lieberson in his study of ten cities from 1930 to 1950.[5] In each of the cities (Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Syracuse) segregation for foreign-born whites in relation to native whites decreased during that period. In contrast, Negro segregation in relation to native-white segregation increased in eight of the ten cities and in relation to foreign-white, increased in nine of the ten cities.

The higher level of Negro segregation is further demonstrated by Taeuber and Taeuber in their study of 207 cities in 1960.[6] The average index of Negro segregation for all the cities was 86, with regional variations ranging from an index of 76 in New England to 91 in the South Atlantic states. Moreover, the Taeubers found that the Negro index of segregation increased between 1940 and 1950 in all the eight geographic divisions they examined (New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, West, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central); and, although segregation decreased slightly in the five northern and western divisions between 1950 and 1960, it actually increased in the three southern geographic divisions.

Thus, between 1910 and 1960, the Negro has been redistributed from the South to the North and West, and from rural to urban and metropolitan areas; but within the urban and metropolitan complexes the Negro American has become and has remained much more highly segregated than was true of white immigrants who flocked to the cities before them.

Family. In 1910, only 38 per cent of Negro women between the ages of fifty and fifty-four were living in first marriages with their husband present as contrasted with 59 per cent of the white. Moreover, larger proportions were widowed or divorced—35 and 19 per

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cent, respectively. By 1940, this differential in marital status had not changed appreciably. Family life must have been, at least temporarily, further disrupted by the large-scale internal migratory flows. In 1960, after fifty years of exodus from the South, less than half (48.6 per cent) of all nonwhite women were married and living with their husbands, as contrasted with almost two-thirds (63.7 per cent) of white women. About 16 per cent of nonwhite women were reported in the Census either as separated, married with their husbands absent, or divorced, in contrast to 6 per cent of the white. About 14 per cent of nonwhite women were widowed as contrasted with 12 per cent of the white.

Family disorganization and unstable family life among Negro Americans is a product of their history and caste status in the United States. During slavery and for at least the first half-century after emancipation, the Negro never had the opportunity to acquire the patterns of sexual behavior and family living which characterized middle-class white society.[7] African family patterns were, of course, destroyed during slavery, when it was virtually impossible to establish any durable form of family organization. Moreover, as a result of the slave traffic, children were necessarily attached to their mother in a more lasting manner than to their father.

This historical tendency toward a matriarchal family structure has been reinforced by the continued inability of the Negro male, because of lack of opportunity and discriminatory practices, to assume the role of provider and protector of his family in accordance with prevailing definitions of the role of husband and father.[8] The Negro male has, in a sense, been the victim of social and economic emasculation which has perpetuated and reinforced the matriarchal Negro family structure created by slavery. Moreover, this pattern has been further bolstered by the fact that the Negro female, in household interaction with middle-class white families of the South as well as the North, has acquired attitudes and norms of behavior which have led her to look down upon any Negro male without similar exposure. The Negro male, condemned largely to illiteracy, rough and dirty work, and limited social and cultural opportunities, could not meet the expectations of the Negro female. Furthermore, the tendency for Negro mothers to raise their children according to standards acquired in their contacts with white households has introduced tensions into relationships of father and child as well as husband and wife.

In view of unstable family life among Negroes, then, it should

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not be surprising that a smaller proportion of the nonwhite population than of the white lives in primary family groups, 84 per cent as contrasted with 89 per cent. Furthermore, nonwhite children, as contrasted with white, were much less frequently living with both their parents. In 1960, almost one-third (32.2 per cent) of nonwhite children under fourteen, as compared with 8 per cent of white, were being reared in the absence of one or both parents. About four times as large a proportion of nonwhite than white children (19.6 *vs.* 5.5 per cent) were living with their mothers only; and five times as many (10.9 *vs.* 1.8 per cent) were living with neither parent.

Education. In 1910, almost one in every three Negroes ten years old and over in the United States was illiterate (30.4 per cent). Illiteracy among Negroes, therefore, was ten time as great as among native whites(3 per cent). In the rural areas, Negro illiteracy was at a level of over 36 per cent and in urban areas about 18 per cent. Negro illiteracy in the South reached 33 per cent, as contrasted with 10 per cent in the North and 7 per cent in the West. By 1930, the last census in which the literacy question was asked, Negro illiteracy had declined by about half to 16 per cent; but it was still over ten times the level of native whites (1.5 per cent). Illiteracy was still more than twice as high among rural than urban Negroes, and in the South was more than five times as high as in the West and four times as high as in the North.

In 1940, the Bureau of the Census substituted a question on years of school completed for the literacy question. At that date, nonwhite men twenty-five years of age and older had on the average completed only 5.4 years of schooling (median years of schooling) as compared with 8.7 years for whites. Nonwhite adult women had, on the average, completed 6.1 years of schooling, as compared with 8.8 years for white women. By 1960, nonwhite men had attained, on the average, 7.9 years of schooling, as compared with 10.6 years for white men; and nonwhite women 8.5 years as compared with 11.0 years for white women. Thus, between 1940 and 1960 the difference in average educational attainment between nonwhite and white men had decreased from 3.3 to 2.6 years, while the differences between nonwhite and white women decreased slightly from 2.7 and 2.5 years.

More revealing than these measures of average education are the proportions of persons who had reached meaningful levels of schooling. For example, in 1940, 41 per cent of the nonwhite adults had less than five years of schooling and were, therefore, function-

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ally illiterate. This was almost four times the level of white functional illiteracy, at 11 per cent. In 1940, 92 per cent of the nonwhite adults had not completed high school, as compared with 74 per cent of the whites. Only 1.3 per cent of the nonwhites, compared with 4.9 per cent of the whites, had completed college.

By 1960, the proportion of functionally illiterate adult nonwhites had decreased to 23 per cent, but this was still more than three times as great as that of whites, at 7 per cent. Nonwhite adults without a high-school education had dropped to 78 per cent, but the comparable figure for whites had declined to 57 per cent. Nonwhites who had completed a college education had risen to 3.5 per cent, but was still less than half that of whites at 8.1 per cent. Since there is an inverse relationship between age and education (younger persons tend to have higher education) and since the Negro population is younger than the white, the above noted differences in levels of education between whites and nonwhites are understated.

Differences in literacy and education are, of course, produced by differences in school enrollment. In 1910, school enrollment levels for Negro children were well below those for white. Only 59 per cent of the Negro children six to thirteen years old were enrolled in school as compared with 85 per cent of the native white. For youngsters fourteen to fifteen years of age, only 58 per cent of Negroes were in school as compared with 78 per cent of the native whites; for youngsters sixteen to seventeen, 36 per cent of Negroes and 46 per cent of native whites; and among youths eighteen to twenty, the comparable figures for nonwhite and native white were 12 and 17 per cent.

By 1960, Negro school enrollment for children six to thirteen had risen to 93 per cent but was still below white (including foreign born) at 96 per cent. For Negro youngsters fourteen to fifteen, school enrollment had risen to 90 per cent, as compared with 95 per cent for white; for young persons sixteen to seventeen, Negro enrollment was 73 per cent, compared with 82 per cent for white; and for youths eighteen to twenty, Negro enrollment had reached 31 per cent as compared with 37 per cent for white. The improved relative school enrollment of the Negro was one of the consequences of his regional and urban redistribution.

Labor force. The role of the Negro in the economy cannot be understood solely in terms of demography. Study of the composition of the Negro population, however, usually requires some con-

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sideration of his economic characteristics. Since participation in the labor force, occupation, and income are vital factors both in influencing the integration of the Negro and in indicating how far the process has gone, they are given brief treatment here.

A larger proportion of the Negro than of the white population has been in the work force over the years. In 1900, 65 per cent of Negroes fourteen years of age and older were workers, as compared with 52 per cent of whites. The high proportion of Negroes was due to the much greater proportion of younger and older persons and of females who were working. This difference between Negro and white patterns of labor-force participation parallels that between the developing regions of the world and the economically advanced areas. With the passage of time, the difference in the work rates of Negroes and whites has diminished. By 1960, 56 per cent of Negroes fourteen years of age and over, as compared with 55 per cent of whites, were in the labor force, and the proportions of younger and older persons and females in the work force had grown much more similar.

Changes in the occupational pattern of Negro workers must be considered in the context of changes in the occupational pattern of the entire nation under the impact of increasing technological development and urbanization. By 1960, the structure of the United States labor force as a whole was completely different from what it was in the first decade of the century. Whereas in 1910 74 per cent of the total work force were engaged in the production of physical goods and only 26 per cent were providing services, by 1960, only 46 per cent were producing goods and 54 per cent were providing services. In 1960, only 6 per cent of the nation's workers were in agricultural pursuits as compared with 38 per cent in 1910; and 42 per cent as compared with 18 per cent were in white-collar work.

In 1910, when the Negro population was still concentrated mainly in the South, Negroes were predominantly agricultural workers in rural areas and unskilled laborers or service workers in urban areas. In 1910, 56 per cent of the Negroes who were gainfully employed, as compared with 33 per cent of all workers, were engaged in agriculture. The next largest category of Negro workers included the 22 per cent who were engaged in domestic and personal service, compared with 10 per cent of all workers. Thus, in 1910, over three-fourths (78 per cent) of all Negro workers were in agriculture or domestic service, as contrasted with 43 per cent of all workers in the nation.

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By 1940, the proportion of Negroes in agricultural pursuits had diminished to 41 per cent, but it was still almost twice that of white workers (21 per cent). More than an additional one-fifth of the Negroes in the labor force (21 per cent) were laborers in non-agricultural pursuits, as compared with 7.5 per cent for whites. Hence, in 1940, almost two-thirds of all Negro workers (62 per cent), as contrasted with less than one-third of the white (28 per cent), were in agriculture or unskilled labor. It is noteworthy that, by 1940, the proportion of Negroes in domestic service had shrunk to 2.9 per cent, but twice as many Negroes (12 per cent) as whites were employed in "other services." White-collar workers—those in the professions, clerical and sales work, and proprietary and managerial occupations—accounted for only 9 per cent of all Negro workers, compared with 26 per cent of the white. Craftsmen and operatives accounted for only 17 per cent of all Negro workers, as contrasted with 34 per cent of the white.

By 1960, because of the impact of the war—which greatly accelerated the regional and urban-rural redistribution of the Negro—and the continued changes in the American economy, the occupational pattern of the Negro had greatly changed. In 1960, only 11 per cent of the Negro labor force remained in agriculture and only 8 per cent of the white.

Although unskilled labor in non-agricultural work still accounted for an appreciable proportion of all Negro workers, the Negro had made considerable gains in white-collar work and in skilled crafts. In 1960, 25 per cent of Negro workers, as compared with 20 per cent of white workers, were operatives; 20 per cent, as compared with 6 per cent, were laborers not in agriculture. The proportion of Negroes in craft and allied occupations had more than doubled from 1940 to 1960 to reach a level of 10 per cent, but this was still only half that of the white proportion (21 per cent). Negroes in white-collar occupations had increased to 11 per cent—less than one-third the proportion of whites in white-collar occupations. In fact, the proportion of white workers in white-collar jobs between 1940 and 1960 increased more rapidly than that of Negroes. By 1960, Negroes in domestic service had shrunk to less than 1 per cent, but Negroes in "other services" had increased to 14 per cent, about two and one-half times the level for whites.

All in all, between 1940 and 1960, Negroes made some progress in upgrading their occupational pattern relative to that of whites, but they still lagged far behind. In 1940, the index of dissimilarity

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for Negro as compared with white workers by broad occupational groupings was 43, and in 1960 it had decreased to 38—that is, in 1940, it would have been necessary to change the occupations of 43 per cent of the Negroes to match the occupational distribution of the whites and, by 1960, this proportion had dropped to 38.

The moderate upgrading in the national Negro occupational pattern is apparent in a longitudinal as well as a cross-sectional analysis, as Nathaniel Hare has shown.[9] A "cohort analysis," the tracing of the same population through successive ages, reveals that the younger cohorts of Negroes are approaching white occupational levels more rapidly than did older cohorts. However, it must be emphasized that an analysis of occupational changes by region and urban-rural residence indicates that the moderate upgrading of the national Negro occupational pattern was primarily the result of his redistribution through internal migration out of the South and into urban and metropolitan areas. Within each region and within urban and metropolitan areas, the Negro continued to work at occupational levels below those of the white.

Since the Negro was employed in farm and unskilled manual work much more frequently than the white, he received much smaller remuneration. Data for comparing the income of whites and nonwhites over a long period of time are not available. In 1939, however, median wage or salary income of nonwhite males fourteen years old and over was only $460 for all workers and $639 for year-round full-time workers.[10] The comparable figures for whites were $1,112 and $1,419. Thus, in 1939 nonwhite wage or salary income for all workers was 41 per cent that of white, and that for year-round full-time workers was 45 per cent of white. In 1960, nonwhite median wage or salary income had risen to $3,075 for all persons with wage or salary income and $3,789 for year-round full-time workers. By 1960, however, comparable white incomes were $5,137 and $5,662. Hence, nonwhite median wage or salary income had risen to 60 per cent of the comparable income of white persons and 67 per cent of that of white year-round full-time workers.

Again, analysis of regional and urban-rural differences indicates that the gains achieved by the Negro were the product of his redistribution within the country. Within each region and urban complex he was still well below the income levels attained by whites and even failed to keep pace with white advances.

Although the lower income of Negroes is largely attributable to their concentration in jobs which require little education or skill,

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some measure of their lower income stems from discriminatory practices. Herman P. Miller has demonstrated that Negroes do not reach so high a level of employment as do whites with comparable education; and Paul M. Siegel has shown that Negroes earn a lower income than whites with similar jobs.[11] For example, Miller pointed out that in 1960 only 5 per cent of whites, but 16 per cent of nonwhites, with high-school education were laborers. Similarly, of Negro high-school graduates only 23 per cent were white-collar workers, whereas this was true of almost twice as large a proportion of whites (41 per cent).

In respect to income, Miller has shown that the Negro with the same education and same occupation as the white receives smaller remuneration. For example, nonwhite high-school graduates get only 60 per cent of the estimated lifetime earnings of white workers. Nonwhite elementary-school graduates earn 64 per cent of the lifetime income of white elementary-school graduates; and Negro college graduates about 50 per cent of comparable whites. Similarly, even when both the Negro's education and occupation are the same as the whites, his earnings are lower. For example, Negro carpenters with an elementary-school education receive only 72 per cent of white earnings; and Negro carpenters with a high-school education get only 76 per cent of the earnings of comparable whites.

Siegel, carrying the analysis further, has actually estimated the monetary cost of being a Negro. The difference between nonwhite and white earnings in 1959 of males twenty-five to sixty-four years old was $2,852 as reported in the Census. Of this difference $1,755, or 62 per cent, is attributable to the differences in the regional, occupational, and educational distribution of whites and nonwhites. Thus, even if nonwhites had achieved the same regional, educational, and occupational distribution as whites, nonwhites would still have earned only $1,097, or 38 per cent below the level of whites. The average cost of being a Negro in the United States in 1960, then, was about $1,000 in earnings. Of considerable significance for integration of the Negro is Siegel's finding that the differences in earnings of whites and nonwhites increase as the educational level increases. The implications of this finding for integration will be discussed below.

Finally, with the national focus on poverty, it is appropriate to consider the position of the Negro in respect to poverty. An analysis by Mollie Orshansky of the Social Security Administration revealed that in 1963 43 per cent of all Negro families had incomes below

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the "economy level" and 56 per cent below the "low-cost level."[12] In other words, these proportions of Negro families were in the poverty category according to criteria which related income to family size and ability to adhere to "economy" and "low-cost" food plans, respectively. The "low-cost" food plan allows an average of 28 cents per meal per person in a four person family; the "economy" level, an average of 22 cents a meal. In contrast, only 12 per cent of white families had incomes below the "economy level" and 19 per cent below the "low-cost level." Thus, the proportion of poor Negro families by the "economy" criterion was over three and one-half times that of white, and by the "low-cost" criterion, about three times that of white. The plight of the Negro in the South is evident in the fact that 58 per cent of Negro families, as contrasted with 18 per cent of white, were poor at the "economy level"; and 72 per cent of the Negro families, as contrasted with 27 per cent of the white, were poor by the "low cost" criterion. Similarly, poverty was much more common among Negroes than whites who were living alone or as unrelated members of households. Of such Negro individuals, 58 per cent were poor by the "economy level" rating and 62 per cent by the "low-cost level" standard. Comparable figures for unrelated white individuals were 42 per cent and 48 per cent.

Perhaps the most significant impact of poverty on integration lies in its implications for the rearing of children. Of Negro families with one child under eighteen, 33 per cent were poor by the less rigorous standard and 46 per cent by the more rigorous. The proportion of poor Negro families rose to levels of 77 per cent and 88 per cent, respectively, for families with six or more children. In contrast, of white families with one child under eighteen, 10 per cent and 18 per cent, respectively, were poor by these criteria; and the proportion of poor families rose to 35 per cent and 52 per cent for white families with six or more children under eighteen. Of all children under eighteen living in families in the United States, 22 per cent are in families regarded as "poor" by the less rigorous criterion and 31 per cent by the more rigorous.[13] Of all nonwhite children under eighteen, 62 per cent to 76 per cent were in poor families. In contrast, comparable percentages for white children resident in poor families ranged from 15 to 25 per cent.

Moreover, the proportion of children reared in poverty rose as the number of children increased in both white and nonwhite families. But much greater proportions of nonwhite than white children were so handicapped. Of nonwhite children in families with

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one or two children under eighteen, 39 to 52 per cent were poor, as compared with 9 to 15 per cent for white. Of nonwhite children in families with three or four children, 54 to 68 per cent were living in poverty, compared with 15 to 25 per cent for white. Of nonwhite children in families with five or more children, 81 to 94 per cent were being reared in poverty, as compared with 33 to 48 per cent for white. Probably no other facts link high fertility and poverty so dramatically and point up so vividly the plight of the poor and especially the Negro poor in this country.

Implications for Integration

Although the Negro had lived in this nation for some three centuries by 1910, he had scarcely begun to enter the main stream of American life. Almost nine-tenths of all American Negroes were in the South, where they were living largely in isolation from white society as a segregated, subcultural group steeped in poverty, largely illiterate, and denied participation in the political process. Moreover, about three-fourths of them resided on farms or in places having fewer than 2,500 inhabitants, where even remote contact with white America was limited. In a fundamental sense, then, it may be said that the Negro really did not enter white American society until World War I. Although Negro female household workers did have contact with whites in a restricted manner, the Negro, at present, is in many respects a more recent arrival to the main stream of American life than our most recent mass immigrant white European groups.

The rapid urbanization and metropolitanization of the Negro in the half century following 1910—resulting from technological, political, economic, and social changes—brought the Negro into unprecedented contact with the white society and consequently opened the possibility for widespread integration or assimilation. The emergence of "integration" as a political as well as an economic and social issue must, in large part, be attributed to the migration of the Negro since 1910, from the South to the North and the West, and from rural to urban and metropolitan areas.

Migration and settlement. Hence, a demographic factor, internal migration, may be considered the major factor in opening the door to integration. Once freed from Southern and rural isolation, the Negro gained access to the white community; this paved the way for social interaction and assimilation. Although regional

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and urban-rural redistribution of the Negro was essential, it could not, by itself, achieve integration. The entrance of the Negro into urban and metropolitan as well as Northern and Western United States paved the way for integration. But the manner of the entrance set up barriers to it. These barriers may be viewed in demographic terms: namely, the magnitude and rate of internal migration and the magnitude and rate of Negro population growth in the North and West and in urban and metropolitan areas.

The volume of Negro in-migration to urban and metropolitan United States, especially under the pressures generated by World War II and postwar developments, literally inundated large sections of the areas of destination. Although American cities had experienced large increments of population during the periods of heavy European immigration, none of the earlier migrations brought in so many persons of one ethnic or racial stock over so short a period of time. Between 1940 and 1960, the Negro population of central cities in metropolitan areas of 1,000,000 or more increased by 4,230,000 persons, or 59.7 per cent of their total population in 1960.

The in-migrant Negro followed the traditional pattern of newcomers by settling into enclaves in sections of the city serving as ports of entry. The greater size of the settlement, however, tended to separate the Negro more sharply from contact with the longer resident white population than had been the case for his white immigrant predecessor. Thus, the size of the Negro ghetto excluded a larger proportion of its inhabitants from physical and, therefore, social contact with non-ghetto whites. Moreover, existing prejudices and categoric reactions augmented the social distance between Negroes and whites, as compared with ghetto and non-ghetto whites.

Thus, it may be argued that the cataclysmic social upheaval occasioned by the two world wars generated both opportunity for and barriers to integration. On the one hand, it removed Negroes from their segregation in the rural South which had precluded meaningful contact with white society and had barred their assimilation into American society. On the other hand, it poured so large a Negro population into the cities, and especially the large cities, over so short a period of time that it made the Negro in-migratory stream relatively unassimilable—economically, socially, and politically. It remains to be seen whether this is a relatively short-term phenomenon or whether, given their huge enclaves in the cities, Negroes have been freed from their segregation and isolation in the

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rural slum South only to be thrust into a new form of segregation and isolation in the urban slum in the North, West, and South.

Natural increase and growth. It may be anticipated that the Negro population will continue to grow rapidly in the urban and metropolitan areas of the nation even though internal migratory flows of Negroes from the South to other regions diminishes. Large-scale Negro out-migration from the rural South is definitely diminishing as the supply of rural Negroes approaches exhaustion. But Negro urban populations will continue to increase rapidly because natural increase is replacing migration as the chief source of growth. The Negro, like the inhabitant of the developing regions in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, in his new exposure to amenities of twentieth-century living, is experiencing rapidly declining mortality while fertility rates either remain high or, as in urban areas, actually increase. There is some evidence that both the Negro and white birth rates have declined since 1960, but it is too early to appraise the full significance of these declines. In any case, the Negro birth rate is still well above the level of the white.

The continuation of rapid growth will almost certainly serve as a negative factor in the integration or assimilation of the Negro, for it will exacerbate the difficulties faced by the Negro seeking to enter the main stream of white society. There can be little doubt that more moderate growth rates would ease the problems of admixture and of integration. This position is justifiable even though it may be argued that rapidly increasing numbers may hasten the day when the Negro may acquire greater political power with which to attack the problem. But apart from the fact that greatly increased political power is a longer-term matter because of the gap between birth and voting age, law can impose only admixture, and not integration. Moreover, it is possible that the more desegregation or admixture is achieved through legal compulsion rather than free choice, the more integration, that is, assimilation, will be retarded rather than advanced.

This does not mean that there should be an appreciable slow-up in legislative and administrative provisions for desegregation where the alternative of education is hopeless, or nearly so, for indefinite periods as in the Black Belt of the South. It does mean, however, that, wherever possible, every effort should be made to achieve desegregation by voluntary acts based on increased enlightenment. Education as an instrument for desegregation will be discussed in greater detail later.

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Continued rapid growth, it may be concluded, will augment rather than decrease the difficulties of integration. There is one aspect of the continued growth of Negro population in some metropolitan areas, however, which may tend to promote integration. Increments in the Negro populations of these areas are increasingly due to natural causes, namely, the excess of birth over deaths, rather than to in-migration. Moreover, as the Taeubers have shown, increasing proportions of these in-migrants are from other urban and metropolitan areas rather than from the rural South.[14] Therefore, they do not bring with them handicaps to integration as did earlier in-migrants from the rural areas of the South. The end of migration from the rural South is producing Negro metropolitan populations increasingly similar to others in the areas to which they have come. From now on, within individual metropolitan areas, the characteristics of future generations of Negro Americans will depend more on the opportunities provided for them where they now reside and less upon the inadequacies of their environments in their areas of origin in the South.

The high birth rate also operates on another level to retard integration and to contribute to the misery of the Negro population. It has been shown that one of the consequences of a high birth rate is a youthful age structure and a high youth dependency ratio. The Negro population, as compared with the white, has an appreciably greater number of dependents to support per person of working age. It is clear that this demographic fact, coupled with the much lower income of the Negro, compounds the difference in per capita expenditure available for rearing and educating Negro and white youngsters. The unfortunate results of this fact may be better appreciated, perhaps, by considering its impact on the Negro child.

High fertility with its consequent large family size handicaps the Negro by limiting the investment the family can make in human resources—that is, in the education and training of the child. Under economic pressure the Negro child, on the one hand, has little incentive to remain in school and, on the other, is often forced to leave even when he desires to obtain an education. Thus, the Negro child tends to be the high-school dropout rather than the high-school graduate. Even if much more is done to remove the Negro family from the bitter consequences of raw poverty, large numbers of children will tend to set limits on the education each child in the Negro community will receive. Certainly the family with two or three children will, for some time to come, be in a bet-

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ter position to support its children through high school than the family with six or more children.

The poverty of the Negro family must rank as the single most important factor preventing the Negro from developing those abilities which could help him to assume both the rights and obligations of being a first-class American citizen. As has been demonstrated above, the large proportion of Negro children now under eighteen cannot possibly be expected to participate fully in the main stream of American life so long as they are steeped in the morass of poverty.

Poverty and high fertility are at present linked in the United States, as in the world as a whole. Largely unrestrained birth rates are found primarily among the poor and uneducated. The better educated and more affluent members of American society have, as a matter of course, access to the knowledge and methods of family planning, while the uneducated and poor, who include the Negro in disproportionate numbers, have no, or inadequate, knowledge about or access to methods of controlling family size. Movements now under way in various parts of the country to provide persons on relief with knowledge and materials for family planning, in accordance with religious scruples, may greatly ameliorate this problem in the coming years. However, much more remains to be done to help the relatively uneducated and impoverished Negro family to restrict its size. Until this is done, many Negro families will be caught in the vicious cycle of poverty, high fertility, inadequate education and skill, and, therefore, continued poverty.

The adverse effect of high fertility on what may be regarded as the quality of the Negro population, that is, its education and skill, apart from its deleterious consequences for each individual, tends to retard mass integration further. As a result of a high birth rate, the Negro population retains characteristics such as inferior occupations, low income, and a style of life precluding association and social interaction with the dominant white society—all of which retard assimilation.

Family disorganization and age structure. The relatively high rate of family disorganization which characterizes the Negro community also hinders integration. As has been shown, in 1960 about one in three Negro children under fourteen, as contrasted with one in twelve white, was in households with one or both parents absent. The Negro child, compared with the white, not only is handicapped by a smaller per capita sum for his rearing but is also more likely to

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be reared in less favorable family circumstances. The deleterious effects of this situation can only be speculated upon, but it would seem highly probable that being reared in such abnormal family situations must adversely affect the child in a number of ways. To the extent that the result is a maladjusted or deviant child, the prospects for integration, it may be safely concluded, are not enhanced.

Another aspect of Negro family disorganization which must be dealt with is to be found in the historical, economic, and social emasculation of the Negro male. There is a great need for special efforts to enhance the role of the Negro male in the family, to concentrate on providing him with the capabilities of taking on his expected functions, responsibilities, and obligations as husband, father, and provider. Poverty has undoubtedly contributed to the economic and social emasculation of the Negro male, but it is also true that his inferior role contributes to continued Negro poverty. This is only one of the vicious cycles retarding Negro advance which remain to be broken.

The relatively large proportion of young in the Negro population may also vitally affect integration in another way, both positively and negatively. To the extent that younger Negro Americans are acquiring greater education and skills than the older, they are also characterized by higher expectations. The "revolution of rising expectations," to use Harlan Cleveland's felicitous phrase, is manifest among Negro Americans, as it is among the people in the developing regions of the world. The higher expectations and the greater aggressiveness and militancy of the young are important factors in the progressively more vigorous activist programs which characterize the Negro revolt. Whether increased pressure for not only "freedom" but also "equality now" will continue to result in rapid advance or, at some point, produce boomerang effects remains to be seen. In any case, it seems clear that Negro American leadership is becoming increasingly youthful and perhaps, therefore, more militant and activist.

Education and skill. Without question the major factor in the assimilation of the white immigrant groups who came to this country—their "Americanization"—was the school. It was the school and, more specifically, the education and skills it transmitted that enabled each immigrant group in turn to rise from the bottom of the economic, social, and political ladder to limits eventually set only by individual capabilities. Considered in mass, the Negro's major handicap in his efforts to advance in America, apart from his

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visibility and the categoric prejudicial response which it evokes, is undoubtedly to be found in his limited education and skills.

The data indicate that the education of the Negro is improving. But the process is necessarily slow since it occurs by generation rather than by year. Moreover, because of the ghettoization of the Negro, *de facto* segregation in the schools, and his disadvantaged background, the Negro's achievements in education are, year by year, inferior to those of whites. In consequence, even the Negro high-school and college graduates typically have not attained the level of whites with comparable education. Moreover, the Negro who is more dependent on vocational schools than the white for the acquisition of manual skills, is usually sorely handicapped by the outmoded equipment and curricula of these schools.

Education not only opens the door to better jobs and remuneration but also tends to transform the person's style of life and makes it more compatible with urban living. Education, therefore, has a double effect in facilitating integration. It helps give the Negro access to better residential areas and, simultaneously, it modifies the Negro's way of life to a pattern more consistent and, therefore, less apt to conflict with the white middle-class patterns.

Anything which obstructs the rise in the level of the Negro's education blocks his economic and social mobility. For this reason, it is important to integrate the schools and greatly to improve the quality of education for the Negro child by recognizing his need for compensatory education. Especially vicious is the practice, common in many of the large city public school systems, of promoting virtually all children to the next higher grade without regard to achievement. Few things are more likely to keep the Negro relatively uneducated and unskilled than this benighted "economy" measure. Moreover, there is a great need for revising school curricula in both general and vocational schools so that every child, including the disadvantaged, will receive an education that will enable him to realize his potential abilities. The prevalent high dropout rate is more correctly interpreted as an index of the failure of the schools than of the failure of the child.

As the data indicate, the trend in the school enrollment of the Negro has been upward as Negroes have moved to the North and West and to urban and metropolitan areas. But much remains to be done both to accelerate enrollments among Negro teenagers, especially in the later teenage years, and to provide them with adequate education.

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An important factor, other than poverty, in restricting Negro school enrollment and completion of at least a high-school education is to be found in the relative absence of incentive and motivation for acquiring education among Negroes, as compared with white immigrants. This is readily understandable. White immigrants, in the main, came from culturally intact backgrounds which provided incentive and motivation to move ahead. For example, the Poles came with incentive, as embodied in the Polish culture, to acquire property to achieve status. The Jewish immigrant arrived with motivation, as imbedded in his culture, to acquire education. In contrast, the Negro, whose African culture was destroyed during slavery, and whose lot in the United States after slavery scarcely provided him with incentive and motivation for advancement, may in his new metropolitan setting actually possess negative incentives for education. For the Negro is aware that the acquisition of an education by an occasional Negro over the years has not necessarily opened the doors to economic and social advance. An essential element of any program designed to eliminate poverty among Negroes must, therefore, instill in the Negro child the incentive and motivation necessary to take advantage of new and expanding opportunity.

The Negro, as a product of his pathetic share of the American way of life, is, in mass, faced with much greater difficulties in entering the main stream of American life than were foreign-white immigrants. Because of the increased complexity and higher technological level of contemporary society, the Negro's inferior education and skill are a more serious handicap to his upward mobility than was the case with comparable white immigrants. Moreover, the Negro's chronic poverty and style of life at variance with middle-class urban living patterns restrict social contact with whites. These characteristics are reinforced by the prejudicial categoric reaction of whites based on their traditional stereotyped images of the Negro.

In general, it is undeniable that the acquisition of higher education and skills and a style of life more compatible with middle-class white standards would facilitate social contact and interaction. Yet, while upgrading in education, skill, and style of life may be thought of as prerequisites of integration, they are in the case of the Negro, more than in the case of the immigrant, not sufficient in themselves. Evidence indicates that the Negro who has achieved higher education and skill and their correlates in style of life still does not receive commensurate income and entry to white society.

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In fact, as Siegel has demonstrated, the higher the Negro's level of education, the greater is the difference between his earnings and that of comparable whites.

Siegel is undoubtedly correct in emphasizing that, in transition at least, the Negro may face more rather than less discrimination. But, it remains true that social contact and interaction with whites increase with advancing education and skills and higher absolute income, despite the greater discrimination or "cost" of being Negro. Higher education will undoubtedly continue to help the Negro, as it did the white immigrant, to break down barriers to assimilation. It is possible, although data are not available to prove this, that the white immigrant may similarly have been more discriminated against in transition as his education and skill increased, even while he was experiencing greater social contact with native whites.

Programs for integration. The implications of the above analysis for policy and programs designed to hasten integration may now be summarized. There are at least two basic sets of factors that retard integration. One is the group of demographic characteristics of the Negro which restrict his participation in the main stream of American life. The second is to be found not in the characteristics of the Negro but in the attitudes and behavior of whites.

The characteristics of the Negro which impede integration include the excessively rapid population growth in urban and metropolitan areas, brought on by high rates of internal migration during the two world wars and now by excessive natural increase. A continuation of this pattern may retard the dispersion of Negro enclaves and thus obstruct social contact and interaction with the white population. Moreover, the high Negro birth rate will tend to retard the upgrading of Negro education and skill by limiting per capita investment in education and training.

In order to break down these demographic barriers to integration it is necessary to decrease Negro birth rates by making available to the Negro community those methods of family planning which are now available to the better educated and more affluent population, for the poor and uneducated should also have the right to determine how many children they will have.

A decrease in the Negro birth rate would simultaneously dampen the rate of Negro population growth, reduce the greater dependency burden that the Negro carries, and permit acceleration in the upgrading of Negro education and skill. It would thus help eliminate poverty, accelerate access to better jobs and earn-

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ings, and contribute to the emergence of patterns of living consistent with metropolitanism as a way of life.

Needless to say, a decrease in the birth rate will not automatically produce all these results. It would still be necessary to provide adequate educational and training opportunities at levels and under conditions which would be effective. Current programs designed to improve educational and training opportunities for the "culturally deprived" child are steps in the right direction. But they fall far short, as yet, of providing the education and training necessary to enable every Negro American child to compete in the contemporary, complex economic and social world.

Moreover, such activities must not ignore the Negro adult, and especially the Negro adult male, who may be beyond the age at which it is possible to acquire skills which permit him to make his own way. As an alternative to the dole, serious consideration should be given to the development of intensive labor projects on which such adult Negroes can be usefully employed. In the transition to equal opportunity for the Negro American, it may well be necessary to bear the burden of such programs, despite their low productivity, so that deprived adult Negroes can experience the dignity and income that comes from work, rather than the humiliation and degradation associated with being the recipient of a handout. Opportunity for useful and adequately remunerated work would undoubtedly constitute the major restorative of masculinity and self-respect to the Negro male and, thereby, contribute greatly to the improvement of Negro family structure and organization. It is highly probable that programs of the type suggested would, in the long run, be less expensive than the present combination of inadequate educational and training facilities and wasted human resources resulting from unemployment, welfare and relief, delinquency and crime, and high morbidity and mortality.

Ironically, it may be that the rapid urbanization of the Negro population may lead to the reduction of family disorganization and the restoration of masculinity to the Negro male. But this can come about only if the Negro child is adequately equipped to cope with the urban environment in the coming generation and if, in the transition to equal opportunity, measures are taken to enable the present Negro adult male to fulfill the role which is expected of the male in our society. Unfortunately, not only have no comprehensive programs yet been developed to attain these objectives but, on the contrary, a number of programs exist which tend even further to

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emasculate the Negro male. Outstanding among them is, of course, the present program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children which, in effect, bolsters the matriarchal family and further denigrates the male. Aid should, of course, be provided to needy mothers and their children but under conditions that would encourage, rather than discourage, the continued presence and participation of the husband and father.

The prevalent pattern of residential segregation constitutes, of course, not only evidence of but a barrier to integration. The massive enclaves of Negro Americans in the central cities of our metropolitan areas are allowing a generation of Negro Americans to be born into a new form of segregation—*de facto* segregation, Northern style, as contrasted with *de jure* segregation, Southern style. Residential segregation produces educational segregation, social segregation, and, to a considerable extent, occupational segregation as well. The Negro is caught in the rigid vise of poverty and residential segregation which imposes isolation from whites and social segregation, which produces educational segregation and inferior education, which restricts occupational and income opportunities, which maintains and reinforces poverty.

For these reasons "open occupancy" has become a crucial element in the push for integration and, without question, will remain a central issue until the Negro is free to choose where he wishes to live. Interestingly enough, the current battle over open occupancy is a battle over symbols rather than reality. It is clear that internal social and economic pressures would prompt Negroes to continue to live in enclaves for some time to come even if there were no barriers to their movement. It must be borne in mind that even the descendents of nineteenth-century immigrants, German, Irish, and Scandinavian, not to mention twentieth-century immigrants and their offspring, still live in voluntary enclaves. There is no reason to believe the situation will be much different for Negroes even when voluntary occupancy becomes a fact. Assimilation and participation in the activities of white society will be achieved only as Negroes become able to avail themselves of the residential opportunities that may open to them and then choose to do so. This will be more difficult for the Negro than for the white immigrant because a fundamental difference will still characterize the Negro who leaves his enclave. Whereas the white who fled his ghetto was also often able simultaneously to flee identification with his ethnic group, the Negro does not have this alternative. He may leave his ghetto but

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he cannot, except occasionally, manage to escape racial identification.

The second set of factors which impede integration is not to be found in the characteristics of the Negro so much as in the attitudes and practices of whites. The Negro with education and skill and a compatible style of life is still the object of discriminatory practices and is thus prevented from full participation in American society. Such a Negro, having acquired the necessary conditions for greater social interaction, must still await changes in the dominant white society. The whites must be educated in order to break down their outmoded stereotypes of the Negro, to rectify their distorted image of the new emerging Negro, and to allay their fears of the Negro as a competitor and a neighbor.

The need for massive programs to educate whites has not yet been adequately recognized. Just as it is important to think in terms of "compensatory education" for Negroes because of "cultural deprivation" so, also, it is important to think of "corrective education" for whites because of the rudiments of white supremacy and racism and the distorted image of the Negro which are still to be found in large elements of our population. It requires explicit efforts to correct and to supplement present distorted or inadequate textbooks in the schools at all levels. It is necessary to present an accurate picture of the nature of our pluralistic democratic order, an accurate account of the history of the Negro and other minorities in the United States, an appreciation of the cultures and contributions of our diverse ethnic and racial groups, and an understanding of the place of the United States in the world order and the implications of prejudice and discrimination for our role in international affairs.

The proposed program of corrective education for whites must necessarily be on a massive scale. Although much can be achieved through the efforts of individual scholars, teachers, schools, civic, business, industrial, labor, religious, fraternal, and other private organizations, the government—on the federal, state, and local levels —must also be actively involved. Only the government can provide the financial resources to stimulate, initiate, develop, and conduct the corrective educational programs required. Although the schools are the obvious place to begin, it must be recognized that such efforts will affect the next generation more than the present. The mass media can certainly be mobilized to play a much more important role in educating adult whites than they have yet been called upon

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to do. A saturation program of corrective education for whites is without question as important as compensatory education for Negroes to pave the way for an integrated society.

The United States, at long last, has opened the door to the assimilation of the Negro. There are those that believe the problem of integrating the Negro will continue to be different from that of the white immigrants. That there are significant differences in color and cultural background cannot be denied. But it is a serious mistake to assume that the "color stigma" is different in kind or even in degree from the stigma which accompanied many of our foreign-white immigrant groups. Prejudice toward, and hatred of, the Negro by the most bigoted of our white supremacists is not unlike the attitude of the Pole who spat upon the ground when a "Christ-killer" Jew appeared upon the scene, or the attitude of the primitive fundamentalist Baptist whose hatred of "papists" similarly reached high levels of intensity, or the attitude of the fanatical orthodox Jew toward a prospective Gentile son-in-law. Stigma has been associated with human differences other than those based on color and with equal fervor, righteousness, and fanaticism. There is evidence in the United States as well as in various other parts of the world, that the color difference can be bridged even as religious and other cultural differences have been bridged, through social interaction and consequent acculturation. Elsewhere in this volume the conditions most conducive to such a development are discussed.[15]

Strategies and phasing. In mapping strategies and planning programs for accelerating integration it is essential that there be full awareness of the time dimensions that are necessarily involved. Desegregation or admixture can be relatively simply and quickly achieved, as has been amply demonstrated since World War II. The term "relatively" must be stressed, however, because the desegregation of schools in the South ordered by the United States Supreme Court to take place with "due deliberate speed" has not progressed very far even in the full decade which has elapsed since that historic decision. On the other hand, desegregation of public facilities has been effected more rapidly, and desegregation of the military establishment required merely a military order. Desegregation in all phases of life should, of course, be pushed as rapidly as possible by education and enlightenment and, if necessary, by legal coercion.

Desegregation can be accompanied with little delay by other programs designed to provide full equality of opportunity for the Negro American. Such programs should include provisions for

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open occupancy, compensatory education and training, and intensive labor projects, if necessary. They should include welfare and aid provisions for those unable to work, programs that are modified to help restore social and economic masculinity to the Negro male and establish normal family structure and living patterns. These types of programs are possible in the intermediate-run and can provide largely an affirmative answer to the Negro's insistence on "now." But the achievement of integration in the sense of acculturation or assimilation is a longer-term affair. The realization of integration in this sense requires generations rather than years or even decades. For integration as acculturation can follow only from social contact and social interaction between the Negro and the white. Integration can be achieved only after desegregation and full equality of opportunity break down present barriers to communication and social intercourse.

In the transition to an integrated society, a delicate balance must be attained and maintained between strategies and tactics of conflict and those of consensus. There are those who believe that only or primarily through incessant conflict and the exercise of power can the Negro achieve his rightful place in the economic, social, and political order. Such tactics, however, even if they were to advance the cause of the Negro in the long run—which is doubtful—would not achieve integration in the sense of acculturation. They would, at best, create a separate and solidified Negro community which, while it may be able to win concessions and better its position, will have also helped to create a separate and solidified white community with which it will have to bargain over an indefinite period.

Another alternative, and a preferable one, is the strategy of maximizing the achievement of consensus, even while being prepared to use other tactics as occasion and circumstances may warrant.[16] Certainly, in theory, the more the relationship between the Negro and white populations is characterized by consensus rather than conflict, and the more social interaction between them is on an interpersonal rather than group basis, the greater will be the likelihood of integration. In any case, whether conflict or consensus be the main strategy, equal status, as distinguished from equal opportunity, cannot be achieved immediately. Against this perspective "freedom now" makes sense; "equality now," however, is pathetic, wishful fantasy.

The test of whether the United States is a democratic and open

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society for the Negro will depend on at least three different factors: First, it must become evident that desegregation has been achieved. Second, it must be demonstrated that equality of opportunity has been established. Third, it must be shown that integration of the Negro is possible. Individual human beings, Negro and white, must have the freedom to choose whether or not they will continue to live in enclaves or in an admixed and integrated community.

The Negro revolt has, thus far, accelerated efforts toward desegregation and the establishment of equality of opportunity for Negro Americans. It has also undoubtedly accelerated the achievement of integration. It remains to be seen, however, whether the course which the revolt follows will continue to promote integration or whether it will produce a solidified Negro community which, as a conflict group, will help to organize a solidified, and perhaps increasingly resistant, white community. It remains to be seen whether the Negro will have the choice, available to white ethnic groups, of continuing to live in enclaves or of living in an admixed and integrated pattern. It remains to be seen whether the Negro community can follow white ethnic immigrants into an increasingly integrated order or whether it will endure as a separate, even if equal, minority group.

In a fundamental sense integration is an American problem, not a Negro problem. Perhaps this country's major contribution to the history of man lies in her demonstration of the ability to achieve unity out of diversity and to maintain an open pluralistic society in which each person can rise from humble origins to limits set only by his own capabilities. Thus far, this demonstration has applied only to our white ethnic groups. To continue to deny the Negro any of the choices which are available to whites is to threaten the very premises, and to undermine the foundations, of our democratic society.

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JAMES TOBIN

On Improving the Economic Status of the Negro

I START from the presumption that the integration of Negroes into the American society and economy can be accomplished within existing political and economic institutions. I understand the impatience of those who think otherwise, but I see nothing incompatible between our peculiar mixture of private enterprise and government, on the one hand, and the liberation and integration of the Negro, on the other. Indeed the present position of the Negro is an aberration from the principles of our society, rather than a requirement of its functioning. Therefore, my suggestions are directed to the aim of mobilizing existing powers of government to bring Negroes into full participation in the main stream of American economic life.

The economic plight of individuals, Negroes and whites alike, can always be attributed to specific handicaps and circumstances: discrimination, immobility, lack of education and experience, ill health, weak motivation, poor neighborhood, large family size, burdensome family responsibilities. Such diagnoses suggest a host of specific remedies, some in the domain of civil rights, others in the war on poverty. Important as these remedies are, there is a danger that the diagnoses are myopic. They explain why certain individuals rather than others suffer from the economic maladies of the time. They do not explain why the over-all incidence of the maladies varies dramatically from time to time—for example, why personal attributes which seemed to doom a man to unemployment in 1932 or even in 1954 or 1961 did not so handicap him in 1944 or 1951 or 1956.

Public health measures to improve the environment are often more productive in conquering disease than a succession of individual treatments. Malaria was conquered by oiling and draining swamps, not by quinine. The analogy holds for economic maladies.

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Unless the global incidence of these misfortunes can be diminished, every individual problem successfully solved will be replaced by a similar problem somewhere else. That is why an economist is led to emphasize the importance of the over-all economic climate.

Over the decades, general economic progress has been the major factor in the gradual conquest of poverty. Recently some observers, J. K. Galbraith and Michael Harrington most eloquently, have contended that this process no longer operates. The economy may prosper and labor may become steadily more productive as in the past, but "the other America" will be stranded. Prosperity and progress have already eliminated almost all the easy cases of poverty, leaving a hard core beyond the reach of national economic trends. There may be something to the "backwash" thesis as far as whites are concerned.[1] But it definitely does not apply to Negroes. Too many of them are poor. It cannot be true that half of a race of twenty million human beings are victims of specific disabilities which insulate them from the national economic climate. It cannot be true, and it is not. Locke Anderson has shown that the pace of Negro economic progress is peculiarly sensitive to general economic growth. He estimates that if nationwide per capita personal income is stationary, nonwhite median family income falls by .5 per cent per year, while if national per capita income grows 5 per cent, nonwhite income grows nearly 7.5 per cent.[2]

National prosperity and economic growth are still powerful engines for improving the economic status of Negroes. They are not doing enough and they are not doing it fast enough. There is ample room for a focused attack on the specific sources of Negro poverty. But a favorable over-all economic climate is a necessary condition for the global success—as distinguished from success in individual cases—of specific efforts to remedy the handicaps associated with Negro poverty.

The Importance of a Tight Labor Market

But isn't the present over-all economic climate favorable? Isn't the economy enjoying an upswing of unprecedented length, setting new records almost every month in production, employment, profits, and income? Yes, but expansion and new records should be routine in an economy with growing population, capital equipment, and productivity. The fact is that the economy has not operated with reasonably full utilization of its manpower and plant capacity since

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1957. Even now, after four and one-half years of uninterrupted expansion, the economy has not regained the ground lost in the recessions of 1958 and 1960. The current expansion has whittled away at unemployment, reducing it from 6.5 to 7 per cent to 4.5 to 5 per cent. It has diminished idle plant capacity correspondingly. The rest of the gains since 1960 in employment, production, and income have just offset the normal growth of population, capacity, and productivity.

The magnitude of America's poverty problem already reflects the failure of the economy in the second postwar decade to match its performance in the first.[3] Had the 1947-56 rate of growth of median family income been maintained since 1957, and had unemployment been steadily limited to 4 per cent, it is estimated that the fraction of the population with poverty incomes in 1963 would have been 16.6 per cent instead of 18.5 per cent.[4] The educational qualifications of the labor force have continued to improve. The principle of racial equality, in employment as in other activities, has gained ground both in law and in the national conscience. If, despite all this, dropouts, inequalities in educational attainment, and discrimination in employment seem more serious today rather than less, the reason is that the over-all economic climate has not been favorable after all.

The most important dimension of the overall economic climate is the tightness of the labor market. In a tight labor market unemployment is low and short in duration, and job vacancies are plentiful. People who stand at the end of the hiring line and the top of the layoff list have the most to gain from a tight labor market. It is not proves in a tight labor market and declines in a slack market. Unsurprising that the position of Negroes relative to that of whites imemployment itself is only one way in which a slack labor market hurts Negroes and other disadvantaged groups, and the gains from reduction in unemployment are by no means confined to the employment of persons counted as unemployed.[5] A tight labor market means not just jobs, but better jobs, longer hours, higher wages. Because of the heavy demands for labor during the second world war and its economic aftermath, Negroes made dramatic relative gains between 1940 and 1950. Unfortunately this momentum has not been maintained, and the blame falls largely on the weakness of labor markets since 1957.[6]

The shortage of jobs has hit Negro men particularly hard and thus has contributed mightily to the ordeal of the Negro family,

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which is in turn the cumulative source of so many other social disorders.[7] The unemployment rate of Negro men is more sensitive than that of Negro women to the national rate. Since 1949 Negro women have gained in median income relative to white women, but Negro men have lost ground to white males.[8] In a society which stresses breadwinning as the expected role of the mature male and occupational achievement as his proper goal, failure to find and to keep work is devastating to the man's self-respect and family status. Matriarchy is in any case a strong tradition in Negro society, and the man's role is further downgraded when the family must and can depend on the woman for its livelihood. It is very important to increase the proportion of Negro children who grow up in stable families with two parents. Without a strong labor market it will be extremely difficult to do so.

Unemployment. It is well known that Negro unemployment rates are multiples of the general unemployment rate. This fact reflects both the lesser skills, seniority, and experience of Negroes and employers' discrimination against Negroes. These conditions are a deplorable reflection on American society, but as long as they exist Negroes suffer much more than others from a general increase in unemployment and gain much more from a general reduction. A rule of thumb is that changes in the nonwhite unemployment rate are twice those in the white rate. The rule works both ways. Nonwhite unemployment went from 4.1 per cent in 1953, a tight labor market year, to 12.5 per cent in 1961, while the white rate rose from 2.3 per cent to 6 per cent. Since then, the Negro rate has declined by 2.4 per cent, the white rate by 1.2.

Even the Negro teenage unemployment rate shows some sensitivity to general economic conditions. Recession increased it from 15 per cent in 1955-56 to 25 per cent in 1958. It decreased to 22 per cent in 1960 but rose to 28 per cent in 1963; since then it has declined somewhat. Teenage unemployment is abnormally high now, relative to that of other age groups, because the wave of postwar babies is coming into the labor market. Most of them, especially the Negroes, are crowding the end of the hiring line. But their prospects for getting jobs are no less dependent on general labor market conditions.

Part-time work. Persons who are involuntarily forced to work part time instead of full time are not counted as unemployed, but their number goes up and down with the unemployment rate. Just as Negroes bear a disproportionate share of unemployment, they

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bear more than their share of involuntary part-time unemployment.[9] A tight labor market will not only employ more Negroes; it will also give more of those who are employed full-time jobs. In both respects, it will reduce disparities between whites and Negroes.

Labor-force participation. In a tight market, of which a low unemployment rate is a barometer, the labor force itself is larger. Job opportunities draw into the labor force individuals who, simply because the prospects were dim, did not previously regard themselves as seeking work and were therefore not enumerated as unemployed. For the economy as a whole, it appears that an expansion of job opportunities enough to reduce unemployment by one worker will bring another worker into the labor force.

This phenomenon is important for many Negro families. Statistically, their poverty now appears to be due more often to the lack of a breadwinner in the labor force than to unemployment.[10] But in a tight labor market many members of these families, including families now on public assistance, would be drawn into employment. Labor-force participation rates are roughly 2 per cent lower for nonwhite men than for white men, and the disparity increases in years of slack labor markets.[11] The story is different for women. Negro women have always been in the labor force to a much greater extent than white women. A real improvement in the economic status of Negro men and in the stability of Negro families would probably lead to a reduction in labor-force participation by Negro women. But for teenagers, participation rates for Negroes are not so high as for whites; and for women twenty to twenty-four they are about the same. These relatively low rates are undoubtedly due less to voluntary choice than to the same lack of job opportunities that produces phenomenally high unemployment rates for young Negro women.

Duration of unemployment. In a tight labor market, such unemployment as does exist is likely to be of short duration. Short-term unemployment is less damaging to the economic welfare of the unemployed. More will have earned and fewer will have exhausted private and public unemployment benefits. In 1953 when the over-all unemployment rate was 2.9 per cent, only 4 per cent of the unemployed were out of work for longer than twenty-six weeks and only 11 per cent for longer than fifteen weeks. In contrast, the unemployment rate in 1961 was 6.7 per cent; and of the unemployed in that year, 17 per cent were out of work for longer

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than twenty-six weeks and 32 per cent for longer than fifteen weeks. Between the first quarter of 1964 and the first quarter of 1965, overall unemployment fell 11 per cent, while unemployment extending beyond half a year was lowered by 22 per cent.

As Rashi Fein points out elsewhere in this volume, one more dimension of society's inequity to the Negro is that an unemployed Negro is more likely to stay unemployed than an unemployed white. But his figures also show that Negroes share in the reduction of long-term unemployment accompanying economic expansion.

Migration from agriculture. A tight labor market draws the surplus rural population to higher paying non-agricultural jobs. Southern Negroes are a large part of this surplus rural population. Migration is the only hope for improving their lot, or their children's. In spite of the vast migration of past decades, there are still about 775,000 Negroes, 11 per cent of the Negro labor force of the country, who depend on the land for their living and that of their families.[12] Almost a half million live in the South, and almost all of them are poor.

Migration from agriculture and from the South is the Negroes' historic path toward economic improvement and equality. It is a smooth path for Negroes and for the urban communities to which they move only if there is a strong demand for labor in towns and cities North and South. In the 1940's the number of Negro farmers and farm laborers in the nation fell by 450,000 and one and a half million Negroes (net) left the South. This was the great decade of Negro economic advance. In the 1950's the same occupational and geographical migration continued undiminished. The movement to higher-income occupations and locations should have raised the relative economic status of Negroes. But in the 1950's Negroes were moving into increasingly weak job markets. Too often disguised unemployment in the countryside was simply transformed into enumerated unemployment, and rural poverty into urban poverty.[13]

Quality of jobs. In a slack labor market, employers can pick and choose, both in recruiting and in promoting. They exaggerate the skill, education, and experience requirements of their jobs. They use diplomas, or color, or personal histories as convenient screening devices. In a tight market, they are forced to be realistic, to tailor job specifications to the available supply, and to give on-the-job training. They recruit and train applicants whom they would otherwise screen out, and they upgrade employees whom they would in

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slack times consign to low-wage, low-skill, and part-time jobs.

Wartime and other experience shows that job requirements are adjustable and that men and women are trainable. It is only in slack times that people worry about a mismatch between supposedly rigid occupational requirements and supposedly unchangeable qualifications of the labor force. As already noted, the relative status of Negroes improves in a tight labor market not only in respect to unemployment, but also in respect to wages and occupations.

Cyclical fluctuation. Sustaining a high demand for labor is important. The in-and-out status of the Negro in the business cycle damages his long-term position because periodic unemployment robs him of experience and seniority.

Restrictive practices. A slack labor market probably accentuates the discriminatory and protectionist proclivities of certain crafts and unions. When jobs are scarce, opening the door to Negroes is a real threat. Of course prosperity will not automatically dissolve the barriers, but it will make it more difficult to oppose efforts to do so.

I conclude that the single most important step the nation could take to improve the economic position of the Negro is to operate the economy steadily at a low rate of unemployment. We cannot expect to restore the labor market conditions of the second world war, and we do not need to. In the years 1951-1953, unemployment was roughly 3 per cent, teenage unemployment around 7 per cent, Negro unemployment about 4.5 per cent, long-term unemployment negligible. In the years 1955-57, general unemployment was roughly 4 per cent, and the other measures correspondingly higher. Four per cent is the official target of the Kennedy-Johnson administration. It has not been achieved since 1957. Reaching and maintaining 4 per cent would be a tremendous improvement over the performance of the last eight years. But we should not stop there; the society and the Negro can benefit immensely from tightening the labor market still further, to 3.5 or 3 per cent unemployment. The administration itself has never defined 4 per cent as anything other than an "interim" target.

Why Don't We Have a Tight Labor Market?

We know how to operate the economy so that there is a tight labor market. By fiscal and monetary measures the federal government can control aggregate spending in the economy. The govern-

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ment could choose to control it so that unemployment *averaged* 3.5 or 3 per cent instead of remaining over 4.5 per cent except at occasional business cycle peaks. Moreover, recent experience here and abroad shows that we can probably narrow the amplitude of fluctuations around whatever average we select as a target.

Some observers have cynically concluded that a society like ours can achieve full employment only in wartime. But aside from conscription into the armed services, government action creates jobs in wartime by exactly the same mechanism as in peacetime—the government spends more money and stimulates private firms and citizens to spend more too. It is the *amount* of spending, not its purpose, that does the trick. Public or private spending to go to the moon, build schools, or conquer poverty can be just as effective in reducing unemployment as spending to build airplanes and submarines —if there is enough of it. There may be more political constraints and ideological inhibitions in peacetime, but the same techniques of economic policy are available if we want badly enough to use them. The two main reasons we do not take this relatively simple way out are two obsessive fears, inflation and balance of payments deficits.

Running the economy with a tight labor market would mean a somewhat faster upward creep in the price level. The disadvantages of this are, in my view, exaggerated and are scarcely commensurable with the real economic and social gains of higher output and employment. Moreover, there are ways of protecting "widows and orphans" against erosion in the purchasing power of their savings. But fear of inflation is strong both in the U.S. financial establishment and in the public at large. The vast comfortable white middle class who are never touched by unemployment prefer to safeguard the purchasing power of their life insurance and pension rights than to expand opportunities for the disadvantaged and unemployed.

The fear of inflation would operate anyway, but it is accentuated by U.S. difficulties with its international balance of payments. These difficulties have seriously constrained and hampered U.S. fiscal and monetary policy in recent years. Any rise in prices might enlarge the deficit. An agressively expansionary monetary policy, lowering interest rates, might push money out of the country.

In the final analysis what we fear is that we might not be able to defend the parity of the dollar with gold, that is, to sell gold at thirty-five dollars an ounce to any government that wants to buy. So great is the gold mystique that this objective has come to occupy a niche in the hierarchy of U.S. goals second only to the military de-

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fense of the country, and not always to that. It is not fanciful to link the plight of Negro teenagers in Harlem to the monetary whims of General de Gaulle. But it is only our own attachment to "the dollar" as an abstraction which makes us cringe before the European appetite for gold.

This topic is too charged with technical complexities, real and imagined, and with confused emotions to be discussed adequately here. I will confine myself to three points. First, the United States is the last country in the world which needs to hold back its own economy to balance its international accounts. To let the tail wag the dog is not in the interests of the rest of the world, so much of which depends on us for trade and capital, any more than in our own.

Second, forces are at work to restore balance to American international accounts—the increased competitiveness of our exports and the income from the large investments our firms and citizens have made overseas since the war. Meanwhile we can finance deficits by gold reserves and lines of credit at the International Monetary Fund and at foreign central banks. Ultimately we have one foolproof line of defense—letting the dollar depreciate relative to foreign currencies. The world would not end. The sun would rise the next day. American products would be more competitive in world markets. Neither God nor the Constitution fixed the gold value of the dollar. The U.S. would not be the first country to let its currency depreciate. Nor would it be the first time for the U.S.—not until we stopped "saving" the dollar and the gold standard in 1933 did our recovery from the Great Depression begin.

Third, those who oppose taking such risks argue that the dollar today occupies a unique position as international money, that the world as a whole has an interest, which we cannot ignore, in the stability of the gold value of the dollar. If so, we can reasonably ask the rest of the world, especially our European friends, to share the burdens which guaranteeing this stability imposes upon us.

This has been an excursion into general economic policy. But the connection between gold and the plight of the Negro is no less real for being subtle. We are paying much too high a social price for avoiding creeping inflation and for protecting our gold stock and "the dollar." But it will not be easy to alter these national priorities. The interests of the unemployed, the poor, and the Negroes are under-represented in the comfortable consensus which supports and confines current policy.

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Another approach, which can be pursued simultaneously, is to diminish the conflicts among these competing objectives, in particular to reduce the degree of inflation associated with low levels of unemployment. This can be done in two ways. One way is to improve the mobility of labor and other resources to occupations, locations, and industries where bottlenecks would otherwise lead to wage and price increases. This is where many specific programs, such as the training and retraining of manpower and policies to improve the technical functioning of labor markets, come into their own.

A second task is to break down the barriers to competition which now restrict the entry of labor and enterprise into certain occupations and industries. These lead to wage- and price-increasing bottlenecks even when resources are not really short. Many barriers are created by public policy itself, in response to the vested interests concerned. Many reflect concentration of economic power in unions and in industry. These barriers represent another way in which the advantaged and the employed purchase their standards of living and their security at the expense of unprivileged minorities.

In the best of circumstances, structural reforms of these kinds will be slow and gradual. They will encounter determined economic and political resistance from special interests which are powerful in Congress and state legislatures. Moreover, Congressmen and legislators represent places rather than people and are likely to oppose, not facilitate, the increased geographical mobility which is required. It is no accident that our manpower programs do not include relocation allowances.

Increasing the Earning Capacity of Negroes

Given the proper over-all economic climate, in particular a steadily tight labor market, the Negro's economic condition can be expected to improve, indeed to improve dramatically. But not fast enough. Not as fast as his aspirations or as the aspirations he has taught the rest of us to have for him. What else can be done? This question is being answered in detail by experts elsewhere in this volume. I shall confine myself to a few comments and suggestions that occur to a general economist.

Even in a tight labor market, the Negro's relative status will suffer both from current discrimination and from his lower earning capacity, the result of inferior acquired skill. In a real sense both factors reflect discrimination, since the Negro's handicaps in

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earning capacity are the residue of decades of discrimination in education and employment. Nevertheless for both analysis and policy it is useful to distinguish the two.

Discrimination means that the Negro is denied access to certain markets where he might sell his labor, and to certain markets where he might purchase goods and services. Elementary application of "supply and demand" makes it clear that these restrictions are bound to result in his selling his labor for less and buying his livelihood for more than if these barriers did not exist. If Negro women can be clerks only in certain stores, those storekeepers will not need to pay them so much as they pay whites. If Negroes can live only in certain houses, the prices and rents they have to pay will be high for the quality of accommodation provided.

Successful elimination of discrimination is not only important in itself but will also have substantial economic benefits. Since residential segregation is the key to so much else and so difficult to eliminate by legal fiat alone, the power of the purse should be unstintingly used. I see no reason that the expenditure of funds for this purpose should be confined to new construction. Why not establish private or semi-public revolving funds to purchase, for resale or rental on a desegregated basis, strategically located existing structures as they become available?

The effects of past discrimination will take much longer to eradicate. The sins against the fathers are visited on the children. They are deprived of the intellectual and social capital which in our society is supposed to be transmitted in the family and the home. We have only begun to realize how difficult it is to make up for this deprivation by formal schooling, even when we try. And we have only begun to try, after accepting all too long the notion that schools should acquiesce in, even re-enforce, inequalities in home backgrounds rather than overcome them.

Upgrading the earning capacity of Negroes will be difficult, but the economic effects are easy to analyze. Economists have long held that the way to reduce disparities in earned incomes is to eliminate disparities in earning capacities. If college-trained people earn more money than those who left school after eight years, the remedy is to send a larger proportion of young people to college. If machine operators earn more than ditchdiggers, the remedy is to give more people the capacity and opportunity to be machine operators. These changes in relative supplies reduce the disparity both by competing down the pay in the favored line of work and by

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raising the pay in the less remunerative line. When there are only a few people left in the population whose capacities are confined to garbage-collecting, it will be a high-paid calling. The same is true of domestic service and all kinds of menial work.

This classical economic strategy will be hampered if discrimination, union barriers, and the like stand in the way. It will not help to increase the supply of Negro plumbers if the local unions and contractors will not let them join. But experience also shows that barriers give way more easily when the pressures of unsatisfied demand and supply pile up.

It should therefore be the task of educational and manpower policy to engineer over the next two decades a massive change in the relative supplies of people of different educational and professional attainments and degrees of skill and training. It must be a more rapid change than has occurred in the past two decades, because that has not been fast enough to alter income differentials. We should try particularly to increase supplies in those fields where salaries and wages are already high and rising. In this process we should be very skeptical of self-serving arguments and calculations —that an increase in supply in this or that profession would be bound to reduce quality, or that there are some mechanical relations of "need" to population or to Gross National Product that cannot be exceeded.

Such a policy would be appropriate to the "war on poverty" even if there were no racial problem. Indeed, our objective is to raise the earning capacities of low-income whites as well as of Negroes. But Negroes have the most to gain, and even those who because of age or irreversible environmental handicaps must inevitably be left behind will benefit by reduction in the number of whites and other Negroes who are competing with them.

Assuring Living Standards in the Absence of Earning Capacity

The reduction of inequality in earning capacity is the fundamental solution, and in a sense anything else is stopgap. Some stopgaps are useless and even counter-productive. People who lack the capacity to earn a decent living need to be helped, but they will not be helped by minimum wage laws, trade union wage pressures, or other devices which seek to compel employers to pay them more than their work is worth. The more likely outcome of such regula-

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tions is that the intended beneficiaries are not employed at all.

A far better approach is to supplement earnings from the public fisc. But assistance can and should be given in a way that does not force the recipients out of the labor force or give them incentive to withdraw. Our present system of welfare payments does just that, causing needless waste and demoralization. This application of the means test is bad economics as well as bad sociology. It is almost as if our present programs of public assistance had been consciously contrived to perpetuate the conditions they are supposed to alleviate.

These programs apply a strict means test. The amount of assistance is an estimate of minimal needs, less the resources of the family from earnings. The purpose of the means test seems innocuous enough. It is to avoid wasting taxpayers' money on people who do not really need help. But another way to describe the means test is to note that it taxes earnings at a rate of 100 per cent. A person on public assistance cannot add to his family's standard of living by working. Of course, the means test provides a certain incentive to work in order to get off public assistance altogether. But in many cases, especially where there is only one adult to provide for and take care of several children, the adult simply does not have enough time and earning opportunities to get by without financial help. He, or more likely she, is essentially forced to be both idle and on a dole. The means test also involves limitations on property holdings which deprive anyone who is or expects to be on public assistance of incentive to save.

In a society which prizes incentives for work and thrift, these are surprising regulations. They deny the country useful productive services, but that economic loss is minor in the present context. They deprive individuals and families both of work experience which could teach them skills, habits, and self-discipline of future value and of the self-respect and satisfaction which comes from improving their own lot by their own efforts.

Public assistance encourages the disintegration of the family, the key to so many of the economic and social problems of the American Negro. The main assistance program, Aid for Dependent Children, is not available if there is an able-bodied employed male in the house. In most states it is not available if there is an able-bodied man in the house, even if he is not working. All too often it is necessary for the father to leave his children so that they can eat. It is bad enough to provide incentives for idleness but even worse to legislate incentives for desertion.[14]

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The bureaucratic surveillance and guidance to which recipients of public assistance are subject undermine both their self-respect and their capacity to manage their own affairs. In the administration of assistance there is much concern to detect "cheating" against the means tests and to ensure approved prudent use of the public's money. Case loads are frequently too great and administrative reglations too confining to permit the talents of social workers to treat the roots rather than the symptoms of the social maladies of their clients. The time of the clients is considered a free good, and much of it must be spent in seeking or awaiting the attention of the officials on whom their livelihood depends.

The defects of present categorical assistance programs could be, in my opinion, greatly reduced by adopting a system of basic income allowances, integrated with and administered in conjunction with the federal income tax. In a sense the proposal is to make the income tax symmetrical. At present the federal government takes a share of family income in excess of a certain amount (for example, a married couple with three children pays no tax unless their income exceeds $3700). The proposal is that the Treasury pay any family who falls below a certain income a fraction of the shortfall. The idea has sometimes been called a negative income tax.

The payment would be a matter of right, like an income tax refund. Individuals expecting to be entitled to payments from the government during the year could receive them in periodic installments by making a declaration of expected income and expected tax withholdings. But there would be a final settlement between the individual and the government based on a "tax" return after the year was over, just as there is now for taxpayers on April 15.

A family with no other income at all would receive a basic allowance scaled to the number of persons in the family. For a concrete example, take the basic allowance to be $400 per year per person. It might be desirable and equitable, however, to reduce the additional basic allowance for children after, say, the fourth. Once sufficient effort is being made to disseminate birth control knowledge and technique, the scale of allowances by family size certainly should provide some disincentive to the creation of large families.

A family's allowance would be reduced by a certain fraction of every dollar of other income it received. For a concrete example, take this fraction to be one third. This means that the family has considerable incentive to earn income, because its total income including allowances will be increased by two-thirds of whatever it

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earns. In contrast, the means test connected with present public assistance is a 100 per cent "tax" on earnings. With a one-third "tax" a family will be on the receiving end of the allowance and income tax system until its regular income equals three times its basic allowance.[15]

Families above this "break-even" point would be taxpayers. But the less well-off among them would pay less taxes than they do now. The first dollars of income in excess of this break-even point would be taxed at the same rate as below, one-third in the example. At some income level, the tax liability so computed would be the same as the tax under the present income tax law. From that point up, the present law would take over; taxpayers with incomes above this point would not be affected by the plan.

The best way to summarize the proposal is to give a concrete graphical illustration. On the horizontal axis of Figure 1 is measured family income from wages and salaries, interest, dividends, rents, and so forth—"adjusted gross income" for the Internal Revenue Service. On the vertical axis is measured the corresponding "disposable income," that is, income after federal taxes and allowances. If the family neither paid taxes nor received allowance, disposable income would be equal to family income; in the diagram this equality would be shown by the 45° line from the origin. Disposable income above this 45° line means the family receives allowances; disposable income below this line means the family pays taxes. The broken line OAB describes the present income tax law for a married couple with three children, allowing the standard deductions. The line CD is the revision which the proposed allowance system would make for incomes below $7963. For incomes above $7963, the old tax schedule applies.

Beneficiaries under Federal Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance would not be eligible for the new allowances. Congress should make sure that minimum benefits under OASDI are at least as high as the allowances. Some government payments, especially those for categorical public assistance, would eventually be replaced by basic allowances. Others, like unemployment insurance and veterans' pensions, are intended to be rights earned by past services regardless of current need. It would therefore be wrong to withhold allowances from the beneficiaries of these payments, but it would be reasonable to count them as income in determining the size of allowances, even though they are not subject to tax.

Although the numbers used above are illustrative, they are in-

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Figure 1

Illustration of Proposed Income Allowance Plan
(Married couple with three children)



dicative of what is needed for an effective program. It would be expensive for the federal budget, involving an expenditure of perhaps fifteen billion dollars a year. Partially offsetting this budgetary cost are the savings in public assistance, on which governments now spend five and six-tenths billion dollars a year, of which three and two-tenths billion are federal funds. In addition, savings are possible in a host of other income maintenance programs, notably in agriculture.

The program is expensive, but it need not be introduced all at once. The size of allowances can be gradually increased as room in the budget becomes available. This is likely to happen fairly rapidly. First of all, there is room right now. The budget, and the budget deficit, can and should be larger in order to create a tight labor market. Second, the normal growth of the economy increases federal revenues from existing tax rates by some six to seven billion dollars a year. This is a drag on the economy, threatening stagnation and rising unemployment unless it is matched by a similar rise

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in federal spending or avoided by cutting taxes. With defense spending stable or declining, there is room both for increases in civilian spending, as in the war on poverty, and for further tax cuts. Indeed, periodic tax reduction is official administration policy, and President Johnson agrees that the next turn belongs to low-income families. Gradually building an allowance system into the federal income tax would be the best way to lower the net yield of the tax—fairer and more far-reaching than further cuts in tax rates.

I referred to programs which make up for lack of earning capacity as stopgaps, but that is not entirely fair. Poverty itself saps earning capacity. The welfare way of life, on the edge of subsistence, does not provide motivation or useful work experience either to parents or to children. A better system, one which enables people to retain their self-respect and initiative, would in itself help to break the vicious circle.

The proposed allowance system is of course not the only thing which needs to be done. Without attempting to be exhaustive, I shall mention three other measures for the assistance of families without adequate earning capacity.

It hardly needs emphasizing that the large size of Negro families or non-families is one of the principal causes of Negro poverty. There are too many mouths to feed per breadwinner, and frequently the care of children keeps the mother, the only possible breadwinner, at home. A program of day care and pre-school education for children five and under could meet several objectives at once—enriching the experience of the children and freeing the mother for training or for work.

The quality of the medical care of Negroes is a disgrace in itself and contributes to their other economic handicaps.[16] Even so the financing of the care of "the medically indigent" is inadequate and chaotic. Sooner or later we will extend the principle of Medicare to citizens under sixty-five. Why not sooner?

As mentioned above, much Negro poverty in the South reflects the inability of Negroes to make a livelihood in agriculture. As far as the traditional cash crop, cotton, is concerned, mechanization and the competition of larger-scale units in the Southwest are undermining the plantation and share-cropping system of the Southeast. The Negro subsistence farmer has too little land, equipment, and know-how to make a decent income. Current government agricultural programs, expensive as they are to the taxpayer, do very little to help the sharecropper or subsistence farmer. Our whole

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agricultural policy needs to be recast, to give income support to people rather than price support to crops and to take people off the land rather than to take land out of cultivation. The effects on the social system of the South may be revolutionary, but they can only be salutary. Obviously there will be a tremendous burden on educational and training facilities to fit people for urban and industrial life. And I must emphasize again that substantial migration from agriculture is only possible, without disaster in the cities, in a booming economy with a tight labor market.

Conclusion

By far the most powerful factor determining the economic status of Negroes is the over-all state of the U.S. economy. A vigorously expanding economy with a steadily tight labor market will rapidly raise the position of the Negro, both absolutely and relatively. Favored by such a climate, the host of specific measures to eliminate discrimination, improve education and training, provide housing, and strengthen the family can yield substantial additional results. In a less beneficent economic climate, where jobs are short rather than men, the wars against racial inequality and poverty will be uphill battles, and some highly touted weapons may turn out to be dangerously futile.

The forces of the market place, the incentives of private self-interest, the pressures of supply and demand—these can be powerful allies or stubborn opponents. Properly harnessed, they quietly and impersonally accomplish objectives which may elude detailed legislation and administration. To harness them to the cause of the American Negro is entirely possible. It requires simply that the federal government dedicate its fiscal and monetary policies more wholeheartedly and singlemindedly to achieving and maintaining genuinely full employment. The obstacles are not technical or economic. One obstacle is a general lack of understanding that unemployment and related evils are remediable by national fiscal and monetary measures. The other is the high priority now given to competing financial objectives.

In this area, as in others, the administration has disarmed its conservative opposition by meeting it halfway, and no influential political voices challenge the tacit compromise from the "Left." Negro rights movements have so far taken no interest in national fiscal and monetary policy. No doubt gold, the federal budget, and

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the actions of the Federal Reserve System seem remote from the day-to-day firing line of the movements. Direct local actions to redress specific grievances and to battle visible enemies are absorbing and dramatic. They have concrete observable results. But the use of national political influence on behalf of the goals of the Employment Act of 1946 is equally important. It would fill a political vacuum, and its potential long-run pay-off is very high.

The goal of racial equality suggests that the federal government should provide more stimulus to the economy. Fortunately, it also suggests constructive ways to give the stimulus. We can kill two birds with one stone. The economy needs additional spending in general; the wars on poverty and racial inequality need additional spending of particular kinds. The needed spending falls into two categories: government programs to diminish economic inequalities by building up the earning capacities of the poor and their children, and humane public assistance to citizens who temporarily or permanently lack the capacity to earn a decent living for themselves and their families. In both categories the nation, its conscience aroused by the plight of the Negro, has the chance to make reforms which will benefit the whole society.

References

1. As Locke Anderson shows, one would expect advances in median income to run into diminishing returns in reducing the number of people below some fixed poverty-level income. W. H. Locke Anderson, "Trickling Down: The Relationship between Economic Growth and the Extent of Poverty Among American Families," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 78 (November 1964), pp. 511-524. However, for the economy as a whole, estimates by Lowell Galloway suggest that advances in median income still result in a substantial reduction in the fraction of the population below poverty-level incomes. "The Foundation of the War on Poverty," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 55 (March 1965), pp. 122-131.

2. Anderson, *op. cit.*, Table IV, p. 522.

3. This point, and others made in this section, have been eloquently argued by Harry G. Johnson, "Unemployment and Poverty," unpublished paper presented at West Virginia University Conference on Poverty Amidst Affluence, May 5, 1965.

4. Galloway, *op. cit.* Galloway used the definitions of poverty originally suggested by the Council of Economic Advisers in its 1964 Economic Report, that is: incomes below $3000 a year for families and below $1500 a year

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for single individuals. The Social Security Administration has refined these measures to take better account of family size and of income in kind available to farmers. Mollie Orshansky, "Counting the Poor: Another Look at the Poverty Profile, *Social Security Bulletin*, Vol. 28 (January 1965), pp. 3-29. These refinements change the composition of the "poor" but affect very little their total number; it is doubtful they would alter Galloway's results.

5. Galloway, *op. cit.*, shows that postwar experience suggests that, other things equal, every point by which unemployment is diminished lowers the national incidence of poverty by .5 per cent of itself. And this does not include the effects of the accompanying increase in median family income, which would be of the order of 3 per cent and reduce the poverty fraction another 1.8 per cent.

6. For lack of comparable nationwide income data, the only way to gauge the progress of Negroes relative to whites over long periods of time is to compare their distributions among occupations. A measure of the occupational position of a group can be constructed from decennial Census data by weighting the proportions of the group in each occupation by the average income of the occupation. The ratio of this measure for Negroes to the same measure for whites is an index of the relative occupational position of Negroes. Such calculations were originally made by Gary Becker, *The Economics of Discrimination* (Chicago, 1957). They have recently been refined and brought up to date by Dale Hiestand, *Economic Growth and Employment Opportunities for Minorities*, (New York, 1964), p. 53. Hiestand's results are as follows:

   Occupational position of Negroes relative to whites:

	1910	*1920*	*1930*	*1940*	*1950*	*1960*
Male	78.0	78.1	78.2	77.5	81.4	82.1
Female	78.0	71.3	74.8	76.8	81.6	84.3

The figures show that Negro men lost ground in the Great Depression, that they gained sharply in the nineteen forties, and that their progress almost ceased in the nineteen fifties. Negro women show a rising secular trend since the nineteen twenties, but their gains too were greater in the tight labor markets of the nineteen forties than in the nineteen thirties or nineteen fifties.

Several cautions should be borne in mind in interpreting these figures: (1) Much of the relative occupational progress of Negroes is due to massive migration from agriculture to occupations of much higher average income. When the over-all relative index nevertheless does not move, as in the nineteen fifties, the position of Negroes in non-agricultural occupations has declined. (2) Since the figures include unemployed as well as employed persons and Negroes are more sensitive to unemployment, the occupational index understates their progress when unemployment declined (1940-50) and overstates it when unemployment rose (1930-40 and 1950-60). (3)

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Within any Census occupational category, Negroes earn less than whites. So the absolute level of the index overstates the Negro's relative position. Moreover, this overstatement is probably greater in Census years of relatively slack labor markets, like 1940 and 1960, than in other years.

The finding that labor market conditions arrested the progress of Negro men is confirmed by income and unemployment data analyzed by Alan B. Batchelder, "Decline in the Relative Income of Negro Men," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 78 (November 1964), pp. 525-548.

7. This is emphasized by Daniel Patrick Moynihan in his contribution to this volume.

8. Differences between Negro men and women with respect to unemployment and income progress are reported and analyzed by Alan Batchelder, *op. cit.*

9. Figures are given in other papers in this volume: see, for example, the articles by Rashi Fein and Daniel Patrick Moynihan.

10. In 34 per cent of poor Negro families, the head is not in the labor force; in 6 per cent, the head is unemployed. These figures relate to the Social Security Administration's "economy-level" poverty index. Mollie Orshansky, *op. cit.*

11. See *Manpower Report of the President*, March 1964, Table A-3, p. 197.

12. Hiestand, *op. cit.*, Table I, pp. 7-9.

13. Batchelder, *op. cit.*, shows that the incomes of Negro men declined relative to those of white men in every region of the country. For the country as a whole, nevertheless, the median income of Negro men stayed close to half that of white men. The reason is that migration from the South, where the Negro-white income ratio is particularly low, just offset the declines in the regional ratios.

14. The official Advisory Council on Public Assistance recommended in 1960 that children be aided even if there are two parents or relatives *in loco parentis* in their household, but Congress has ignored this proposal. *Public Assistance: A Report of the Findings and Recommendations of the Advisory Council on Public Assistance*, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, January 1960. The Advisory Council also wrestled somewhat inconclusively with the problem of the means test and suggested that states be allowed to experiment with dropping or modifying it for five years. This suggestion too has been ignored.

15. Adjusting the size of a government benefit to the amount of other income is not without precedent. Recipients of Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance benefits under the age of seventy-two lose one dollar of benefits and only one dollar for every two dollars of earned income above $1200 but below $1700 a year.

16. See the statistics summarized by Rashi Fein elsewhere in this volume.

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JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN

The Two Worlds of Race: A Historical View

I

MEASURED BY universal standards the history of the United States is indeed brief. But during the brief span of three and one-half centuries of colonial and national history Americans developed traditions and prejudices which created the two worlds of race in modern America. From the time that Africans were brought as indentured servants to the mainland of English America in 1619, the enormous task of rationalizing and justifying the forced labor of peoples on the basis of racial differences was begun; and even after legal slavery was ended, the notion of racial differences persisted as a basis for maintaining segregation and discrimination. At the same time, the effort to establish a more healthy basis for the new world social order was begun, thus launching the continuing battle between the two worlds of race, on the one hand, and the world of equality and complete human fellowship, on the other.

For a century before the American Revolution the status of Negroes in the English colonies had become fixed at a low point that distinguished them from all other persons who had been held in temporary bondage. By the middle of the eighteenth century, laws governing Negroes denied to them certain basic rights that were conceded to others. They were permitted no independence of thought, no opportunity to improve their minds or their talents or to worship freely, no right to marry and enjoy the conventional family relationships, no right to own or dispose of property, and no protection against miscarriages of justice or cruel and unreasonable punishments. They were outside the pale of the laws that protected ordinary humans. In most places they were to be governed, as the South Carolina code of 1712 expressed it, by special laws "as may restrain the disorders, rapines, and inhumanity to which they are naturally prone and inclined. . . ." A separate world for them had

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been established by law and custom. Its dimensions and the conduct of its inhabitants were determined by those living in a quite different world.

By the time that the colonists took up arms against their mother country in order to secure their independence, the world of Negro slavery had become deeply entrenched and the idea of Negro inferiority well established. But the dilemmas inherent in such a situation were a source of constant embarrassment. "It always appeared a most iniquitous scheme to me," Mrs. John Adams wrote her husband in 1774, "to fight ourselves for what we are daily robbing and plundering from those who have as good a right to freedom as we have." There were others who shared her views, but they were unable to wield much influence. When the fighting began General George Washington issued an order to recruiting officers that they were not to enlist "any deserter from the ministerial army, nor any stroller, negro, or vagabond, or person suspected of being an enemy to the liberty of America nor any under eighteen years of age." In classifying Negroes with the dregs of society, traitors, and children, Washington made it clear that Negroes, slave or free, were not to enjoy the high privilege of fighting for political independence. He would change that order later, but only after it became clear that Negroes were enlisting with the "ministerial army" in droves in order to secure their own freedom. In changing his policy if not his views, Washington availed himself of the services of more than 5,000 Negroes who took up arms against England.[1]

Many Americans besides Mrs. Adams were struck by the inconsistency of their stand during the War for Independence, and they were not averse to making moves to emancipate the slaves. Quakers and other religious groups organized antislavery societies, while numerous individuals manumitted their slaves. In the years following the close of the war most of the states of the East made provisions for the gradual emancipation of slaves. In the South, meanwhile, the antislavery societies were unable to effect programs of state-wide emancipation. When the Southerners came to the Constitutional Convention in 1787 they succeeded in winning some representation on the basis of slavery, in securing federal support of the capture and rendition of fugitive slaves, and in preventing the closing of the slave trade before 1808.

Even where the sentiment favoring emancipation was pronounced, it was seldom accompanied by a view that Negroes were the equals of whites and should become a part of one family of

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Americans. Jefferson, for example, was opposed to slavery; and if he could have had his way, he would have condemned it in the Declaration of Independence. It did not follow, however, that he believed Negroes to be the equals of whites. He did not want to "degrade a whole race of men from the work in the scale of beings which their Creator may *perhaps* have given them. . . . I advance it therefore, as a suspicion only, that the blacks, whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and circumstance, are inferior to the whites in the endowment both of body and mind." It is entirely possible that Jefferson's later association with the extraordinarily able Negro astronomer and mathematician, Benjamin Banneker, resulted in some modification of his views. After reading a copy of Banneker's almanac, Jefferson told him that it was "a document to which your whole race had a right for its justifications against the doubts which have been entertained of them."[2]

In communities such as Philadelphia and New York, where the climate was more favorably disposed to the idea of Negro equality than in Jefferson's Virginia, few concessions were made, except by a limited number of Quakers and their associates. Indeed, the white citizens in the City of Brotherly Love contributed substantially to the perpetuation of two distinct worlds of race. In the 1780's, the white Methodists permitted Negroes to worship with them, provided the Negroes sat in a designated place in the balcony. On one occasion, when the Negro worshippers occupied the front rows of the balcony, from which they had been excluded, the officials pulled them from their knees during prayer and evicted them from the church. Thus, in the early days of the Republic and in the place where the Republic was founded, Negroes had a definite "place" in which they were expected at all times to remain. The white Methodists of New York had much the same attitude toward their Negro fellows. Soon, there were separate Negro churches in these and other communities. Baptists were very much the same. In 1809 thirteen Negro members of a white Baptist church in Philadelphia were dismissed, and they formed a church of their own. Thus, the earliest Negro religious institutions emerged as the result of the rejection by white communicants of their darker fellow worshippers. Soon there would be other institutions—schools, newspapers, benevolent societies—to serve those who lived in a world apart.

Those Americans who conceded the importance of education for Negroes tended to favor some particular type of education that would be in keeping with their lowly station in life. In

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1794, for example, the American Convention of Abolition Societies recommended that Negroes be instructed in "those mechanic arts which will keep them most constantly employed and, of course, which will less subject them to idleness and debauchery, and thus prepare them for becoming good citizens of the United States." When Anthony Benezet, a dedicated Pennsylvania abolitionist, died in 1784 his will provided that on the death of his wife the proceeds of his estate should be used to assist in the establishment of a school for Negroes. In 1787 the school of which Benezet had dreamed was opened in Philadelphia, where the pupils studied reading, writing, arithmetic, plain accounts, and sewing.

Americans who were at all interested in the education of Negroes regarded it as both natural and normal that Negroes should receive their training in separate schools. As early as 1773 Newport, Rhode Island, had a colored school, maintained by a society of benevolent clergymen of the Anglican Church. In 1798 a separate private school for Negro children was established in Boston; and two decades later the city opened its first public primary school for the education of Negro children. Meanwhile, New York had established separate schools, the first one opening its doors in 1790. By 1814 there were several such institutions that were generally designated as the New York African Free Schools.[3]

Thus, in the most liberal section of the country, the general view was that Negroes should be kept out of the main stream of American life. They were forced to establish and maintain their own religious institutions, which were frequently followed by the establishment of separate benevolent societies. Likewise, if Negroes were to receive any education, it should be special education provided in separate educational institutions. This principle prevailed in most places in the North throughout the period before the Civil War. In some Massachusetts towns, however, Negroes gained admission to schools that had been maintained for whites. But the School Committee of Boston refused to admit Negroes, arguing that the natural distinction of the races, which "no legislature, no social customs, can efface renders a promiscuous intermingling in the public schools disadvantageous both to them and to the whites." Separate schools remained in Boston until the Massachusetts legislature in 1855 enacted a law providing that in determining the qualifications of students to be admitted to any public school no distinction should be made on account of the race, color, or religious opinion of the applicant.

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Meanwhile, in the Southern states, where the vast majority of the Negroes lived, there were no concessions suggesting equal treatment, even among the most liberal elements. One group that would doubtless have regarded itself as liberal on the race question advocated the deportation of Negroes to Africa, especially those who had become free. Since free Negroes "neither enjoyed the immunities of freemen, nor were they subject to the incapacities of slaves," their condition and "unconquerable prejudices" prevented amalgamation with whites, one colonization leader argued. There was, therefore, a "peculiar moral fitness" in restoring them to "the land of their fathers." Men like Henry Clay, Judge Bushrod Washington, and President James Monroe thought that separation—expatriation—was the best thing for Negroes who were or who would become free.[4]

While the colonization scheme was primarily for Negroes who were already free, it won, for a time, a considerable number of sincere enemies of slavery. From the beginning Negroes were bitterly opposed to it, and only infrequently did certain Negro leaders, such as Dr. Martin Delany and the Reverend Henry M. Turner, support the idea. Colonization, however, retained considerable support in the most responsible quarters. As late as the Civil War, President Lincoln urged Congress to adopt a plan to colonize Negroes, as the only workable solution to the race problem in the United States. Whether the advocates of colonization wanted merely to prevent the contamination of slavery by free Negroes or whether they actually regarded it as the just and honorable thing to do, they represented an important element in the population that rejected the idea of the Negro's assimilation into the main stream of American life.

Thus, within fifty years after the Declaration of Independence was written, the institution of slavery, which received only a temporary reversal during the Revolutionary era, contributed greatly to the emergence of the two worlds of race in the United States. The natural rights philosophy appeared to have little effect on those who became committed, more and more, to seeking a rationalization for slavery. The search was apparently so successful that even in areas where slavery was declining, the support for maintaining two worlds of race was strong. Since the Negro church and school emerged in Northern communities where slavery was dying, it may be said that the free society believed almost as strongly in racial separation as it did in racial freedom.

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II

The generation preceding the outbreak of the Civil War witnessed the development of a set of defenses of slavery that became the basis for much of the racist doctrine to which some Americans have subscribed from then to the present time. The idea of the inferiority of the Negro enjoyed wide acceptance among Southerners of all classes and among many Northerners. It was an important ingredient in the theory of society promulgated by Southern thinkers and leaders. It was organized into a body of systematic thought by the scientists and social scientists of the South, out of which emerged a doctrine of racial superiority that justified any kind of control over the slave. In 1826 Dr. Thomas Cooper said that he had not the slightest doubt that Negroes were an "inferior variety of the human species; and not capable of the same improvement as the whites." Dr. S. C. Cartwright of the University of Louisiana insisted that the capacities of the Negro adult for learning were equal to those of a white infant; and the Negro could properly perform certain physiological functions only when under the control of white men. Because of the Negro's inferiority, liberty and republican institutions were not only unsuited to his temperament, but actually inimical to his well-being and happiness.

Like racists in other parts of the world, Southerners sought support for their ideology by developing a common bond with the less privileged. The obvious basis was race; and outside the white race there was to be found no favor from God, no honor or respect from man. By the time that Europeans were reading Gobineau's *Inequality of Races,* Southerners were reading Cartwright's *Slavery in the Light of Ethnology.* In admitting all whites into the pseudo-nobility of race, Cartwright won their enthusiastic support in the struggle to preserve the integrity and honor of *the* race. Professor Thomas R. Dew of the College of William and Mary comforted the lower-class whites by indicating that they could identify with the most privileged and affluent of the community. In the South, he said, "no white man feels such inferiority of rank as to be unworthy of association with those around him. Color alone is here the badge of distinction, the true mark of aristocracy, and all who are white are equal in spite of the variety of occupation."[5]

Many Northerners were not without their own racist views and policies in the turbulent decades before the Civil War. Some, as Professor Louis Filler has observed, displayed a hatred of Negroes that

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gave them a sense of superiority and an outlet for their frustrations. Others cared nothing one way or the other about Negroes and demanded only that they be kept separate.[6] Even some of the abolitionists themselves were ambivalent on the question of Negro equality. More than one antislavery society was agitated by the suggestion that Negroes be invited to join. Some members thought it reasonable for them to attend, but not to be put on an "equality with ourselves." The New York abolitionist, Lewis Tappan, admitted "that when the subject of acting out our profound principles in treating men irrespective of color is discussed heat is always produced."[7]

In the final years before the beginning of the Civil War, the view that the Negro was different, even inferior, was widely held in the United States. Leaders in both major parties subscribed to the view, while the more extreme racists deplored any suggestion that the Negro could ever prosper as a free man. At Peoria, Illinois, in October 1854, Abraham Lincoln asked what stand the opponents of slavery should take regarding Negroes. "Free them, and make them politically and socially, our equals? My own feelings will not admit of this; and if mine would, we well know that those of the great mass of white people will not. Whether this feeling accords with justice and sound judgment, is not the sole question, if indeed, it is any part of it. A universal feeling, whether well or ill founded, cannot be safely disregarded. We cannot, then, make them equals."

The Lincoln statement was forthright, and it doubtless represented the views of most Americans in the 1850's. Most of those who heard him or read his speech were of the same opinion as he. In later years, the Peoria pronouncement would be used by those who sought to detract from Lincoln's reputation as a champion of the rights of the Negro. In 1964, the White Citizens' Councils reprinted portions of the speech in large advertisements in the daily press and insisted that Lincoln shared their views on the desirability of maintaining two distinct worlds of race.

Lincoln could not have overcome the nation's strong predisposition toward racial separation if he had tried. And he did not try very hard. When he called for the enlistment of Negro troops, after issuing the Emancipation Proclamation, he was content not only to set Negroes apart in a unit called "U. S. Colored Troops," but also to have Negro privates receive $10 per month including clothing, while whites of the same rank received $13 per month plus clothing. Only the stubborn refusal of many Negro troops to accept discrimi-

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natory pay finally forced Congress to equalize compensation for white and Negro soldiers.[8] The fight for union that became also a fight for freedom never became a fight for equality or for the creation of one racial world.

The Lincoln and Johnson plans for settling the problems of peace and freedom never seriously touched on the concomitant problem of equality. To be sure, in 1864 President Lincoln privately raised with the governor of Louisiana the question of the franchise for a limited number of Negroes, but when the governor ignored the question the President let the matter drop. Johnson raised a similar question in 1866, but he admitted that it was merely to frustrate the design of radical reformers who sought a wider franchise for Negroes. During the two years following Appomattox Southern leaders gave not the slightest consideration to permitting any Negroes, regardless of their service to the Union or their education or their property, to share in the political life of their communities. Not only did every Southern state refuse to permit Negroes to vote, but they also refused to provide Negroes with any of the educational opportunities that they were providing for the whites.

The early practice of political disfranchisement and of exclusion from public educational facilities helped to determine subsequent policies that the South adopted regarding Negroes. While a few leaders raised their voices against these policies and practices, it was Negroes themselves who made the most eloquent attacks on such discriminations. As early as May 1865, a group of North Carolina Negroes told President Johnson that some of them had been soldiers and were doing everything possible to learn how to discharge the higher duties of citizenship. "It seems to us that men who are willing on the field of battle to carry the muskets of the Republic, in the days of peace ought to be permitted to carry the ballots; and certainly we cannot understand the justice of denying the elective franchise to men who have been fighting *for* the country, while it is freely given to men who have just returned from *four* years fighting against it." Such pleas fell on deaf ears, however; and it was not until 1867, when Congress was sufficiently outraged by the inhuman black codes, widespread discriminations in the South, and unspeakable forms of violence against Negroes, that new federal legislation sought to correct the evils of the first period of Reconstruction.

The period that we know as Radical Reconstruction had no sig-

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nificant or permanent effect on the status of the Negro in American life. For a period of time, varying from one year to fifteen or twenty years, some Negroes enjoyed the privileges of voting. They gained political ascendancy in a very few communities only temporarily, and they never even began to achieve the status of a ruling class. They made no meaningful steps toward economic independence or even stability; and in no time at all, because of the pressures of the local community and the neglect of the federal government, they were brought under the complete economic subservience of the old ruling class. Organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan were committed to violent action to keep Negroes "in their place" and, having gained respectability through sponsorship by Confederate generals and the like, they proceeded to wreak havoc in the name of white supremacy and protection of white womanhood.[9]

Meanwhile, various forms of segregation and discrimination, developed in the years before the Civil War in order to degrade the half million free Negroes in the United States, were now applied to the four million Negroes who had become free in 1865. Already the churches and the military were completely segregated. For the most part the schools, even in the North, were separate. In the South segregated schools persisted, even in the places where the radicals made a half-hearted attempt to desegregate them. In 1875 Congress enacted a Civil Rights Act to guarantee the enjoyment of equal rights in carriers and all places of public accommodation and amusement. Even before it became law Northern philanthropists succeeded in forcing the deletion of the provision calling for desegregated schools. Soon, because of the massive resistance in the North as well as in the South and the indifferent manner in which the federal government enforced the law, it soon became a dead letter everywhere. When it was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1883, there was universal rejoicing, except among the Negroes, one of whom declared that they had been "baptized in ice water."

Neither the Civil War nor the era of Reconstruction made any significant step toward the permanent elimination of racial barriers. The radicals of the post-Civil War years came no closer to the creation of one racial world than the patriots of the Revolutionary years. When Negroes were, for the first time, enrolled in the standing army of the United States, they were placed in separate Negro units. Most of the liberals of the Reconstruction era called for and worked for separate schools for Negroes. Nowhere was there any

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extensive effort to involve Negroes in the churches and other social institutions of the dominant group. Whatever remained of the old abolitionist fervor, which can hardly be described as unequivocal on the question of true racial equality, was rapidly disappearing. In its place were the sentiments of the business men who wanted peace at any price. Those having common railroad interests or crop-marketing interests or investment interests could and did extend their hands across sectional lines and joined in the task of working together for the common good. In such an atmosphere the practice was to accept the realities of two separate worlds of race. Some even subscribed to the view that there were significant economic advantages in maintaining the two worlds of race.

III

The post-Reconstruction years witnessed a steady deterioration in the status of Negro Americans. These were the years that Professor Rayford Logan has called the "nadir" of the Negro in American life and thought. They were the years when Americans, weary of the crusade that had, for the most part, ended with the outbreak of the Civil War, displayed almost no interest in helping the Negro to achieve equality. The social Darwinists decried the very notion of equality for Negroes, arguing that the lowly place they occupied was natural and normal. The leading literary journals vied with each other in describing Negroes as lazy, idle, improvident, immoral, and criminal.[10] Thomas Dixon's novels, *The Klansman* and *The Leopard's Spots,* and D. W. Griffith's motion picture, "The Birth of A Nation," helped to give Americans a view of the Negro's role in American history that "proved" that he was unfit for citizenship, to say nothing of equality. The dictum of William Graham Sumner and his followers that "stateways cannot change folkways" convinced many Americans that legislating equality and creating one great society where race was irrelevant was out of the question.

But many Americans believed that they *could* legislate inequality; and they proceeded to do precisely that. Beginning in 1890, one Southern state after another revised the suffrage provisions of its constitution in a manner that made it virtually impossible for Negroes to qualify to vote. The new literacy and "understanding" provisions permitted local registrars to disqualify Negroes while permitting white citizens to qualify. Several states, including Louis-

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iana, North Carolina, and Oklahoma, inserted "grandfather clauses" in their constitutions in order to permit persons, who could not otherwise qualify, to vote if their fathers or grandfathers could vote in 1866. (This was such a flagrant discrimination against Negroes, whose ancestors could not vote in 1866, that the United States Supreme Court in 1915 declared the "grandfather clause" unconstitutional.) Then came the Democratic white primary in 1900 that made it impossible for Negroes to participate in local elections in the South, where, by this time, only the Democratic party had any appreciable strength. (After more than a generation of assaults on it, the white primary was finally declared unconstitutional in 1944.)

Inequality was legislated in still another way. Beginning in the 1880's, many states, especially but not exclusively in the South, enacted statutes designed to separate the races. After the Civil Rights Act was declared unconstitutional in 1883 state legislatures were emboldened to enact numerous segregation statutes. When the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Plessy *v.* Ferguson, set forth the "separate but equal" doctrine in 1896, the decision provided a new stimulus for laws to separate the races and, of course, to discriminate against Negroes. In time, Negroes and whites were separated in the use of schools, churches, cemeteries, drinking fountains, restaurants, and all places of public accommodation and amusement. One state enacted a law providing for the separate warehousing of books used by white and Negro children. Another required the telephone company to provide separate telephone booths for white and Negro customers. In most communities housing was racially separated by law or practice.[11]

Where there was no legislation requiring segregation, local practices filled the void. Contradictions and inconsistencies seemed not to disturb those who sought to maintain racial distinctions at all costs. It mattered not that one drive-in snack bar served Negroes only on the inside, while its competitor across the street served Negroes only on the outside. Both were committed to making racial distinctions; and in communities where practices and mores had the force of law, the distinction was everything. Such practices were greatly strengthened when, in 1913, the federal government adopted policies that segregated the races in its offices as well as in its eating and rest-room facilities.

By the time of World War I, Negroes and whites in the South and in parts of the North lived in separate worlds, and the appa-

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ratus for keeping the worlds separate was elaborate and complex. Negroes were segregated by law in the public schools of the Southern states, while those in the Northern ghettos were sent to predominantly Negro schools, except where their numbers were insufficient. Scores of Negro newspapers sprang up to provide news of Negroes that the white press consistently ignored. Negroes were as unwanted in the white churches as they had been in the late eighteenth century; and Negro churches of virtually every denomination were the answer for a people who had accepted the white man's religion even as the white man rejected his religious fellowship.

Taking note of the fact that they had been omitted from any serious consideration by the white historians, Negroes began in earnest to write the history of their own experiences as Americans. There had been Negro historians before the Civil War, but none of them had challenged the white historians' efforts to relegate Negroes to a separate, degraded world. In 1882, however, George Washington Williams published his *History of the Negro Race in America* in order to "give the world more correct ideas about the colored people." He wrote, he said, not "as a partisan apologist, but from a love for the truth of history."[12] Soon there were other historical works by Negroes describing their progress and their contributions and arguing that they deserved to be received into the full fellowship of American citizens.

It was in these post-Reconstruction years that some of the most vigorous efforts were made to destroy the two worlds of race. The desperate pleas of Negro historians were merely the more articulate attempts of Negroes to gain complete acceptance in American life. Scores of Negro organizations joined in the struggle to gain protection and recognition of their rights and to eliminate the more sordid practices that characterized the treatment of the Negro world by the white world. Unhappily, the small number of whites who were committed to racial equality dwindled in the post-Reconstruction years, while government at every level showed no interest in eliminating racial separatism. It seemed that Negro voices were indeed crying in the wilderness, but they carried on their attempts to be heard. In 1890 Negroes from twenty-one states and the District of Columbia met in Chicago and organized the Afro-American League of the United States. They called for more equitable distribution of school funds, fair and impartial trial for accused Negroes, resistance "by all legal and reasonable means" to

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mob and lynch law, and enjoyment of the franchise by all qualified voters. When a group of young Negro intellectuals, led by W. E. B. Du Bois, met at Niagara Falls, Ontario, in 1905, they made a similar call as they launched their Niagara Movement.

However eloquent their pleas, Negroes alone could make no successful assault on the two worlds of race. They needed help—a great deal of help. It was the bloody race riots in the early years of the twentieth century that shocked civic minded and socially conscious whites into answering the Negro's pleas for support. Some whites began to take the view that the existence of two societies whose distinction was based solely on race was inimical to the best interests of the entire nation. Soon, they were taking the initiative and in 1909 organized the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. They assisted the following year in establishing the National Urban League. White attorneys began to stand with Negroes before the United States Supreme Court to challenge the "grandfather clause," local segregation ordinances, and flagrant miscarriages of justice in which Negroes were the victims. The patterns of attack developed during these years were to become invaluable later. Legal action was soon supplemented by picketing, demonstrating, and boycotting, with telling effect particularly in selected Northern communities.[13]

IV

The two world wars had a profound effect on the status of Negroes in the United States and did much to mount the attack on the two worlds of race. The decade of World War I witnessed a very significant migration of Negroes. They went in large numbers—perhaps a half million—from the rural areas of the South to the towns and cities of the South and North. They were especially attracted to the industrial centers of the North. By the thousands they poured into Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Chicago. Although many were unable to secure employment, others were successful and achieved a standard of living they could not have imagined only a few years earlier. Northern communities were not altogether friendly and hospitable to the newcomers, but the opportunities for education and the enjoyment of political self-respect were the greatest they had ever seen. Many of them felt that they were entirely justified in their renewed hope that the war would bring about a complete merger of the two worlds of race.

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Those who held such high hopes, however, were naive in the extreme. Already the Ku Klux Klan was being revived—this time in the North as well as in the South. Its leaders were determined to develop a broad program to unite "native-born white Christians for concerted action in the preservation of American institutions and the supremacy of the white race." By the time that the war was over, the Klan was in a position to make capital of the racial animosities that had developed during the conflict itself. Racial conflicts had broken out in many places during the war; and before the conference at Versailles was over race riots in the United States had brought about what can accurately be described as the "long, hot summer" of 1919.

If anything, the military operations which aimed to save the world for democracy merely fixed more permanently the racial separation in the United States. Negro soldiers not only constituted entirely separate fighting units in the United States Army, but, once overseas, were assigned to fighting units with the French Army. Negroes who sought service with the United States Marines or the Air Force were rejected, while the Navy relegated them to menial duties. The reaction of many Negroes was bitter, but most of the leaders, including Du Bois, counseled patience and loyalty. They continued to hope that their show of patriotism would win for them a secure place of acceptance as Americans.

Few Negro Americans could have anticipated the wholesale rejection they experienced at the conclusion of World War I. Returning Negro soldiers were lynched by hanging and burning, even while still in their military uniforms. The Klan warned Negroes that they must respect the rights of the white race "in whose country they are permitted to reside." Racial conflicts swept the country, and neither federal nor state governments seemed interested in effective intervention. The worlds of race were growing further apart in the postwar decade. Nothing indicated this more clearly than the growth of the Universal Negro Improvement Association, led by Marcus Garvey. From a mere handful of members at the end of the war, the Garvey movement rapidly became the largest secular Negro group ever organized in the United States. Although few Negroes were interested in settling in Africa—the expressed aim of Garvey—they joined the movement by the hundreds of thousands to indicate their resentment of the racial duality that seemed to them to be the central feature of the American social order.[14]

More realistic and hardheaded were the Negroes who were

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more determined than ever to engage in the most desperate fight of their lives to destroy racism in the United States. As the editor of the *Crisis* said in 1919, "We return from fighting. We return fighting. Make way for Democracy! We saved it in France, and by the Great Jehovah, we will save it in the U.S.A., or know the reason why." This was the spirit of what Alain Locke called "The New Negro." He fought the Democratic white primary, made war on the whites who consigned him to the ghetto, attacked racial discrimination in employment, and pressed for legislation to protect his rights. If he was seldom successful during the postwar decade and the depression, he made it quite clear that he was unalterably opposed to the un-American character of the two worlds of race.

Hope for a new assault on racism was kindled by some of the New Deal policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt. As members of the economically disadvantaged group, Negroes benefited from relief and recovery legislation. Most of it, however, recognized the existence of the two worlds of race and accommodated itself to it. Frequently bread lines and soup kitchens were separated on the basis of race. There was segregation in the employment services, while many new agencies recognized and bowed to Jim Crow. Whenever agencies, such as the Farm Security Administration, fought segregation and sought to deal with people on the basis of their needs rather than race they came under the withering fire of the racist critics and seldom escaped alive. Winds of change, however slight, were discernible, and nowhere was this in greater evidence than in the new labor unions. Groups like the Congress of Industrial Organizations, encouraged by the support of the Wagner Labor Relations Act, began to look at manpower resources as a whole and to attack the old racial policies that viewed labor in terms of race.

As World War II approached, Negroes schooled in the experiences of the nineteen-twenties and thirties were unwilling to see the fight against Nazism carried on in the context of an American racist ideology. Some white Americans were likewise uncomfortable in the role of freeing Europe of a racism which still permeated the United States; but it was the Negroes who dramatized American inconsistency by demanding an end to discrimination in employment in defense industries. By threatening to march on Washington in 1941 they forced the President to issue an order forbidding such discrimination. The opposition was loud and strong. Some state governors denounced the order, and some manufac-

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turers skillfully evaded it. But it was a significant step toward the elimination of the two worlds.

During World War II the assault on racism continued. Negroes, more than a million of whom were enlisted in the armed services, bitterly fought discrimination and segregation. The armed services were, for the most part, two quite distinct racial worlds. Some Negro units had white officers, and much of the officer training was desegregated. But it was not until the final months of the war that a deliberate experiment was undertaken to involve Negro and white enlisted men in the same fighting unit. With the success of the experiment and with the warm glow of victory over Nazism as a backdrop, there was greater inclination to recognize the absurdity of maintaining a racially separate military force to protect the freedoms of the country.[15]

During the war there began the greatest migration in the history of Negro Americans. Hundreds of thousands left the South for the industrial centers of the North and West. In those places they met hostility, but they also secured employment in aviation plants, automobile factories, steel mills, and numerous other industries. Their difficulties persisted as they faced problems of housing and adjustment. But they continued to move out of the South in such large numbers that by 1965 one third of the twenty million Negroes in the United States lived in twelve metropolitan centers of the North and West. The ramifications of such large-scale migration were numerous. The concentration of Negroes in communities where they suffered no political disabilities placed in their hands an enormous amount of political power. Consequently, some of them went to the legislatures, to Congress, and to positions on the judiciary. In turn, this won for them political respect as well as legislation that greatly strengthened their position as citizens.

V

Following World War II there was a marked acceleration in the war against the two worlds of race in the United States. In 1944 the Supreme Court ruled against segregation in interstate transportation, and three years later it wrote the final chapter in the war against the Democratic white primary. In 1947 the President's Committee on Civil Rights called for the "elimination of segregation, based on race, color, creed, or national origin, from American life."[16] In the following year President Truman asked Congress to establish

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a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission. At the same time he took steps to eliminate segregation in the armed services. These moves on the part of the judicial and executive branches of the federal government by no means destroyed the two worlds of race, but they created a more healthy climate in which the government and others could launch an attack on racial separatism.

The attack was greatly strengthened by the new position of world leadership that the United States assumed at the close of the war. Critics of the United States were quick to point to the inconsistencies of an American position that spoke against racism abroad and countenanced it at home. New nations, brown and black, seemed reluctant to follow the lead of a country that adhered to its policy of maintaining two worlds of race—the one identified with the old colonial ruling powers and the other with the colonies now emerging as independent nations. Responsible leaders in the United States saw the weakness of their position, and some of them made new moves to repair it.

Civic and religious groups, some labor organizations, and many individuals from the white community began to join in the effort to destroy segregation and discrimination in American life. There was no danger, after World War II, that Negroes would ever again stand alone in their fight. The older interracial organizations continued, but they were joined by new ones. In addition to the numerous groups that included racial equality in their over-all programs, there were others that made the creation of one racial world their principal objective. Among them were the Congress of Racial Equality, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. Those in existence in the 1950's supported the court action that brought about the decision against segregated schools. The more recent ones have taken the lead in pressing for new legislation and in developing new techniques to be used in the war on segregation.

VI

The most powerful direct force in the maintenance of the two worlds of race has been the state and its political subdivisions. In states and communities where racial separation and discrimination are basic to the way of life, the elected officials invariably pledge themselves to the perpetuation of the duality. Indeed, candidates frequently vie with one another in their effort to occupy the most

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extreme segregationist position possible on the race question. Appointed officials, including the constabulary and, not infrequently, the teachers and school administrators, become auxiliary guardians of the system of racial separation. In such communities Negroes occupy no policy-making positions, exercise no influence over the determination of policy, and are seldom even on the police force. State and local resources, including tax funds, are at the disposal of those who guard the system of segregation and discrimination; and such funds are used to enforce customs as well as laws and to disseminate information in support of the system.

The white community itself acts as a guardian of the segregated system. Schooled in the specious arguments that assert the supremacy of the white race and fearful that a destruction of the system would be harmful to their own position, they not only "go along" with it but, in many cases, enthusiastically support it. Community sanctions are so powerful, moreover, that the independent citizen who would defy the established order would find himself not only ostracized but, worse, the target of economic and political reprisals.

Within the community many self-appointed guardians of white supremacy have emerged at various times. After the Civil War and after World War I it was the Ku Klux Klan, which has shown surprising strength in recent years. After the desegregation decision of the Supreme Court in 1954 it was the White Citizens' Council, which one Southern editor has called the "uptown Ku Klux Klan." From time to time since 1865, it has been the political demagogue, who has not only made capital by urging his election as a sure way to maintain the system but has also encouraged the less responsible elements of the community to take the law into their own hands.

Violence, so much a part of American history and particularly of Southern history, has been an important factor in maintaining the two worlds of race. Intimidation, terror, lynchings, and riots have, in succession, been the handmaiden of political entities whose officials have been unwilling or unable to put an end to it. Violence drove Negroes from the polls in the 1870's and has kept them away in droves since that time. Lynchings, the spectacular rope and faggot kind or the quiet kind of merely "doing away" with some insubordinate Negro, have served their special purpose in terrorizing whole communities of Negroes. Riots, confined to no section of the country, have demonstrated how explosive the racial situation can be in urban communities burdened with the strain of racial strife.

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The heavy hand of history has been a powerful force in the maintenance of a segregated society and, conversely, in the resistance to change. Americans, especially Southerners whose devotion to the past is unmatched by that of any others, have summoned history to support their arguments that age-old practices and institutions cannot be changed overnight, that social practices cannot be changed by legislation. Southerners have argued that desegregation would break down long-established customs and bring instability to a social order that, if left alone, would have no serious racial or social disorders. After all, Southern whites "know" Negroes; and their knowledge has come from many generations of intimate association and observation, they insist.

White Southerners have also summoned history to support them in their resistance to federal legislation designed to secure the civil rights of Negroes. At every level—in local groups, state governments, and in Congress—white Southerners have asserted that federal civil rights legislation is an attempt to turn back the clock to the Reconstruction era, when federal intervention, they claim, imposed a harsh and unjust peace.[17] To make effective their argument, they use such emotion-laden phrases as "military occupation," "Negro rule," and "black-out of honest government." Americans other than Southerners have been frightened by the Southerners' claim that civil rights for Negroes would cause a return to the "evils" of Reconstruction. Insecure in their own knowledge of history, they have accepted the erroneous assertions about the "disaster" of radical rule after the Civil War and the vengeful punishment meted out to the South by the Negro and his white allies. Regardless of the merits of these arguments that seem specious on the face of them—to say nothing of their historical inaccuracy—they have served as effective brakes on the drive to destroy the two worlds of race.

One suspects, however, that racial bigotry has become more expensive in recent years. It is not so easy now as it once was to make political capital out of the race problem, even in the deep South. Local citizens—farmers, laborers, manufacturers—have become a bit weary of the promises of the demagogue that he will preserve the integrity of the races if he is, at the same time, unable to persuade investors to build factories and bring capital to their communities. Some Southerners, dependent on tourists, are not certain that their vaunted racial pride is so dear, if it keeps visitors away and brings depression to their economy. The cities that see themselves

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bypassed by a prospective manufacturer because of their reputation in the field of race relations might have some sober second thoughts about the importance of maintaining their two worlds. In a word, the economics of segregation and discrimination is forcing, in some quarters, a reconsideration of the problem.

It must be added that the existence of the two worlds of race has created forces that cause some Negroes to seek its perpetuation. Some Negro institutions, the product of a dual society, have vested interests in the perpetuation of that society. And Negroes who fear the destruction of their own institutions by desegregation are encouraged by white racists to fight for their maintenance. Even where Negroes have a desire to maintain their institutions because of their honest commitment to the merits of cultural pluralism, the desire becomes a strident struggle for survival in the context of racist forces that seek with a vengeance to destroy such institutions. The firing of a few hundred Negro school teachers by a zealous, racially-oriented school board forces some second thoughts on the part of the Negroes regarding the merits of desegregation.

VII

The drive to destroy the two worlds of race has reached a new, dramatic, and somewhat explosive stage in recent years. The forces arrayed in behalf of maintaining these two worlds have been subjected to ceaseless and powerful attacks by the increasing numbers committed to the elimination of racism in American life. Through techniques of demonstrating, picketing, sitting-in, and boycotting they have not only harrassed their foes but marshaled their forces. Realizing that another ingredient was needed, they have pressed for new and better laws and the active support of government. At the local and state levels they began to secure legislation in the 1940's to guarantee the civil rights of all, eliminate discrimination in employment, and achieve decent public and private housing for all.

While it is not possible to measure the influence of public opinion in the drive for equality, it can hardly be denied that over the past five or six years public opinion has shown a marked shift toward vigorous support of the civil rights movement. This can be seen in the manner in which the mass-circulation magazines as well as influential newspapers, even in the South, have stepped up their support of specific measures that have as their objective the elimination of at least the worst features of racism. The discussion of the

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problem of race over radio and television and the use of these media in reporting newsworthy and dramatic events in the world of race undoubtedly have had some impact. If such activities have not brought about the enactment of civil rights legislation, they have doubtless stimulated the public discussion that culminated in such legislation.

The models of city ordinances and state laws and the increased political influence of civil rights advocates stimulated new action on the federal level. Civil rights acts were passed in 1957, 1960, and 1964—after almost complete federal inactivity in this sphere for more than three quarters of a century. Strong leadership on the part of the executive and favorable judicial interpretations of old as well as new laws have made it clear that the war against the two worlds of race now enjoys the sanction of the law and its interpreters. In many respects this constitutes the most significant development in the struggle against racism in the present century.

The reading of American history over the past two centuries impresses one with the fact that ambivalence on the crucial question of equality has persisted almost from the beginning. If the term "equal rights for all" has not always meant what it appeared to mean, the inconsistencies and the paradoxes have become increasingly apparent. This is not to say that the view that "equal rights for some" has disappeared or has even ceased to be a threat to the concept of real equality. It is to say, however, that the voices supporting inequality, while no less strident, have been significantly weakened by the very force of the numbers and elements now seeking to eliminate the two worlds of race.

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HAROLD C. FLEMING

The Federal Executive and Civil Rights: 1961-1965

WHEN John F. Kennedy assumed the Presidency, the prospects for orderly progress in civil rights were far from bright. Years of inaction during the preceding administration were yielding a predictable harvest of discontent. The civil rights movement was both accelerating and assuming new and more demanding forms. The strategy of almost exclusive reliance on court action, brilliantly led by the legal staff of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, was giving way to techniques of mass protest and nonviolent direct action. Vying for preeminence in the increasingly militant struggle were such organizations as the Congress of Racial Equality, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. Crisis was no longer the occasional and accidental byproduct of court-directed change, but the continuing and conscious result of planned confrontation between opponents and defenders of the existing racial order.

Nevertheless, civil rights advocates generally viewed the prospects under the Kennedy administration with high expectation—excessively high, perhaps, under the circumstances. The explanation is two-fold. First, there was the mere fact that the White House was being occupied by a young President who promised a vigorous and innovative administration. The "moral leadership" of the White House, absence of which had been so long and bitterly decried by civil rights spokesmen, was seen as an imminent reality. A second factor was Kennedy's behavior in the campaign, which won him the acclaim of Negro citizens and their overwhelming support at the polls. His telephone call to Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., expressing concern for her jailed husband, and Robert Kennedy's intercession to effect King's release convinced the great majority of Negroes that Kennedy would be a bold and effective champion of their cause.

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The fact that Negro support was an indispensable factor in his election strengthened this conviction.

There were other, countervailing factors, however, in Kennedy's initial calculations of his administration's approach to civil rights. His victory had been an exceedingly narrow one, dependent on Southern electoral votes, among others. A loss of Democratic seats in Congress had left him with a perilously thin margin of potential support for his legislative program. An array of critical international problems laid immediate and heavy claim on him. Prudence dictated a course that would yield as much progress in civil rights as possible without alienating essential Congressional allies, thwarting his hopes for a broader national consensus and diverting an excessive amount of his time, attention, and prestige from foreign affairs and other pressing matters.

The broad outlines of Kennedy's strategy for achieving this balance soon became evident—at least by inference—and may be summed up as follows:

1. No new legislation would be sought; instead, expanded use of executive action would be emphasized. This was foreshadowed by Kennedy's statement during the campaign when asked about his plans for civil rights legislation. "First," he replied, "there is a good deal that can be done by the Executive branch without legislation. For example, the President could sign an executive order ending discrimination in housing tomorrow. Second, the President could compel all companies which do business with the Government, and after all that is nearly every American company, to practice open, fair hiring of personnel without regard to race, creed, or color. . . . In addition, the Department of Justice can pursue the right to vote with far more vigor. . . . So I would say that the greater opportunity is in the Executive branch without Congressional action."

2. Executive action would be taken mainly in those areas where federal authority is most complete and undisputed, as in federally connected employment, in contrast to areas of sensitive federal-state relationships, as in federal assistance programs. Sanctions would be imposed as a last resort after all efforts at persuasion and conciliation had failed.

3. The President's personal influence and prestige would be drawn upon sparingly. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy would be the acknowledged strategist and leader of the administration's civil rights activities. As the President's brother, he could speak and act with unusual authority, thus supplying by deputation some of

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the moral leadership that normally only the President could exert.

4. First priority would be assigned to securing the right to vote, through negotiation and litigation by an invigorated Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice.

The pressure of Negro militancy and a series of critical episodes in the South led to major alterations in this approach, beginning in the summer of 1961. Nevertheless, it was possible to speak meaningfully of a federal civil rights strategy, however rudimentary, for the first time in living memory. For when John F. Kennedy entered the White House in 1961, he inherited no comprehensive program in this field, only a legacy of piecemeal legislation and executive actions.

Franklin D. Roosevelt had instituted new social and economic programs unrelated to civil rights but beneficial to low-income groups, in which Negroes were conspicuous. While he avoided the confrontation with Southern Congressmen that would have resulted from advocacy of civil rights legislation, he was persuaded by the pressure of Negro leadership to issue an executive order creating a Fair Employment Practices Committee.

Harry S. Truman was unable to preserve the fledgling FEPC, which was killed by Congressional action in 1946. As a substitute, he established the more limited Committee on Government Contract Compliance charged with promoting equal employment opportunity among firms doing business with the federal government. He also put new emphasis on nondiscrimination in the government's own employment practices. More important, he signed an unprecedented executive order requiring integration and equality of treatment in the Armed Forces. He adopted as his own the bold recommendations of his Committee on Civil Rights for anti-lynching, anti-poll tax, and fair employment laws, waging an aggressive campaign for their enactment by Congress. His legislative efforts were foredoomed, but through them he demonstrated for the first time that a Democrat could be elected President without the support of the segregationist South, and he set a precedent for legislative proposals that were to be enacted some years later.

Throughout the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, the United States Supreme Court handed down a series of decisions validating the Negro's constitutional claims to equality under the law. In steady progression, it upheld the right of Negroes to travel unsegregated on interstate carriers, to register and vote in the Southern Democratic primaries, and to enroll in publicly supported insti-

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tutions of higher education. The culmination of this judicial revolution came in 1954, when the Supreme Court repudiated the long-standing "separate but equal" doctrine and held that racially segregated public schools were unconstitutional. Although much civil rights litigation was yet to come, the 1954 decision left no doubt that all forms of state-supported segregation and discrimination would ultimately be prohibited.

The urgency of the civil rights issue had been mounting steadily since the outset of World War II. The historic 1954 decision soon catapulted it to the top of the nation's domestic concerns. The demands and expectations of Negroes began to take on a new and increasing militancy, while the traditional South of the old Confederacy stiffened its defenses against racial change. An era of national crisis was at hand.

It is ironic that as the storm began to gather, the Presidency was assumed by a man whose personal and political philosophy was antipathetic to strong leadership, particularly on such an issue as civil rights. Throughout his eight years as chief executive, Dwight D. Eisenhower reiterated his essentially *laissez-faire* views on civil rights. He held that this was an issue to be resolved at the local level and at an evolutionary pace, that laws in this field were of dubious value, that alteration of "the hearts and minds of men" was a precondition of change, that local intervention by the federal government was to be assiduously avoided. He also declined to throw the moral weight of his office into the balance, repeatedly refusing to express his personal view of the Supreme Court's school decision on the ground that such an expression would be improper. More than once, in fact, his statements seemed to imply reservations about the wisdom of the decision and the pace of even such modest change as it had generated.

Despite the generally low priority accorded civil rights during the Eisenhower administration, some noteworthy executive actions were taken. The Contract Compliance Committee established by Truman was continued under the chairmanship of Vice President Nixon. It did little to improve the economic status of the Negro, however, since it relied mainly on broad programs of public relations rather than systematic review and enforcement of nondiscrimination requirements. A second committee, severely limited in staff and resources, was created to promote equal employment opportunity within the federal government. President Eisenhower also carried forward the integration of the Armed Forces begun by Tru-

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man. He gave effective leadership in the desegregation of public accommodations and schools in the District of Columbia. Although his own role in the matter was at best ambiguous, his administration at the initiative of Attorneys General Herbert Brownell and William Rogers proposed the first successful civil rights legislation since Reconstruction—the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and its sequel in 1960, both dealing primarily with voting rights.

Eisenhower's most important civil rights action—one in which he was pressed to a drastic reversal of his non-interventionist philosophy—was the dispatch of federal troops to Little Rock in September 1957. The hands-off posture of the administration, coupled with the President's public assurance that he could imagine no circumstance that would prompt him to send federal troops into the South, evidently encouraged Arkansas' Governor Orval Faubus to believe that he could successfully thwart a federal court order admitting nine Negro pupils to a Little Rock high school. In any case, Faubus's defiance and the rioting that followed posed a supreme test of the enforceability of federal court orders. If Eisenhower was indecisive until the eleventh hour of the Little Rock crisis, once the issue was inescapably drawn he acted with resolution. Order was restored and the court ruling enforced by one thousand men of the 101st Airborne Infantry Division. An irrevocable precedent was set for use of federal military power when necessary to quell active resistance to the orders of a federal court.

These, then, were the major precedents for federal action in the civil rights field as of January 1961: two statutes concerned primarily with voting discrimination, executive orders providing essentially educational programs for nondiscrimination in federally connected employment, a presidential ban on segregation and discrimination in the Armed Forces, and the use of U. S. troops to enforce federal court orders in the face of civil disturbances. Among these were some of the essential components of an effective federal effort, but many vital elements were lacking and most of the existing ones were too weak or too limited to achieve their purpose.

The evolution of federal executive action in civil rights during the succeeding four years is treated here in three broad categories—administrative action and executive orders, law enforcement, and presidential leadership and legislative proposals. Needless to say, the following treatment of each of these areas is necessarily both abbreviated and highly selective.

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Administrative Action and Executive Orders

Administrative machinery. If executive action on civil rights was to have high priority in the incoming administration, it was necessary to create new mechanisms for planning and direction of the augmented effort. The first step in this direction was the appointment of a special assistant for civil rights on the White House staff. This position was filled for only one year, by Harris Wofford, Jr., a lawyer with extensive knowledge of civil rights. When he resigned to take another post in the government, the position was discontinued. Subsequently, civil rights was one of a number of responsibilities handled by Lee White, Assistant Special Counsel (now Special Counsel) to the President. Civil rights groups periodically urged that one or more full-time specialists in this field be added to the White House staff, but this step was not taken. The White House did, however, draw on the staff services of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, and early in 1965 President Johnson created a new body to oversee civil rights activities.

During Wofford's tenure, two new groups were constituted to deal with racial problems. One was a small *ad hoc* committee that met frequently and informally to discuss ongoing programs and propose solutions for the emergencies of the moment. The second was a larger and more formal body, the Subcabinet Committee on Civil Rights, composed of senior departmental and agency staff members with assigned responsibility for equal employment opportunity and other civil rights functions. William L. Taylor, a staff member (now staff director) of the Civil Rights Commission, served as secretary of the Subcabinet Committee.

For a time, the initial arrangement proved serviceable; the *ad hoc* committee assisted Wofford in the many tactical and administrative problems on which he advised the President and his chief lieutenants and the Subcabinet Committee provided a forum for orderly discussion and communication of policy that affected all or a number of agencies. Later, however, the *ad hoc* group gradually fell into disuse, its role being assumed to some extent by staff members of the Civil Rights Commission. Major questions of policy and executive action to meet large-scale crises were dealt with, as they had been from the start, by the Attorney General and his assistants, especially Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall of the Civil Rights Division.

Although the Subcabinet Committee still exists today, its meet-

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ings have grown less frequent and its importance has declined. As more and more agencies developed civil rights concerns, it became too big for efficient discussion, and the issues became too varied to permit a common focus. By 1964 it existed more on paper than in fact.

From 1961 through 1964, the Civil Rights Commission operated on more than one level. In keeping with its statutory mandate of 1957, it studied and held hearings on "denial of equal protection of the laws" in general and federal laws and policies affecting equal protection in particular. Beginning in 1959, it issued a series of memorable reports and recommendations to the President and Congress. Many of the recommendations were ultimately implemented by legislative and executive action and others no doubt will be in the future.

As an independent, bipartisan agency, however, the Commission was not really considered an arm of the administration. In fact, there was a certain amount of periodic disagreement and tension between the Commission, on one hand, and the Justice Department and the White House, on the other. Two publicized examples were the frustration of the Commission's desire to hold public hearings in Mississippi, because of the Attorney General's objections, and the President's rebuff of a Commission recommendation in April 1963 that federal grants-in-aid to Mississippi be withheld. On an informal level, however, the Commission staff gave indispensable advice and assistance to overworked White House aides.

Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 created many new civil rights functions within the Executive Department. Title VI alone, which requires nondiscriminatory use of federal funds, affects the administrative operation of dozens of agencies and some 190 programs of federal assistance. With new agencies superimposed on old ones, new functions overlapping existing ones, and responsibilities widely diffused, the danger of confusion and duplication was obvious. Until consolidation of functions and agencies could be achieved, rigorous coordination was urgently required.

To meet this impelling need, President Johnson, early in 1965, appointed the Council on Equal Opportunity, composed of Cabinet officers and heads of agencies with major civil rights responsibilites. Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey was designated chairman and given authority to appoint staff, require reports from agencies and departments, and appoint working groups to fashion coordinated plans and procedures. Named as its executive secretary was Wiley

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A. Branton, the first Negro graduate of the University of Arkansas Law School, who represented the plaintiff school children of Little Rock and later headed the Voter Education Project. Neither the Council nor its chairman has operational responsibility—that remains with the agencies and the President. The effectiveness of this coordinating arrangement will depend on the skill of its staff, the extent to which the Vice President can make his influence felt throughout the sluggish bureaucracy, and above all the degree of support manifested by the President himself.

One thing seems clear: The times are no longer congenial to tentative and makeshift approaches to planning and coordination of administrative action on civil rights. The momentum of the civil rights movement is formidable. It is no longer enough for the national government to respond to pressure and crisis; it must initiate preventive and affirmative action. To redirect the vast administrative structure of the federal establishment toward this end—against the weight of inertia, a multitude of countervailing pressures, and residual prejudice among administrators themselves—will require a determined effort.

Administrative innovation. The sensitivity of the Kennedy-Johnson administration to questions of racial equity may be publicly dated from January 20, 1961, when John F. Kennedy noted the absence of Negroes among Coast Guard marchers in the inaugural parade. His subsequent inquiry launched the Coast Guard Academy on a large-scale talent search for Negro candidates. This same sensitivity led to the appointment of scores of Negroes to high-level federal posts. Among the most prominent were Thurgood Marshall as an appointee to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and later to be the Solicitor General of the United States, Robert C. Weaver as head of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, George L-P Weaver as Assistant Secretary of Labor, Carl T. Rowan as, successively, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Ambassador to Finland, and head of the U. S. Information Agency, Lisle Carter as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

There were other examples of affirmative use of executive powers. Normal administrative processes were by-passed to permit distribution of surplus food to Negro victims of economic reprisals in Fayette and Heywood Counties, Tennessee. Cabinet officers and other high-ranking federal officials were ordered to avoid segregated meetings and facilities. Federal financing of language insti-

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tutes at Southern colleges was conditioned on nondiscrimination. Later, an energetic and partly successful effort was made to end segregation of off-base schools serving children of military personnel. The existence of these and other problems of discrimination against servicemen caused the President to appoint a Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, a panel of outstanding citizens which delivered a series of wise and forceful recommendations. The President also issued several executive orders against discrimination, two of which are discussed later.

Yet these and other steps that might be cited did not constitute the comprehensive sort of executive action that President Kennedy had seemed to promise and that many Negroes had hoped for. With the notable exception of some areas for which the Justice Department had peculiar responsibility, the executive thrust in civil rights was blunted by political judgments, not the least of which concerned the reactions of powerful Southern Congressmen.

Harris Wofford, in a speech of impressive candor delivered in the spring of 1961, described the process to his fellow civil rights advocates in these terms:

> I do not mean that the new avenue of executive action will be easy. This course has plenty of contradictions and it will not . . . resolve the built-in political contradictions. The need for the enactment of vital measures for the general welfare . . . may still at any given moment have to be weighed against other actions to advance civil rights. Since these social measures have the most direct impact on our racial minorities, so many of whom are at the bottom of our economic ladder, the weighing process is sometimes painful. You may on occasion disagree with the result of the weighing of priorities. But for your disagreement to be effective you will need to look at the process through a political lens that takes into account the major contradictions shaping this problem.

The results of the weighing process were frequently disappointing to the organizations supporting civil rights. Several of them—the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the Southern Regional Council, the National Urban League, and the National Association of Intergroup Relations Officials—submitted to the President detailed recommendations for a campaign of executive action against discrimination. Many of their proposals, including the most important, were not adopted until the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave them statutory authority.

Chief among these were recommendations that the massive sums of federal aid dispensed to states and localities carry the obligation

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of equal treatment. With few exceptions, such as those mentioned above, the administration steadfastly rejected such a course. Even in programs supported almost entirely by federal funds, such as the existing federal public housing and the National Guard, segregation was not prohibited. The Justice Department did engage in court action challenging the constitutionality of segregation in federally aided hospitals and impacted school districts, but the slow processes of litigation were eventually overrun by Congressional action in 1964.

The "weighing of priorities" caused the executive hand to falter in other areas of civil rights. Perhaps the most serious examples occurred when the traditional influence of U. S. Senators on the selection of federal judges led President Kennedy to name several ardent segregationists to Southern district courts. As a consequence, not only civil rights workers but the Department of Justice as well have been seriously hampered in securing court orders that would protect and advance civil rights in the Deep South. The predicament in which President Kennedy found himself and the alternatives available to him have been well summed up by Professor Alexander Bickel of the Yale Law School:

> Justice Department officials say that, of course, the President would not appoint a man who, he had reason to believe, would fail to do his duty; which one may cheerfully grant, whatever it may mean. And they say further that Senators from the state concerned have a virtual veto over appointments to the district courts, and that the choice is therefore not among various possible appointments, but between a semi-permanent vacancy and the one man who can be confirmed. Vacancies are serious, no doubt. However, the Chief Justice of the United States has ample and frequently exercised power to assign judges from other districts, including retired judges, to districts where there is a vacancy. . . . This is a usable counter-pressure to the Senatorial veto. And the South is not devoid of men who will do their judicial duty in an ampler sense than merely by not committing impeachable acts or refusing to follow unavoidable precedents from higher courts. President Eisenhower found a goodly number of them, as did even President Truman, whose judicial appointments are not his greatest claim to enduring renown. And so, to be sure, has President Kennedy—with, however, what appear to be some rather glaring exceptions.

President Johnson has not entirely escaped the difficulties posed by this dilemma. In June 1965, his appointment of former Mississippi Governor James P. Coleman, a "moderate" segregationist, to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals drew the fire of some civil rights groups.

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The Executive Order on Housing. President Kennedy's campaign promise to ban discrimination in federally aided housing by "a stroke of the pen" was not acted on until almost two years after he took office. This delay is commonly said to have been the result of his apprehension that such an order would depress new construction and antagonize Southern congressmen whose support was desperately needed for the Foreign Trade Bill and other legislation. If so, these fears were exaggerated. Executive Order 11063, finally issued on November 20, 1962, was something of an anti-climax. Neither at that time nor since has it had any measurable adverse effect on the housing industry. And no revolt against the administration broke out in the halls of Congress.

Admittedly the order was narrow in coverage and, partly as a consequence, has been administered in gingerly fashion. It applied only to new housing (after November 20, 1962) owned or operated by the federal government, built on urban renewal land, or financed with loans made or guaranteed by the government. It did not apply to any existing housing, even federal public housing. Nor did it apply to conventionally financed housing. The order did contain a "good offices" provision, Section 102, under which the housing agencies were directed to take "appropriate action permitted by law, including the institution of appropriate litigation, if required, to promote the abandonment of discriminatory practices with respect to residential property and related facilities heretofore provided with Federal financial assistance . . ." With a few exceptions in the realm of persuasion, mostly ineffective, this approach to desegregation of existing housing has not been used. Not a single law suit has been filed to implement it. The net effect of the order was to bring under the nondiscrimination requirement less than 20 per cent of new housing starts annually. When the turnover of existing units is considered, this is only a small fraction of the housing market in a given year.

Legal doubts as well as political calculations figured in these limitations. Fair housing advocates had urged—as they still do—that the order cover housing financed by Savings and Loan Associations and commercial banks whose deposits are insured by the federal government. Some lawyers, inside and outside the government, maintained that such provisions would exceed presidential authority, or come imprudently close to doing so. Others argued to the contrary.

This disagreement is still unresolved. But it has become pain-

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fully clear that Executive Order 11063 in its present form is too limited in coverage to have any significant impact on the prevailing pattern of residential segregation. The very fact that the order affects only a portion of the market, putting it at a potential disadvantage with respect to the rest, militates against a vigorous enforcement program. It also places those leaders and developers who comply in danger of unfair competition. Analogous arguments were used effectively by the administration in advocating passage of the public accommodations title of the Civil Rights Act; they are no less applicable to the field of housing.

The President's Committee on Equal Opportunity in Housing, headed by former Governor David Lawrence of Pennsylvania, has repeatedly recommended that the President extend the coverage of the housing order, as have the Mortgage Bankers Association and various other spokesmen for lenders, builders, and realtors, as well as civil rights groups. If constitutional or other doubts restrain the President from doing so, it is likely that in time circumstances will force him to ask for Congressional enactment of a fair housing law, however inexpedient that might seem at the moment.

The Executive Order on Employment. Kennedy's earliest and most promising executive action was the issuance in April 1961 of Executive Order 10925 on equal opportunity in federal and federally connected employment. (It was supplemented in 1963 by Executive Order 11114 regulating employment in federally assisted construction.) The order greatly strengthened standards of compliance and methods of enforcement applying to contractors and federal agencies. It also established, under the chairmanship of then Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, a committee of public and private members with broad powers of regulation and review of the agencies' programs. Civil rights spokesmen greeted the order as impressive evidence that, in Mr. Johnson's words, "we mean business." Administrators of federal programs affected by the directive also saw the action as an indication of strong presidential concern, conferring high priority on the employment effort.

As a result, the objectives of the Order were pursued with far more energy than had ever before been manifested. The military departments, which administer the greatest dollar volume of federal contracts, employed a number of fair employment specialists to assist their contract management personnel in enforcing the nondiscrimination requirements. The federal agencies stepped up their efforts at recruiting and upgrading Negroes and other minorities. In

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each case, the stated goal was not merely passive nondiscrimination but "affirmative action"—generally construed to mean concern for the identification, training, and motivation of present and potential minority employees. The sharp rate of increase in the number of complaints filed after 1961 was no doubt indicative of the greater air of seriousness with which the equal employment program was carried on.

Despite this more energetic performance, the implementation of Executive Order 10925 has fallen below expectation. This is attributable in part to unavoidable problems. The government's contractual relationships—and hence the Order—afforded little jurisdiction over labor unions. Moreover, the employment effort coincided with the growth of automation and the resulting decline in the less skilled blue-collar jobs. Because of inadequate education and training, there was a limited supply of qualified Negro applicants for jobs requiring a substantial degree of technical skill. Not all of the shortcomings of the program could be explained by immutable economic and social forces, however; some resulted from the way in which the program was administered.

The great virtue of Executive Order 10925 was that it provided, for the first time, the basis for effective use of the federal government's formidable contractual power, systematically and across the board, to enforce standards of equal employment in thousands of American corporations. To achieve this result, two things were needed: steady insistence on the employers' obligation through the channels of contract management, including the use of sanctions when necessary, and strong and continuing backing for this approach from high officials in the administration. Voluntary action going beyond the requirements of the Order could be a desirable adjunct, as long as it was kept wholly distinct from, and secondary to, the contractual obligation.

Unfortunately, these administrative conditions were not fully maintained. The sense of high priority and presidential interest initially communicated to the contracting agencies soon diminished. From the beginning, the Committee was beset by internal dissension over the balance to be struck between persuasion, education, and promotion of voluntary action, on the one hand, and systematic compliance and enforcement efforts, on the other. Some Committee members and civil rights leaders were critical of the "Plans for Progress" program, under which many of the largest contractors signed agreements to advance equal employment opportunity by

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voluntary means; this emphasis on "voluntarism," it was argued, could only weaken the approach to firm and uniform application of compliance procedures to all contractors, large and small. Defenders of the program, whose views prevailed, maintained that the two approaches were not incompatible but supplementary.

This controversy later subsided, and today few of its former critics would deny the usefulness of the Plans for Progress program as it has developed. It is undeniable, however, that the enforcement provisions of the order have gone virtually unused. The ultimate sanction—contract termination—has never been applied, no hearings have been held, and only a few companies have been put on the list of ineligibles for future contracts pending improved performance. Statistics published by the Committee indicate some welcome, if relatively slight, gains by both federal agencies and contractors.* But the over-all figures tend to obscure the fact that gains have been quite uneven, the accomplishments of some of the larger and better performing employers compensating for little or no progress on the part of many others.

It should be added that the government employment effort has reflected less dilution of priority and aggressiveness, although gains in the Deep South have been slow and token at best. As recently as April 1965 LeRoy Collins, then director of the Community Relations Service, declared: "Equality of opportunity in employment is a hard-and-fast policy of the Federal Government—at the top, but it is not yet very visible out in the Selmas [Alabama]."

A new chapter in the equal employment effort was opened with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII of the Act, based on the federal power to regulate interstate commerce, will ultimately require non-discriminatory employment practices of most companies with twenty-five or more employees. It provided for an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to administer the program, with jurisdiction beginning in July 1965. At this writing the Commission, chaired by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., has only recently been appointed, and any estimate of its effectiveness would be premature. State fair-employment programs dependent on complaints —as is the new federal program—have not been notably successful. The federal Commission suffers the added handicap of having no

* By 1964 the Committee was able to report that since 1961 Negroes had increased from 12.9 to 13.2 per cent of all federal employees; and that in 103 Plans for Progress companies the comparable increase was from 5.1 to 5.7 per cent.

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enforcement powers of its own. Until such time as this legislative shortcoming is remedied, the hope for an effective program must rest on two existing bases. The first is the power of the Attorney General to bring suit when a "pattern or practice" of discrimination is discovered. The other is the prospect of a vigorous, affirmative approach through education, persuasion, and technical assistance.

Enforcing the Law

The Kennedy Administration was less than four months old when Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, in a notable speech at the University of Georgia, sounded the keynote of the Justice Department: "I say to you today that if the orders of the court are circumvented, the Department of Justice will act. We will not stand by or be aloof. We will move. . . . We will not make or interpret the laws. We shall enforce them—vigorously, without regional bias or political slant."

These were bold words. And they were put to the test almost immediately. The day before the Attorney General made his Georgia speech, an interracial team of CORE members boarded a south-bound bus in Washington, D. C., and began what was to become known as the "Freedom Ride." Their object was to test the integration of waiting-room facilities for interstate travelers, long required by court interpretations but ignored in many parts of the South. The trip was uneventful until one bus arrived in Anniston, Alabama, where it was set upon and burned by pro-segregation extremists. A second bus was mobbed in Birmingham and its passengers brutally beaten, while local policemen remained strangely absent until the damage was done.

From this point on, the Justice Department became a veritable command post. The Attorney General bombarded Alabama Governor John Patterson with persistent but unanswered telephone calls. He finally dispatched an emissary who extracted from the Governor an assurance that a new group of Freedom Riders headed for Montgomery would have state protection. More mob violence occurred in Montgomery, however, with only belated intervention by the police. The Attorney General promptly sent a force of 600 deputy marshals and other federal officers to the scene, narrowly averting further violence.

The recalcitrant South thus learned that the Kennedy administration would not shrink from the use of force if necessary to preserve

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explicit federal guarantees. But the most important result of the Freedom Rides was the Justice Department's skillful engineering of a long overdue administrative remedy. The Attorney General and his aides persuaded the independent Interstate Commerce Commission to issue in record time new regulations prohibiting segregation in interstate bus and rail terminals. They also moved through negotiation and litigation to effect the desegregation of air terminals, more difficult to reach through regulation.

By the end of 1961, the administration had weathered with credit its first major crisis in federal-state relations. But other challenges were soon to come.

In September 1962, state resistance and civil disorder greeted the court-ordered admission of the first Negro to the University of Mississippi. The episode began when the administration sought assurances from Governor Ross Barnett that he would protect the Negro student, James Meredith, and would maintain order. It ended with massive rioting, resulting in two deaths and many injuries, and with federal intervention in the form of deputy marshals and, later, federalized national guardsmen. It can be persuasively argued that much of the violence might have been prevented if the Governor's assurances (which were not fulfilled) had been given less credence, or if there had not been an unaccountable delay in the arrival of the troops. But these criticisms do not detract from the commitment and resourcefulness displayed by Robert Kennedy and then Deputy Attorney General Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, the determination of President Kennedy, and the courage of the federal officers who withstood the attacks of the mob without arms. The heroism of James Meredith was, of course, an indispensable factor.

The experience gained in Alabama in 1961 and Mississippi in 1962 was put to effective use in subsequent law enforcement crises —for example, in 1963 when Alabama Governor George Wallace threatened to bar admission of Negro students to the University of Alabama and, more recently, in the spring of 1965 when Wallace refused to provide protection for the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and his followers on their march from Selma to Montgomery.

Any dispassionate analysis must credit the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations with an impressive performance in the enforcement of federal court orders. But the civil rights movement of the 1960's is not inclined toward dispassionate analysis. Americans have been terrorized, beaten, gassed, unfairly arrested and prosecuted, bombed, and on occasion killed in attempts to exercise con-

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stitutionally protected rights. Sometimes state and local police have been the perpetrators of these brutalities, sometimes they have been acquiescent bystanders. Yet federal police actions have been confined to a few large-scale disturbances after federal court orders have been secured.

The Justice Department has with some success sought to enjoin economic reprisals against Negroes involved in the civil rights movement. It has turned to the overburdened and slow-moving federal courts to counter misuse of state criminal procedures. It has occasionally attempted prosecutions under Sections 241 and 242, Title 18, U. S. Code, a Reconstruction statute aimed at conspiracies and official acts intended to deprive individuals of their civil rights. But the old statute is a weak instrument, and Southern juries, albeit federally impaneled, are loath to hand down indictments and convictions in such cases. As a result, abuses of civil rights workers and those they seek to help have usually gone unpunished.

In the view of a growing number of Americans—particularly the younger and more militant civil rights workers—this is both intolerable and indefensible. They reject the Justice Department's contention that the federal government has no legitimate means of providing police protection or of taking preventive action against possible violence. Burke Marshall has written lucidly of these conflicting views. In the Spring of 1964, he summed up the federal dilemma as follows:

> Those who say that civil rights issues cut into the fabric of federalism are correct. They cut most deeply where police power is involved, for the police as well as for those in conflict with the police. There would be vast problems in any attempts at federal control of the administration of justice, even through the moderate method of federal court injunctions. Yet vast problems have been created already by police indifference to Negro rights in the South, and they will grow if the trend is not turned. The loss of faith in law—the usefulness of federal law and the unfairness of local law—is gaining very rapidly among Negro and white civil rights workers. The consequences in the future cannot be foreseen.

Within a year after that was written, a new crisis produced new consequences. Police brutality and Ku Klux Klan violence (including two murders) directed against demonstrators in Selma, Alabama, created a wave of national indignation and prompted President Johnson to ask for legislation to curb vigilante extremists. At this writing, the precise content of the prospective legislation has not been announced. But it is unlikely that it will go far enough to resolve the problem posed by Mr. Marshall. Only a dramatic change

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for the better in the hard-core South can silence the chorus of demands for a radical revision of federal-state relations in the administration of justice.

The right to vote. Both President Kennedy and his brother the Attorney General made it amply clear from the start that they regarded voting as the "master right" through which a basic settlement of the civil rights problem could be achieved. Although the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 had granted the Attorney General the authority to initiate voting suits, only six such cases had been filed under President Eisenhower, and those mainly in the waning months of his administration.

Beginning early in 1961, the invigorated Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department launched an unremitting campaign to enforce the neglected voting rights laws. First Assistant John Doar (who was later to succeed Marshall) and other lawyers of the Division took to the county seats and backroads of the South to compile the evidence of discrimination. There was a sharp upsurge in the number of voting suits initiated, from the original six to a total of fifty-eight through 1963, and scores of new investigations were undertaken.

But fear, ignorance, and apathy were also obstacles to Negro political participation. Robert Kennedy and Burke Marshall correctly perceived that Negro registration would not advance rapidly by federal action alone. Accordingly, they urged civil rights organizations to expend more effort in this direction. This advice was received coolly, even with suspicion and resentment. It was seen, along with the Attorney General's call for a "cooling-off" period during the inflamed summer of 1961, as an attempt to divert the Negro protest from direct action that was embarrassing to the administration. Yet only a few months later, the major civil rights groups did join in a cooperative Voter Education Project, sponsored by the Southern Regional Council with the aid of foundation funds. At the end of two and a half years of operation, VEP reported that Negro voters in the South had increased by an estimated 688,800.

Notwithstanding these accelerated governmental and private efforts, it soon became apparent that Negro registration was growing at a hopelessly slow pace. The Justice Department's suits had produced some impressive breakthroughs in such Black Belt counties as Macon, Bullock, Montgomery, and Jefferson counties in Alabama and Washington, Bienville, and Jackson parishes in Louisiana. But generally progress was frustrated by the repressive climate of

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the rural South and the interminable delays of litigation. As Marshall has written:

> The federal government has demonstrated a seeming inability to make significant advances, in seven years' time, since the 1957 law, in making the right to vote real for Negroes in Mississippi, large parts of Alabama and Louisiana, and in scattered counties in other states . . . Does this mean that this basic problem is beyond solution and the simple right beyond realization?
>
> The experience of the Justice Department to date would not justify this conclusion . . . The harder question is whether the tempo of the civil rights movement has not quickened to such a degree that there is not enough time left. . . . The only tangible result in the near future will be a mass of litigation in the federal courts which will take months or years to resolve. And that in itself will be divisive between Negroes and whites, between state and federal governments, with racial issues continuing to be a prime political factor in any election.

It was recognition of these problems that led President Kennedy to end his moratorium on requested civil rights legislation. In January 1962, he asked Congress for a supplementary voting rights law that would make six years of schooling *prima facie* evidence of literacy. His appeal went unheeded, as did the administration's 1963 proposal for federal voting referees in counties where fewer than 15 per cent of the eligible Negroes were registered. It remained for President Johnson in 1965 to ask a more receptive Congress for an even stronger voting rights measure.

The lawyers of the Civil Rights Division have worked untiringly since 1961 to overcome voting discrimination against Negroes. That so much time and effort went to waste because of inadequate legal tools is an incalculable loss to the nation.

School desegregation. Following the Supreme Court's 1954 decision, desegregation of Southern school systems proceeded at a glacial pace. As late as mid-1963, the Attorney General reported that some 2,000 school districts were still operating dual school systems. At the outset of the Kennedy administration, the Justice Department set out to try to hasten the process. The Attorney General and his staff sought to promote peaceful and voluntary compliance through quiet discussions with scores of state and local officials, politicians, educators, and civic leaders. They also stayed in close touch with communities where court-ordered desegregation might be met by official interference or mob violence.

The most conspicuous new approach, however, was in the area of litigation. In the spring of 1961, the Justice Department entered

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four Louisiana school cases as a friend of the court—the first such government initiative taken for the purpose of advancing desegregation. But not all federal judges were amenable to government participation. In heavily Negro Prince Edward County, Virginia, the public schools had been closed in 1959 to avoid compliance with a desegregation ruling. The seemingly endless battle of litigation was still dragging on in 1961, with no visible hope of resolution. Meanwhile, the county's Negro children went uneducated, while whites attended a private academy funded by state tuition grants. The Justice Department sought to enter the case as a friend of the court but was refused by the district judge. When 1963 brought the prospect of a fifth school-less year for the Negro children, Robert Kennedy acted. Quietly, he and his staff, working with the U. S. Office of Education, mustered private support for a full program of instruction to be carried out in public school buildings for all who wished to attend. With endorsement from prominent Virginians, including the Governor, free schooling again became available to more than 1500 Negro youngsters and the few whites who elected to join them. A year later, the tangle of litigation was at last unwound, and public schools were again operating in Prince Edward County.

Despite the Justice Department's best efforts, executive action clearly was not enough. Belatedly, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave the Attorney General authority to initiate school desegregation suits; even more important, perhaps, it supplemented the too-deliberate speed of the courts with the threat that the federal government would withhold funds from segregated school districts. These measures, at last, provided a realistic hope that the Supreme Court's 1954 decision would be translated into fact.

Presidential Leadership and Legislative Proposals

As we have seen, President Kennedy's original plan of approach to civil rights barely survived intact through the first year of his term. Reliance on executive action was producing only modest results; pressure for civil rights legislation was mounting; the administration had had to meet a major federal-state crisis in curbing disorder in Alabama; and despite strenuous efforts voting discrimination had yielded little ground. That matters were not worse was due in no small part to the able men on the administration's first civil rights team: Marshall, White, Wofford, Katzenbach, and John Siegenthaler of the Department of Justice, Berl Bernhard of the

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Civil Rights Commission, John Feild of the employment committee, Louis Martin of the Democratic National Committee, and others who worked with them. But it was Robert Kennedy who spared the President most. His forthright public role enabled the President to reserve his personal influence without creating doubt about his position.

At various times in the first eighteen months, the President referred to civil rights in messages and news conferences, making plain his concern for the racial problem and his conviction that it was first and foremost a moral issue. But it was not until September of 1962 that he made his first major statement to the nation on a civil rights emergency. Nationally telecast, it was essentially an appeal to the students of "Ole Miss" to accept the enrollment of James Meredith without disorder. Ironically, as it was being delivered, the rioting broke out on the Oxford, Mississippi, campus.

In February of 1963 the President again addressed himself exclusively to civil rights—this time in a message to Congress requesting a more far-reaching civil rights bill. On two previous occasions the administration had been identified with proposed legislation. The first identification, in 1961, was the result of an erroneous news report describing the Clark-Celler Bill as administration sponsored; a frigid White House denial administered the death sentence to this proposal. The second identification, bona fide but equally ill-fated, was the 1962 bill establishing a sixth-grade presumption of literacy. Not only did Congress refuse to pass the bill—partly, it seems, out of a belief that the President's advocacy was less than whole-hearted—but civil rights spokesmen were sharply critical of it as being unacceptably weak.

In his February 1963 message the President sought to overcome both liabilities—the first by unmistakably committing his personal prestige, the second by proposing a more comprehensive though still moderate "package." It included provisions intended to expedite voting litigation, establish a presumption of literacy, prohibit dual standards of voter qualification, provide for the appointment of temporary voting referees while a federal suit was in progress, afford technical and financial assistance to desegregating school districts, and extend the life and broaden the functions of the Civil Rights Commission.

Civil rights leaders were by no means satisfied that these proposals went far enough, but their objections shortly became moot. The crisis which erupted in Birmingham, Alabama, in April marked an

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historic turning point in the nation's perception of the civil rights issue and in the administration's approach to it. For weeks Negroes marched and demonstrated in the Alabama city, beset by savage police dogs, fire hoses, and massive arrests. An uneasy truce was finally achieved, mainly as a result of Burke Marshall's patient negotiations. But the Birmingham excesses and other atrocities, including the murder of the NAACP's Medgar Evers in Jackson, Mississippi, shocked the nation and triggered a chain reaction of angry protests in hundreds of cities, north and south. In the ten weeks following the Birmingham truce, the Justice Department counted a nationwide total of 758 racial demonstrations.

In response to the national upheaval, President Kennedy discarded the caution that had characterized his previous public statements and legislative approaches to civil rights. On June 11, he made an urgent address to the nation on television, and on June 19 he directed a second civil rights message to Congress.

"The events in Birmingham and elsewhere," he declared, "have so increased the cries for equality that no city or state or legislative body can prudently choose to ignore them. . . . [The] result of continued Federal legislative inaction will be continued, if not increased, racial strife—causing the leadership of both sides to pass from the hands of reasonable and responsible men to the purveyors of hate and violence."

He then proposed a number of legislative provisions to supplement those advocated in his February message. Among them were the prohibition of discrimination in a wide variety of public accommodations, authority for the Attorney General to initiate school desegregation suits, the creation of a Community Relations Service to conciliate racial disputes, and a requirement of nondiscrimination in programs financed or assisted by the federal government. This was an impressive set of proposals, stronger by far than could have been realistically expected only a few months earlier.

But the momentum of the civil rights movement was such that even the President's stepped-up proposals were not considered strong enough. The racial turmoil of the "long, hot summer," culminating in the massive though peaceful march on Washington in August, generated pressure inside and outside Congress for a strengthened civil rights bill. The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, which included representatives from the major organizations supporting the bill, carried on an energetic lobby in Congress. The constituent groups—labor, religion, and civil rights—activated their

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members across the country. The churches, in particular, became for the first time an effective pressure group, whose influence was powerfully felt in the Capitol.

By the time the bill had assumed substantially final form in October, it had in fact been strengthened in several respects. The principal addition, inclusion of which had initially been opposed by the administration, was a fair employment practices title. The President had endorsed the principle of an FEPC, but he had not submitted it among his specific proposals, prudently advocating instead certain measures to enlarge existing programs for full and fair employment. He and his advisers feared that inclusion of so controversial a provision would doom the bill to defeat at the hands of a conservative coalition. That it did not is hardly conclusive evidence of faulty administration judgment, although this was the view commonly held by civil rights advocates; for between June 1963 and July 1964, when the bill was finally passed, developments on the civil rights front and in the Presidency itself had significantly altered the bounds of possibility.

What is indisputably clear is that by the time of his assassination in November 1963 President Kennedy had moved from a position of cautious and sparing use of his personal influence for civil rights to a posture of leadership that was bold and unreserved. Undoubtedly his sense of history, no less than his personal values, convinced him that the issue was of such national gravity that it must transcend normal political considerations.

He recognized, too, that governmental action, though indispensable, was not sufficient in itself to procure a final solution of the civil rights problem. Accordingly, he threw his personal influence and the prestige of his office into a large-scale effort to enlist private leadership in the struggle. He convened a series of White House meetings, at which he urged action on governors, mayors, businessmen, lawyers, and leaders of labor, religion, education, and women's groups. Within a forty-day period, there were twenty-one such meetings, attended by some 1700 persons. Among the tangible results were the formation of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law, the Women's Committee for Civil Rights, and a community relations program of the United States Conference of Mayors. Moreover, much of the voluntary desegregation that occurred in the ensuing months, particularly in public accommodations, was unquestionably facilitated by the President's appeals for local action.

Those who feared that President Johnson would retreat from his

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predecessor's advanced position on civil rights were in for a gratifying surprise. In his first address to Congress after taking office, he put the drive for full civil rights first among the legacies of the slain President that he was determined to carry on. He pressed successfully for the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. And when the first racial crisis of his own administration erupted in Alabama in 1965, his utterances and actions were resolute—though barely swift enough for impatient civil rights leaders and outraged citizens generally. His statements on civil rights to Congress and the nation at that time were the strongest and most impassioned words on this subject yet heard from an American President. He all but demanded of a predominantly friendly Congress that it pass without delay a new voting rights act that would put registration machinery under federal control in the most recalcitrant Southern states.

In these actions, and in others yet to come, President Johnson has advantages that were denied his predecessor: He is President by virtue of a landslide vote; he is supported by a civil rights revolution that will not be ignored; he can point to his own Southern origins; and he can build on the precedents established by painful trial and error during the Kennedy years when public sentiment was less favorable. He is obviously determined not only to use but to improve on these advantages.

It is a fact of our time, however, that the specter of inequality, so long quiescent, now outruns all attempts to exorcise it. Lyndon Johnson will not have to struggle with the same aspects of the civil rights problem that vexed John Kennedy. There is an almost complete array of federal tools with which to root out the rank discriminations that still abound in the South. The challenge is to use them rapidly and efficiently enough to spare the nation more destructive racial turmoil and division. It will not be easy to translate federal law and policy into daily practice in the tradition-bound towns and hamlets where Southerners regard Washington with uncomprehending anger.

Nor is the struggle confined to the South; it has long since spread to the cities of the North and West, with their bitter, congested ghettos. The basic conditions affecting Negroes there—wretched housing, poor schools, unemployment, hopelessness, resentment, alienation—will not yield to simple fiats. Their solution will require an enormous mobilization of leadership, money, and national will. The federal remedies thus far provided or in sight—the anti-poverty program, aid to education, urban and housing reforms—are promis-

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ing but relatively trifling beginnings. Much larger public investments, acceptance of inconvenience and dislocations in political and economic power must precede any major victories over inequality in the big urban areas.

There is every prospect that the United States will never again want for presidential leadership and federal action on behalf of civil rights as traditionally defined. But in the next decade the federal executive, like the nation as a whole, will have to cope with human rights problems of a complexity not yet fully perceived.

Conclusion

What lessons can be drawn from the federal civil rights experience of the past four years? The major one, to which others are corollary, is as important as it is obvious: The federal executive tends to innovate forcefully and effectively only in response to an evident sense of national urgency. No administration, however wisely or humanely led, is likely to initiate far-reaching action in the face of public indifference, to say nothing of hostility. The quality of federal civil rights performance, then, depends directly on the ability of Negro Americans to dramatize their cause in such a way that it enlists the support of other influential segments of the society. Obvious though it may be, this conclusion has been explicitly rejected by some of the militant Negro leadership and it is often ignored in practice by others of both races.

The high hopes for executive action in civil rights that marked the beginning of the Kennedy administration were only spottily realized. They were vindicated most fully in the federal response to crisis—as at the University of Mississippi in 1962. They were fulfilled more prosaically and less completely in the internal management of the federal establishment itself, as in government appointments and employment. But, despite much committed effort, affirmative achievements in the areas of general employment, education, housing, and day-to-day administration of justice were few and far between. On the infrequent occasions when noteworthy gains were made in these areas it was usually because federal officials could point to widespread evidence of minority discontent. Not until this discontent and the brutal methods used to contain it won the sympathy of millions of Americans did Congress provide meaningful weapons with which to wage a large-scale attack on discrimination.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was more than a simple Congres-

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sional response to national emergency and moral crisis. It was also a recognition that the civil rights forces had assembled a coalition which any practical politician could respect. Not only the civil rights groups but organized labor and religion as well were at least momentarily united in a crusade that commanded the allegiance of a majority of Americans. The churches mobilized unprecedented support in localities where civil rights had not previously been of much concern to voters. A continuing coalition of this kind will be sorely needed in the days to come. It will be essential in insuring effective implementation of the laws and executive orders already on the books, and in strengthening and supplementing them as needed. Above all, it will be a prerequisite of an effective federal attack on the social disorders of the cities which so drastically penalize Negroes and other minorities.

Preoccupation with urban pathologies, acute as these are, should not obscure the fact that civil rights *per se* are still far from full achievement. New federal laws and the programs they have created are not self-executing. They rely for the most part on complaints to trigger the enforcement mechanism. Experience clearly indicates that it is difficult to bring to light a substantial number of valid complaints. The victims of discrimination are often persons of limited education and little confidence in their ability to win redress through appeals to a large and complicated bureaucracy. It will take all the resources the civil rights organizations and like-minded groups can muster to see that federal civil rights processes are activated as the law provides and then are truly responsive to need. Sympathetic government administrators could wish nothing more, for they are the first to recognize that without outside prodding their ability to move forcefully against discrimination is seriously weakened.

Housing discrimination is a case in point. In this field lack of vigorous pressure by the civil rights coalition, coupled with widespread public resistance to the prospect of housing integration, has resulted in a minimal federal effort, lower in priority than any other civil rights program. This, in an area of American life where federal influence and federal obligation, because of past delinquencies, are enormous. A broadening of the housing order or even passage of a fair housing act would not provide any wholesale remedy for the housing problems of Negroes. But they would permit a significant beginning in an area where segregation has its deepest roots and is least challenged.

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It is a commonplace to say that racial inequities are the nation's most pressing domestic problem and that nothing short of massive intervention by the national government can meet it adequately. But, this having been said, it remains to create the conditions of effective governmental action. The principle of federal responsibility in civil rights has been solidly established. Now, more systematic effort must be directed to producing the kind of interplay between public and private forces that will make this principle a working reality.

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JAMES Q. WILSON

The Negro in Politics

PERHAPS THE best way to understand the political position of the American Negro today is to compare what some Negroes are asking of politics with what politics seems capable of providing. I mean here politics in the narrower sense—the competitive struggle for elective office and deliberate attempts to influence the substance of government decisions—and not, in the broadest sense, as any activity by which conflict over goals is carried on. Although something is sacrificed by limiting the definition (rent strikes, boycotts, and sit-ins may have consequences for office-holders and legislation), the sacrifice is necessary if we are to understand what is meant by the statement that the civil rights movement, and Negro protest generally, ought to become a *political* movement. Bayard Rustin, in a recent issue of *Commentary*, has put the argument in its most succinct and lucid form in an article significantly entitled, "From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement."[1] Briefly, Rustin argues that the problems of the Negro cannot be solved by granting him even the fullest civil rights, for it is his fundamental social and economic conditions, more than his legal privileges, which must be changed. Such changes, in the magnitudes necessary, require radical—indeed, revolutionary—programs in education, housing, and income redistribution; these programs, in turn, will be attained only by an organized radical political coalition of Negroes, trade unions, church groups, and white liberals.

Those who remember the political currents of the 1930's may smile wanly at the call today for a Negro-labor alliance. When the call was issued thirty years ago, few responded. In the South, the Negro was almost entirely disfranchised; in the North, he was po-

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litically unorganized except by a few (largely Republican) big-city machines. Everywhere, Negroes—including the miniscule leadership class—were effectively excluded from almost all the institutions of American life. Negroes had nothing and attempted little. It was probably fortunate for A. Phillip Randolph that he was not required to deliver on his threat of a massive march on Washington in 1941. In their most charitable mood, even the more radical trade union leaders saw Negroes as a group which could produce (perhaps worthy) demands but not votes or money or influence; less generously, they viewed Negroes as scabs and strike-breakers.

Apparently, enough has changed since to suggest that a reappraisal may be in order. The Negro electorate has grown greatly in both North and South. It is estimated (no one knows) that as many as six million Negroes were registered in 1964, about a third of whom were in the South. In most of the large cities where these voters are to be found, there is no political machine; in the typical case, leadership is competitive, uncontrolled, sometimes demagogic but just as often responsible, and to an increasing extent aggressive. A massive and impressive march on Washington has occurred. The proliferation and vigor of civil rights organizations suggest that expectations are rising more rapidly than achievements; the national leaders of these groups have become *the* spokesmen of the American Negro, virtually eclipsing elective officials. Among these men, all shades of radical (as well as moderate) opinion can be found, accompanied, as one might expect, by a passionate concern for distinguishing subtle (and sometimes vague) sectarian differences. And in 1964, the Negroes gave President Johnson an unprecedented 94 per cent of their vote (according to an estimate by the Gallup Poll). Perhaps these changes are sufficient to make the Negroes ready for an effective and liberal coalition.

While there is little doubt that Negro voters will continue to exert a liberalizing influence on American politics, the possibility of a stable, organized liberal—to say nothing of radical—coalition is, I believe, slight. Furthermore, attempts to fashion one may be dangerous unless it is a very loose and *ad hoc* arrangement. The Negro is already a partner in a set of tacit, though unorganized, coalitions; they are probably the only viable ones but they are certainly not radical ones. To break existing alliances, tenuous though they are, in favor of a new alliance which may be impossible of realization may be a costly experiment. This is particularly true in the South; it is to a lesser extent true in the North.

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I. *The Negro Voter in the South*

A useful oversimplification is that, in the South, the enemy of the Negro is the lower- and lower-middle-class, particularly rural, white, and the ally of the Negro is the upper-middle-class, particularly urban, white. Since Reconstruction, the Bourbons and the Populists have engaged in intermittent political warfare; occasionally the Negro has been used—particularly in the last two decades of the nineteenth century—as an ally of one white class against the other, while at other times—particularly in the first half of the twentieth century—he has been disfranchised in order to prevent him from being allied with either class. The political suppression of the Negro did not, as C. Vann Woodward makes clear, occur immediately after the withdrawal of Union troops but only after the white community, divided along class lines, discovered that the competitive wooing of Negro votes created a politically unstable situation best resolved by eliminating the Negro vote—and thus the Republican party—and bringing the white majority into the dominant Democratic party.[2]

But the Negro is no longer disfranchised, except in Black Belt counties; probably one-third of the potential Negro vote has been registered, and more gains can be anticipated. Negroes of voting age constitute one-fifth of the adult population of the eleven Southern states but less than one-twelfth of the registered Southern voters. If another 570,000 Negroes can be added to registration rolls now estimated to contain nearly two million Negroes, half the potential Negro voters will be eligible. In those areas where the Negro vote is already significant, the politics of a "Second Reconstruction" seem to be emerging—with the important difference that the Negro may no longer be disfranchised if competition for his vote proves unsettling.

Negroes, when they vote, can cause a startling change in the style, if not the substance, of Southern politics. Segregationists will have to choose between abandoning race-baiting as a political tactic or getting out of politics. (The prospect of large numbers of politicians quitting politics—especially in the South, where politicians are shrewd and politics is a way of life—seems, to say the least, remote.) And politicians who are by nature inclined to entertain sympathetically legitimate Negro demands will be encouraged to entertain them publicly. For example, Rep. Charles L. Weltner, Democrat of Georgia, voted against the 1964 Civil Rights Act when it

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first came before the House in February, 1964. By July, however, when the bill came back from the conference committee for final passage, he had changed his mind and voted in favor of it. It does not detract from the moral quality of Weltner's bold action to note that between the two crucial votes the governor of Georgia signed into law a bill to redistrict the state's congressional seats in a manner that substantially increased the proportion of enfranchised Negroes and decreased the proportion of lower-middle-class whites in Weltner's district.[3]

In the past, at least, neither political party could take the Southern Negro vote for granted. A majority of their votes twice went to Dwight Eisenhower and frequently were cast for Republican candidates in such cities as Atlanta and Louisville. In 1960, many—though not all—Southern Negro precincts voted for President Kennedy; in 1964, almost all of them supported President Johnson.

The independence—which, to the politician, can mean only uncertainty—of the Southern Negro vote has various causes. One, of course, is that the Southern Democratic party has so conspicuously been the enemy, its candidates in all but a few cases outbidding each other in defending segregation. Another is that the issue confronting the Southern Negro in many elections is clear and dramatic: which white candidate scores lowest on the segregation scale, this being, for the Negro, the only important scale. Unstable politics is here the result of single-issue politics. A third reason is that potential Negro political leaders, being largely excluded from an active role in both the majority party and the increasingly "lily-white" Republican minority party, have not been co-opted by the system. Negro politicians, without permanent organizational commitments to white leaders, have been free to deliver Negro votes to whichever candidate or party seemed most attractive in each election. Where the Negro leader was corrupt, he delivered the vote in exchange for tangible considerations;[4] where honest, in exchange for intangible concessions.[5] Negro politics in the South has yet to be professionalized, and thus the distinction—commonplace in the North—between the (usually moderate) party hierarchy and the (often militant) civic and "race" leadership has not become widespread.

To say that the Southern Negro political leadership is unprofessional does not mean that it is either unskillful or unsuccessful. In those cities or counties where the Negro voter is neither terrorized nor apathetic, he is capable of voting with almost incredible unanimity and precision, at least for the most visible offices. When

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Ivan Allen, Jr., ran against Lester Maddox in 1961 for mayor of Atlanta, Negro precinct 7-D gave Allen 2,003 votes, or 99.9 per cent of the total, and Maddox 4 votes. Since there were five white voters living in the precinct, it is quite likely that Allen got *all* of the Negro votes—an almost unbelievable feat of organization and communication, especially when one recalls that Allen was a wealthy white businessman who was scarcely an all-out integrationist.[6] The single-issue politics of the South has produced a form of political behavior among Negroes and whites which is highly rationalistic and extraordinarily sophisticated.[7] Voters become exceptionally sensitive to almost imperceptible differences in the positions candidates take, publicly or privately, on "The Issue" and go to considerable lengths to conceal group preferences lest premature revelation prove counterproductive.

In the South, more than anywhere else, a deliberate balance of power politics may be practiced in which viable coalitions may be formed. The most important and most successful example of this is what might be called the Atlanta Coalition. Formed in the 1950's by Mayor (now "Mayor Emeritus") William B. Hartsfield and continued by Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr., it is, stripped to its essentials, a tacit alliance between upper-middle-class whites and Negroes against lower-middle-class whites. In even blunter terms, the Bourbons and the Negroes have voted together to exclude the rednecks from power in the city. There are, of course, strains in the alliance. The more militant Negroes are restless with the leadership of the Atlanta Negro Voters' League and with what they regard as the insufficient progress in race relations under Hartsfield and Allen. White businessmen, in turn, often feel the mayor has gone too far, as when Allen testified before Congress in favor of the elimination of segregation in public accommodations. Furthermore, it is not clear that every Southern city could put together such a coalition even if it wanted to do so. Some cities have lost their Bourbons to the suburbs (Atlanta carefully annexes all upper-income suburbs and avoids annexing any working-class suburbs) while others have a business leadership that is composed of small shopkeepers rather than a commercial and industrial élite concerned with establishing the city as a great regional center.[8] And in some cities, such as New Orleans, the Negroes themselves have been unable to create a stable and effective political organization representative of all elements of the community.[9]

Whatever the limitations or difficulties, however, there can be

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little doubt that the natural ally of the Southern Negro, for the foreseeable future, is the cosmopolitan white bourgeoisie.[10] In part, this reflects self-interest: race conflict is bad for business, destructive of property, and productive of unfavorable national publicity. In part, it reflects an enlarged conception of the common interest: Negroes have a moral right to vote, to be free from arbitrary arrest, and to be protected from official abuse, even if century-old prejudices require that the Negro not live next door to whites. The issues now being pressed by the Negro in the South make the most fundamental claims of elementary justice; when the claims of simple justice are reinforced by self-interest, the potential for effective action is great. But this white ally has little interest in a massive redistribution of income, the nationalization of political authority, or the reordering of society.

In the Black Belt, where Negroes outnumber whites, such alliances are hard to create. In Mississippi, there seem to be no allies whatsoever. It is precisely in such areas that a more radical Negro politics is emerging, though it is still so apocalyptic in its vision and unrealistic in its methods that it can point to little progress. The Freedom Democratic party won a great victory at the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, but the radical leadership which now appears to influence it not only rejected that convention's seating compromise but seems intent on rejecting all compromises with what, to it, is an essentially corrupt and hypocritical society. Given the massive, unyielding, and violent nature of white resistance to Negro demands in many Black Belt counties, it is not hard to understand some of the attitudes of the increasingly radical Negro political leadership. Early and measured accommodation to Negro political demands has, in many Southern cities, led to the emergence of relatively moderate Negro leaders and of a Negro strategy emphasizing limited objectives. But the Black Belt has not, except in a few cases, made concessions—in part because Negroes there are in the majority and in part because such largely rural or small-town areas lack a white upper class of sufficient size and strength to challenge white extremists.

There are some Black Belt counties where Negroes can and do vote, but ironically the gains that have accrued to them from politics in these areas are less than the gains from politics in areas where Negroes are a minority but where social and economic conditions are more favorable to political organization, articulation of demands, and bargaining over changes in the wel-

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fare or status of Negroes. Where Negro voting has occurred in the Black Belt, it has meant (in general) the cessation of police abuse and administrative discrimination, the appointment of Negroes to certain government positions, and higher expenditures on public facilities in Negro neighborhoods.[11] It has rarely meant general integration of schools or public accommodations or new public works programs to improve Negro living conditions. The financial resources and community tolerance for such efforts simply do not exist. White voters do not even approve such projects for themselves. By contrast, in some of the highly urbanized areas where Negroes vote but are in a distinct minority, a combination of factors—the availability of tax resources, a well-organized white political structure with which bargains can be struck, and a large and self-sufficient Negro leadership class—makes it easier to translate votes into substantive gains.

All this suggests that the substantive, rather than psychological, consequences of Negro voting in Black Belt counties are not likely to be so great as the diehard white resistance might imply. The resistance itself, however, should it continue for long, may change this significantly. When the social, economic, and political demands of a group are linked with a protracted and bitter struggle for the franchise, the members of that group are more likely to acquire a permanent sense of political identity and a more intense commitment to the goals of the group than would be the case if substantive goals were asserted long after the franchise had been won. (One of the reasons—there are many—that no socialist or labor party developed among American workers may be that their major economic demands were made long after the franchise had been acquired without a struggle.)[12] The campaign for the vote now developing among Southern Negroes is likely to have profound effects on subsequent Negro political organization and tactics, for the campaign can generate morale, a sense of unity (the vote is a wholly instrumental objective that permits otherwise competing leaders to submerge their differences), and an independence from traditional party loyalties.

Discussion, in such states as Mississippi, of the possibility of a Negro political party suggests one alternative—in my judgment, a disastrous one—to the pattern of coalition politics now being practiced outside the Black Belt. For the Negro vote to be (potentially) the marginal vote, it is not enough that it be an uncommitted vote. Since Negroes in every Southern state are a minority (although in

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some states a very large one), it is also necessary that the white vote be divided. In such states as Georgia and North Carolina, the Negro vote can be the marginal vote—both because white votes are divided along party or factional lines and because the Negro vote is not an automatic expression of traditional party loyalties. Within the Black Belt, not only must the franchise be won for the Negro, but some way must be found of dividing the white vote. This is not the case in Mississippi, where in a clear choice Barry Goldwater defeated Lyndon Johnson by winning an incredible 87 per cent of the vote. In the table below, the present and potential Negro vote is shown for each Southern state. In the first column is the percentage of registered voters who, in 1964, were estimated (by the Voter Education Project) to be Negro; in the second column is the percentage of all voting-age persons who in 1960 were Negro. If *all* adults, Negro and white, voted, this last figure would be the "Negro vote." If every Negro in Mississippi had voted in 1964, Goldwater would still have won; in other states, the Negro's need for allies is even greater.

The Southern Negro Vote, Present and Potential

State	Percentage of all registered voters who are Negro (April, 1964)	Percentage of all voting-age persons who are Negro (1960)
Alabama	5.7%	26.2%
Arkansas	7.7	18.5
Florida	7.8	15.2
Georgia	9.9	25.4
Louisiana	9.0	28.5
Mississippi	2.4	36.0
North Carolina	9.7	21.5
South Carolina	10.5	30.6
Tennessee	10.1	15.0
Texas	6.8	11.7
Virginia	5.2	18.9
THE SOUTH	7.7	20.0

Dividing the white vote will not be easy under the best of circumstances, but it is not likely to be easier if Negro political strategists either elect to form a separate party or emphasize objectives which draw closer the white cosmopolitan élite and white lower-middle-class extremists. Continued Negro pressure, with federal assistance, for the franchise and for the observance of constitutional and legislative guarantees will ultimately divide the opposition;

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broadening Negro demands at this time to include more radical objectives may unite it. This may be an expression of the willingness on the part of the bourgeoisie to support demands for *liberty* (the franchise, legal justice, and equal access to public facilities) but to oppose demands for *equality* (the elimination of intergroup differences in income, occupation, and place of residence). Negro-white coalitions in the South, where they exist at all, are by and large libertarian rather than egalitarian in purpose.

The history of one such coalition—or rather sequence of coalitions—is illuminating. Described by Donald Matthews and James Prothro in their forthcoming book on Southern Negro politics, the events took place in a city which the authors call "Urbania."[13] A thriving commercial center in the Piedmont region, the city has a cosmopolitan white business élite as well as a strong Negro middle-class and a unionized industrial labor force. As early as 1935, a Negro political organization was formed (at a meeting held at the Negro Tennis Club!); by the 1940's, a coalition of Negroes with white liberals and union leaders had been formed that was strong enough to capture the county Democratic organization. The alliance, never a firm one, was successful as long as it had limited political objectives. After the 1954 Supreme Court school desegregation decision, however, strains developed. Because of the defection of white workers, the coalition lost control of the party by 1958; nonetheless —and this may be suggestive of the emerging pattern of Southern politics—the mayor remained sympathetic to the Negro demands and he and other city officials worked openly, before and after the tense months of the 1963-1964 protest demonstrations, to integrate public facilities and private businesses. This policy of accommodation apparently was in part the result of the attitude of the white business élite, part (but not all) of which was sufficiently cosmopolitan to favor whatever degree of integration was necessary to avoid a "bad business climate" or unfavorable national repercussions. It was not, on the other hand, in favor of the liberal economic policies of the early labor-Negro coalition. In Urbania, the Negroes found unionized white workers the appropriate allies when political power was the object; when progress on certain libertarian issues (here, school desegregation) was at stake, the labor alliance collapsed and the support of white businessmen became important.

Coalition politics is important not only because of the need for allies, but also because of the problem of motivating Negro voters. As a result of their low socio-economic position, getting Negroes to

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register and vote even after all administrative barriers have collapsed can be very difficult. (In 1959, Southern urban Negroes had a median income less than *half* that of Southern urban whites.) Surprisingly high voter participation can be obtained, however, when the contest is important *and the Negro vote may decide the outcome*. In the Allen-Maddox election in Atlanta, for example, 80 per cent of the registered voters in nine predominantly Negro precincts turned out to vote; by comparison, only 69 per cent of the registered voters in ten predominantly lower-income white precincts voted.[14] (Negroes participate less than whites in elections for offices less visible than mayor; they also register in slightly smaller proportions.) Although there is no direct evidence on this, it seems likely that the remarkably high Negro voter turnout in cities like Atlanta might be much lower if the candidate supported by Negroes had no chance of winning—as would be the case if he did not have the backing of a substantial block of white voters.

II. *The Negro Voter in the North*

It is in the North that politics as conventionally practiced seems less relevant to the needs of the Negro. This may appear paradoxical, given the great importance attached to the Northern urban Negro vote in influencing contests for President, governor, and senator. It is of course true that the Negro is concentrated in areas of high strategic significance for state-wide or national political candidates. The Negro vote for President Kennedy was, in several Northern industrial states, greater than the margin by which Kennedy carried those states. The same, however, can be said for the Jewish vote, the Catholic vote, and the labor vote. With so many apparently marginal votes cast, a President might be forgiven if he allowed himself to be paralyzed by the competing demands of their spokesmen. (For some time it appeared that President Kennedy was in exactly this position, but he responded to Negro protests which began in the spring of 1963 with a vigorous affirmation of the moral rights of Negroes—becoming not only the first President to have said this, but perhaps the first to have believed it.) In Congress, the Negro vote is likely to have a much greater long-run effect in the South than in the North. Over *half* of all Southern congressional districts in 1963 had a population that was one-fifth or more Negro. In the North and West, by contrast, fewer than one-twelfth of the districts had so high a proportion of Negroes.

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Furthermore, the civil rights legislation so far enacted has been directed primarily at remedying discrimination against the Negro in the South—in voting, public accommodations, and the like. To the extent that Negro political influence in the North contributed to the passage of these bills, it was influence wielded on behalf of Southern Negroes and as part of a much larger liberal coalition in which religious organizations played an exceptionally important role.[15] Further legislative progress on behalf of Southern Negroes is still possible; the question, however, is what progress can be made on behalf of Northern Negroes and what political tactics should be used.

The utility of politics to the Northern Negro is limited for a variety of reasons. First, his traditional party loyalties are strong and thus his vote, particularly in general elections, is less likely to be uncertain. There are some obvious exceptions to this pattern, of course. In cities such as Boston, where party organization is almost nonexistent and where an attractive Negro candidate can be found in the Republican party, Negroes will cross party lines in very large numbers. (Edward Brooke, the Negro Republican Attorney General of Massachusetts, carried Negro precincts by margins of ten to one at the same time that Democrat Lyndon Johnson was carrying these precincts by margins of fifty to one.) In most of the largest Northern cities, however, the only question surrounding the Negro vote in partisan elections is its size rather than its direction.

Second, the major issues confronting the mass of Northern Negroes are economic and cultural rather than political or legal. Rustin is entirely correct in saying that "at issue, after all, is not *civil rights*, strictly speaking, but social and economic conditions."[16] The paradox is two-fold. On the one hand, American political institutions provide no way for the organized political pressure of a particular disadvantaged group to reshape in any fundamental sense social and economic conditions. Whereas the identity and political obligations of a sheriff or a governor can profoundly affect the lives of Negroes in the South by determining whether or how they will be intimidated or harassed, the election of a public official in the North rarely has any direct or obvious consequences for the average Negro voter. (It is *because* it makes so little difference, of course, that Northern party leaders have found it relatively easy to instill traditional party commitments in Negroes. A simple decision rule—such as "vote Democratic"—is more economical, for both the party and the voter, than the kind of elaborate and subtle

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group interest calculations that occur where, as in the South, the outcome *is* important.)

That is not to say that it makes no difference which party or faction controls the White House or Congress. The probability of there being certain kinds of redistributionist and welfare programs enacted does depend on election outcomes, but not in a way that makes it possible for any particular voting bloc to hold any particular public official responsible for such programs. Such considerations ought to be borne in mind when one evaluates assertions about the "alienation" of the urban voter, particularly the low-income Negro. That politics seems irrelevant to their daily preoccupations is not necessarily an expression of neurotic withdrawal or separateness but may well be the rational conclusion of a reasonably well-informed citizen.

The other paradoxical element is that, when major programs *are* launched to deal with basic social and economic conditions, they are likely to be the product of a political coalition in which the persons whose lives are to be changed play a relatively small role. The recent federal programs to deal with delinquency, poverty, and housing were assembled by bureaucrats, professors, and White House politicians. The most dramatic of these—the "war on poverty"—did not come about, as Daniel Patrick Moynihan makes clear, as the result of any great upsurge of popular demand.[17] Nor were these programs aimed explicitly at the "Negro problem." Indeed, it might have been much harder to get them adopted if they had been defined as "Negro programs." (In fact, some of these programs—particularly the antipoverty program—were in part intended by many of their supporters, probably including the President, to dampen the civil rights "revolution" by improving the material condition of Negroes.) At the local level, public expenditures for the benefit of the poor are often authorized in local referenda elections in which the civic leadership as well as a substantial portion of the votes comes from upper-class whites who join with lower-class Negroes to secure the adoption of measures which, if they were national rather than local matters, these whites would oppose.[18] Rich suburbanites will favor free medical care for the indigent if the issue is stated in terms of building a new county hospital and is voted on locally but not if the issue is called "socialized medicine" and is voted on in Washington.

All this suggests that the Negro is in need not of a single grand alliance, but of many different and often conflicting alliances which

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take into account the different bases of support available for different kinds of issues. Nationally, organized labor may support civil rights and income-transfer measures but locally it is often likely to support (at least tacitly) segregated housing and economy in government. Religious groups are very effective when the issue is voting rights; they are much less effective in dealing with economic questions where simple morality is not at issue. Upper-class businessmen may support Negro voting claims in Southern cities and Negro oriented public works programs in Northern cities, but nationally they will oppose large-scale income redistribution. A grand Negro-liberal coalition, if achieved, may so rationalize these inconsistent positions as to deliver the leadership of would-be allies into the hands of those elements who are least in favor of (or least effective on behalf of) Negro causes. Nowhere are these problems better seen than in the relationship between Negro and white workers in our major industrial cities.

While it may be true that Negroes and whites have a common interest in ending unemployment, improving housing and education, and resisting technological displacement, a stable and enduring alliance to attain these objectives will not be easily achieved. The only major political mechanism by which poor whites and Negroes have in the past been brought into alliance—the big-city machine—is collapsing; except for a few large industrial unions, no substitute has yet appeared.

Only Philadelphia and Chicago, of the larger Northern cities, have strong city-wide machines (that is, political parties based on the distribution of material rewards). In these areas, Negro and white political leaders are paid to work together, albeit for very limited objectives; Negro and white voters, in turn, are induced by door-to-door persuasion to vote together, particularly in primaries.[19] Such organizations cannot endure much longer, for the resources at their command are diminishing. When they collapse, Negro political leadership will fall into the hands of men who can find effective substitutes for organization: personal charisma and bellicose militancy (such as that of Adam Clayton Powell in New York or Cecil Moore in Philadelphia), expertise in factional manipulation and strategic alliances (such as that of J. Raymond Jones in New York), or successful appeals to middle-class white voters and white political leaders (such as that of Edward Brooke in Massachusetts or Augustus Hawkins in Los Angeles).[20] Yet to emerge, but certain to come, are Negro political leaders who will obtain their major sup-

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port from the more militant civil rights organizations. In only a very few cases does there seem to be much likelihood of organized political coalition between white and Negro workers similar to that found from time to time in Detroit. The United Auto Workers, and to a lesser extent the United Steel Workers, have, through the political action of integrated locals, elected carefully balanced tickets of Negro and white politicians.

Even under UAW leadership, the Negro-white workers' coalition has been subject to tensions. The most important of these has been the necessity of emphasizing economic objectives that do not require social reorganization (such as integrated housing) close to home. The UAW cannot deliver votes of white workers for liberal mayors or those of Negro workers for conservative mayors without great difficulty. Furthermore, the coalition was created in a period of rising demand for workers; how it will function when Negroes and whites are competing for a decreasing number of jobs remains to be seen. (The fact that the locals are integrated and that an elaborate code of seniority rules has been devised may help reduce what might otherwise be a starkly racial conflict over jobs.) Finally, no one should allow himself the comfort of believing that President Johnson's massive victory over Barry Goldwater disproves the existence of strong anti-Negro sentiments among many white Northern Democratic voters. At most it suggests that, faced with a complex political decision involving issues of foreign relations, economic policy, and welfare programs as well as civil rights, the white worker decided that peace and security were, under the circumstances, more important than registering a protest against Negro claims.

The area in which this latent conflict between Negro claims and white resistance is most likely to erupt is that of public safety and administration of criminal justice. It is one of the few issues (schools are another) in the North over which a clear political contest can be waged. The police are highly sensitive to the explicit and implicit directives of local elective officials; unlike economic issues, a political victory here can have direct and immediate—although perhaps not drastic—consequences for Negroes. The white concern over "violence in the streets" and unchecked criminality is not (as critics of Goldwater charged) simply a rhetorical mask for opposition to civil rights demonstrations or even for anti-Negro sentiment (though it involves a significant element of this). Polls taken by both parties during the campaign suggest that Johnson was never able to meet this issue effectively; perhaps a majority of voters thought Gold-

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water was best able to handle this problem.[21] For the Negroes, the issue of "police brutality" and police corruption is probably the single most effective appeal for the mobilization of mass Negro protest activity, particularly among rank-and-file lower-income Negroes. Many middle-class Negroes will, of course, admit privately that they, too, would like to see the police check criminal behavior among lower-class Negroes, but it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to say this publicly.

What is remarkable is that so few candidates for mayor or governor are openly exploiting white fears of crime, particularly Negro crime. In part this is because too many of them must face Negro voters who would immediately interpret such views as anti-Negro prejudice even if, in fact, prejudice had nothing to do with it. And in part this is because there is a deep and general distrust of the police among upper-middle-class whites, particularly white liberals, such that it is often better politics to be "anti-cop" than "anti-Negro." On this issue, even more than on the issue of income redistribution, the natural Northern ally of the Negro is the white liberal.

It is, of course, fashionable today to attack the "white liberal" as hypocritical on civil rights issues. After all, he is likely to live in a "lily-white" suburb, attend a "lily-white" church, and perhaps teach in a university with no Negroes on its faculty. And the white liberal, in the eyes of Negro radicals, makes the fatal error of believing that meaningful change can be accomplished within the present political, social, and economic system. By accepting the system, he accepts the necessity of compromise, and compromise is seen as both morally wrong and practically unworkable.

All this misses the point, which is that the white liberal is, in the North, one of the Negro's *only* significant allies in a situation in which allies are essential. He is not and cannot be an all-purpose ally, however. The upper-class business or professional man is a more useful ally in the South where, by halting and nervous steps, his support is being mobilized to achieve voting rights and end police abuse; he is also a more useful ally in the North when the issue is legitimating a local public welfare program. The principal value of the white liberal, on the other hand, is to supply the votes and the political pressures (increasingly mobilized through religious organizations) that make it almost suicidal for an important Northern politician openly to court anti-Negro sentiment.

The alliance, however, is as much tacit as explicit. If Negroes increasingly distrust liberals (because they are both ideologically sus-

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pect and rivals for power), liberals have had difficulty finding Negroes who have both a genuine mass following and a commitment to what the liberals regard as appropriate means and ends. The hoped-for alliance in Manhattan between liberal Democratic reform clubs and Harlem political leaders has not materialized to any degree.[22] The most popular Negro leader in Philadelphia, Cecil Moore, is regarded with incredulous disdain by white liberals. Negro machine politicians, such as William Dawson of Chicago, are rejected by both those middle-class Negroes and those middle-class whites whose commitment to social change exceeds their faith in the Democratic party leadership.[23] Negroes, such as Edward Brooke, whom white liberals find attractive are usually prevented by their position (that is, being responsive to a largely white constituency) from being in the visible forefront of civil rights campaigns. The cause of most of this unrequited love is that the Negro has come of age politically at a time when not only machines are collapsing, but the whole lower-class style of politics—the politics of friendships, trades, patronage, and neighborhood localism—is falling into disrepute. Negroes are expected to climb a political ladder which, as a result of several decades of successful reform efforts, is now missing most of its rungs. For whites, vaulting to the top is easy—television is one way; converting an established business or civic reputation into appointive and elective office is another. But the Negro community lacks the business and civic infrastructure which is necessary to convert private success into public office. Enough money has yet to be earned by enough Negroes to produce a significant precipitate of Negro civic statesmen.

Negroes know this and therefore are demanding that economic differences between Negroes and whites be eliminated. If the white liberal reformer is to be allowed to abolish the system by which political and economic progress was once made, then he must (many Negroes argue) replace it with something better. The Negro demand for economic equality is no longer, as Nathan Glazer points out, simply a demand for equal opportunity; it is a demand for equality of economic *results*.[24] American politics has for long been accustomed to dealing with ethnic demands for recognition, power, and opportunity; it has never had to face a serious demand for equal economic shares. Thus, in the North as well as the South the principal race issue may become a conflict between liberty and equality. This may be the issue which will distinguish the white liberal from the white radical: the former will work for liberty and

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equal opportunity, the latter for equal shares. This distinction adds yet another complication to the uneasy liberal-Negro alliance.

If the alliance is hard to sustain today, it will be subject to even greater strains in the future. The Northern Negro community, lacking a single clear objective and a well-organized and unified leadership, will continue to be volatile. Protest demonstrations will reveal less discipline than those in the South, and the likelihood of violence will be greater. The church simply does not have the importance to the Northern Negro that it does to the Southern, nor are the targets in the North so visible as those in the South. The Negro riots of the summers of 1964 and 1965 in Harlem, Rochester, Chicago, Brooklyn, Los Angeles, and elsewhere were not in any obvious sense "race" riots (that is, riots of Negroes against whites in protest against claimed injustices) or the outgrowth of civil rights demonstrations. But whatever their cause (simple hooliganism was an important element), their lesson for genuine civil rights demonstrations is clear: there is always a potential for violence, particularly when the demonstration is as much against indifference as against injustice.

That the movement is badly organized, understaffed, and threatened by violence does not mean it is ineffective. As other sources of power decline in strength, the power of the civil rights organizations increases. It is not yet possible for them to *elect* candidates, even in all-Negro districts, to many significant offices, but it is entirely possible for them to *prevent* someone else from being elected, even in heavily white districts. In most Northern cities, there are now a small number of Negro civil rights leaders whose reputation is such that their concerted opposition to a Negro candidate would prevent his election. They are often strong enough to hurt the chances of white candidates by casting on them (rightly or wrongly) an "anti-civil-rights" label which will be the kiss of death for white liberal (and even not-so-liberal) voters. As one Negro leader in Boston, a hopelessly unorganized city, told me recently, "We are entering a new political era of guerrilla warfare in which the lack of organization and discipline will not be nearly so important as the possibility of well-placed sniping at the enemy."

Competition to get the pro-civil-rights label (or, more accurately, to avoid getting the anti-civil-rights label) will become more intense. The 1964 presidential campaign may well have facilitated this process by involving Negroes in unprecedented numbers both as voters and as campaigners. The intense opposition to Goldwater resulted in Negroes registering as Democrats in overwhelm-

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ing proportions in both North and South. The Democratic National Committee mobilized ministers, barbers, beauticians, and other strategically placed Negroes as volunteer campaigners. Nationally known civil rights leaders, particularly Martin Luther King, toured the country giving ostensibly "nonpartisan" speeches, urging Negroes to vote but not telling them whom to vote for (that was hardly necessary). Only time will tell what effect Goldwater will have on Negro political loyalties (particularly in the South, where they have been in doubt) and on the number and style of Negro political activists. It is possible, though far from certain, that 1964 will have fixed Negro political loyalties in the same way that Al Smith in 1928 and Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936 fixed white loyalties and will bring into politics a new cadre of Negro leaders just as 1952 and 1956 brought in new white cadres. Regardless of whom the Republicans nominate, the Democrats will be running against Goldwater for the next twenty years.

Apart from building fires under politicians, there remains the question of what Negro (or Negro-white liberal) politics can accomplish. Simply electing more Negroes to public office will make some difference, for politics depends as much as anything on communication. Groups not in a position to know in time cannot act in time; protest as a strategy is better suited to *blocking* change than to initiating it, and this requires a good intelligence network. There are already an estimated 280 Negroes holding elective office, including 6 congressmen and 90 state legislators.[19] And as Negroes rise in seniority in various legislative systems, they will acquire power with which to bargain. (For better or worse, Representative Adam Clayton Powell, as chairman of the House Committee on Education and Labor, is an astute bargainer perfectly prepared to trade a concession on a bill favoring organized labor for a consession by labor on a matter of interest to Negroes.) Furthermore, the greater and more direct involvement of the federal government in the affairs of cities and metropolitan areas under circumstances which require that federal authorities not visibly deny the precept of equal justice for all means that Negroes, through injunctive procedures as well as political pressure, will be able to compel changes in the administration of local programs in schools, housing, and the like as a precondition to receiving the growing volume of federal aid.[20]

In those areas where elective officials administer and are directly responsible for programs affecting the lives of Negroes, Negro

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voting strength will, of course, be important. One such area is the administration of justice. In the South, the impact of Negro enfranchisement on these practices could be revolutionary; even in the North, Negro political power can significantly constrain mayors and police chiefs. (The mayor of Detroit, Jerome Cavanaugh, attracted widespread—and possibly decisive—Negro electoral support because of Negro discontent with Detroit police practices under the previous administration; immediately upon assuming office, Cavanaugh replaced the police commissioner and supported efforts to alter police behavior in Negro neighborhoods.) Education is another area where elected officials can sometimes be held accountable to the voters. But here the Negro voter faces a paradox: in cities (such as New York) where Negroes are sufficiently numerous to be taken seriously by politicians, they are also so numerous as to make a solution to the problems of racial imbalance or low standards in the public schools very hard to find. Where (as in Boston) Negroes are sufficiently few in number to make solutions possible (at least in principle), they are also so few as to be a relatively inconsequential political force.

Negroes, in short, will increasingly be able to play marginalist politics. But this approach rarely produces wholesale or fundamental changes in the life chances of large numbers of people. Some Negro (and white) leaders, recognizing the limitations of conventional politics, are suggesting new forms of organization. One of these is the power-oriented neighborhood association, exemplified by The Woodlawn Organization (TWO) in Chicago.[21] Such groups mobilize Negroes (or lower-income voters generally) by defining and dramatizing adverse local conditions which are the result of the indifference or hostility of outside forces, such as the city administration or nonresident white businessmen. Relying on indigenous leadership, the organization mounts a neighborhood protest against the outside "enemies"; by blocking proposed changes or by effectively challenging current programs, the group acquires the power to bargain with outsiders, especially city politicians and administrators. Demands are made and enforced concerning the appropriate kinds and levels of city services to be provided in the area.

The key to this strategy is the effort to build an indigenous political organization which is not part of the city-wide political apparatus and thus is not subject to its constraints. The plan is to fill the vacuum created by the decay of the ward organization of city-wide machines by substituting a nonpartisan but power-oriented civic as-

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sociation which seeks to provide collective rather than divisible benefits (such as patronage) for its members and followers. Since it trades in general rather than individual benefits, the civic association must find new ways to motivate its members; it does so by relying on a combative ideology. There are at least two major problems with this strategy, however. First, the resources with which to sustain such an organization are very scarce. It obviously cannot rely on government or business support (although the recent history of New York's Mobilization for Youth, patterned in many ways on the TWO model, suggests that at least in the immediate future it may be possible to use government funds—such as federal antipoverty or antidelinquency money—to launch organizations aimed at challenging government policies). Foundation and philanthropic support is available (TWO was begun in this way), but such support depends on the programs of the action groups being consistent with what middle-class white liberals who operate foundations will tolerate. In short, it depends on a Negro-liberal white alliance.

The second problem is that it may prove difficult to generalize such a strategy. Building a coalition of several neighborhood combat organizations necessitates finding the terms on which groups with essentially local interests can work together. This is difficult even for a traditional political party which can control patronage and nominations for office. A nonpartisan neighborhood association, on the other hand, which attempts to maximize benefits for its area often must do so at the expense of other areas; this potentially competitive situation may make collaboration difficult. A coalition might, of course, be formed out of a common allegiance to a candidate for major political office, but this means accepting the constraints (principally, moderation) that inevitably accompany electoral contest.

III. *The Negro Voter in the Future*

In short, the possibility for an effective radical Negro political strategy seems remote and the effort to achieve it costly. In the South, the potential supporters of at least current Negro objectives are the members of the commercial and industrial élite. Although they are everywhere slow to emerge and in some places wholly absent, there is at present no reasonable alternative. Atlanta is an example of both the strengths and weaknesses of such an alliance; even there, of course, it rests on a delicate population equilibrium

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which could be upset should either the Negroes become too numerous or the upper-class whites too few. What will happen after federal intervention has opened the ballot box to Negroes in the Black Belt counties remains to be seen. There are very few precedents from which one might infer predictions about political behavior when Negroes are in the majority in a city or county and vote. (In Washington, D. C., Negroes are the voting majority, but there are few issues of substance to decide.) There are some Southern communities which are over 50 per cent Negro and in which many (though not all) Negroes vote. Little is known about them except that, while the franchise has ended harassment by public officials and law enforcement officers, it has not revolutionized the living conditions of the Negroes. Perhaps the safest prediction is that the vote will have very different effects in different places. In some communities, patronage-based Negro political machines will emerge; in others, non-ideological Negro-white alliances will develop; in still others, militant and even radical Negro movements will appear (particularly, perhaps, in parts of Mississippi where the young cadres of SNCC and the Freedom Democratic party have begun to instill a radical ideology, though not yet to build a serious organization). In general, the type of Negro political organization which emerges will depend crucially on the type of white political organization already in existence.

In the North, the Negro, facing goals more complex and less clearly moral than those faced in the South, will continue to require white liberal, business, and union support for slow progress toward programs productive of income, education, and wider opportunities. The urban vote already greatly influences the presidential election; how much more it will influence state and congressional elections now that reapportionment is upon us is uncertain. It will clearly be on state legislatures that the Supreme Court's edict will fall most heavily. Congress is not likely to be revolutionized; indeed, there is some evidence that an absolutely equal apportionment system might *strengthen* the "conservative" vote.[28] In any case, the role of Congress is more the product of our localistic political structure than of the apportionment system, and this is not likely to change significantly for a very long time.

Negro-labor alliances will still be possible, but like all such alliances in American politics they will be *ad hoc*, imperfectly organized, and difficult to sustain. From the point of view of the Negro,

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one of the chief advantages of the American political system is surely that the "undemocratic" convention and caucus system by which political parties are governed makes possible *leadership* coalitions that, while not based on a perfect fusion of interests and aims, are not without influence in the choice of candidates and even the outcome of elections. Indeed, to the extent political parties are made internally more "democratic"—by abolishing conventions in favor of primaries, by reforming the governance of local political organizations, and by flooding the deliberations of party leaders with the merciless light of publicity—these coalitions may become more difficult to assemble and sustain, for an informed rank and file requires leaders who emphasize rather than compromise the very great differences which now separate, for example, white and Negro working-class voters.

The fact that many different alliances must be maintained will not only call for a high degree of tactical flexibility; it will probably also mean that the civil rights movement will remain divided and even at war with itself. The divisions among Negro leaders are the result not simply of personal rivalry or organized ideology, but of the effort to adapt a movement to the necessity of simultaneously occupying incompatible positions in order to draw strength from others.

The various white partners in these alliances will themselves be changed by civil rights activity. The nonpolitical strategies developed by the Negro for gaining bargaining power—the sit-in, the protest march, and passive resistance—have already been adopted by whites concerned with everything from American foreign policy to university administration.[29] Physically obstructing the operation of an organization—often illegally—has, in the 1960's, become a commonplace method for attempting to change the behavior of that organization. This "spill-over" of civil rights tactics into other areas of social conflict has probably been one of the most important consequences of increased Negro militancy.

Because of the structure of American politics as well as the nature of the Negro community, Negro politics will accomplish only limited objectives. This does not mean that Negroes will be content with those accomplishments or resigned to that political style. If Negroes do not make radical gains, radical sentiments may grow. How these sentiments will find expression is perhaps the most perplexing and troubling question of all.

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2. C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (New York, 1957), pp. 38–47, 60–68.
3. Rep. Weltner voted against final passage of HR 7152 on February 10, 1964. On February 17, the United States Supreme Court ordered redistricting in Georgia (Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 [1964]). The Georgia Senate, anticipating the ruling, had already passed a redistricting bill on February 12; the House followed suit on February 21. The governor signed the bill into law on March 10; it divided Weltner's old district into two new districts—Weltner's (the Fifth), consisting of Fulton County (Atlanta); the other (the Fourth) consisting of suburban DeKalb County. As a result of this change, the percentage of Weltner's district which was Negro rose from 26.5 to 33.3. Weltner voted for House acceptance of the Senate-amended Civil Rights Act in July. An interesting analysis of Weltner's relationship to the Negro vote is M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler, "A Moderate's Victory in a Southern Congressional District," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Vol. 28 (Winter 1964), pp. 595–603.
4. Alfred B. Clubok, John M. Degrove, and Charles D. Farris, "The Manipulated Negro Vote; Some Pre-Conditions and Consequences," *Journal of Politics,* Vol. 26 (February 1964), pp. 112–129. This is not confined to the South. In 1964, certain Negro precincts in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, voted for Senator Goldwater while Northern Negroes elsewhere were voting ten-to-one for President Johnson. One can only speculate on the ways by which that extraordinary result was achieved.
5. Cf. H. Douglas Price, *The Negro and Southern Politics: A Chapter of Florida History* (New York, 1957); Bradbury Seasholes and Frederic N. Cleaveland, "Negro Political Participation in Two Piedmont Crescent Cities," in F. Stuart Chapin and Shirley F. Weiss (eds.), *Urban Growth Dynamics* (New York, 1962), pp. 265–270; Henry Holloway, "The Negro and the Vote: The Case of Texas," *Journal of Politics,* Vol. 23 (August 1961), pp. 526–556. These Negro voters' leagues are effective only if they operate within the consensual framework of the Negro community. Price (on page 72) notes that a "league endorsement of a wrong candidate in a contest where a clear difference in attitude toward the Negro exists does not swing many Negro votes; rather it raises the question, 'who sold out?'" Holloway (on pages 539–540) observes that "Negro leaders don't have the power to deliver a bloc vote at will. . . . The Negro voter has his own fairly constant voting propensities which leaders disregard at risk to themselves."
6. Jack Walker, "Negro Voting in Atlanta: 1953–1961," *Phylon,* Vol. 24 (Winter 1963), pp. 379–387.
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11. United States Commission on Civil Rights, *1961 Report* (Book 1, Part 3).

12. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N. Y., 1960), pp. 84–85.

13. Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, *Negro Political Participation in the South* (New York, forthcoming).

14. Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 384.

15. The importance of political factors other than the Negro vote in obtaining civil rights legislation is illustrated by the state adoption of "open occupancy" laws barring discrimination in the private housing market. The first states to pass such laws were typically states with a very small Negro population. See James Q. Wilson, "The Negro in American Politics" in John P. Davis (ed.), *American Negro Reference Book* (New York, forthcoming).

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17. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "Three Problems," an address given before the Conference on Poverty in America at the University of California at Berkeley, February 26–28, 1965 (mimeo).

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20. Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), chap. xx, discusses alternative Negro political styles.

21. See *Election '64*, a report of the Ripon Society (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), p. 29.

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22. James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago, 1962), Ch. ix, discusses reform-Negro relations.

23. In Chicago, certain white and Negro civil rights groups ran a Negro candidate (A. A. Rayner, Jr.) against Rep. William L. Dawson in the 1962 Democratic primary. Dawson won, easily carrying the lower-income Negro precincts but losing (by as much as two-to-one) many middle-class Negro precincts. The Dawson organization is very strong among lower-income Negroes, particularly those in public housing projects.

24. Nathan Glazer, "Negroes and Jews: The New Challenge to Pluralism," *Commentary* (December 1964), p. 34.

25. *The New York Times,* December 23, 1964, quoting the Democratic National Committee.

26. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 will facilitate challenges.

27. Charles Silberman, *The Crisis in Black and White* (New York, 1964), Ch. x, describes TWO.

28. Andrew Hacker, *Congressional Districting* (Washington, D. C., 1963), pp. 87–91.

29. Recently, internes protesting the pay policies of a California county hospital practiced a "heal-in." They flooded the hospital with patients, many not in need of hospitalization, in order to overload the organization and thus acquire bargaining power vis-à-vis the administration.

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THOMAS F. PETTIGREW

Complexity and Change in American Racial Patterns: A Social Psychological View

Mr. Fawks is a white American who feels he "knows" Negroes. He works in a desegregated aircraft plant in Marietta, Georgia, lives a few hundred yards from "the colored part of town," and sends his children to a school that recently received its first Negro pupil. Yet Mr. Fawks knows only three of his Negro co-workers and none of his Negro neighbors by name, and he dares not socialize with them. His professed knowledge comes, then, almost entirely from racist folklore, from which he exempts his Negro co-workers on the grounds they are "different."

Mr. Seemes is another white American who feels he understands the racial scene. Although he knew no Negroes as a boy and none lives within miles of his suburban Connecticut town today, he has made friends with two Negroes in his New York office. They were hired a few years ago when the company became "an equal opportunity employer" because of its many federal contracts. Mr. Seemes genuinely likes his co-workers, though he seldom has social contacts with them after office hours. Consequently, he has decided that "the whole problem is really a matter of social class."

Likewise, Mr. Brown is a Negro American who has great hopes for the future of American race relations. He recently graduated from an all-Negro high school in Durham, North Carolina, and now finds himself one of the first Negroes hired in a previously all-white Southern-based insurance company. His pastor recommended him to the firm, and he started only a few months ago in an entirely Negro section of the city. But his employers urge him to develop new white business, and he has selected as likely prospects faculty liberals of nearby Duke University.

By contrast, Mr. Davis is a Negro American who has given up

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hope that any racial change will ever improve his personal lot. Born on a Southern farm, he moved with his mother to Harlem while still young. And there he has remained—deep within the ghetto. Mr. Davis has repeated contact with whites in only three roles—as employers, landlords, and merchants. These formal and invariably financial relations with whites combine with ghetto folklore to convince him that "the man" is never going to allow significant racial alterations.

The American racial scene has always been highly complex, defying facile generalizations by its variety and inconsistency. And, as these four cases and millions like them reveal, the current period of rapid change acts to heighten this complexity. It is appropriate, then, to explore this complexity and its implications for the nation's future racial patterns.

I. *The Complexity of American Racial Patterns*

Racial roles. One useful way to conceptualize American racial patterns is to describe them in role-theory terms.[1] Discriminatory encounters between whites and Negroes require that both parties "play the game." The white must act out the role of the "superior"; by direct action or subtle cue, he must convey the expectation that he will be treated with deference. For his part, the Negro must, if traditional norms are to be obeyed, act out the role of the "inferior"; he must play the social role of "Negro." And should he refuse to play the game, he would be judged by many whites as "not knowing his place," and harsh sanctions could follow.[2]

The socially stigmatized role of "Negro" is the critical feature of having dark skin in the United States. At the personality level, such enforced role adoption divides each individual Negro both from other human beings and from himself. Of course, all social roles, necessary as they are, hinder to some extent forthright, uninhibited social interaction. An employer and employee, for example, may never begin to understand each other as complete human beings unless they break through the formality and constraints of their role relationships. Likewise, whites and Negroes can never communicate as equals unless they break through the role barriers. As long as racial roles are maintained, both parties find it difficult to perceive the humanity behind the facade. Many whites who are by no means racists confuse the role of "Negro" with the people who must play this role. "That's just the way Negroes are," goes the

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phrase. Conversely, many Negroes confuse the role of "white man" with whites. "Whites are just like that, they are born thinking they should be boss."

Intimately associated with this impairment of human relatedness is an impairment of the individual's acceptance and understanding of himself. Both whites and Negroes can confuse their own roles as being an essential part of themselves. Whites can easily flatter themselves into believing that they are in fact "superior"; after all, does not the deferent behavior of the role-playing Negro confirm this "superiority"? And Negroes in turn often accept much of the mythology; for does not the imperious behavior of the role-playing white confirm this "inferiority"?

These ideas are supported by a large body of social psychological research. This research convincingly demonstrates the power of role playing to change deeply-held attitudes, values, and even self-conceptions.[3] Moreover, these remarkable changes have been rendered experimentally by temporary role adoptions of an exceedingly trivial nature when compared to the life-long role of "Negro." Imagine, then, the depth of the effects of having to play a role which has such vast personal and social significance that it affects virtually all realms of daily living. In short, racial roles have profound and direct psychological as well as behavioral effects upon their adopters.

In broadest outline, this role relationship of "superior" white and "inferior" Negro has, historically, structured racial interaction in America. But it is a basic theme around which there is a great range of variations, for racial patterns systematically vary according to specific situation, institution, socio-economic class, and region.

Variation by situation. Mr. Fawks, the white aircraft worker in Georgia, has never thought his interracial neighborhood was strange and accepts the desegregation of the plant in which he works, yet he objects strenuously to public school desegregation. "I never went to no school with colored people," he grumbles, "and I never thought I'd see my kids doing it." There is nothing uniquely Southern about Mr. Fawks' selective reaction to racial patterns. Mr. Seemes approves of the interracial character of his work situation, but he entertains serious doubts about interracial neighborhoods. "I've heard Negroes' moving into an area lowers property values," he explains, "and most of my Connecticut neighbors are dead against it—so I don't think it's a good idea."

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These inconsistencies by situation and institution are commonplace. For example, in Panama there is a divided street, one side of which is in the United States Canal Zone and the other side in Panama. For many years, the facilities on the Canal Zone side were tightly segregated by race, while no segregation was practiced on the Panamanian side.[4] Yet customers conducting their business managed to adjust their behavior easily as they crossed first to one side of the street and then to the other. Similarly, in the coal mining county of McDowell, West Virginia, Negro and white miners at one time followed a traditional pattern of desegregation below the ground and almost complete segregation above the ground.[5] Obviously, the Canal Zone residents did not shift their racial views each time they crossed and recrossed the business street. Nor did the West Virginian miners change their racial attitudes each time they went below the ground and came above it. Attitudes and behavior need not always be congruent; particular situations can structure how most people behave in spite of the attitudes they may harbor.

Social scientists were first alerted to this by a 1934 study of verbal versus actual discrimination.[6] A Chinese couple traveled widely over the United States, stopping at 250 sleeping and eating establishments. They were refused service only once. Later, the same places received inquiries by mail as to whether or not they served "members of the Chinese race." About half did not reply; of those which did, over 90 per cent announced they did not accommodate Chinese guests. A control sample of comparable, unvisited establishments yielded similar results.

This phenomenon was repeated in eleven restaurants in a northeastern suburban community.[7] Three women, two white and one Negro, went to the establishments, encountered no difficulty, and in each received exemplary service. Two weeks later, requests were sent to the restaurants for reservations for a similar group. Ten of the letters went unanswered, and follow-up phone calls met great resistance. Control calls for all-white parties led to ten reservations. It is more difficult to reject another human being face to face than through impersonal letters and phone calls.

The power of specific situational norms to shape racial patterns of behavior is dramatized by the difficulties which arise when there are no such norms. One ingenious project studied New York State facilities unaccustomed to Negro patronage.[8] Negro researchers would enter a tavern, seek service, and later record their experi-

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ences, while white researchers would observe the same situation and record their impressions for comparison. Typically the first reaction of waitresses and bartenders was to turn to the owner or others in authority for guidance. When this was unavailable, the slightest behavioral cue from anyone in the situation was utilized as a gauge of what was expected of them. And if there were no such cues, confusion often continued until somehow the threatening situation had been structured.

Variation by institution. Comparable observations have been recorded for inconsistent racial patterns across different societal institutions. Consider a neighborhood of white steel workers in the Chicago area.[9] These men were all members of the same thoroughly desegregated union and worked in desegregated plants. In fact, Negroes held elected positions as shop stewards, executive board members, and vice-president of the union and shared with whites the same locker rooms, lunch rooms, showers, and toilets in both the union hall and the plants. Only 12 per cent of the 151 whites who were studied evidenced "low acceptance" of Negroes in this work situation; and the deeper the involvement in union activities, the greater was the white acceptance of Negroes as co-workers. But neighborhood acceptance was a vastly different matter. Bolstered by a neighborhood organization which opposed desegregation, 86 per cent of the white steel workers rejected the idea of allowing Negroes to live near them, with those men most involved in the collective existence of the neighborhood evincing the most adamant opposition. The effects of harmonious interracial patterns in employment did not extend to housing. No relationship existed between acceptance of Negroes as fellow workers and acceptance of them as neighbors.

The social psychological key to understanding this process is the operation of the organizations in each of the realms. Most of the steel workers conform to what is expected of them, even when these expectations counter one another. Thus, their inconsistency is more apparent than real; it appears conflicting to the outside observer, but to the person involved such behavior is perfectly reasonable. In other words, the steel worker is living by the norms of the groups to which he refers his behavior—his *reference groups*.[10] And these reference-group norms often act in modern American society to produce what appear to be inconsistent racial patterns and to restrict the generalization of contact-induced attitude change from one institution to another.

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Once again we encounter the distinction between expressed attitudes and actual behavior. A 1951 investigation of almost a thousand Texas manufacturers found that their attitudes toward Negroes and their actual practice for hiring Negroes were not related.[11] And a 1953 study of thirty discriminatory fraternities at the University of Michigan noted that the members were more willing to accept Jewish than Negro students as "brothers," though they were more intensely anti-Semitic than anti-Negro in their attitudes.[12]

Thus, in order to comprehend some of the complexity of American racial patterns, it becomes necessary to examine separately some of the major institutions of American society. Other papers in this volume provide racial analyses in depth of many of these institutions. It is sufficient here to sketch the principal trends, although even these generalizations run the risk of becoming quickly outdated.

The family remains the most racially homogeneous institution in American life. Indeed, twenty states still have explicitly anti-miscegenation laws, although the constitutionality of these statutes is currently up for review in Virginia and Oklahoma.[13] Rates of racial intermarriage in states where the practice is both legal and recorded—California, Hawaii, Michigan, and Nebraska—remain very low save for Hawaii and appear to have increased only slightly in recent years.[14] And white American attitudes on the subject have shifted very little during this era of racial change. A 1963 *Newsweek* poll found 90 per cent of a representative sample of the nation's whites objected to their "own teen-age daughter dating a Negro."[15] A more striking finding of this same poll concerns whites who had experienced previous social contact with Negroes. While this contact group was overwhelmingly accepting of Negroes in other institutional realms, 80 per cent objected to their teen-age daughter dating a Negro and 70 per cent objected to a close friend or relative marrying a Negro.[16]

Opinion is divided, however, about anti-miscegenation laws. Gallup shows that 48 per cent of white Americans approve and 46 per cent disapprove of such statutes.[17] A large regional difference exists on the question: 72 per cent of white Southerners, compared with only 42 per cent of white Northerners and Westerners, favor anti-miscegenation legislation. Thus, legal alterations in this realm seem possible in the near future, but interracial marriages are not likely to become commonplace until the special Negro stigma is eliminated.

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Organized religion is also an extensively segregated institution. The vast majority of Negroes who maintain religious ties are Protestant, and more than 90 per cent of Negro Protestants belong to all-Negro denominations.[18] Among those relatively few Negroes who are members of predominantly white denominations, a large majority attend racially separate churches within these denominations. Moreover, church-sponsored facilities—hospitals, colleges, welfare agencies—are often more segregated, if possible, than the churches.[19] Consequently, the organized church has not been a conspicuous source of interracial contact in the United States, although protest groups such as the Catholic Interracial Council and the Episcopal Society for Cultural and Racial Unity may signal a significant change in this respect for the future.

Racial patterns in education are now in considerable flux. While public education from primary to college levels was separate in the South until recently, the pattern has been somewhat more varied in the North. Pre-World War II Negro ghettos in Northern cities were neither so dense nor so large as today; thus biracial education at the primary and secondary levels was quite common. This explains why many middle-aged white and Negro Northerners today recall that they knew members of the other race best during their early school days. This Northern pattern did not, however, extend into college. Among the few Negro Northerners who managed to go onto higher education, the great majority enrolled either in all-Negro colleges in the South or similar institutions in the North —some private (for example, Lincoln University in Pennsylvania and Wilberforce University in Ohio) and some public (such as Cheyney State College in Pennsylvania).

The present educational picture is more complex. Southern public education is no longer tightly segregated. The first eleven years after the 1954 Supreme Court ruling against *de jure* segregation of public schools have witnessed slow, but fundamental, alterations. By the fall of 1964, 43 per cent of biracial Southern school districts had begun at least token desegregation programs that placed one out of every nine Negro Southern school children in schools with white Southerners.[20] A disproportionate share of this progress, however, has occurred in the border South. While 93 per cent of biracial school districts in the border South had desegregated, only 27 per cent of the ex-Confederate South had done so; and while three out of every five border-state Negro children attended biracial schools, only one in forty-seven did so in the ex-Confederate

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South. Yet there are unmistakable signs that this pace is quickening. The annual average number of newly-desegregated school districts in the South has recently increased three-fold, with the threatened cut-off of federal educational funds under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act proving an effective stimulant. Thus, if the first decade after the 1954 Supreme Court desegregation ruling can be termed a slow-paced era of judicial orders, then the second decade after the ruling promises to be a somewhat faster-paced Civil Rights Act era.[21]

Ironically, however, as *de jure* segregation of schools decreases, *de facto* segregation is rapidly increasing. The ever-growing Negro ghettos in major cities throughout the United States combine with the neighborhood-school principle to establish an entrenched pattern of racially-separate education. The problem is particularly serious at the locally-based elementary level. Even in Boston, where in 1960 only 9 per cent of the population was nonwhite, there are seventeen elementary and two junior high schools with 90 per cent or more Negro pupils.[22] The *de facto* school segregation controversy is presently raging in the North and West and will soon erupt in the nominally "desegregated" cities of the South, and its judicial and legislative status is only now taking shape.[23] But for present purposes, it must be emphasized that this expansion of urban ghettos and the development of *de facto* segregated education have meant that Negroes growing up in these areas have generally had far *less* equal-status contact with whites in their formative years than had Negroes of earlier generations.

Since family, religious, and educational institutions provide only limited interracial contact, encounters on the job between Negro and white Americans assume special importance. Negro employment has been upgraded slightly in recent years, though the pace has hardly been breath-taking. For example, if the rate of nonwhite gains between 1950 and 1960 continued, nonwhites would not attain equal proportional representation nationally among clerical workers until 1992, among skilled workers until 2005, among professionals until 2017, among sales workers until 2114, and among business managers and proprietors until 2730![24] Nor are these data merely a result of Southern discrimination. In metropolitan Boston, for example, a continuation of the nonwhite rate of change in employment in the 1950's would mean nonwhite Bostonians would not be proportionately represented among clerical and skilled workers until the late 1980's, among professionals until the early 1990's, and

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among business managers and sales workers until the twenty-second and twenty-third centuries respectively.[25]

Alert and rigorous enforcement of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, particularly Title VII's provisions for ending discrimination in employment, will be required for basic structural change in this critical area. And the need for such basic change is obvious: the low ratio in the median income of Negro and white workers has remained substantially the same since 1951; technological innovations are disproportionately displacing Negroes from their jobs; except for a few major unions (teamsters, meatpackers, and the steel and automotive workers, for example), Negroes are still essentially excluded from organized labor in key industries (such as the building trades and textiles); employment services and apprenticeship and vocational training programs still typically discriminate against Negroes; and unemployment rates among riot-age Negro youth are almost twice those of white youth and rise as high as 60 and 70 per cent in certain ghetto areas.[26] But if Title VII is forcefully applied and if the Job Corps and other relevant aspects of the "War on Poverty" can achieve major structural alterations, economic institutions could well become the major source for some years of equal-status interracial contact in American society.

This conclusion is bolstered by the increasingly apparent fact that residential patterns are not going to provide widespread opportunities for Negro and white contact in the foreseeable future. It is a paradox of racial change over the past generation that as desegregation proceeds in other realms, housing becomes more racially separate. Residential segregation, state the Taeubers, "has increased steadily over past decades until it has reached universally high levels in cities throughout the United States, despite significant advances in the socio-economic status of Negroes."[27] Federal programs of urban renewal and public housing have often augmented this trend, and the late President Kennedy's executive order against housing discrimination has proven severely limited. Neither state housing anti-discrimination statutes nor the 500-or-so private Fair Housing Practices Committees has made substantial progress. In general, both state laws and citizens' committees apply a case-by-case approach, relying upon individual complaints or contacts; yet the problem has such deep roots—ranging from property tax laws to land-use planning—that only direct confrontation of these fundamental issues and the housing industry as a whole offers any hope for sweeping improvement in this realm.[28]

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Variation by socio-economic class. Mention of housing segregation raises an interesting socio-economic class phenomenon. Higher-status whites generally give more support to racial desegregation than lower-status whites, but this tendency does not seem to hold for attitudes toward interracial housing. Thus, a 1956 national survey noted that 61 per cent of college-educated whites approved of school desegregation, compared with 51 per cent of the high-school-educated and 36 per cent of the grammar-school-educated; and 72 per cent of the college-educated approved of the desegregation of public transportation, compared with 64 per cent of the high-school-educated and 46 per cent of the grammar-school-educated; but virtually no difference appeared among the three groups in response to the query— "If a Negro with the same income and education as you moved into your block, would it make any difference to you?"[29]

Other research suggests that this special reluctance of upper-status whites to support housing desegregation is maintained despite the fact they often realize that these beliefs are in direct conflict with their own religious and national ideals.[30] Part of this phenomenon is explained by the fact that housing desegregation directly affects them in a way other changes typically do not. In addition, there is a tendency for many middle-class white Americans to assume that their own values are typically different from those of Negroes—even when the survey question specifies a Negro neighbor with the same income and education.

This is not to imply that white Americans make no distinction among Negroes of different social classes. Indeed, Westie has shown that the willingness of whites to associate with Negroes is a direct function of both the social status of the respondent and that of the particular Negro being judged.[31] That is, the higher the status of the white, the greater is his willingness to interact with Negroes and the greater the tendency for him to make a differentiation between, say, a Negro doctor and a Negro machine operator. Lower-status whites are more rejecting of Negroes in general and less prepared to distinguish between Negroes of different social standings.

Interestingly, Westie repeated this research with Negroes, measuring their social distance attitudes toward whites, and obtained essentially the same findings.[32] Higher-status Negroes are far more willing than other Negroes to interact with whites and draw sharper differentiations between whites of various occupations. Another set

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of studies investigated the stereotypes of whites as a group held by Negroes of varying social classes in the North and South.[33] In general, the same over-all stereotype emerged for all classes in both regions: whites tend to be seen as "ambitious, sticking together, businesslike, deceitful and tricky, feeling superior, keeping the Negro down, underestimating the Negro's ability, judging Negroes by the worst type, and not caring to be among Negroes." Yet higher-status Negroes, particularly those in the North, are considerably more favorable in their image of whites than other Negroes.

Variation by Region. The relatively more favorable view of whites held by upper-status Negro Northerners is largely a function of their much greater opportunity for equal-status contact with whites. Though still relatively small in number, this group is especially significant for the future—as Northern migration and middle-class expansion continue among Negroes. Thus, it is of interest to look in the following table at the reported interracial experiences of a representative sample of 250 middle-income Negro housewives residing in Roxbury, the Negro ghetto of Boston.[34]

These women typically knew whites well as children—though this is not the case for their children growing up in the ghetto. It appears the husband's work situation is the family's principal contact with whites, with mutual visiting with white work associates almost reaching the level of all such contacts with whites. An additional contact comes through professional family services—such as the family doctor and dentist. But less than one in four of the women reports membership in a church which substantial numbers of whites attend.

Such interracial contacts, of course, are severely restricted for low-income Negroes in both the North and South. They are less likely to have known whites as children; they are more likely to work in laboring and semi-skilled jobs with other lower-status Negroes as associates and whites only as supervisors and employers; they are not likely to have a family doctor or dentist, but to depend upon the impersonal services of public hospitals and clinics; and they seldom belong to a church with white members.

Middle-income Negro Southerners are also more constrained than similarly-situated Negro Bostonians. Segregation sealed them off in ghettos with longer histories and more developed Negro infrastructures than Northern ghettos. Consequently, they, too, are less likely than their Northern counterparts to have known whites as children, to work and visit with whites, to have white physi-

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Interracial Contacts of
Middle-Income Negroes of Boston*

Source of Contact		Percentage Reporting
As a child:		
played with white children		86.0
lived in racially-mixed neighborhood		75.0
attended integrated school		67.5
Today:		
family very friendly with white people		83.1
white people visit home at least once a month		43.8
visit white people at their home at least once a month		39.9
husband works with white people		93.2
white work associates visit home at least once a month		37.6
visit white work associates at their home at least once a month		34.8
family doctor is white		56.0
family dentist is white		40.4
member of a church which is:	virtually all white	0.0
	mostly white	15.0
	roughly equal	8.4
	mostly Negro	10.3
	virtually all Negro	66.4

*Source: H. F. Freeman, Helen H. Hughes, T. F. Pettigrew, and L. G. Watts, *The Middle-Income Negro: Stake and Status in the Ghetto.* Manuscript in preparation. The sample consisted of 250 Negro housewives whose families resided in the ghetto and had a total family income of not less than $5,200 annually; the percentages exclude the few cases which did not answer the query or did not belong to a church, and so forth.

cians and dentists, and to belong to interracial church congregations. Yet here the racial patterns are rapidly changing. While the revolution of the past few years has not significantly altered the lives of most lower-status Negroes, the lives of higher-status Negro Southerners are undeniably affected. The desegregation of public golf courses, expensive restaurants, and the Atlanta opera and the new opportunities for skilled Negroes with federal contractors have not meant much yet to the poor and unskilled, but such changes have pried open the ghetto's lid for those in the middle class who want to take advantage of them. In a few years, middle-income Negroes in the urban South may report interracial patterns, especially those revolving around employment, quite similar to those cited for Boston.

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Mention of Southern racial change raises other interesting regional differences. Negroes are not strangers or interlopers on the Southern scene, as they are often perceived in the North. White and Negro Southerners are both products of the same subculture. They share a common history and a common religion, while white and Negro Northerners frequently share neither. These advantages have tempted Southern liberals, Negro and white, to speculate about the possibility that the South will take the giant step from formal desegregation to informal integration with greater ease and alacrity than the North. The writer has at times shared this dream with his Southern compatriots, though the present adoption by the urban South of strict residential segregation makes it appear that the South, too, will have to work through a difficult period of *de facto* segregation similar to that of the present-day North.[35]

Nevertheless, these cultural and religious bonds between Negro and white Southerners are an important element in the explanation for the present difference in "moods" between Negro communities in the South and North. To risk oversimplification, this difference seems to involve hope and despair. Negroes in the South, including most lower-status Negro Southerners, still "believe," still have faith that the revolution is bringing "freedom." Despite governors like Barnett and Wallace, despite police brutality and wanton murders, Negro Southerners are rewarded in this belief by seeing *de jure* segregation crumble. In sharp contrast, Negro Northerners, particularly the lower-status residents of the bowels of the Harlems and South Sides, either have lost or are losing such hope for the future. A brooding and desperate despair develops from failing to see the Mayor Wagners and the School Superintendent Willises even nudged by protests against *de facto* segregation. And, progress stifled, despair spills over into rioting. This regional difference is made blatant by the response of a hardened Harlemite to a young Negro Southerner visiting New York. "Baby," he jeered, "down South you're just fighting to get where we are now—and we can tell you that once you get here it's just a solid blank wall."[36]

This dramatic regional difference in Negro "mood" is borne out by national survey data. Gallup reports that between 1963 and 1965 the proportion of Negro Southerners who said that they feel they are treated "not very well" or "badly" declined from roughly 90 to 70 per cent, while virtually no change was noted among Negro Northerners.[37] Another important ingredient in this regional difference lies in the distinction between aspirations and attainment. So-

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cial motivation is more directly determined by *relative*, rather than absolute, deprivation.[38] Negro Southerners have aspired to far less than Negro Northerners, and hence have perceived greater reinforcement from smaller racial advances. But this situation will obviously not last much longer. As the Negro American revolution proceeds, aspirations will tend to rise faster than actual gains. Moreover, as *de jure* segregation fuses into *de facto* segregation, gains are certain to come less rapidly and dramatically. Will the Negro Southerner continue even then "to believe"? The answer obviously depends largely upon the response of the urban South, a response that has not been encouraging so far.

II. *Change in American Racial Patterns*

Contact and change. Many well-meaning Americans have expressed the opinion that if only Negroes and whites could experience more contact with each other the nation's racial difficulties would solve themselves. Unfortunately, the case is not so simple. Africans and Europeans have more contact in the Republic of South Africa than anywhere else on the African continent, and Negro and white Americans have more contact in the South than in any other region of the nation; yet neither of these areas is conspicuous for its interracial harmony. It appears almost as if contact between the two peoples exacerbates, rather than relieves, intergroup hostility; but this conclusion would be just as hasty and fallacious as the naive assumption that contact invariably lessens prejudice.

Increasing interaction, whether it be of groups or individuals, intensifies and magnifies the processes already underway. Hence, more interracial contact can lead either to greater prejudice and rejection or to greater respect and acceptance, depending upon the situation in which it occurs. The basic issue, then, concerns the types of situations in which contact leads to distrust and those in which it leads to trust.

Gordon Allport, in his review of the relevant research, concludes that four characteristics of the contact situation are of utmost importance.[39] Prejudice is lessened when the two groups: (1) possess equal status, (2) seek common goals, (3) are cooperatively dependent upon each other, and (4) interact with the positive support of authorities, laws, or custom.

If groups are of widely different social status, contact between them may do little more than reinforce old and hostile stereotypes.

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In the typical Southern situation of interracial contact, most Negroes encountered by white Southerners are servants and other low-status service workers. Many whites eventually conclude that these are the types of jobs best suited for Negroes, that somehow this is the Negro's "proper place." To be sure, there are Negro professionals in the South, but, as noted above, segregation has forced them to stay deep within the Negro ghetto where whites rarely meet them. The segregationist who boasts that he "really knows Negroes" is usually referring to his casual encounters with Negroes of lower status. This is a principal reason that the plentiful Negro-white patterns of contact in the South have not led to more interracial understanding.

As previously mentioned, many whites are convinced that Negroes do not share their interests and values, a belief which compounds racial prejudice with assumed value conflict. *Equal-status* contact attacks this problem in two ways. First, people of equal status are more likely than others to possess congruent outlooks and beliefs simply by virtue of their common positions in society. Second, equal-status situations provide the optimal setting in which this congruence can be mutually perceived.

When groups work together toward *common goals*, further opportunities are presented for developing and discovering similarities of interests and values. The reduction of prejudice through contact generally requires an active, focused effort, not simply intermingling for its own sake. Athletic teams furnish a pertinent example. In striving to win, interracial teams not only create an equal-status contact situation but one in which Negro and white team members cannot achieve their common goal of winning without the assistance of each other. Under such conditions, race loses importance.

Not only must groups seek common goals, but the attainment of these goals must be a *mutually dependent* effort involving no competition along strictly racial lines. For instance, if the San Francisco Giants were an all-white baseball team and the Los Angeles Dodgers were all Negro, they could probably play indefinitely and not become more racially tolerant. Though equal-status and common goal conditions would prevail, the lines of competition would make race relevant. Fortunately, professional athletic teams are interracial and provide a notable case of successful desegregation. But the lesson is clear. The contact situations which lead to interracial harmony must involve cooperative interdependence.

The final factor concerns the auspices of the contact. If the sit-

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uation has *explicit social sanction*, interracial contact is more readily accepted and leads to more positive effects. Though the situation may be a bit awkward at first, the support of authorities helps make it seem "right." Failure of local authorities, law, and custom to bolster even minimal desegregation in much of the South is a chief reason for the failure of many white Southerners to respect federal court orders.

Research literature abounds with examples of these contact principles in operation. One study found that white merchant marines tended to hold racial attitudes in direct relation to how many voyages they had taken with equal-status Negro seamen—the more desegregated voyages, the more positive their attitudes.[40] Another investigation noted that white Philadelphia policemen who had personally worked with Negro colleagues were far more favorable toward the desegregation of their force than other white policemen.[41] A third study of white government workers, veterans, and students found that those who had known Negro professionals were far less prejudiced toward Negroes than those who had known only unskilled Negroes.[42]

Evidence appears even in times of crisis. While Negro and white mobs raged during the Detroit race riot of 1943, integrated coworkers, university students, and neighbors of long standing peacefully carried on their lives side-by-side.[43] Mention of neighborhood integration introduces the most solid research evidence available. Repeated studies have found that integrated living in public housing developments which meet all four of Allport's contact criteria sharply reduces the racial prejudice among both Negro and white neighbors.[44] And these same studies demonstrate that living in segregated, but otherwise identical, housing developments structures interracial contact in such a way that, if anything, racial bitterness is enhanced. Additional data derive from the desegregation of the Armed Forces.[45] Once again, conditions involving equal status, cooperative striving toward common goals, and authority support led directly to the reduction of racial prejudice among both Negro and white servicemen. As a Negro officer in Korea candidly phrased it: "After a while you start thinking of whites as people."

One important qualification attends attitude change through interracial contact: At least in the initial stages, the change is often limited to the specific situation involved. Recall the steel workers whose experiences in a fully integrated union had not noticeably influenced their views on interracial housing. These limitations of

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the effects of even optimal contact are a result of the depth and complexity with which segregation has snarled the vital fabric of American life. Untying one knot does not prove that a solution has been found, but as desegregation proceeds there should be increasing generalization from one situation to another.

The law and change. Within this perspective, a reappraisal can be made of the old saw—"Laws cannot change the hearts and minds of men." A case in point is the 1945 anti-discrimination employment legislation enacted by New York State. This law led to the initial hiring of Negroes as sales clerks in New York City department stores. Two investigators conducted separate tests of the effects of this law-induced desegregation. One study of white sales personnel revealed that those who had experienced the new equal-status job contact with Negroes held more favorable attitudes toward interracial interaction in the work situation.[46] Once again, however, the initial effects of this contact did not extend beyond the immediate situation; equal-status clerks were not more accepting of Negroes in eating and residential situations. The other investigation questioned customers.[47] Their responses showed widespread acceptance of this legally-required racial change. They were concerned largely with shopping conveniently and efficiently; many hesitated to challenge the firm *fait accompli* established by the law; and for many the new pattern was consistent with their belief in the American creed of equal opportunity for all.[48]

Contrary to the old adage, then, laws *can* change the hearts and minds of men. They do so through a vital intermediate step. Laws first act to modify behavior, and this modified behavior in turn changes the participants' attitudes. Notice that this is precisely the opposite sequence commonly believed to be the most effective method of social change. When people are convinced to be less prejudiced through informational and good-will campaigns, conventional reasoning asserts, then they will discriminate less. To be sure, this sequence is sometimes effective, but the preponderance of social psychological evidence attests to the greater efficacy of the opposite approach. Behaving differently is more often the precursor to thinking differently.

The celebrated annual rituals of brotherhood week, brotherhood dinners, and brotherhood awards illustrate the point. While they remind participants of their religious and national ideals and strengthen the already convinced, these events appear of limited value in convincing the unconvinced. The basic problem with such

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observances is that they do not require participants to change their behavior. The interracial contact is brief and artificial, and the emphasis is placed on exhortation and influencing attitudes directly. A vast body of psychological data indicates that prejudiced individuals in such situations will avoid the message altogether, deny its relevance for themselves, or find ways of twisting its meaning.[49] In addition, ritualistic exhortations for brotherhood may often serve an unanticipated negative function. By attending the annual dinner and paying the tax-deductible $50 or $100 per plate, many individuals of considerable influence regularly relieve their guilt. Having gone through the motions of supporting "equality for all," participants are psychologically released to go on discriminating as before.

Anti-discrimination laws can also be tuned out by prejudiced individuals and used as conscience salves by the guilty. Frequently, the laws remain unenforced except on a case-by-case basis which fails to attack the structural pattern supporting discrimination. But if properly enforced and pattern-directed, such legislation offers a potential means for achieving behavioral change not possessed by exhortation. Several reasons for this are apparent. There is, of course, the threat of punishment and unfavorable publicity for recalcitrants. But more important is the "off-the-hook" function such laws provide. Thus, the department stores in New York City may each have been afraid to hire Negro sales personnel as long as there were no assurances their competitors would follow suit. But the anti-discrimination law, applied to all stores, furnished this needed assurance. And the legally-established *fait accompli*, unlike exhortations for tolerance, generates its own acceptance.[50] The improvement it achieves is a year-round process, a constant, institutionalized reminder that racial harmony is the sanctioned norm. Finally, the new behavior required by the law psychologically commits the individual, for when a person has behaved publicly in a new manner and has been rewarded for doing so he is likely to become personally committed to the racial change.[51]

A microcosmic case in point. The fundamental principles underlying racial attitude change are dramatically highlighted by an ingenious field study conducted in Oklahoma.[52] Twenty young boys, of homogeneous backgrounds but previously unacquainted with one another, attended an experimental summer camp. From the start, the boys were divided into two groups—"The Rattlers" and "The Eagles." The first stage of the experiment was designed to develop high *espirit de corps* within each of the groups. Separated

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from each other, the Rattlers and Eagles engaged in a variety of satisfying experiences, and each group soon evidenced the pride and sense of "we-ness" characteristic of strong in-group solidarity.

The second stage brought the groups face-to-face in a series of grimly competitive tasks—tugs-of-war, baseball and football games, and tent pitching. In all of these contact situations, only one group could win and the other had to lose. The inevitable intergroup animosity soon appeared. Derogatory songs and slogans were composed; destructive raids on "the enemy's" cabin began; negative stereotypes developed; and even preferences for group segregation were voiced. Competitive contact had wreaked its usual havoc.

The experiment's third stage tried to mend the damage. "The brotherhood dinner" approach came first. The boys met in such non-competitive situations as eating good food in the same room, shooting off fireworks, and attending a movie together—all of them involving passive conduct without common goals or group interdependence. And, understandably, intergroup friction did not abate; in fact, the boys employed these unfocused events as opportunities for further vilification of their hated rivals. Next, the investigators introduced carefully contrived problems that required the cooperation of both groups for their solution. Fixing together the damaged water tank that supplied the whole camp, raising the funds to show a favorite movie, and other functionally dependent behavior achieved a striking decrement in intergroup hostility. While at the close of the competitive second stage over half of the characteristics assigned by the boys to their group rivals were sharply unfavorable, over two-thirds of such judgments were favorable at the close of the interdependent third stage. Moreover, the percentage of friendship choices across group lines multiplied fourfold.

One final result of this intriguing investigation replicates the limited nature of the attitude change initially induced even under optimal contact conditions. The first interdependent encounters of the two camp groups by no means removed all of the bad feeling between the Rattlers and the Eagles. But as these socially-sanctioned confrontations continued, the prejudice-reducing power of this type of contact accumulated. This suggests that, as the desegregation process proceeds, it may well receive increasingly greater support and have increasingly greater effects upon the participants, both Negro and white.

The growth of institutional protections. The Rattlers and the

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Eagles demonstrate a basic principle undergirding the changing of America's racial patterns: namely, effective efforts must attack the patterns directly. It is not enough to be concerned with the reduction of anti-Negro prejudice. Indeed, the very changes that eliminate social barriers to Negro progress structure new situations which in turn alter individual attitudes to the greatest possible extent. Allport's four situational criteria for lessening prejudice are virtually impossible to achieve without prior elimination of racial discrimination.

At the broadest level, the elimination of discrimination requires the development of institutional protections for minorities. Other papers in this volume describe in detail many of these institutional protections in the political, legal, and economic realms.[53] Suffice it to add that these protections often appear in forms not ostensibly related to minorities and come in a variety of ways. For example, changes in municipal property tax laws and minimum wage coverage are desperately needed by many Negroes—and whites. Property tax structures tend to foster and perpetuate slum housing in many cities. Slum landlords are encouraged to allow property to deteriorate in the ghetto by tax incentives and by the lack of enforcement of building and sanitation codes. Likewise, the concentration of Negroes in service work not covered by minimum wage legislation feeds ghetto disorganization. The meager income from such work makes it nearly impossible for a man to support a family and thus swells the ranks of broken homes.

American institutional protections for minorities have evolved in a variety of ways. Sometimes they emerge dramatically, as in the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; more often they come quietly and without national attention, as in the acceptance of minorities into previously discriminatory professions and college social fraternities.[54] But generally these protections have been won, at least in large part, through pressure exerted by the minorities themselves. Of course, most groups of Americans are numerical minorities, but a combination of minorities easily forms a majority. Indeed, the largest political party in the nation is a delicately-balanced coalition of minorities, including among others the predominant share of the country's Negroes, Jews, and Roman Catholics. And this party has managed to win seven of the last nine presidential elections in part because of its achievements in establishing precisely the type of institutional protections under discussion. Given the momentum of this trend and the growing expec-

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tations of practically all of the nation's minorities, there is good reason to expect that the evolution of institutional protections will continue.

Success vs. *test strategies of change.* The United States government is not the only sponsor of institutional protections, but it has become by far the chief agent of planned change in Negro-white relations. And frequently a "success *vs.* test" strategy conflict confronts government officials in this and other areas.

Consider an official with a reasonably tight budget, a limited staff, and a broad legislative mandate for immediate action. He could be an official of the Office of Education charged with enforcing Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and preparing to cut off federal funds from a variety of school districts which refuse to comply with the non-discriminatory provisions of the Act. Or he could be an official administering the Manpower Retraining Act or the Job Corps and preparing to select the Negroes and whites for the program out of the vast pool of people who need and desire such training. In each of these situations the organizers must decide where to focus the limited resources. Should the principal effort be directed at those cases which are most likely to change easily and thus will demonstrate that the program is a *"success"*—the so-called "skimming-off-the-cream" approach? Should it be directed at those cases least likely to change easily and thus provide a rigorous *test* of the program? Or should it be directed primarily at cases of medium difficulty, or at some combination of these possibilities?

Frequently, civil rights specialists have criticized federal programs for following the path of least resistance and tackling only the easy cases. Yet a reasonable argument can be made for this approach: why not change those who obviously can be changed? Indeed, this policy yields more conspicuous gain per dollar spent than any other strategy—a not irrelevant consideration. Consequently, it has appeal for political purposes and for the career aspirations of those administrators involved in directing the program. In addition, a show of early success safeguards the program's continuance, making it theoretically possible for a later attack on the core of the problem from a stronger posture. And it can establish a *fait accompli* effect that enhances the program's image as one that is making progress.

But maximizing early success has its obvious drawbacks as a strategy for planned change. If the Office of Education followed

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this approach, it would reward the most belligerant and recalcitrant school districts practicing racial discrimination by exempting them from the initial stages of the enforcement of Title VI. Likewise, in the job training programs, this process would differentially operate against the enrollment of Negroes because the ghetto floor of deprivation is qualitatively and quantitatively below that of disadvantaged whites. Fundamentally, then, the dangers of the early success approach are that it may squander a major chance for basic and needed change and ease consciences while only scratching the problem's surface.

These weaknesses point up the advantages of the counter-strategy—the need to put change programs to the full *test* by concentrating upon the most difficult cases. In enforcing Title VI, this test strategy would require the use of virtually all resources for school districts in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, northern Florida, and southwest Georgia; in the Manpower Retraining and Job Corps programs, it would necessitate accepting only the hard-core unemployed. Consequently, the most debilitated segments of the Negro ghetto would be far more likely to be included in significant numbers. In addition to affording a real test of the program, such a strategy provides a genuine attempt at initiating the basic institutional alterations needed before truly society-wide solutions are possible.

But basic institutional alterations are generally politically dangerous; and there is a greater chance of short-run failure with the test strategy. Moreover, greater expenditures of public funds for less conspicuous success will generally be involved, for the cost per person effectively prepared for the labor market in, say, the Manpower Retraining program would necessarily be greater if the hard-core unemployed comprised the principal clientele. Thus, the test strategy seriously jeopardizes the continuation of the whole program on several counts.

The striking complementary nature of the advantages and disadvantages of these rival strategies suggests the usefulness of a third possibility. A dual strategy might involve a judicious mixture of both the success and test strategies, employed simultaneously, taking as many of the easiest and hardest cases as resources allow while omitting the middle-range. The political need for early success can be met largely with the easier cases, while the more difficult allow head-on grappling with the most recalcitrant and early experience with the fundamental issues of the problem at its worst.

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The most effective methods for the easy cases will almost undoubtedly not be the same as those for the difficult cases. Nor has modern social science any "bag of tricks" or even well-tested techniques for such tasks as training the most seriously disadvantaged young people now being enrolled in the Job Corps. A successful attack on the effects of racism and poverty must have an evolving strategy, it must learn as it unfolds; and it probably cannot operate in this fashion if it does not have, on the one hand, easy instances for reasons of publicity, politics, and the program's future and, on the other hand, difficult instances from which to learn how to shape the program in the future.

III. *Future American Racial Patterns*

The Negro-American stigma. At first glance, the plight of Negroes trapped in urban ghettos recalls the immigrant ghettos of previous generations. Both moved from near-peasant status to form the lower classes of large metropolitan centers. But here the analogy abruptly breaks down. As Talcott Parsons ably demonstrates in this volume, the Negro American poses a sharply different problem of inclusion into America's "societal community" than immigrant Americans.

The immigrant-Negro analogy is exceedingly misleading. It provokes the often heard query: "What's so special about Negroes? We Irish (or Italians or Jews) made it on our own—why all this fuss over the Negro's problems?" In addition to its debatable accuracy concerning how immigrants were absorbed into American society, such a question overlooks all that is unique about the Negro case from slavery to current times. In particular, the analogy obscures the principal social psychological problem of American race relations—the persistent fact that there is in American society a special and debilitating *stigma* placed upon Negro status.

The concept of "stigma" is here used in its social psychological sense: that is, stigma signifies a handicap which disqualifies an entire class of persons from full social acceptance.[55] It need *not* be a permanent handicap, and the concept should not be confused with certain popular usages of the term as a lasting physical mark or blemish. The Negro stigma revolves largely around the presumption of primitive inferiority.[56] And manifestations of the stigma include the white American attitudes toward interracial marriage cited earlier and the expected subservient role of "Negro." The

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special stigma becomes apparent when the Negro's societal position is compared with that of other deprived groups. Negro Texans, for example, have a median of two years more education than Texans of Mexican descent, yet their median family income falls well below even that of the culturally-handicapped Spanish Americans. Nor is this stigma a matter of mere color and visibility; compare the Negro American's place in American society with that of Japanese and Chinese Americans.

Outgroup stigmata often take one of two contrasting forms. One type is rooted in super-ego concerns, with the outgroup stereotyped as shrewd, mercenary, pushy, ambitious, sly, and clannish. The other type is rooted in id concerns, with the outgroup stereotyped as superstitious, lazy, happy-go-lucky, ignorant, dirty, irresponsible, and sexually uninhibited. The psychoanalytic interpretation of these distinctive stereotypes is straight-forward. Outgroups serve in part as alter-egos for the bigot; intergroup animosities are seen as projections of the bigot's own unacceptable inner impulses onto a minority group. In the United States, the prejudiced person thus personifies his own super-ego sins of ambition, deceit, and egotism in the Jew and his own id sins of the flesh in the Negro.[57]

This psychoanalytic distinction between super-ego and id stereotypes is applicable to a variety of cross-cultural situations. Thus, outgroups assigned a super-ego stigma are usually merchants who are not native to an area, middle-men caught between the landed and the laboring classes as were the European Jews in the Middle Ages.[58] Nor are the people who invoke the super-ego stereotype unaware of this similarity, for the Chinese merchants of Malaysia and Indonesia are often called the "Jews of Asia" and the Muslim Indian merchants of East and South Africa, the "Jews of Africa." Likewise, the id stigma is invoked in many parts of the world for groups that are usually found on the bottom of the social structure; in Europe, Gypsies and Southern Italians are often the targets.[59] Yet the Negro American inherits the id stigma with special force. Not only is he typically confronted by class barriers at the bottom of the social structure, but he is also confronted by caste barriers as the degrading legacy of three centuries of slavery and segregation.[60]

This id stigma branded upon the Negro American is only now beginning to recede. Compared with the results of a study in the early 1930's, a follow-up study of Princeton University undergraduates in 1950 found that the Negro stereotype, like other stereotypes, had lost some of its salience. The percentage of students regarding

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the Negro American as "superstitious" had declined from 84 to 41 per cent, as "lazy" from 75 to 31 per cent, as "happy-go-lucky" from 38 to 17 per cent, and as "ignorant" from 38 to 24 per cent.[61] Evidence of a similar trend for the entire adult population comes from repeated surveys of the National Opinion Research Center asking: "In general, do you think Negroes are as intelligent as white people—that is, can they learn just as well if they are given the same education and training?" The percentage among the white respondents answering "yes" in 1942 was only 42, by 1946 this figure had risen to 52, by 1956 it had climbed to 77, and in 1963 it still remained at 77.[62] Even among white Southerners, 59 per cent said "yes" to the query by 1963.

For striking evidence of how this shift is reflected in the mass media, one need only compare contemporary materials with the early issues of *Life Magazine*.[63] While occasionally portraying Negroes neutrally or as "credits to their race," *Life* in the late 1930's overwhelmingly presented Negroes as either musical, primitive, amusing, or religious, or as violent and criminal; occupationally, they were pictured as either servants, athletes, or entertainers, or as unemployed. Pictures included a Negro choir at a graveside funeral, an all-Negro chain gang, and Negro W.P.A. workers beating a drum "in tribal fashion" at a W.P.A. circus. Dialect was common: to the question of who was Father Divine's father, "Mrs. Mayfield cackled, 'Lawd chile, that been so long ago, I done fergit.'" Descriptions of Negroes dancing included such terms as "barbaric," "jungle," and "native gusto." Today the mass media would not consider such material.

This is not to imply that the id stigma of Negroes has faded completely from view. A 1963 national survey of white Americans revealed that 68 per cent still believe that Negroes "laugh a lot," 66 per cent that they lack ambition, 60 per cent that they "smell different," 55 per cent that they "have looser morals," 46 per cent that they "keep untidy homes," and 41 per cent that they "want to live off the handout."[64] Nevertheless, the id stigma is slowly receding. The upgrading of the Negro labor force and the improvement of mass media racial content combine with the assertive resourcefulness of the Negro revolution to spell the gradual abolition of the centuries-old stigma. It will recede from view, as John Turner notes, in direct relation to how dysfunctional it becomes for American society, but this process will undoubtedly require a number of generations before the most entrenched aspects of the stigma are eradicated.

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Future interracial patterns. Erasure of the Negro stigma will in large part be a function of changing interracial patterns. And the current Negro-American revolution guarantees that there will be changes in these patterns; but it is equally certain that these alterations will come unevenly.

Racial patterns in 1984, to select a fateful year, will differ most from those of today in the employment realm and least in the areas of housing and family. Employment contact—most of it meeting Allport's criteria for reducing intergroup animosity—will expand rapidly in the future, leaving by the 1980's only pockets of the economic sector (for example, automobile executives) which lack at least token Negro representation. Nevertheless, these occupational gains will be limited by the capacity of public education and such intervention programs of the federal government as the Job Corps and the pre-school "Head Start" effort to upgrade Negro skills.[65] This educational factor may well prove to be a severe limitation. Here the importance of *de facto* segregation of schools looms large, for Negroes cannot be expected to work in interracial situations at high standards if they have overwhelmingly been trained in uniracial schools with low standards. The racial balancing of schools, however, may well be a slow process at best in the future; and it will probably require state and federal legislative initiatives as opposed to judicial action against *de jure* school segregation. At any rate, public education will provide steadily increasing opportunities in the higher grades for interracial contact that meets Allport's criteria; but these opportunities will not increase so rapidly as employment and may deter the racial integration of the American labor force.

The whole issue of *de facto* segregation in schools, churches, and other neighborhood-based institutions revolves around residential segregation. Interracial housing trends of recent years portend a future generation resembling the one just past—that is, a period of rapid racial change in other realms with housing integration sharply lagging behind. Some of the barriers to interracial housing are structural. Further progress is inseparably intertwined with such larger issues as the total supply of low-cost housing, property tax laws, and land-use planning. These are not issues for which picketing, sit-ins, and other protest techniques are ideally suited. Some of the barriers are less subtle and are erected by fierce white resistance. Racial discrimination in housing is usually blatant, entrenched, and pervasive throughout the nation and the class struc-

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ture. It is not only fueled by status and financial fears as well as bigotry, but is encouraged by much of the real-estate industry.

In addition to white resistance, the lack of Negro insistence is a critical barrier to the alteration of housing patterns. Segregation has led to large and concentrated Negro ghettos in a great majority of America's cities; and each of these ghettos has developed institutions and a community life in many ways distinct from and independent of the wider community. These deeply-rooted Negro communities present formidable barriers to an eventual integrated society. As Franklin Frazier often pointed out, separate community life causes many Negroes to develop a vested interest in segregation.[66] Thus, Negro professionals and businessmen enjoy a captive market within the walls of a tight ghetto, but they must meet extensive competition in a desegregated society. Likewise, the all-Negro church and other all-Negro institutions naturally thrive best in a racially segregated society. Consequently, there is every reason to expect that even when residential discrimination essentially ends and Negroes as a group are prosperous enough to afford a wide range of housing, there will be binding ghetto ties that restrain many Negroes from moving to interracial areas.

Research on Boston's middle-income Negroes found that only a small fraction of these families have seriously considered living in the predominantly white suburbs.[67] Despite the fact that they are now in the direct path of urban renewal, that suburban housing is available in their income range, that suburban Fair Housing Practices Committees seek and welcome them, that they are upset over the ghetto's inferior and racially imbalanced schools, and that the few Negroes who have moved to the suburbs around Boston have typically adjusted quite well,[68] only 9 families of 250 (less than 4 per cent) moved to interracial areas during a critical ten-month period. For that matter, less than 20 per cent of these prosperous Negro Bostonians have made any realistic effort to investigate suburban housing. In short, most of these people have their stake and status in the ghetto and are not sufficiently motivated to leave it.

Yet some change, even in housing patterns, can be expected during the next generation. Such change will definitely be selective, however, unless massive federal intervention in housing occurs along lines far different from the usually ghetto-tightening efforts of the past. There may well be somewhat more federally sponsored interracial contact at the low-cost housing level. But in general only the prospering middle-class Negroes in the urban North will be

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able to purchase or rent the type of housing that will be available in interracial areas on the private market. This will be true for two reasons. First, those predominantly white communities with the range of housing most suited to Negro middle-income needs (about $12,000 to $20,000) are typically more resistant to Negro occupancy than those with housing far beyond the resources of even middle-income Negroes (roughly $30,000 and up). Second, a number of studies agree that those relatively few Negroes who are particularly anxious to move to the suburbs not only earn a higher income than most other Negroes, but also are typically Northern-born, well-educated, young, and light-skinned.[69]

The selective nature of this housing trend will give many white Americans living in the "better" residential districts the strong impression that considerable change is underway. After all, their suburban neighborhoods are likely to shift from having no Negro residents whatsoever to one Negro family or even an "invasion" of two or three Negro families. This will mean that token integration patterns in suburban churches and schools are likely to become the rule, while the ghettos of the central cities grow ever larger.[70]

"The other Negro America." The Negro ghetto seems destined to remain a part of the American scene for years to come, though it may evolve over time from a racial prison into an ethnic area of choice. In a few places, this evolution is already beginning, but the choice to live in or out of the ghetto is confined to high-status Negroes. Indeed, a distinction between lower- and higher-status Negroes has had to be drawn continually throughout this paper. Those Negroes less scarred by past deprivations are in a position to take advantage of current racial change, and it is to these people that fingers point when "racial progress" of recent years is proudly cited. These are the Negro Americans who by 1984 will be not just desegregated but truly integrated into "the affluent society."

Progress for "the affluent Negro America" is, of course, not unimportant. Successful middle-class Negroes offer needed achievement models for the Negro community; they can effectively obliterate racial barriers by being "the first of the race" in previously all-white situations; they help eliminate the Negro stigma by providing a constant contradiction between class and caste; and they furnish the great majority of protest leaders. But middle-class Negroes are only a minority of the group.

To borrow from Michael Harrington, there is "the other Negro America." Now constituting perhaps two-thirds of all Negroes,[71]

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this other Negro America has not as yet been significantly touched by present racial adjustments. Nor has it had any increased contact with white Americans in recent years; rather, it slips further and further into the depths of "the dark ghetto" and its own desperate despair. Its hopes were raised in the 1950's;[72] but now it cannot even rationalize personal failure entirely in racial terms, for *Ebony* bulges each month with evidence that "the affluent Negro America" is making rapid strides.

No realistic assessment of American racial patterns in 1965 can ignore "the other Negro America." Progress for those who are already prosperous is important, but is hardly sufficient. The future of race relations in the United States will depend ultimately on the nation's ability and willingness to penetrate the veneer of success and alter the lives of this "other Negro America" in a truly meaningful fashion.

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35. Pettigrew, "De Facto Segregation, Southern Style," *op. cit.;* and Pettigrew, "Continuing Barriers to Desegregated Education in the South," *op. cit.*

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37. George Gallup, "Negroes, Whites Disagree on Treatment of Former," American Institute of Public Opinion, May 4, 1965.

38. Pettigrew, *Profile of the Negro American, op. cit.*, Ch. 8.

39. G. W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), Ch. 16.

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41. W. M. Kephart, *Racial Factors and Urban Law Enforcement* (Philadelphia, 1957), pp. 188-189.

42. Barbara MacKenzie, "The Importance of Contact in Determining Attitudes Toward Negroes," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 43 (October 1948), pp. 417-441.

43. A. M. Lee and N. D. Humphrey, *Race Riot* (New York, 1943), pp. 97, 130, 140.

44. M. Deutsch and Mary Collins, *Interracial Housing: A Psychological Evaluation of a Social Experiment* (Minneapolis, Minn., 1951); Marie Jahoda and Patricia West, "Race Relations in Public Housing," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 7, Nos. 1 and 2 (1951), pp. 132-139; D. M. Wilner, Rosabelle Walkley, and S. W. Cook, *Human Relations in Interracial Housing: A Study of the Contact Hypothesis* (Minneapolis, Minn., 1955); and E. Works, "The Prejudice-Interaction Hypothesis from the Point of View of the Negro Minority Group," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 67 (July 1961), pp. 47-52.

45. S. A. Stouffer, E. A. Suchman, L. C. DeVinney, Shirley A. Star, and R. M. Williams, Jr., *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, Vol. 1, *The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life* (Princeton, N. J., 1949), Ch. 10.

46. J. Harding and R. Hogrefe, "Attitudes of White Department Store Employees Toward Negro Co-Workers," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 8, No. 1, (1952), pp. 18-28.

47. G. Saenger and Emily Gilbert, "Customer Reactions to the Integration of Negro Sales Personnel," *International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research*, Vol. 4 (Spring 1950), pp. 57-76.

48. Prohibition provides an interesting contrast at this point. It apparently

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failed largely because it was neither rigorously enforced nor, despite its moral overtones for some Protestants, did it articulate with national traditions or ease the consciences of many Americans.

49. Eunice Cooper and Marie Jahoda, "The Evasion of Propaganda: How Prejudiced People Respond to Anti-Prejudice Propaganda," *Journal of Psychology,* Vol. 23 (January 1947), pp. 15-25; and H. H. Hyman and P. B. Sheatsley, "Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Vol. 11 (Fall 1947), pp. 413-423.

50. For an interesting political example of this phenomenon, see: H. Cantril (ed.), *Gauging Public Opinion* (Princeton, N. J., 1944), pp. 226-230.

51. W. A. Scott, "Attitude Change Through Reward of Verbal Behavior," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* Vol. 55 (July 1957), pp. 72-75; and W. A. Scott, "Attitude Change by Response Reinforcement: Replication and Extension," *Sociometry,* Vol. 22 (December 1959), pp. 328-335.

52. M. Sherif, D. J. Harvey, B. J. White, W. R. Hood, and Carolyn Sherif, *Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment* (Norman, Okla., 1961).

53. In particular, see James Tobin's discussion in this volume of lowering the unemployment rate—a prime example of an "economic protection" in the sense it is used in this paper.

54. An excellent recent example of a "quiet protection" with extensive consequences involved the announcement of the Federal Government banning local United Fund solicitations of government employees at work unless all agencies receiving the United Fund aid were free of discrimination. The effects were immediate. Agencies eager to remain in their Funds—such as the Y.M.C.A. of Richmond, Virginia—began pronouncing new policies of non-discrimination.

55. E. Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity.* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963).

56. See Talcott Parson's paper in this volume.

57. Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *Social Change and Prejudice* (New York, 1964); and T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950).

58. The super-ego outgroup pattern also typically involves a middle-man minority which is separatist in an expanding nationalist state which emphasizes unity. Thus, the Huguenots of England and Ireland were not separatist, nor was India when it received the Parsis an expanding nationalist state—and neither the Huguenots nor the Parsis triggered the super-ego pattern. S. Stryker, "Social Structure and Prejudice," *Social Problems,* Vol. 6 (Spring 1959), pp. 340-354.

59. Direct parallels between the American stereotype of the Negro and the Northern Italian stereotype of the Southern Italian are demonstrated in M. W. Battacchi, *Meridioanli e Settentrionali nella Struttura del Pregiudizio*

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Ethnico in Italia [Southerners and Northerners in the Structure of Ethnic Prejudice in Italy] (Bologna, Italia, 1959).

60. Moreover, as Tannenbaum has pointed out, modern slavery differed from earlier forms of the institution by being totally identified with one specific group. Before it had been a condition anyone might suffer, and so it was regarded as a misfortune. But when the slave status came to be occupied solely by Negroes, the question naturally arose: *Why the Negro?* Modern racism was called upon to supply an answer; and the stigma of slavery attached to the Negro took an especially lasting form. See Frank Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas* (New York, 1947), p. 110.

61. D. Katz and K. W. Braly, "Racial Stereotypes of 100 College Students," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 28 (October-November 1933), pp. 280-290; and G. M. Gilbert, "Stereotype Persistence and Change Among College Students," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 46 (April 1951), pp. 245-254.

62. H. H. Hyman and P. B. Sheatsley, "Attitudes Toward Desegregation," *op. cit.;* and "Attitudes Toward Desegregation," *Scientific American*, Vol. 211 (July 1964), pp. 16-23.

63. I am indebted to Patricia Pajonas, research assistant in the Harvard University Laboratory of Social Relations, for her analysis of all racial material appearing in thirty-four issues of *Life* sampled from November 1936 to March 1938.

64. Brink and Harris, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-141.

65. Rashi Fein points out that the children in the Head-Start pre-school program of 1965 will be only twenty-two years old by 1984.

66. E. F. Frazier, "The Negro Middle Class and Desegregation," *Social Problems*, Vol. 4 (April 1957), pp. 291-301.

67. Freeman, *et al., op. cit.;* and L. G. Watts, H. E. Freeman, Helen Hughes, Robert Morris, and T. F. Pettigrew, *The Middle-Income Negro Family Faces Urban Renewal* (Boston, Mass., 1965).

68. Helen Hughes and L. G. Watts, "Portrait of the Self-Integrator," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 20 (1964), pp. 103-115.

69. Freeman, *et al., op. cit.;* Watts, *et al., op. cit.;* Morton Rubin, "The Negro Wish to Move: The Boston Case," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 15 (October 1959), pp. 4-13; and Robert Johnson, "Negro Reactions to Minority Group Status," in M. L. Barron (ed.), *American Minorities* (New York, 1957), pp. 192-212.

70. This dual pattern of suburban tokenism and central city segregation suggests one important and largely untapped source of future interracial contact. This would entail programs where the suburbs pitch in to help the

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central city through the acceptance of a specified number of inner-city Negro children in their schools, the acceptance of low-cost public housing, and so forth.

71. Obviously, the particular figure chosen varies with the particular definition chosen.
72. Pettigrew, *Profile of the Negro American, op. cit.*, pp. 184-185.

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TALCOTT PARSONS

Full Citizenship for the Negro American? A Sociological Problem

THE DESIGNATION "second-class citizen" has often and with justice been used to describe the status of the Negro in American society. As the British sociologist T. H. Marshall has shown with particular clarity,[1] citizenship is a complicated matter which is by no means exhausted by the more literal meanings of the term "civil rights." I should like to begin this discussion with an analysis of the meaning of the concept of citizenship, leaning heavily on Marshall's work, though attempting to go beyond it in some respects. I shall then attempt to analyze some of the conditions which have been necessary to account for the progress which the Negro American has made so far toward gaining full citizenship—and which, at the same time, the society has made toward including the Negro in that status—and the further conditions which must be fulfilled if the process is to approach completion. In carrying out this analysis I shall pay particular attention to comparing the status of the Negro with that of other groups which have in various analogous ways been discriminated against in American society. I hope that such an analysis will reveal a combination of similarities and differences which illuminates the salient features of the Negro case. Since the other groups have progressed considerably further toward full inclusion than has the Negro so far, their experience may provide certain projective guide lines for considering the Negro case. The relation of the internal change of status of the Negro American to the color problem in world affairs will also be discussed.

The concept of citizenship, as used here, refers to full membership in what I shall call the *societal community*.[2] This term refers to that aspect of the total society as a system, which forms a *Gemeinschaft*, which is the focus of solidarity or mutual loyalty of its mem-

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bers, and which constitutes the consensual base underlying its political integration. This membership is central to what it means to be defined, in the case of our own nation, as "an American"—hence it gives a special justification for the word order in the title of the present issue of *Dædalus,* that it is the Negro American, not vice versa. The Negro slave could have been, and certainly was called, an "American Negro"—he was resident in the United States and owned by American citizens, but was not part of the societal community in the present sense.

Perhaps John Rawls has formulated, in general philosophical terms, more clearly than anyone else the way in which full citizenship implies a fundamental equality of rights—not equality in *all* senses, but in the sense in which we refer to the rights of membership status in the societal community.[3]

From the unit viewpoint, societal community is a category of the commitment of members to the collectivity in which they are associated, and of the members to each other. It is the focus of loyalties which need not be absolute, indeed cannot be, but which require high priority among loyalties of the members.[4] To occupy this position the associational structure must be in accord with the common values of the society: members are committed to it because it both implements their values and organizes their interests in relation to other interests. In the latter context it is the basis for defining rules for the play of interests which make integration possible, preventing the inevitable elements of conflict from leading into vicious circles radically disruptive of the community. It is also the reference base of the standards for allocating available mobile resources in complex communities.

In all "advanced" societies, societal community is linked with political organization, but is also differentiated from it. Although all advanced societies are "politically organized," this aspect of their organization, what we ordinarily refer to, at the societal level, as government, is not identical with community in the present sense. It is precisely when the two are in some kind of conflict that revolutionary situations can arise.

The Nation as Societal Community

In modern Western history, the focus of the differentiation of the societal community lay in the emergence of the nation, hence of "nationalism." Obviously, a similar process is now going on in

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many parts of the world in the formation of the "new nations." There are three aspects of the emergence of the nation which I should like to note and then briefly spell out for the American case.

The first is the differentiation of criteria for belonging to the nation in contrast to membership in the more "primordial" kinship-ethnic and, often, religious groupings. Here the change is toward the establishment of *associational* criteria. In the case of a total society, as politically organized, it is impossible for membership to be entirely voluntary for all, but it can move very far in this direction, that is, away from a purely ascriptive basis, and has done so. More importantly the status of citizenship comes to be institutionalized in terms independent of the ascriptive criteria just cited, for it concerns above all the "natural rights" so fundamental to American tradition.

Second, the nation is differentiated from its government. This is *not* to say they are dissociated. Rather, this differentiation involves the development of political independence by the societal community so that it is no longer ascribed to any particular governmental leadership, such as hereditary monarchy with full executive authority. The obverse of this development is that government becomes structurally independent in that it is free to mobilize within the society those resources which are relatively fluid, for example, in establishing an appointive civil service free of more particularistic ties and in soliciting support from a range of different groups in the constituency.

Finally, the differentiation of the societal community as nation involves a shift of the integration of the three elements, community, ascriptive bases, and government, in the direction of a synthesis of citizenship and territoriality. This is necessary because the individual is anchored in residential ties, even though there is high residential mobility, because work as well as residence is located physically, and because the availability of resources is territorially anchored.[5]

For the United States, as for many other countries, the consolidation of nationhood was directly connected with a struggle for political independence. It may be said that there was sufficient ethnic and religious uniformity to make solidarity possible, but enough diversity to favor a major shift toward the associational basis of that solidarity, as compared with the European analogues. The core was surely white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant (WASP). The Negroes, most of whom were slaves, were not included, and the

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Catholic, Dutch, and Jewish minorities were so small as to be structurally almost negligible. However, one of the three components, the religious, had built-in diversity in that there were many Protestant denominations.[6] And, in spite of the prominent involvement of the Anglican church in the colonies, the non-Anglican majority was understandably reluctant to countenance an Anglican Establishment, particularly because of the latter's obvious relation to England.

On the side of values, two particularly important components were the influence of the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on assuring the rights of individuals independently of their ascriptive involvements, and the fact that the most important religious groups involved were in the same broad tradition, which we tend to call "liberal Protestantism" today. The Bill of Rights is the central institutional embodiment of these components.[7]

The new American Union was, however, a *federal* union of a special sort. Though the Constitution prescribed a Republican form of government as well as other universalistic patterns, especially through the Bill of Rights, the states could and did, serve as a strong protector of the particularistic groups and institutions at many levels, from the South's "peculiar institution" before the Emancipation Proclamation and the 13th Amendment to local power interests, police power, and the conservative interpretation of the 14th Amendment.[8] Today we are acutely aware of how hard it has been to overcome the conception that the state was somehow "sovereign" and that we were only a confederation of states, not a federal state. In view of the difficulties of maintaining the Union, not only in the Civil War crisis, but also earlier,[9] it seems probable that this "concession" to state particularism was necessary in order to establish a union at all—*vide* the length of time it took Rhode Island to decide to join.

The essential consequence for our problem is that this version of federalism drastically limited the extent to which universalistic values and normative principles, formulated most conspicuously in the Bill of Rights, could be applied to the regulation of relations internal to a large variety of groups and collectivities. The extension of this jurisdiction has been a long process and is still far from complete. The most visible aspect of the process has been legal, based above all on the post-Civil War Amendments, the 14th and 15th. The legal process has been both cause and effect of a broader process of structural change in the society, several aspects of which will

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figure in the following discussion. A major force in this process is further societal *differentiation* in many fields, such as property rights and the development of new institutions regulating marriage and education.

Some of the same circumstances established quite firmly the mutual independence of government and the national community. This was a phase which underlay another main source of American strains, namely, the suspicion between the private sector and government. This has had a long-run influence on the Negro problem by minimizing certain kinds of private business support for public action in favor of the Negro. On the whole, the differentiation proceeded faster and further here than in Europe, a fact which has, on balance, contributed positively to the inclusion of the Negro as well as other groups which were originally excluded. The reason for this judgment is that the relatively open and pluralistic situation, although it provided opportunity for much obstruction, has served as a structural base for challenging and overcoming the obstruction. Above all, such structural changes as industrialization and urbanization, which ultimately undermined the obstacles, were favored.

Finally, the new nation began with a unified, territorially based control of resources and of rights, a factor which eventually contributed to the integration of its societal community. The Constitution guaranteed economic unity by prohibiting tariffs between the states and by allowing no limitations on the movement of citizens. Inherent in this guarantee was a general bias against the consolidation of local and regional particularism, even though other powerful forces worked toward it. This was of special importance because it existed in the early phase of a unique opportunity—that of occupying a territorial area of continental scope. The integration of the pattern of citizenship with that of territory in all areas under American control created a relatively uniform standard of citizenship. This meant not the neglect of sectional interests, but the positive establishment of a pattern covering all regions. The special case of the South will, of course, occupy much of our attention.

As Lipset has pointed out,[10] the United States originated as a "new nation" in a way broadly similar to those which have been emerging in our own time. It achieved independence from colonial status. It approached the pattern of association of people who came to implement their own values and goals more closely than could older nations, but it had sufficient initial cultural homogeneity to

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achieve its initial integration, not without serious internal struggles, but still with a certain effectiveness. This "liberal" tradition, especially as expressed in the Bill of Rights, provided a basis for other groups, culturally and ethnically more distant from those predominant in the founding generations, to be included in the national community.

The consolidation of that community and the advancement of the process of differentiation of the society to the point that a strong national government could take precedence over local, state, and regional particularisms took a long time. Though the most serious crisis was settled by the outcome of the Civil War, as Samuel Beer has made clear, a new phase began in the period of the New Deal.[11] In part, this was a result of our wider sense of national responsibility in world affairs following our involvement in the First World War. As we shall see, it was not unimportant that the process of inclusion of the "new immigration" reached its culmination at the same time that the Democratic party attained its new position of power in the New Deal era. It was not fortuitous that the same transitional period saw the predominant Negro political allegiance shift from the Republicans to the Democrats.

As not only the first, but probably by now the most "mature," of the "new" nations, the United States has, as Lipset emphasizes, a special opportunity to serve as a symbol of the movement of national "liberation" and to assume a role of leadership in this context. This role, in turn, has been intimately connected with the internal structure of the society with respect to liberty and equality. Of these internal standards, those of ethnicity and religion are particularly important. Unfortunately, the American role in international leadership has been severely compromised in the last generation by our competition and conflict with the Communist movement. Our hypersensitivity to the threat of internal subversion places us in danger of being identified internationally with the older European "colonial" powers and their imperialism. The relationship of these issues to race and color is patent. The suggestion will be made in this paper that the movement for inclusion of the Negro into full citizenship in the national community may prove to be a crucial aspect of this complex set of processes, and may present a great opportunity to claim a place of fuller leadership in this setting. This movement, as Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson show in their paper in this volume, has been stimulated largely by the rise of new

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nonwhite nations, particularly those of Africa. It is, however, my thesis that its *main* impetus has been internal to the development of American society itself. If the movement, and the forces which favor it in the white community, can succeed substantially, this may prove to have momentous international repercussions. I shall return to this theme at the end of the paper.

I shall conclude this introduction with a brief theoretical discussion. The process by which previously excluded groups attain full citizenship or membership in the societal community will, in this paper, be called *inclusion*. This is, as will be shown presently, a highly complex process. It will be argued that, at least under the conditions which have prevailed in American society, this has been intimately linked with the process of differentiation which has produced an increasingly *pluralistic* social structure. Not only are there many subcollectivities within the societal community, but the typical individual participates through membership in an increasingly wide variety. If interest is centered in *ethnic* groups, membership is necessarily by hereditary ascription.[12] In religious affiliation, a larger voluntary element is common, but most religious affiliations, at least to the larger groups, are *de facto* hereditary and often closely associated with ethnicity.

In a pluralistic social structure, membership in an ethnic or religious group does not determine *all* of the individual's social participations. His occupation, education, employing organization, and political affiliation may in varying degrees be independent of his ethnicity or religion. On the whole, the trend of American development has been toward increasing pluralism in this sense and, hence, increasing looseness in the connections among the components of total social status.

This trend has one particularly important implication for our purposes, namely, that it is essential to make a clear distinction between *inclusion* and *assimilation*. There may be pluralism of religious and ethnic groups among full citizens which cuts across many other involvements of the same people. The prototype was the original religious pluralism within the white Protestant group, which was built into the constitutional structure by the separation of Church and State and by religious toleration and freedom. It has subsequently been extended to include Jews and Catholics through what is usually called an "ecumenical" process.

However, because the United States was originally primarily a

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white Protestant society, it was often thought that inclusion was synonymous with becoming Protestant or as similar as possible to the Anglo-Saxon tradition. The developments which will be outlined below make it quite clear that this is not the case for the other white groups, and I shall argue that it need not and probably will not be so for the Negro. Full inclusion and multiple role participation are compatible with the maintenance of distinctive ethnic and/or religious identity, though not in the sense which is the obverse of exclusion, namely self-imposed isolation as in the case of extreme Jewish Orthodoxy.

The Components of Citizenship

T. H. Marshall, in his discussion of the development of citizenship in Great Britain noted above, distinguished three components of the status of citizenship, the *civil* (which in an American reference should perhaps be called legal), the *political*, concerned particularly with the democratic franchise, and the *social*, which refers essentially to the context we defined as "welfare" or, in the terms of our federal organization, health, education, and welfare.

Marshall establishes an important pattern of temporal sequence in the institutionalization of these three components as criteria of membership in the English national community: the civil came first, the political next, and the social last. In England, the establishment of civil rights in this relatively narrow sense was started at the time of Justice Coke in the early seventeenth century, with its consolidation of the independence of the Common Law vis-à-vis government, and extended in various phases through the eighteenth century. The political component began to emerge with the beginning of the development of the parliament's independence from the crown in the seventeenth century, which culminated in 1688. However, for the individual, its institutionalization centered in the franchise extensions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—from the Reform Bill of 1832 to the Women's Suffrage Act of 1918. The social component goes back to the factory acts of the nineteenth century, but gathered force in the social legislation of the present century, culminating in the enactment of the Beveridge Plan after World War II. With appropriate adaptations this pattern is applicable both to the American experience as a whole and to that of the Negro.

Before entering into this, further explanation of the meaning of these components is necessary. The civil or legal component con-

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cerns the *application* of the value system to the relevant context. This is what is particularly salient in the context of the term, *rights*. Rights indicate that members of the societal community in the normative sense "must" enjoy certain basic freedoms and securities in them. The catalogue is of course familiar. It involves security of each individual and of property, freedom of speech, religion, assembly, and association, and both substantive and procedural equality before the law—components formulated in our Constitutional tradition as "equal protection of the laws" and "due process of law." These rights are to take precedence over any particular political status or interest and over any social component such as wealth or poverty, prominence or obscurity.

It is a very long step from the constitutional and legal enactment of these rights to their effective implementation, and this process is still going on in many sectors of American society, even in some which are largely unrelated to the racial problem. But, the constitutional basis of these rights is firmly established and has served as the most important lever for exerting pressure during the earlier stages of the Negro inclusion movement. The special role of the N.A.A.C.P. has been to exploit this aspect of our citizenship structure in behalf of the Negro.

The political component concerns participation in collective goal-attainment, at the societal level in the processes of government. The differentiation of government from the societal community, as noted above, implies that the average citizen is neither a governmental functionary in any usual sense nor a totally controlled subject of his government. He does, however, have rights of participation in the governmental process. These crystallize at two main points in modern politics. One is the franchise, basically the right of a formal voice in the selection of leadership—leadership being a more generalized and practicable focus than specific policies, which are decided by referendum. The other is the right to attempt to influence policy, starting with the rights of free speech and assembly, but extending to the sensitive area of "lobbying." As mediating structures, the party system and the institutionalization of mass media became involved here. The body of citizens needs "spokesmen," the potential influencer needs media for making his wishes and their gratifications known, and leaders need structural outlets for their opinions, appeals, and proposals.

The social component does not concern the opportunity to express and implement the rights derived from the societal values so

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much as the resources and capacities necessary for this implementation. In this connection the societal community defines and presents standards for the allocation of resources to the community as a whole and to its various sub-sectors. The obverse of this is the definition of the terms on which capacities, as matched with opportunities, can be involved in the process of inclusion. This is a special context of the problem of "qualifying" for inclusion.

There are two categories of resources which must be distinguished for our purposes. In our achievement-oriented society, one can scarcely imagine that justice would prevail if large classes of its members, through no fault of their own, were either denied opportunity for achievement (including the reaping of its rewards) or handicapped severely in gaining access to it. Given the formal status of equality in civil or legal rights and in basic political participation, these rights can be "empty" if opportunity is not equalized.

Of course, discrimination may be abolished or minimized across a whole range of opportunities, particularly in employment. But even absence of discrimination is "empty" if remediable handicaps continue to prevail. These handicaps may be randomly distributed among the categorial grouping with which this discussion is primarily concerned. But if they are linked to the status position of the excluded group, they raise the essential problem of the implementation of the rights of citizenship through the equalization of opportunity and the base from which that opportunity can be exploited.

This is where the distinction between the two categories of resources becomes essential. The first category is mainly financial. For an individual to be able to take advantage of available opportunities he must have not only the capacity but also the financial means to do so. This aspect of the social citizenship complex was paramount in the discussions and measures of public policy during the New Deal era. The second concerns the underlying capacity of the units, especially individuals and their families, to function effectively in the environment in which they are placed. At the level of the individual this concerns above all health and education. There has been so much discussion of all these themes that it is not necessary to spell them out further here. Suffice it to say that, first, increasing attention is being placed on education as the most decisive link between the individual's underlying levels of capacity and his relation to the opportunity structure.[13] Second, the concept of

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"welfare" is a diffuse one extending from the most elementary financial conditions of subsistence to the problem of the structure of the social environment in which disadvantaged groups are placed. This latter extension reflects the fact, firmly established by social science, that at the bottom of the social scale (as judged by the usual criteria of success, prestige, and so on) there is a vicious circle of cumulative *disadvantage,* the more marked the "competitiveness" of the society becomes. This broad tendency is inseparable from the development of individualism, the kinds of citizenship rights we have been talking about, and related matters. It almost goes without saying that the Negro in this country is very deeply caught up in this vicious circle and that Marshall's category of social citizenship is particularly important in the present context.[14]

The three principal components of the citizenship complex seem to constitute not only a rough temporal series, but also a type of hierarchy. With all the differences between British and American societies, they have very similar values. After all, with an important infusion from the French Enlightenment and the Revolutionary tradition, the origin of our own values lies mainly in our British heritage.

We can then say that it is the civil or legal rights which come closest to direct implementation of the values which Myrdal formulated in his famous summary of the *"American Creed."*[15] In understanding what has been going on, it is crucial to remember that the societal commitment to this value pattern has exerted steady pressure toward its implementation in behavior and institutions, though this has often been counteracted in specific ways. These commitments, though they be genuine, cannot by themselves bring about a restructuring of the society. Attempts to implement them will inevitably encounter what Mayhew[16] has called "structural discrimination," which can be overcome only if factors other than the assertion of commitments come into play. Without them, the outcome will be either a stalemate, as it was for so long in the United States, or a traditionalist revolution restoring the ascendancy of the contravalue orientation—a prototype being post-Reconstruction Southern society.

The spread and consolidation of the legal component through judicial process rather than legislation is particularly important in view of the present situation in America. This is a step well beyond a *moral* commitment to the relevant rights, because it places the

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power of government presumptively behind their implementation. In Little Rock, Governor Faubus was defying not only the "decent opinion of mankind," but also a specific order of a duly constituted federal court. This dramatizes the sense in which the 1954 decision on education was a decisive landmark—yet by itself it produced only a rather paltry "tokenism" in spite of being on the books for a full decade. Clearly something more was required, though this is not to belittle the enormous importance of the legal commitment. This Supreme Court decision was part of a much larger trend in the general development of judicial interpretation of the Constitution, of which more will be said later.

The two other principal factors are, on the one hand, the mobilization of political pressures designed to insure that the excluded group can enjoy both formal rights and actual participation in the political process and, on the other, the mobilization of the governmental apparatus to take the responsibility of implementing these rights. From this point of view, the step from the Supreme Court's espousal of Negro rights to the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 was crucial, as has so often been remarked. Both, to be sure, obligate the government. But in the latter case the obligation has been enacted by the elected representatives of the people on the recommendation of a popularly elected President. Hence it can no longer be called the "whim" of nine men who, in the political as distinguished from the legal sense, do not "represent" anyone.[17] Of course there are still many steps which must be taken before effective implementation can be achieved, but the Civil Rights Acts clearly add a major set of social forces to the side of effective implementation.

Even if enforcement were effective, it would still be necessary to bring about the essential set of conditions concerned with qualifications for taking advantage of the opportunities offered. The newly included group must have the capacity to perform its role creditably. The mere statement that justice requires inclusion is not enough because allegations of injustice must involve the capacity factor—namely, that the excluded group could make valuable contributions but is denied the opportunity to do so. Capacity must be asserted on the part of the excluded group, and, insofar as it is not yet present, the larger community must take steps to help develop it.

The hierarchy to which we referred above concerns a relation between necessary and sufficient conditions. With reference to the Negro in the United States, I state broadly that although the insti-

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tutionalization of both legal rights and political participation constitutes the necessary conditions of much further progress toward full inclusion in the societal community, this is not in itself sufficient. It also requires the implementation of the social component in such a way that the realistic handicaps, so conspicuous in the background, are reduced to the point that, though they cannot be expected to disappear in the short run, they become more or less manageable.

The constitution of a societal community is never static, but is continually changing over time. In my view, the main outline of the American community was established in the broad process of founding the new nation. This basic outline includes the Constitution as well as various aspects of the system as a total social process. At the same time, American society has been subject to major changes. The focus of the present essay is on changes in the composition of its membership through the inclusion of groups previously excluded, more or less unambiguously, from full membership. The Negro, both because of slavery and because of Southern reggional isolation, was long kept insulated from the forces favoring inclusion. The groups with which I shall be concerned in the next section, those constituted by the "new immigration" of the turn of the century, were in a different situation.

I shall attempt to analyze the process of inclusion by using a model roughly similar to the "supply and demand" paradigm of economics. There are demands for inclusion—*both* from the excluded group and from certain elements who are already "in"—and there is a supply, which also operates on both sides of the exclusion line. Supply here refers, for the excluded groups, to their qualifications for membership, a matter of their cultural and social structures. Later I shall use the illustration that fully orthodox Judaism, with its rather strong insulation against all but the most instrumental contacts with Gentiles, constituted a formidable barrier to the inclusion of Jews in the American community. The presence of Reform Judaism in the German immigration which preceded that from Eastern Europe provided a focus for the general liberalization of the Jewish community structure. This made it far more amenable to inclusion than the Orthodox structure, as well as far more acceptable to their American hosts. On the side of the receiving community, "supply" consists in structural conditions which create institutionalized "slots" into which the newly received elements can fit, slots structured in accordance with the basic citizenship pat-

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terns of the developing community, not opportunities for crude "exploitation" by its members. Supply in this sense refers to a set of structural conditions on both sides of the "equation." This will be analyzed in terms of the factors necessary to extend and consolidate the societal community as such, that is, the commitment to association in a national community, the mobilization of political power and influence, and the establishment of the capacities which have been reviewed in the present section, as well as the underlying value-patterns which are assumed throughout.

The demand aspect concerns the *mobilization* of these factors and their consequences, again on both sides of the inclusion-exclusion boundary. It is a matter first of the existence of attitudes, in both the group "wanting in" and significant sectors of those already in, that the inclusion is normatively desirable and that it *should* be promoted, and then the transformation of these attitudes into various action programs and their implementation. Certainly, much of the actual process often occurs inconspicuously without much of a movement—this, for example, seems to have been the case for much of the inclusion of the new immigration, though by no means all of it. Nevertheless, as expression and implementation of demand in the present sense, the relevant *movements* have a very important place in our analysis.

Such movements tend to gather strength as the strain of conflict between the normative requirements for inclusion and the factual limitations on it are translated into pressures to act. Movements, however, not only express strain in this sense, but "stir things up" further. Thus, their consequences are often relatively unpredictable.[18] One tendency of this type of movement should be noted. The ultimate social grounding of the demand for inclusion lies in commitment to the values which legitimize it. The general reaction to increasing strain is to increase mobilization of such commitments. This in turn is often associated with a demand for direct, immediate, and complete action to implement the values in full. This tendency encounters a problem deriving from the fact that value-commitment, crucial as it is, is only one of the factors necessary for successful inclusion. Strengthening this factor without likewise strengthening the others may lead not to promotion of the "cause," but to a disproportionate activation of the *always-present* factors of resistance, and hence to setbacks. The activists in such movements are above all likely to become impatient with those who would pay attention to the importance of the other factors.[19]

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This is the broad paradigm which the reader is requested to keep in mind in reading the sometimes involved discussion which follows.

The American Record on Inclusion Processes

The present crisis over the inclusion of the Negro in the American community has unique features besides its immediacy,[20] but it does not stand alone. A brief review of the larger context of related problems may prove illuminating. Two propositions will introduce the discussion. First as already noted, the core of the American community was basically white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant. These three terms, which have become so deeply embedded in the more popular culture, will serve as the axes of our analysis. Second, the United States, in sharp contrast to most of Europe, including our ancestral Britain, has been the proverbial land of open opportunity, welcoming all to join in building a new society in the "New World."

To be sure, this claim was never fully justified. Quite early it was made unmistakably clear that mass Oriental immigration would not be welcomed (note the Chinese exclusion act of 1882). Indeed it may be argued that the Constitutional termination of the Slave Trade was as much an effort to limit the numbers of Negroes in the territorial United States as it was a reflection of hostility to slavery as such. Nevertheless, compared with other societies, especially of that time, the U.S. was notably liberal until the 1924 immigration laws. It placed more emphasis than any other nation of, or before, its time on the view that it was indeed a voluntary association. People were here because either they or their immediate forebears *wanted* to come. And, the proportion of those who came of their own volition was extremely high for quite a long time. The fact that many were escaping from what they felt to be oppressive conditions rather than coming to positive opportunities does not change this pattern. The Negro is the great exception, because his forebears were typically *brought* here as slaves.

Though various early crises of the American nation may be related to this problem, the focus of this discussion will be on the aftermath of the great wave of free immigration of the generation ending with the First World War. This was perhaps, except for the Negro, *the* great test of the norms of freedom for all comers to associate in forming a new kind of nation.[21] Most of the immigrants were a part of the so-called new immigration from Eastern and

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Southern Europe, and as such they violated more sharply than previous large immigrations the older WASP formula for the societal community; they were not only non-Anglo-Saxon, but even non-Germanic in ethnic origin, being mostly from the Latin and Slavic countries (especially Italy and Poland). Also they were predominantly Roman Catholic, except for the very large influx of Jews from Eastern Europe. In addition, the Catholics were usually peasants. Earlier, there had been a small element of German Jews, who had become relatively fully included and a larger group of English-speaking Catholics, the Irish, who were marked by a particularly sharp hostility to everything English. These two elements proved in the end to be very important mediators between the older elements and the larger masses of the new.

In this connection the WASP's generally succumbed to the temptation to define their own role on rather aristocratic terms, but on bases so tenuous that they must be considered only a pseudo-aristocracy. This occurred during the period immediately following World War I when economic prosperity was rampant and when "status-seeking" was certainly far more intensive than in the second postwar period. This is the period of the derogatory names like "wops," "polacks," and "kikes," and of the greatest prevalence of "snobbish" anti-Semitism, the deep feeling that having a Jew as a member of your club was totally unacceptable. (It is perhaps significant that such snobbishness was particularly prominent in the younger generation—in fraternities and sororities, and particularly in the Harvard Final Clubs.)

At the risk of typological oversimplification, I should like to deal with the problem of inclusion of the new immigration in terms of two categories, namely, the Jewish and the Catholic groups. It is clear that there is substantial ethnic diversity within both groups. There are not only East European Jews, who are not themselves homogenous, but also the earlier German contingent and small numbers of Spanish-Portuguese origin. The Catholic group is still more diverse. The Irish were the earliest to arrive in large numbers and have been the most influential. They spoke English, a fact which is significant particularly because they discouraged and often as bishops forbade foreign-language parochial schools. Though bringing with them a strong hostility to things English, which was reflected for generations in their tense relations with the WASP's, their long association in Ireland with English Protestantism brought

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the Irish brand of Catholicism much closer to Protestantism than, for example, was that of most parts of Southern Europe.

Furthermore, an important part of the earlier Catholic immigration was of German origin, which was ethnically closer to the WASP's than most of the new immigration, and therefore was more fully integrated earlier. In some regions of the country, particularly the Middle West, they have played a very important part. The other two largest groups were the Italians and the Poles, which are very different from each other. There were, of course, other Slavic groups, such as the Czechs and Croats, and the two Spanish-speaking groups in the Southwest—those taken over after the Mexican war and migrants from Mexico—and, more recently, the Puerto Ricans, who have begun to diffuse beyond New York City. There are also smaller numbers which are neither Jewish nor Catholic, such as the Greeks, the Armenians, and some other groups who adhere to Orthodox churches. Finally, Protestant immigration has continued, the largest being from the British Isles and still more from English-speaking Canada.

The problem of the absorption of Jews and Catholics resulted in a genuine crisis of the American community; it was probably one of the major foci of social tension and disturbance in this century. The Immigration Act of 1924, with its system of quotas based on the composition of the population by national origin in 1890, was one striking symptom of this strain; it is significant that only now is there a serious and widely supported proposal before Congress to eliminate that egregiously discriminatory policy. The very sagacious French observer of American society at that time, André Siegfried, spoke of the "two nations" and expressed sharp doubt whether they could ever be integrated.[22]

The substantial disturbances and anxieties over the presence of such large "foreign" groups in our midst and their relations to the fears of "un-American" influence and of Communism—from the Palmer Raids and the Sacco-Vanzetti case of the 1920's to the McCarthy episode of the early 1950's—must be understood in this context.[23] Until the crescendo of McCarthyism, the ogre of "Communism" as a danger of *internal* subversion rather than of external threat was increasingly of central concern. Nevertheless it can be claimed that the main crisis over full inclusion of these groups has now passed. I shall argue that the Catholic case was the more serious of the two, and that the election of John F. Kennedy as President, accentuated by the ritual significance of the public reaction

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to his assassination, put a final symbolic seal on the inclusion of all Roman Catholics, not only the Irish. Perhaps it was also symbolic that the first time Lyndon Johnson left Washington as President was to attend the funeral of a Jew, in a Jewish Temple, namely, that of former Senator Lehman of New York.

Neither civil rights in the legal sense nor political rights was seriously at issue in these inclusion problems. The Jewish ghetto and the status of Catholics in Britain before Catholic emancipation in the 1830's lay far in the background. The problem of acceptance lay more at the social level in the above classification than at either of the others. This we would define as the capacity and opportunity for full participation without informal discrimination, such as ineligibility for certain high political offices or relatively systematic "scapegoating." Nevertheless the problem of discrimination has been serious and, though recently it has changed greatly for the better, pockets of such discrimination remain.

It is necessary to consider briefly a difference in emphasis and, hence, symbolic involvement of these two particularly important white groups, the Jews and the Catholics. Realistically, there has never been much question of Jewish motivation and capacity for achievement in terms of social mobility in America. This applies especially to mobility through educational channels. In any case, the Jewish group, despite having had to contend with serious discrimination, has had an extraordinary success story. From lowly origins in the overwhelming proportion of cases, it has, in general, risen very high in the American social scale in about two-thirds of a century.

The Jewish problem of inclusion has been almost purely one of "acceptance" on both sides. In comparative terms, there has been relatively little serious anti-Semitism, but the Jewish community itself has been concerned about how far "assimilation" should be allowed to progress. The symbolic focus of anti-Semitism has not questioned competence—the Jew has been a *dangerous* competitor. Irrational anxiety has centered about his observance of the rules, which is to say his acceptance of the obligations of solidarity in the national community. To the more discerning, his "unscrupulousness" has not involved a lack of moral discipline, but rather a higher loyalty to an alternative community, the Jewish. In this sense the Jew has often been considered "clannish."

The Jewish community has always been of a special type. It has been a "guest" community within a host society and, therefore,

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notably apolitical. Its contacts with Gentiles have historically been on the economic level, with strong Jewish emphasis on their own cultural traditions—including, of course, high valuation of learning which could be transferred to the modern professions. Strong solidarity and, in Orthodox Judaism, exclusiveness have been observed in kinship and, indeed, in all relations of intimacy. Jewish communities have been discrete and local, not organized on a national or international basis, and relatively egalitarian in their internal structure.

It seems that the conflict between Jewish and Gentile communities has been most acute where the former represented what could be interpreted as the exploitative aspect of urban society vis-à-vis the rural and parochial, as in the case of Jewish moneylenders or cattle dealers in relation to peasant communities or where, in urban settings, competition at the level of small business was most prominent.

The decline in the proportion of the American population engaged in agriculture and the development of large-scale corporate business have probably contributed to a climate favorable to inclusion. On this level the competition has not been very intense since Jewish business has centered in the small-scale proprietary fields of small business—notably the clothing industry—and certain fields of retail trade. It is very likely that the private practice professions, such as medicine and law, have been particularly congenial to the Jews who have sought higher education and that their late entry into the academic profession on a wide scale is not wholly the result of discriminatory exclusion, though that has certainly played a part.

The focus of the "problem" of anti-Semitism has been the conception of the foreignness of the Jews, of their solidarity in a community within the community, from which Gentiles could feel excluded. The pluralization of the general social structure, especially at occupational levels, and the diminishing global exclusiveness of the Jewish communities have set the stage for the progress of inclusion, since many of these groups have maintained their quite distinctive identities and considerable sense of solidarity, both among themselves and with the societies of their countries of origin.

The present essay cannot, however, attempt a generalized analysis of the ethnic and religious composition of American society, but is primarily focused on the problem of the status of the Negro American. It is my contention that, first, the Jewish group has had

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special significance because of its distinctive historic role and, second, the Catholic groups have been of great importance in spite of the internal ethnic diversity of the Catholic population. It is worth remarking in passing that the largest single "melting pot" in the society has probably operated within the Catholic population through extensive ethnic intermarriage, but much less so across religious lines. Within the Catholic group, the Irish have played a notable role for the reasons mentioned, with the result, among others, that there is a striking Irish predominance in the hierarchy of the American Catholic Church. For the limited purposes of this essay, I shall concentrate on these two considerations which have become the foci of two different problems and symbolic themes which can be contrasted with each other, as well as with the central issue of the Negro case.

The Jew could then be a good citizen, neighbor, business competitor, and occupational associate of the Protestant with neither relinquishing his religious identity. Religious pluralization—long under way in our society—opens the door to a conception of a basis of societal solidarity which makes all these nondiscriminatory relations possible. On the Jewish side, it should again be noted that a relaxation of the predominantly Orthodox separatism of the Jewish subcommunity has been a necessary condition. In America, the Reform movement, which stemmed from the older German-Jewish element, has been particularly important. Primarily by further development in the differentiation of roles, it has become increasingly possible for Jews to participate in more than the economic aspects of the Gentile community without having to relinquish their Jewishness. From a relatively total subsocietal community, the Jewish group has tended to evolve toward becoming a denomination in the American Protestant sense.[24] Socially, American Jews have been included very fully, but have by no means been assimilated to the same extent.[25]

In the symbolism of discrimination, the Jew has tended to serve as the prototype of "foreignness," in the sense that it is diffusely attached to a community separate from and alien to the American, and therefore presumably untrustworthy in its commitment to the latter. Compared to certain European countries, notably Germany, but also those to the South and East, the United States has had only mild attacks of anti-Semitism. The most serious was in the 1930's (Father Coughlin) and was associated with a general contraction of economic opportunity, a state in which the theme of the dan-

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gerous competition of the outsider is more easily made prominent. The more important expression of this complex has perhaps been the diffuse anxiety about foreignness and un-Americanism. The prominence of this theme would seem to fit with an earlier phase of the development of the national community away from a restricted ethnic-religious basis of solidarity—the famous WASP—to a more cosmopolitan one which includes many elements not qualifying on the more traditional grounds.

The next phase of strain in the openness of the American community constituted a further development of the above. If "foreigners" in general—Jews in particular—are to be accepted, should they not conform to certain requirements? In the Jewish-Protestant case there seemed to be a kind of "fair exchange," involving the non-political stance of diffusely organized communal groups on each side. The idea of a Jewish conspiracy was a rather exotic extreme of anti-Semitic phantasy since the Jews were what they were precisely because of their withdrawal from politically significant organization. One might say much the same for the American brand of Protestantism, especially that part which advocated a radical separation of Church and State. On top of this was the pluralism of American political organization, the beginnings of which go back as far as the history of this nation.[26]

It is perhaps not surprising that *any* relatively or apparently monolithic organization should be a focus of anxiety. Compared with American Protestantism, the Catholic Church was relatively monolithic and in part both was and appeared to be so because of defensive attitudes about its minority position in American society. The problem for its members was not only how far they participated in the usual roles in the American community, but also whether, in doing so, they were under the explicit authoritative control of an organization, their church, which was pursuing its own goals and policies independently of, and posssibly in conflict with, the interests of the American community. Put crudely, the Catholic Church could, particularly to non-Catholic Americans, appear to be a kind of state within the state. Sensitivity to this has been heightened by the individualistic cast of American society, with its suspicion of strong central government. Indeed, for special reasons, Catholics, particularly Irish, tended to gain their mobility through governmental channels, starting with the local ones, but extending to the others. Hence they tended to strengthen Protestant suspicion

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of them. For this reason the symbolic show-down in the election of a Catholic to the Presidency was particularly important.

Two additional facts, besides the nature and position of the Catholic Church, were essential here. First, as will be noted presently, the majority of the Catholic ex-peasants formed the urban lower class. In a sense they played symbolic "proletariat" to the WASP pretensions to privileged social status, a peculiar combination of the European traditions of aristocratic and "bourgeois." Second, the protection of local interests in our constitutional system opened the door, given the democratic franchise (reinforced by corruption), to organizing these new urban masses into the famous —or infamous—political machines of which New York's Tammany Hall was long a prototype. In the decisive period the leadership of these organizations, which tended to wrest immediate local political power away from the WASP element, was predominantly Irish and, of course, Catholic. Hence at a certain level—a highly salient one to the average "old" American—the Catholic Church as a state within a state seemed to have fused with an actual Catholic control of the most important system of local politics of the nation, thus compounding the felony.

The general path of resolution here has been "pluralization" in a political sense. Generally we do not have monolithic or, as Rokkan and Lipset say, "columnar"[27] blocs as major units in our political system. By their continually increasing involvement in American society at all levels, Catholics have come to be widely represented in many different sectors. They are by no means always on the same side in political decision-making. In view of the European experience, it is striking that there has been no strong move to establish a Catholic political party in the United States at either the state or national level. Obversely, the non-Catholic community has been decreasingly apt to relate to Catholics as Catholics rather than on the various other grounds, especially personal competence in specific fields, which come to be so important in the allocation of personnel through the social structure.

Whereas the integration of the Jewish group seems to have been the "simplest," at least symbolically, in that it involved only the "capacity to accept membership," sometimes through renouncing but more importantly through transcending conflicting solidarities,[28] the present case involved a further complication, namely, that the group in question might have a propensity to organize within the community for its own special ends in a way subversive of the com-

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munity's delicately balanced basis of consensus. This seems clearly to be related to the more general symbol of "Communism" as a source of vague danger. The Communist system is precisely characterized by maximal commitment to effectiveness through collective organization.

What I called the American hypersensitivity to the Communist danger is connected with the problem of inclusion of the Catholic groups. The link between them is highly integrated political organization, internally on a nationwide basis but with an international base centered outside the country. It is particularly significant that the fear in the United States has been primarily of internal subversion. This may have been somewhat plausible in the 1930's, but in the cold war period the strength of the American Communist party had been reduced to practically nothing, even among intellectuals. There is a discrepancy between this internal anxiety—firmly documented in Stouffer's study[29]—and the substantially smaller concern about the really serious conflict with Communist movements in foreign affairs. Communism, however, is a symbol, the latent meanings of which include various forms of collective authority which may be felt to threaten freedom—among which the Catholic Church has figured prominently. Therefore, we can infer that the fear of Communism includes a "displaced affect," the sources of which must be sought elsewhere.

Not only was there the problem of the Catholic Church, but the relevant period, from the New Deal on, was one of rapid increase in the size and functions of the federal government. It is notable that the main internal focus of this increase lay in the strengthening of the social component of citizenship which concerned the status of the largely immigrant urban lower classes. Externally, it derived, above all, from involvement in two world wars and the attendant changes in the level of American responsibility in world affairs.

In these circumstances, anti-Communism could serve as a unifying symbol for two important groups, namely the older "conservative" groups who stood in fear of and opposition to the general trend to "bigness," urbanization, and the like, and the upwardly mobile, largely Catholic, groups. The latter could claim to be more than one hundred per cent American and accuse the "liberal" elements among the WASP's of insufficient loyalty to their own country. The strongly anti-Communist stance of the Vatican before the Papacy of John XXIII presumably also strengthened this attitude.[30]

In spite of the complexities, I think it is justified to establish an

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equation that connects Communism symbolically with Catholicism, on the one hand, and with big government, on the other, as a focus of fears and anxieties of a large sector of the American public. It is significant that the relation to Catholicism seems to have eased greatly in the most recent period, especially since the Presidency of Kennedy. This is related to the new definition of the American Right, that is rightward from Goldwater, as quite explicitly connecting the trend to big government and the danger of Communism. The mitigation of the anti-Communist feeling of the Catholic element—in spite of some lingerings in the South—was fundamental in Lyndon Johnson's ability to command a political consensus over such a wide band as he did in the 1964 election. The inclusion of the Catholic component in the anti-Communist syndrome seems to be parallel to the relation of anti-Semitism, again often latently, to the vaguely generalized anxiety about the "foreignness" of the new immigration as a whole, which was so prominent in the 1920's.

There is another aspect of the broadly "Catholic" inclusion problem which constitutes an important bridge to the Negro problem. The elements of the new immigration not only were different in cultural and national origin from most of their predecessors, but also occupied a different position in American society. Virtually all of them became the lower class of the large cities and industrial areas. The Jewish group escaped from this situation very rapidly, while the Catholic groups, most of whom were of peasant origin, did so more slowly. Indeed this circumstance sharply distinguished the United States from the European cases which were the prototypes for classical Marxian theory—there was hardly any indigenous "working class" here and the lower occupational roles were largely performed by immigrants whose eventual group status in the society was still very uncertain. Siegfried put great stress on this fact. With a good many qualifications, it can be said that the urban Negro has inherited this status as the immigrant has moved up. He, too, is by origin predominantly a "peasant," though from the rural South, and has had to undergo many similar processes of adaptation to the urban environment.

In the Jewish case we might speak of the "foreign" community as standing "beside" the main national one. It was difficult to assign it to a hierarchical position, and it was not highly stratified internally. In proportion as the situation just outlined applied to the Catholic group, it tended to bolster the WASP position as an aristocracy

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in the premodern sense. This tendency was of course most accentuated in the South, particularly vis-à-vis the Negro. But it was hardly unknown in the North. Indeed, the kind of anti-Semitism which has been manifested in the exclusion of Jews from select clubs, college fraternities, residential neighborhoods, and resorts is clearly an example of this. Precisely because the Jew has been such a capable achiever by American standards, he has been excluded in order to assert a claim to a status which is not only, or sometimes not at all, linked to achievement.

In the Catholic group, this has been overcome in part by their achieving admission on the most nearly aristocratic terms. The Kennedy story illustrates this dramatically. The elder Kennedy had great wealth which was linked to local political power by his marriage to the daughter of an Irish mayor of Boston. Then not only did his son achieve political success, ultimately the summit of the Presidency, but he partially joined the circle of the WASP aristocracy by attending Harvard College and developing, with his wife, a style of living which was anything but that of peasants.[31] This is an illustration of the process of pluralization. Increasingly the Catholic populations have diffused through the social structure so that there remains little in common among them but their religion and, of course, their Americanism. The great relative growth in the urban population has helped greatly in this by reducing the distinctiveness of a predominantly urban group. The same applies to the Jews.

It was noted above that, partly in reaction to the new immigration, but also to industrialization and urbanization, the tendency toward the turn of the century and well into the present one was for the WASP's to assume something of the position of an aristocracy—a trend related to "snobbish" anti-Semitism. The Jews did a great deal to discourage this through their striking record of upward mobility, especially in educational achievement, the professions, and, latterly, science and the arts. There have, however, been various symptoms of this such as the conspicuous "Anglo-philism" of the upper groups in this period, which has stood in strong contrast to the Anglophobia of earlier phases of our national existence. The England particularly emphasized was that of the "Establishment," the prestige of Oxford education being a prominent symptom. In this situation, it was natural in the North for there to be greater acceptance of the status of the Negro as belonging to a "service" class in a way not too different from the trends of English colonial practice.

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The upward mobility of the new immigrant groups and their increasing inclusion in the national community tended to isolate the Negro in this capacity—the virtual disappearance of Irish domestic servants is an index. Such changes as the immense broadening of the pyramid of education—so that virtually the whole age cohort has received some secondary education and a rapidly increasing proportion has been going to college and beyond—have tended to alter this situation. Thus the brief tendency to crystallize a predominantly WASP upper class has increasingly given way to a new egalitarianism—one stressing equality of opportunity, rather than of final status, but definitely covering an ever-widening ethnic-religious range. This trend has made the recent status of the Negro even more anomalous and is part of the setting of the recent phase of the inclusion process.

The Negro Case

If the predominantly Catholic part of the new immigration owed its primary status ascription in American society mainly to its lower-class status, for the Negro this has been almost wholly the case. For our purposes, color will be treated not as a direct component of the social status of the Negro—for in strict theoretical terms it is not that—but as a symbol. On relatively concrete levels, it is correct to say that individual Negroes are discriminated against in various ways solely because of their skin color. This statement is not, however, an explanation of the general phenomenon of color discrimination, as distinguished from individual cases. Unfortunately this vital distinction is often not kept firmly in mind. Our concern is with the general phenomenon.

In this context skin color symbolizes inferiority in the sense that it is purported to justify placing Negroes as a category so radically at the bottom of the scale as to be only equivocally inside the system at all. It will perhaps be illuminating to consider the problem first in connection with the difference between the South and the North.[32]

The Civil War broke out about the time of, and partly as a result of, the process of industrialization and urbanization in the North. This accentuated the difference in social structure of which slavery was a primary feature. The South was largely an agrarian society with a planter gentry at the top practicing an aristocratic style of life, and with the great mass of menial labor being done by

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Negro slaves. The principal class whose status was equivocal was the white group which could not pretend to gentry status, but which wanted above all to avoid being classified with the Negroes. It was something like a caste society. Though the slaves were formally emancipated as a result of the South's defeat in the war, the post-Reconstruction reaction confirmed this caste structure with the "Jim Crow" system.

Unlike the Jews and Catholics, the Southern Negro has generally had to start his rise by acquiring the most elementary components of legal and political citizenship. Through court decisions and now increasingly through legislation, this part of the task of inclusion has progressed a long way toward accomplishment. The social component is another matter—inclusion in this area is just beginning to develop, and there is no doubt that it will prove the most difficult of the three processes.

Until the First World War the Negro was scarcely a "problem" in the North, mainly because his numbers were so small. This was changed by the great migrations which began about that time, accelerated by the boll weevil havoc in Southern cotton growing. Of course, this process has now gone so far that less than half the Negro population is resident in the eleven states of the old Confederacy, and the proportion will continue to decline. Moreover, in the South there has been a great deal of migration to the cities, so that the category, Southern rural Negro—once the predominant type—is now a distinct minority.

The upward mobility of the white urban lower groups, the new immigration, has contributed to the fact that, in both North and South, the Negro is predominantly urban and lower class. Today about half of the estimated 20 per cent of Americans who are "the poor" are Negroes.[33] This classifies about 50 per cent of the Negroes as poor, whereas no other group—Irish, Italian, and so forth—has nearly that large a proportion.

In a sense the South has "infected" the North with the virus of the Negro problem, even though its meaning has been deeply changed. It was hardly to have been expected that Southerners would get very much Northern political support for maintaining the Jim Crow system intact. Even the coalition of Southern Democrats and Northern conservative Republicans has been gradually eroded to the point that, with the mounting pressure and certain general changes, it has almost disappeared. However, the "problem" is now

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becoming much more uniform throughout the nation—it is becoming an urban class problem.[34]

As noted above, the Jewish inclusion would probably have been much more difficult had it not been for the type of differentiation process in the economy exemplified by the growth of corporate business, and for the great development of higher education, which opened the doors of the professions to considerable numbers of Jews. Similarly, the pluralization of the political system, the breakup of the city machines as the preserves of specific groups, and the decline of the corresponding "better element" sectors of the political structure have greatly facilitated the inclusion of the Catholic groups. I should like to suggest that the "host society" has been undergoing an important process of structural change which is creating essential conditions for the inclusion not only of the Negro, but of the whole lower class in the societal community.

In an important sense, American society has been protected against the urgency of the class problem by the fact that for so long such a large proportion of its lowest socio-economic groups has been of recent immigrant status, especially in the crucially important cities which have increasingly become the structural focus of the newer society. As noted, upward mobility has greatly alleviated the potential class problems, but they are now being brought to an acute and symbolically appropriate focus by the Negro's becoming the prototypical disadvantaged category.

In the broadest terms the incipient inclusion process depends for its success on the much more effective institutionalization of Marshall's social component of citizenship. However, it comprises new movements with respect to all three of the components. It has, for example, been noted that a most important trend in the Supreme Court decisions of recent years is the extension of the Bill of Rights to the level of the states, especially through re-interpretation of the 14th Amendment.[35] Many of these decisions, such as the school desegregation ruling of 1954, have most notably affected discrimination in the South. Others, however, such as the requirement that indigent defendants accused of crime be provided with counsel (the Gideon case), apply more generally. Furthermore, not only legal rights, in the narrower sense, but also political and social rights are affected. Thus the reapportionment cases profoundly affect the franchise and, with it, the distribution of political power; and the school cases impinge on the social component. They seem to imply that government is obligated to provide adequate educa-

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tional facilities to the whole population—with discrimination by race being only one aspect of the present inadequacy.

Within this framework of legal rights, public policy is attempting to cope with the causes of *de facto* discrimination, not just by color but by any status of inferiority which cannot be fairly attributed to the individual himself. A certain religio-ideological grounding of this first emerged with the prominent Social Gospel movement in American Protestantism in the latter part of the nineteenth century (which, incidentally, had much to do with the establishment of sociology as an academic discipline in this country) and with its role in the development of philanthropy concerned with the disadvantaged classes. The New Deal comprised a second main phase, with the beginning of comprehensive federal social welfare legislation, including the consolidation of the legal status of trade unionism through the Wagner Act and, particularly, unemployment, old age, and other benefits. The opposition of the Supreme Court to such legislation, especially by the states, was also ended in that period. The United States now seems to be well into a third phase. Perhaps its most important feature has been the shift in concern from welfare in the narrower sense to health, education, and the nature of the urban community, focusing most acutely so far upon housing.

By the narrower sense of welfare, I mean that concerned primarily with money income. The older conceptions of lower-class status emphasized lack of financial means as the central feature of being disadvantaged. Hence, stress was put on improvement in financial status. This was reasonable especially when, as in the Great Depression, massive unemployment was the most acute condition needing remedy. However, there has been increasing insight that poverty is a function of other factors such as poor health, both physical and—as has been emphasized more recently—mental, and certain aspects of community structure and the like.

Education has become the most salient link with the occupational system, which is, in turn, the principal basis of financial independence for the individual and his immediate family. There has been a general upgrading of education. On the one hand, this means that larger proportions of the age cohort have been attaining higher levels of education, with the result that the disadvantaged minority, especially the well-known drop-outs, has been separated from the majority with increasing sharpness. On the other hand, educational requirements for good employment have been rising at the same time—most of the present unemployment is found

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among the poorly-qualified groups, and educational qualifications are becoming of increasing importance in holding jobs. It seems that not only formal opportunity for a relatively good education (that is, at least through high school), but also capacity to take advantage of it, both in individual ability and in motivation, is coming to be as much a requisite of full inclusion as civil and voting rights.

Behind this, as treated in much more detail elsewhere in this issue, is the problem of the social environment of the disadvantaged, the "slum." The central concern is the vicious circle of the factors in *actual* inferior capacity for valued performance, in which poverty, bad health, low educational standards, family disorganization, delinquency, and other anti-social phenomena are mutually reinforcing. This is where the structure of the urban community itself becomes a salient problem focus. The new concern centers on the residential community. In this connection attention has been called to the fact that the Negro is disadvantaged, even beyond other slum dwellers, in many senses besides the color of his skin. First and foremost, he has been peculiarly lacking in relatively strong family organization[36] which could give strong psychological support to the individual, especially as a child. Second, this has been connected in turn with a relative weakness in "community" institutions of mutual support and solidarity, for example, of the sort which have preeminently characterized Jewish groups even before they rose significantly from their initial low status in American society. Even as the victim of the most radical discrimination of any group, the Negro has not only been forced to be subservient, but has also failed to develop, or bring with him from his Southern rural past, sufficient ingredients for socially effective self-help—a question not merely of individual qualities and initiative, but of collective solidarity and mutual support at many levels, particularly the family and the local community. The strongest Negro institutions have centered in the churches, a vital complex which must be preserved carefully against some of the disintegrating tendencies of urban life. The role of the churches in the civil rights movement perhaps symbolizes this best and will be commented upon further below.

Some Highlights of the Inclusion Process

It is reasonable to suggest that, whatever the extent and nature of the responsibility for the many previous failures, the time is ripe

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for a major advance. The broad tendency of modern society, one in which America has played a rather special role, has been egalitarian in the sense of institutionalizing the basic rights of citizenship in all three categories sketched here.[37] This tendency has become institutionalized over an increasingly broad front, the legal development noted above being prototypal. The basic types of inequality which have continued to be tolerated—in this context rather than that of recognition and reward of achievement—have been justified, when at all, primarily in terms of "paternalistic" immunities of a variety of sectoral types, the status of the child in the family being a kind of model. In case after case, these immunities have been whittled away, so that the universalistic norms of the society have applied more and more widely. This has been true of all the main bases of particularistic solidarity, ethnicity, religion, regionalism, state's rights, and class. The "sovereignty" of the individual American state has perhaps been the most important single bulwark of these particularisms, in the first instance those of WASP's, but potentially of every group. The inclusion of the Jewish and Catholic groups as outlined above fits this paradigm.

Today, more than ever before, we are witnessing an acceleration in the emancipation of individuals of all categories from these diffuse particularistic solidarities. This must be seen as a further *differentiation* of the role-set in which the individual is involved. By being included in larger community structures, the individual need not cease to be a member of the smaller ones, but the latter must relinquish certain of the controls over him which they previously exercised. This reasoning applies to aristocratic groups as much as it does to negatively privileged ones like the Negro. We have been witnessing major steps in the extension and consolidation of the societal community.

Let me emphasize again one particularly important aspect of the present phase, that the more general insistence on the basic equalities of citizenship, which is essential to the inclusion process, cuts across the status of Negro. In its deeper layers, it is a demand not for the inclusion of Negroes as such, but for the elimination of *any* category defined as inferior in itself. For a long time the status of the Negro was a peculiarly Southern problem. Then it became a national problem, but *qua* Negro. Now we are entering the phase in which it is no longer that, but the problem of eliminating status-inferiority as such, regardless of race, creed, or color. The Negro, in becoming only a "special case," even if a very salient one, loses a

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ground for special consideration which he has enjoyed. At the same time, he has established a position for tapping much wider bases of support than before. He can become the spokesman for the much broader category of the disadvantaged, those excluded on this egregious ground. The Negro movement, then, can become the American style "socialist" movement. This is to say that the basic demand is for full inclusion, not for domination or for equality on a basis of separateness.[38]

At the risk of repetition, I may note that the successful accomplishment of this goal of inclusion depends on a balanced mobilization of four categories of factors. The first is commitment to the values which underlie the assumption that the goal itself is desirable. This has a long history in American society and is clearly of the greatest importance. I have mentioned that it was invoked by Myrdal. Recently we have seen a notable "effervescence" (in Durkheim's sense) with respect to activation of these value-commitments at the requisite levels. Here the Negro movement has played the paramount part, but the activation has extended far beyond the movement itself. Its incidence in religious circles is especially noteworthy, not least in the way it has brought all faiths of the white community, Catholics and Jews as well as Protestants, together behind the Negro cause. The presence of Catholic nuns among the demonstrators in Selma was a new note having a significance scarcely to be overestimated.

Mere affirmation of the values is not enough. If a process of change is to be a new implementation of fundamental values, its basic direction must be articulated. This involves the development of a conception of the societal community in which all elements will be fully included in the sense of this discussion. In our own cultural background, quite different directions have also enjoyed powerful value-sanctions, even if rather insecurely. One example was the conception of the Negro as inherently inferior—indeed, in a certain version of older Calvinism now dominant in South Africa, as rightfully belonging in a subordinated status. It is the basic values, as applied to the developing conception of the American societal community, which together form the normative focus of the power of the movement.

This factor underlies the trend to implement the values by inclusion—the only tolerable solution to the enormous tensions lies in constituting a single societal community with full membership for all. This is a renewal and reinterpretation of the concept of the

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Union which was so central for Lincoln. No other solution is tolerable from the American point of view—hence the Black Muslims cannot gain active support in the general community. And despite much ambivalence, it seems certain that the main Negro community is committed to this outlook. The continuing mobilization of these loyalties and commitments on both sides of the racial line seems to be the second crucial factor in the general inclusion process.

It has been very common to postulate and emphasize a primary difference between the "idealists" who hope to achieve integration by asserting the values of, and a willingness for, acceptance, and the "realists" who say that *only* the mobilization of political power and economic interests will help. I should strongly repudiate this framing of alternatives. It is quite correct that the goal cannot be achieved *without* the mobilization of power and economic interests, but it does not follow that these factors are themselves sufficient. It is only a balanced combination of "ideal" and "real" factors which provides the formula for success.

In speaking of political power, I should like to conceive it here more broadly than is usual. Essential as government is, it does not stand alone in implementing major political changes. The political problems of integration involve all fields of organizational decision-making, especially for business firms to accept Negroes in employment, for colleges and universities to admit them for study, for trade unions to avoid discrimination. We have become acutely aware of the limitations of political power. Against a recalcitrant group, attempts to *enforce* compliance are all-too-often ineffective. Nevertheless, at certain crucial points its mobilization is clearly an essential factor, a factor which includes making decisions affecting inclusion processes *binding* as obligations on all members of the requisite collectivity, whether governmental or private. It is particularly important to remember that the use of power has a double effect. First, it mobilizes sanctions against recalcitrants in such ways that they may no longer be able to afford previously feasible resistance. Second, it asserts on behalf of the relevant collectivity that the policy of inclusion must be taken seriously, and hence that noncompliance will not be allowed to proceed with impunity.

Of all the factors favoring integration, economic interests are the most neutral as far as normative obligations are concerned. They involve both the extent to which receiving elements can "afford" the risks involved in taking various steps and the development of

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realistic capacities to do so—a theme discussed above in connection with the whole complex of inferiority of status. Perhaps most important is that without support from the other three sets of factors, economic interests and capacity to exploit economic opportunities are weak reeds. This has been made vividly clear where state governments in the deep South, backed by what seems to have been a white consensus, have adamantly opposed steps toward integration. In such cases business men simply would not move. But where the balance of the other factors shifts toward integration, economic interests on both sides can provide a powerful reinforcement of the change. It is a question of "getting over the hump."[39]

A Note on Resistance to Inclusion

In American social thinking it is regarded almost as simple common sense to emphasize primarily, when speaking of the resistance to such developments as the Negro movement for inclusion, the material vested interests of the opponents, for example, the fear of loss of real-estate values or the view that "our customers would not like dealing with a Negro receptionist," so we would lose business. Such examples themselves suggest that another set of factors is involved. The structure of vested interests is a function of the structure of values and norms underlying the relevant social interaction. We are in the midst of a process of social change in which these components, and not only the interests, are changing.

Resistance has been strongest in the white South. This is because the structure of Southern society has been more "archaic" than that of the rest of the country. It has, however, been changing very rapidly and has tended more or less to polarize around its more advanced urban, industrial, and partly intellectual sectors, on the one hand, and its more traditional rural and small town sectors, on the other. This very broad polarization is by no means peculiar to the South, but is nationwide. Thus states' rights, the resistance to reapportionment on population bases, and many other issues mark a "conservative" reaction against many of the processes of change in the society at large.

Political developments in recent years bring this situation into sharp relief. The one-party system of the South has been breaking up rapidly, creating an opportunity for the Republican party to gain a major foothold in the South. This in turn relates to the tendency of a major—and the more activist—wing of Northern Repub-

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licanism to sympathize with the whole constellation of orientation of which the Southern resistance to desegregation has been a part. Hence that part associated with, or sympathizing with, the more radical Right has been particularly attracted by what has come to be known as the "Southern strategy," which was adopted by Goldwater and his advisers in the 1964 campaign.

Nothing could bring out more sharply the impact of changes in social structure in the last generation or so. The old isolation of South and North has largely broken down. The older Republican party was largely a sectional party, which on the whole opposed the New Deal, especially institutionalization of the social component of citizenship. Now, for the reasons sketched above and others, the Negro has come to the forefront all along the line of the process of social change feared by the "conservative" elements, North and South. Indeed it may be suggested that the affinity between the Goldwaterites and the segregationist Southerners was so strong that they became almost compulsive in their urge to unite. One may suspect that shrewd political calculation played a much smaller part than did this sense of affinity. Yet the outcome of the election makes crystal-clear how impossible it is for a national party which wishes to win nationwide elections to include endorsement of the segregation system in its major policies.

An important underlying aspect of this affinity is the great prominence of Protestant Fundamentalism on both sides of the political alignment. There is strong evidence that such religious orientations are particularly marked among the radical Right, especially in its principal stronghold of the Southwest. Certainly this is true also of the South.

The alignment of the resistance to Negro inclusion, directly or through resistance to various measures essential to its success (such as federal support of education and the war against poverty), with a *generalized* political conservatism is a highly important development. Its obverse is the alignment of the society's more progressive political forces in support of the inclusion process, again both directly and by promoting policies which will provide or strengthen its major factors. Moreover, the more serious of the resistances seem to be located politically rather far on the right, so that it is unlikely that in the near future the opponents of inclusion of the Negro can reach far enough into the political center to mobilize very large political blocks at the national level. Many resistance groups will retain power at the more local levels, but the general trend of

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weakening parochial particularisms seems to be working in a favorable direction. The strengthening of federal power as such is only one aspect of a much more comprehensive process.

Finally a further word should be said about the symbolization of the resistance to inclusion. I have stressed the theme of inferiority as the most central in defining the symbolic status of the Negro. If this is as important as has often been held, it follows that the main focus of anxiety involving resistance lies in the fear that the quality of the societal community will deteriorate if inferior members are admitted. Here the resemblance to fears of "debasing the currency" through irresponsible monetary management and banking is striking. Sometimes in our economic history such fears have proved justified, but over the long range the extension of credit systems and the like have contributed enormously to the productivity of the economy. The "sound money" people have on the whole fought a rear-guard action against such extensions, one which would have contributed greatly to economic retardation had it prevailed.

The process under discussion here is that of a major extension of full membership in the societal community. If it is done imprudently—as, it might be said, was the completely free immigration before World War I—it may have effects analogous to inflation. But the fears of it are just as irrational as the fears of economic modernization have been, and they can be analyzed in closely parallel terms. The most important single condition of avoiding inflationary "debasement" is the general upgrading not only of the Negro but of all elements in the population falling below the minimum acceptable standards of full citizenship.

The Negro Movement and the Problem of Negro Identity

A particularly conspicuous feature of the recent phase in the changing status of the Negro has been the emergence of a strong movement which has had very extensive and important white support, but which has struck much deeper roots in the Negro community itself than have previous phases. The emergence of the movement is a function of several factors such as the general social changes outlined above, the stimulus of the emergence of African states, the strengthening of the Negro middle classes, with their higher levels of education, and the concentration of Negro masses in the cities, primarily in the North. This essay cannot attempt a more detailed analysis of these developments. I should like rather

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to state a few of their implications, especially regarding the opportunities they present.

It has been remarked in several papers that the Negro group has generally had less solidarity and weaker organization than the other ethnic groups which have preceded it in gaining inclusion. The growth of the present movement seems to be both a symptom and a cause of a notable strengthening in this solidarity, which is beginning to create a more clearly defined group consciousness and sense of power and opportunity. It presents a new opportunity to shift the definition of Negro status away from its predominantly negative meaning as an oppressed group which is typically excluded and exposed to multifarious disadvantages. The problem is to develop a basis for a more positive conception of group identity in both American and world society. I should like to suggest that there is a most unusual opportunity inherent in the nature of the movement and its situation, the importance of which, however, is not yet widely appreciated.

One major point of reference is that the primary source of Negro grievance, exclusion on the basis of alleged *inherent* inferiority, is the most radical grievance entertained by any major non-WASP group, except possibly the American Indian's grievance of dispossession. It raises a clearer, more drastic *moral* issue than the other cases, one compounded by the status of the Negro's ancestors as slaves in America and by the injustice of using the "trival" symbol of color as a primary basis of exclusion. Given the universalistic and egalitarian elements in our national traditions, both religious and constitutional, it is difficult to find an issue which is morally more straight-forward.

It has been possible to keep the issue relatively insulated for a long time, but recent social changes as well as the movement itself have made this progressively more problematic. Now, in a period of rising economic affluence, and, it may be said, moral ambivalence both about this and about the confusions over the American position in world affairs, the nation has been presented with a notable opportunity to define a clear and *simple* issue of conscience. By and large, the reverberation of the issue in many different groups has been extensive and impressive, in spite of the tenacious resistance just reviewed. Perhaps the issue also becomes more urgent precisely because of the progress made in resolving the other issues of inclusion which we have discussed, since this leaves the Negro even more conspicuously excluded.

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It seems particularly significant that white involvement has come so definitely from two sources, the churches, especially the clergy, and the students.[40] Categorizing my examples of non-Negro inclusion problems into Jews and Catholics, rather than the corresponding ethnic categories, was the result of deliberate theoretical choice, not simple convenience. I have long been convinced that the religious background of these problems has been—and remains—fundamental and that both the difficulties of inclusion and the opportunities for its success have been intimately involved with religion. One may say that, for the inclusion of the new immigrants, the problem centered in those elements of the relatively "liberal" Protestant community which were, in one way or another, involved in the tenuous WASP claim to aristocratic status.

I have noted that the processes of social change in the present century have tended increasingly to polarize the society along an axis which includes not only political conservatism in resistance to change but, closely related to this, what we call religious "fundamentalism." In the South the connection between militant segregationism and fundamentalism has been very clear,[41] and I have suggested that a broader connection was certainly evident in the Goldwater campaign.

Generally speaking, there are also important connections between lower-class status in industrial societies, social origins in more "primitive" or "underdeveloped" social settings, particularly of a peasant type, a certain general conservatism (or, as Lipset says, "authoritarianism"), and religious fundamentalism. Indeed, one may say that the predominant kind of Catholicism among the new immigrant urban masses was a form of fundamentalism and that the liberalization of American Catholicism in the last generation is partly a function of the upward mobility and inclusion of these masses. To a degree, the Orthodoxy of so many East European Jewish immigrants was also a form of fundamentalism.

The majority of Negro Americans have been and are, religiously speaking, fundamentalists. But, this fact does not have simple consequences. Undoubtedly, in their segregated and insulated status in the rural South, it helped to motivate acceptance of their lot, as the corresponding features of Catholic and Jewish fundamentalism have done in both the peasant or ghetto circumstances of the "old countries" and in the difficult early stages of involvement in American society as first- and second-generation immigrants.

At the same time, there is the deep-seated Judeo-Christian tra-

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